History Studies



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Cover design by Jennifer McCaffrey and Nora McGillicuddy, Limerick School of Art and Design, Limerick Institute of Technology. The cover incorporates the concepts of past, present and future, which is depicted, firstly by the use if the Buddhist symbol Aum. The idea is secondly represented by the illustrative heads looking in different directions. They symbolise the search for history by past, present and future historians.

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Foreword

As on previous occasions, it gives me great pleasure to write the Foreword to this volume of History Studies, now in its seventeenth year. History Studies is a unique achievement of UL's Student History Society; it also reflects the talent of the island of Ireland's (and beyond) talent among its emerging scholars. Each volume goes through a rigorous peer review and the result is a showcase of the very best of history writing in our universities today. This year sees a return to diversity in the range of topics (last year was themed to coincide with the 1916 Rising).

The eight contributions by undergraduates and graduates take us from eighteenth-century Ireland to late twentieth-century Peru, with stops in Belfast, the American Deep South, the former West Germany, and twentieth-century Ireland. There is something in the present volume for every interested reader. The volume opens with a wonderful essay by Lesley Donaldson from Queen's University Belfast (and the only female among the contributors to this volume) on the attempt to initiate a slum clearance of the oldest central streets of Belfast in the mid-nineteenth century. It incorporates the very best of original archive research with reference to the wider literature that easily locates the case study within a transnational context of mid-nineteenth century urban 'improvement'. The movement for improvements to the built environment in the nineteenth century was also linked to improving the physical and moral well-being of residents. By the twentieth century, this drive to 'improve' had already led to a desire to 'control' or regulate habits, especially the leisure habits of the urban population. However, here it was less the municipal authorities but central government and above all, the Catholic Church in Ireland that strove to curb habits of the population, as James Keenan shows in his essay. Keenan takes the Carrigan Report (1931) as his starting point to discuss perceived moral and social turpitude within sections of Irish society, and he does this by focusing on the perceived evils of Jazz. This genre of music and its associated dance patterns burst onto society after the First World War with the American presence in Europe. It did not have to be the erotic syncopated movements of Janet Baker's notorious 'banana dance' popular in Paris, nor the drug-infused gyrations of Anita Berger in Berlin to

rouse the ire of social conservatives and the moral 'police'. It was enough that young people of both sexes congregated in close propinquity dance halls, sometimes touching, to set alarm bells ringing warning of racial degradation and moral depredation. Keenan points out that this was a common concern throughout Europe and the British Isles and Ireland in this period, but he also shows how the interventionist role of the Church Hierarchy in this 'moral crusade' was distinctive to Ireland.

At the opposite end of the spectrum were the attempts to honour those Irishmen (and later women) that fell in the service of empire. Kevin Russell looks at a particular episode in the mid-nineteenth century with the petition to erect a memorial stone in Tralee, Co. Kerry to the memory of those men who fell in the Crimean War. Similar to Donaldson, Russell, making excellent use of the regional press, casts a light onto the intricacies of local stakes. The essay shows clearly the importance of the relationship between Ireland and its people and the British Empire, here epitomized by Major-General John Day Stokes, one of the 17 per cent of officers in the British army at that time who were Irish (let us not forget the Duke of Wellington!). This is an aspect of the relationship between Britain and Ireland that some elements within an extreme narrow nationalist historiography tends to elide. Russell shows clearly also, the difficulties to get the memorial off the ground, responses were sometimes tepid, and could be hostile. From this essay, the importance of individual agency comes into stark relief (in the form of Stokes' successor as torchbearer, Captain Thomas Stuart). However, if the Irish gentry were to be found among the officer class, the same cannot be said of the farmers, artisans and small merchant traders and publicans earlier in the century who formed the backbone of the Ribbonmen, vividly portrayed here by John Harrington. In his essay, Harrington charts the origins and the legacy of the Ribbonmen. This piece offers – rather like Russell's contribution, an exercise in historical 'thick description' (Clifford Geertz). The characters and the scenes that Harrington presents are rich and colourful. He too, like his fellow contributors seeks to restore a missing piece of the mosaic that makes up the history of Irish nationalism. Readers will draw their own conclusion as to the success or otherwise of this endeavor. It is a good read nonetheless.

The final four essays in the volume take us outside Ireland to West Germany, Peru and the Deep South. In his sweeping essay, Matthew Jackson informs the reader about the sometime acrimonious debates among West German historians in the mid-1980s when an attempt was made by conservative and right-wing historians to 'normalise' National Socialism at a time when West Germans were seeking to restore a sense of national identity liberated from the crimes of the Third Reich. Jackson handles his material well and skillfully finds his way through the arguments. Almost contemporaneous with the historical battles raging in Germany, were the real battles in the Latin American sub-continent. Darren McMahon's contribution on the guerilla movement of Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru straddles the border between contemporary history and recent politics. McMahon focuses on its charismatic leader Abimael Guzman and his interpretation of the Marxism to fit Peruvian conditions. Mao Zedong and the Yenan Way would also have been relevant to Guzman's strategy of The People's War. Nevertheless, in a continent well used to violence, the violence of the Sendero proved too much and eventually alienated the peasant population from the movement. At this point, as McMahon argues, the Sendero lost its identity.

Ultimately, what many of these essays have in common is their focus on either power, soft (reform) or overt (violence). The two essays dealing with very different aspects of the American Deep South also have something to say about power and its exercise. Hugh Maguire, a final year student at Queen's University Belfast, exposes this through the lens of James Henry Hammond, a mid-nineteenth century advocate of slavery. Maguire skillfully takes a scalpel to the discourses that sought to justify human bondage, and peels back each layer of skin to reveal the emptiness of the arguments, thus laying bare the nakedness of racialised power. This is a brief but rewarding read. Finally, the last essay is that by Matthew Thompson, also a graduate of Queen's, on 'Industrialising Dixie'. Thompson offers a robust re-interpretation of the transformation of the Deep South, utilisng recent conceptual advances in the analysis of the American Deep South's development that liberates it from Union hegemony. In some ways, this is the American equivalent of the 'Historians Debate' discussed by Jackson. Nevertheless, the difference here is that the players involved are also talking about relations of power during the post-Bellum

period, whether between the victorious North and a defeated South, or between ‘(white) masters and (black) men and (white-owned machines) and (black) workers.

There is much to be gained from reading the contributions to this volume. The editors are to be congratulated on bringing together a first class collection of essays that should have lasting appeal.

Professor Anthony McElligott, FRHistS, MRIA

Acknowledgements

The editors would like to thank Professor Anthony McElligott, Head, Department of History University of Limerick, for his generous sponsorship of and support for this volume of the journal and for his continued support of *History Studies.* We are also extremely grateful for the ongoing and generous financial support of Professor Eoin Devereux, Assistant Dean of Research, and that of Postgraduate Students Union. We would also like to take this opportunity to issue a special recognition to President Don Barry, at this the end of his term, for the support shown to *History Studies* during his tenure. The editors also extend their gratitude to the Dean of the College of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences Professor Tom Lodge for his continued support of this journal. We also extend our gratitude to Gerald Maher, last year's editor, for his patient guidance to enable the completion of this year's volume. To Dr David Fleming, we offer our thanks for his guidance and representations on our behalf. To Dr Ruán O'Donnell we offer our appreciation for all his encouragement and direction. Finally a sincere thanks to our eight contributors, without their hard work none of this would be possible.

Editorial

As this compendium can testify to, the results of historical research can be wide-ranging and esoteric. Derived from a myriad of eras and locations the eight articles herein give an insight in to matters as diverse as the ideology and activities of twentieth century Peruvian communist guerrillas and the deeds of an Irish oath bound secret society that defended the rights of peasant farmers in the nineteenth century. The apologies offered for the justification of and the maintenance of the slave trade in the Antebellum American South is chronicled. As well as the efforts employed to industrialise and modernise the same American South in the early twentieth century. The moral outrage caused by Jazz and dance halls in inter-war Ireland is explored as are the efforts to drive programmes of urban improvement in nineteenth century Belfast. The story behind the commemoration of the Crimean War in stone monuments in Tralee County Kerry take us in to the realm of Public History and the use of space and stone in remembrance. We explore the heated and often poignant debate among academic Historians about the forging of a national identity for post war Germany. All of the articles will cause debate, and it may be argued that some of the topics should not be discussed at all. This illustrates just how important History and historical research are in helping to bring to light and interpret events of the recent and distant past no matter how unpalatable they may appear. All the articles contained in this volume are the result of high quality research and are a testament to the exemplary work being conducted in Universities across the entire island of Ireland. Once again, *History Studies* has set out to gather as diverse a selection of articles as possible and present them to our discerning readership to continue the debates of the issues raised.

The editors,
Robert Collins and John Harrington

The Belfast Improvement Company, 1864-1867: an example of a private, planned improvement scheme.

Lesley E. E. Donaldson

'It would not be easy to find in any city in the Three Kingdoms a locality in every feature more repulsive'.[1] These words formed part of an article on the topic of urban improvement in the *Belfast News-Letter* on 14 November 1864 and referred to the Hercules Place, Hercules Street and John Street area of Belfast; these streets were amongst the original streets of Belfast with Hercules Street shown on a map of 1660.[2] The article appeared two days before the newly formed Belfast Improvement Company presented a draft plan for improving one of Belfast's oldest areas to the Town Improvement Committee of Belfast Town Council. This article will look briefly at Urban Improvement in Britain and secondly at the Belfast Improvement Company and its planned improvement.

Urban history has not been a major feature of Irish history with the tendency being to concentrate on the political and religious aspects of history and, until recent years, Belfast was no exception to this generalization.[3] Nineteenth-century urban history in Britain and farther afield has received much attention over the years, from the basic town history to the more recent assessments particularly of the Victorian age.[4] How the inhabitants experienced and imagined the changing world that they were living in, and their response to such events, have been the subjects of much study in recent years but the focus has usually been on Britain, the rise of the middle

[1] *Belfast News-Letter*, 14 Nov. 1864 (hereafter *BNL*).
[2] Jonathan Bardon, *An illustrated history of Belfast* (Belfast, 1983), p. 19.
[3] Olwen Purdue, 'Introduction' in Olwen Purdue (ed.) *Belfast: the emerging city, 1850-1914* (Dublin, 2013), pp xvi-xvii; Diarmaid Ferriter, *The transformation of Ireland 1900-2000* (London, 2004), pp 1-2, 749.
[4] Simon Gunn, *The public culture of the Victorian middle class. Ritual and authority and the English industrial city, 1840-1914* (Manchester, 2007); Tristram Hunt, *Building Jerusalem, the rise and fall of the Victorian city* (London, 2005); David Griffiths, 'Building an alliance for urban improvement: Huddersfield 1844-1848' in *Local Historian*, xxxix, 3 (2009), pp 192-206; Louise Miskell 'From conflict to co-operation: urban improvement and the case for Dundee, 1790-1850' in *Urban History*, xxix 3 (2002), pp 350-71; Michael Adcock, 'Remaking urban space: Baron Haussmann and the rebuilding of Paris 1851-1870' in *University of Melbourne Library Journal* ii 2 (1996), pp 25-35.

class, suburbanisation and the idea of respectability.[5] One result of the changing social values of the middle class was their 'discovery' of the problems arising from the rapid population growth of the Victorian towns and the associated overcrowding, lack of sanitation and pollution. Many of these overcrowded areas were in very close proximity to the towns' main thoroughfares, and they had a reputation for being dangerous and potential sources of corruption.[6] The existing town infrastructure was unable to adapt to the changes linked to this rapid growth in population, commerce and industry. The only method that the municipal authorities had available to them to deal with these problems was the obtaining of Improvement Acts; these were private acts relating to one city or town and permitted the authorities to borrow money against the rates to fund a specific plan of improvement.[7] The growing awareness of these social problems and the desire to create modern town centres led to the transformation of these central areas; the old congested streets, courts and alleys were cleared away and replaced with modern buildings, wide streets and open spaces. Changes were often justified on the grounds of the need to cleanse 'the city of elements considered impure, contagious or dangerous.'[8]

Although so much has been written about 'Improvement' there appears to be little on the topic in Irish or Belfast histories.[9] The Belfast Town Council was very active in the field of improvement and sponsored Improvement Acts in 1845, 1846 and 1847 and Maguire argued that they were more active than many of their counterparts in England in that respect.[10] However, between 1847 and 1878 the

[5] Gunn, *Public culture*, pp 36-43; David Cannadine, 'Victorian cities: how different' in R.J. Morris and Richard Rodger (eds) *The Victorian city. A reader in British and urban history, 1820-1914* (Harlow, 1993), pp 122-6.
[6] Simon Gunn, 'Class, identity and the urban: the middle class in England, c. 1790-1950 in *Urban History*, xxxi 1 (2004), p. 37; Gunn, *Public culture*, pp 43-8; Asa Briggs, *Victorian cities* (Harmondsworth, 1968), pp 14, 114, 144.
[7] Hunt, *Jerusalem*, pp 292-4; R. J. Morris, 'Urban Ulster since 1600' in Liam Kennedy and Philip Ollerenshaw (eds) *Ulster since 1600: politics, economy, and society'* (Oxford, 2013), pp 132-3.
[8] Gunn, *Public culture*, pp. 43-8.
[9] S. J. Connolly, 'Belfast: the rise and fall of civic culture' in Purdue, *Belfast*, pp 30-41; Bardon, *Belfast*, pp 94-5, W. A. Maguire, *Belfast: A history* (Lancaster, 2009), pp 93-4; Ian Budge and Cornelius O'Leary, *Belfast approach to crisis: a study of Belfast politics, 1613-1970* (London, 1973), pp 41-72.
[10] Maguire, *Belfast*, pp 93.

Council did not promote any further major improvement schemes.[11] It was against this background of stalled 'improvement', that a group of Belfast businesspersons founded the Belfast Improvement Company (BIC) in 1864, their plan being to 'clear away' part of the old centre of Belfast and replace it with modern streets and buildings.

The area that the BIC planned to redevelop was in the centre of Belfast and included some of the oldest streets in Belfast namely Hercules Place, Hercules Street and John Street, and their adjoining courts, alleys and some narrow side streets. Over the years, this area had become very congested and over-crowded especially in the areas behind main streets.[12] This appears to have been a busy commercial area with dealers of all sorts, small manufacturers, provision merchants and grocers, lodging houses and eating houses, and spirit dealers; it was thought to be unsanitary because about fifty percent of Belfast's butchers (and their related trades) were located there in 1860.[13] This pattern of old congested areas in the centre of growing towns was not unique to Belfast and examples of such problems could be found in many towns and cities in England, Scotland and abroad and in all cases they became areas which would attract the attention of either private or official 'Improvers'.[14]

Four prominent businesspersons, Charles Charters, Isaac Murphy and Finlay McCance who were linen merchants and manufacturers, and William Dunville a wine and spirit merchant, founded the BIC.[15] These men appeared before a special meeting of the Town Improvement Committee (TIC) (a sub-committee of the Belfast

[11] Connolly, 'Civic culture', p. 41; S. A. Royle, *Irish historic towns atlas, No. 17. Belfast Part II, 1840 to 1900* (Dublin 2007), p. 1; Maguire, *Belfast*, pp 144-5.
[12] O'Hanlon, Rev.W. M., *Walks among the poor of Belfast and suggestions for their improvement* (Belfast, 1853), pp. 19-21; A. G. Malcolm, *The Sanitary State of Belfast with Suggestions for its Improvement* (Belfast Social Inquiry Society published by Henry Greer for the Society, a pamphlet, 1852), pp 19, 26; C. D. Purdon, *The Sanitary state of the Belfast factory districts during 10 years (1864-1873 inclusive) under various aspects* (Belfast, 1877), p. 21.
[13] L. E. E. Donaldson, 'Hercules Street to Royal Avenue: a microstudy of Belfast 1860-1888' (B.A. dissertation, Queen's University Belfast, 2005, [unpublished]), pp 15-20.
[14] A few examples include: Adcock, 'Haussmann', pp 25-35; K. Grady, 'The cattle and meat trades in Leeds, 1780-1900' in *Northern History*, xxvii Dec., (2000), pp 137-8; Catherine Smith, 'Urban improvement in the Nottinghamshire market town, 1770-1840' in *Midland History*, xxv (2000), pp 108-10; Hunt, *Jerusalem*, pp 343-6.
[15] *Belfast and Ulster Street Directory 1863* (Belfast 1863), pp 68, 74, 287, 313, 328.

Town Council) on 16 November 1864 and informed the Committee that they, with other businesspersons, were forming a company:

> for the purpose of laying out a new street leading from Donegall Place to York Street, and the purchase of the adjacent property, also a street leading from the proposed street to Smithfield.[16]

The promoters of the scheme were hoping to raise £150,000 from private investors, and the Town Council was asked for a subvention of £15,000.[17] The promoters believed that 'if the Corporation agree to join their application to Parliament' it would encourage private investors.[18] The TIC agreed to the Company's request to put the matter to the whole Council with some reservations, namely the lack of detail and worries about the 'closing up' of some streets, they also wished to get a full report from the Surveyor.[19]

At a Special Meeting of the Town Council on the 17 November 1864, the TIC's report was presented.[20] Whilst the plan received overall approval from the Council, concern was expressed at the lack of detail about the proposed company and the prematurity of the plans. Dr Browne felt that to protect both the Council, and himself, from future liabilities the motion should be passed with an amendment in which the Council would 'decline all responsibility as joint promoters of the proposed Bill'. He was also concerned about the long delay in measures needed for sanitary reform.[21] Mr Boag remarked that similar projects in Glasgow had been failures though they had been successful in other places when undertaken by private companies or individuals and not by the Corporation.[22] Mr Boag also expressed

[16] Minutes of Town Improvement Committee (TIC), 16 Nov. 1864 (P.R.O.N.I., LA/7/20/AA/2).
[17] Parliamentary Archives, HL/PO/PB/5/31/13 [House of Lords] Opposed Private Bill Committee evidence, 1865, volume 13, [includes Belfast New Streets bill].
[18] TIC, 16 Nov. 1864 (P.R.O.N.I., LA/7/20/AA/2).
[19] Ibid.
[20] Belfast Council Minutes (P.R.O.N.I., LA/7/2/EA/7), pp 213-4. It is possible that Dr Browne was worried following the out-come of a Chancery Suit in the early 1850s which resulted in many Councillors being surcharged; for further reading see Maguire, *Belfast*; Bardon, *Belfast*.
[21] *BNL*, 18 Nov. 1864.
[22] Briggs, *Victorian Cities*' p. 158. Briggs is referring to events in Leeds in 1850 when a private company could not raise the necessary funds to build a New Town Hall.

concern at the number of other matters concerning the Town Council at this time;[23] he finished his remarks by saying that if the Council erected slaughterhouses it would 'improve Hercules Street both in a moral and sanitary sense.'[24] The Council did approve the 'appropriation of £15,000 towards the cost of the proposed work … reserving the consideration of details until the plans were completed.'[25]

The main reason given for the construction of this new street was to provide a direct link between Belfast's two major rail terminals, one at York Street and the other in Great Victoria Street and at no cost to the Council until the work was completed and the street was handed over to them. There was also a general approbation for the scheme, as it would remodel that part of the town and sweep away the 'worst districts which now disgrace it'.[26] Although the plans were generally well received, there were concerns at the amount of money involved, and the Council's role as they already had many different projects under consideration.[27] It was further suggested at a Council meeting on 20 December 1864 that there might be opposition from shopkeepers in the High Street, Bridge Street, Victoria Street and other streets in the vicinity due to the potential loss of trade following the re-modelling of part of the town.[28] There was relatively little detail in the newspapers about the Company's plans however full details and the ambitious nature of BIC's plans in spatial and financial terms were revealed on perusing the Parliamentary papers relating to the Bill, the papers also included further arguments against the plans.

[23] *BNL*, 18 Nov. 1864; *Northern Whig* (hereafter *NW*), 18 Nov. 1864; these included the provision of a new burying ground, a Water Bill, a bill to separate Belfast from Co Antrim, the structure of the Belfast Police Force.
[24] *NW*, 18 Nov. 1864; *BNL*, 18 Nov. 1864.
[25] Ibid.
[26] *NW*, 18 Nov. 1864, 19 Nov. 1864*; BNL*, 17 Oct. 1864, 14 Nov. 1864, 18 Nov. 1864.
[27] *BNL*, 18 Nov. 1864; *NW*, 18 Nov. 1864. These included the provision of a new burying ground, a Water Bill, a bill to separate Belfast from Co Antrim, the structure of the Belfast Police Force.
[28] *BNL*, 20 Dec. 1864.



Fig 1. 1866 Plan for Proposed New Streets.[29]

The central element of the proposed scheme involved the creation of two new streets, New Street (1) connecting Donegall Place to York Street and New Street (2) which would connect New Street (1) to the northeast corner of Smithfield. There would also be a short connecting street between John Street at its junction with Mustard Street and the New Street (1).[30] The planned scheme covered a wide arc from mid-way along Castle Place, west up Bank Lane, along both sides of Hercules Place and Hercules Street reaching to Smithfield on the west and, passing south of John Street, as far as the lower end of Upper Donegall Street. On the east side of Hercules Place and Hercules Street the area to be cleared ran along the boundary the wall of the 1st Presbyterian Church in Rosemary Street, then through the north end of North Street and Donegall Street. The new streets would require about three acres of land for their construction but the proposed plan involved the purchase and clearance of eighteen acres – this would leave fifteen acres for the company's own use.[31] This

[29] Parliamentary Archives, HL/PC/PB/3/plan 1865/B6/Sheet 2.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Parliamentary Archives, HL/PO/PB/5/31/13.

was a very ambitious plan for the redevelopment of the north end of the town centre with part of the original centre of Belfast being cleared away.[32]

Although improved transport links were given as the main reason for this scheme a number of secondary reasons were also put forward. Firstly, sanitary conditions, including health and moral worries were a concern. Dr Browne, the Council's medical officer of health, had drawn the Council's attention to the conditions prevailing in the courts and alley off Hercules Street as early as 1854.[33] The Rev William O'Hanlon, in his Letters entitled *Walks among the Poor*, was very critical of these areas with regard to over-crowding, lack of sanitation and the easy availability of alcohol.[34] The Rev Hugh Hanna (minister of Berry Street Presbyterian church in the area) also drew attention to the deplorable condition of housing, sanitation and morality in the courts and alleys just behind Belfast's main streets.[35] Both O'Hanlon and Hanna remarked on the overcrowding of the areas, it appeared from the Surveyors' notebooks that many of the houses in the area were in multiple-occupation, and some were in poor condition.[36] Concern was also expressed at the presence of slaughterhouses practically in the heart of the town and close to the principal streets of the town it was felt that this would be unlikely to happen in England.[37] The problem of slaughterhouses in the old centre of a town was not unique to Belfast and a similar situation was found in Leeds where the Improvement Commissioners were also planning to clear away such areas due to congestion and 'unpleasantness'.[38] Finally there was a great need for building land in the centre of Belfast for banks and commercial premises as the town had 'wonderfully grown' in recent years, and the area of the new street was the only suitable locality for such

[32] Bardon, *Belfast*, p. 19; map of Belfast in 1660 shows these streets.
[33] *BNL*, 3 Mar. 1854, Dr Brown's report on 'Marine Stores – The Slaughterhouses of the Borough – The burying Grounds'.
[34] O'Hanlon, *Walks among the poor.*
[35] Parliamentary Archives, HL/PO/PB/5/31/13, Rev Hugh Hanna's evidence.
[36] *Surveyor's notebook for Smithfield-1* [1860], (P.R.O.N.I., VAL/2/B/7/5A).
[37] *BNL*, 17 Oct. 1864.
[38] Grady, 'Leeds', pp 137-9.

development.[39] Similar developments were also taking place in England at the same time.[40]

The clearance of such a large, densely populated area raised concerns about housing 'for mechanics, for labourers and other poor persons.' The Company would have no compulsory powers to re-house the displaced but Mr John James Montgomery, Surveyor in the Town Council, told the Committee that as houses were being built at a rate of about 1,500 per annum at that time there should not be a problem for the displaced inhabitants finding suitable housing.[41] Not all who appeared in front of the Committee were as enthusiastic about the proposed redevelopment as the above witnesses. There were objectors who were concerned with loss of amenity and property if the area was cleared. The Catholic Institute objected, as they owned property bounded by Bank Lane, and Hercules Place, which they had bought two or three years previously, they planned to build a Literary Institute if the Bill did not pass, and they wanted to be left alone and not have their frontage taken away.[42]

Messrs. Samuel Ferguson and Joseph Gilles Biggar, who owned much of the property, which would be 'taken' in the event of the Bill being passed, objected strongly to the proposal. When it was pointed out that they had not objected at the House of Commons' hearing, Mr Ferguson said that his attention 'had not been called to it', also 'there was talk in the town that the Bill would not be proceeded with'.[43] In their evidence they stated that their property, which was about thirty-one years old, was in good condition.[44] This was in stark contrast to the comments of Rev Hugh Hanna who described appalling conditions, as regards over-crowding and sanitation, in some of the houses, which would have been owned by these two men. Rev Hugh Hanna had also stated that many of the houses in the area were not

[39] Parliamentary Archives, HL/PO/PB/5/31/13, Mr Wilkinson, Town Councillor, and Counsel for the promoters of the Bill.
[40] Gunn, *Public culture,* pp 40-3.
[41] Parliamentary Archives, HL/PO/PB/5/31/13, Mr Granville Somerset.
[42] Ibid., Granville Somerset for the Catholic Institute.
[43] Ibid., Samuel Ferguson's evidence (author's underlining).
[44] Ibid., J. G. Biggar's evidence.

perpendicular and were being 'propped up'.[45] Brett, in *Georgian Belfast, 1750-1850. Maps, buildings and trades,* provided an explanation of Hanna's remark in relation to houses being 'propped up'. Brett cites the work of Humphreys, a 'proto-type quantity-surveyor', who wrote in 1813 that for many years after buildings of any type were constructed in Belfast they were 'propped up by large beams at every angle, until the lime and brick gets sufficient time to cement.'[46] Humphreys believed that cost cutting on the part of the employer, and not 'deficiency' on part of the workers was the reason for this practice. [47]

Mr Ferguson denied Hanna's claims and stated that the houses were 'in very good condition and they have yards … let in tenements';[48] Mr Ferguson also stated that the total rents collected were £750 or thereabouts per annum. Mr Ferguson finished his evidence to the Committee by saying that he thought that, if the Bill was promoted at all, it should be under the control of the Corporation, also if the scheme failed, it would be easier to get redress from the Council rather than a bankrupt company.[49] Mr Biggar, a provision Merchant who was Mr Ferguson's partner and acted as rent collector, stated that the Gross rental of the property was £935. He believed that as many of their tenants worked in nearby Smithfield market it would be inconvenient for them to have to move and he told the Committee that all the residents he had spoken to were opposed to the change.[50] Mr William Hastings, the Surveyor for Messrs. Ferguson and Biggar stated that the houses in Torren's Market and Torren's Row (between Hercules Street and Smithfield) were 'a very good class of house' and he disagreed with the evidence of the Rev Hugh Hanna.[51]

[45] Ibid., Rev Hugh Hanna's evidence.
[46] C. E. B. Brett, Raymond Gillespie and W. A. Maguire, *Georgian Belfast, 1750-1850. Maps, buildings and trades.* (Dublin, 2004), pp 9-10. Brett quotes from Thomas Humphreys, *The Irish builders' guide, exhibiting the valuation of buildings throughout Ireland, with reference to the rise and fall of materials and workmen's wages, at all times, even in the most remote towns in Ireland: the whole illustrated with plates; dedicated to Francis Johnston Esq., architects to His Majesty's Honorable [sic] Board of Works; by Thomas Humphreys, measurer* (Dublin, 1813).
[47] Ibid. p. 10.
[48] Ibid., Samuel Ferguson's evidence.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid., J. G. Biggar's evidence.
[51] Ibid., William Hastings' evidence.

Despite the objectors, the Bill was passed and in July 1865, Hansard records An Act 'To Be Judicially Noticed', which authorised 'the opening of certain new Streets in the Borough of Belfast, and to confer certain Powers upon a Company and the Mayor, Aldermen, and Burgesses of the Borough of Belfast ….'[52] Thus, The Belfast New Streets Bill became an Act. The promoters of the Belfast Improvement Company planned to raise additional capital from other investors but by the end of 1866, it appeared not all was well. The Company requested assistance from the Town Council with the Council taking over the Company's powers in relation to the construction of the New Streets.[53] Councillor Black said the he had feared such an outcome some years ago, and that the Council would incur considerable extra expenditure at a time when they already had major expenditure planned.[54] Alderman Lindsay, supporting the Company's request, said that the construction of the New Streets would be a great public benefit and if the work was not done at this time it would have to be done later and would probably cost a great deal more.[55] Concerns were expressed about the damage the uncertainty had had on 'a good many business people'[56] (presumably, those in the areas affected by the planned redevelopment).

In the following three months little progress seemed to be made in raising the funds and on the 23 February 1867 the *Belfast News-Letter* carried an editorial deploring the impending abandonment of the project to 'construct a new street from York Street to Donegall Place', and to sweep away 'an extensive hotbed of disease'.[57] In the article, it was further asserted that only two thirds of the shares in the Company had been taken up and that a small number of investors who saw the potential value of the investment owned these. The *Belfast News-Letter* also condemned the lack of public spirit in the local community and 'the unaccountable apathy that has hitherto prevailed regarding this measure to prove fatal to it.'[58] The *Belfast News-Letter* wished dramatic action to be taken to overcome this apathy and

[52]Hansard, hc, Deb 06 July 1865 180 c 1184, the Act is numbered clxiv; http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/sittings/1865/jul/06 (accessed 30 Aug. 2012).
[53] *BNL*, 29 Nov. 1866.
[54] *BNL*, 18 Nov. 1864.
[55] *BNL*, 29 Nov. 1866.
[56] Ibid.
[57] *BNL*, 23 Feb. 1867.
[58] Ibid.

to encourage the population to invest in the New Streets Company but this does not seem to have happened and the scheme was not carried out.

It was unclear why the Belfast Improvement Company failed to raise the necessary capital despite concentrated efforts at the end of 1865 and again at the beginning of 1867.[59] There may have been a number of potentially interconnected factors: the years between 1862 and 1868 had been a period of rapid growth in Belfast's linen industry, concurrently the shipbuilding industry had begun to grow.[60] The promoters of the BIC were industrialists and it was possible that potential investors had decided to put their funds into industry and the railway developments rather than town centre redevelopment. Additionally, the sums of money the promoters had hoped to obtain from other investors were large; possibly the scheme had been over-ambitious in both financial and practical terms. The American Civil War, which was one of the forces driving the linen industry's dramatic growth in the mid-nineteenth century, had ended in April 1865. Although it would be another ten years before the American cotton industry would recover to threaten linen's dominance, it was possible that this had given rise an element of uncertainty among the linen manufacturers in Belfast.[61] Another influence could have been the financial instability that followed the failure of the Overend & Gurney Bank in 1866.[62] Overend & Gurney was a long established 'banking house' where other banks deposited their surplus cash. In the pursuit of increased returns, Overend & Gurney used this short-term deposit to fund long-term investments such as ships and railways. When the economic conditions changed, these assets were found to be worthless, Overend & Gurney went bankrupt, and this led to panic in the financial markets. Walter Bagehot stated that the way Overend & Gurney was managed was 'so reckless and foolish' that a child could have done it better.[63] The exact reasons for the failure of this particular scheme are unknown but it is possible that it was only

[59] *BNL*, 28 Nov. 1865, 1 Dec. 1865, 6 Dec. 1865, 14 Dec. 1865, 7 Jan. 1867.
[60] Emily Boyle, 'Linenopolis: the rise of the textile industry' in J. C. Beckett *et al*, *Belfast the Making of the City, 1800-1914* (Belfast, 1988), pp 41-55; J.P. Lynch, *An unlikely success story. The Belfast shipbuilding industry 1880-1935* (Belfast, 2001), pp 4-11.
[61] J.P. Lynch, personal communication with author.
[62] A. A. Mahate, 'Contagion effects of three late nineteenth-century British bank failures', in *Business and economic history*, xxiii 1 (Fall), (1994), pp. 102-15; *Ulster Observer*, 29 Dec. 1865.
[63] *The Daily Telegraph*, 19 Sept. 2007.

one of many similar schemes put forward in the years before 1878. This is when the Belfast Improvement Act finally brought the 250-year long history of Hercules Street and the surrounding area to an end with the construction of Royal Avenue.

The Ribbonmen: the template for Irish Catholic Nationalism

John Harrington

> Spies were sent in to their ranks by Dublin Castle…but the secrets of the society; the names of its leaders, its methods of government and of action were far more successfully concealed than those of any other oath bound combination among Irish people. This was due primarily to a wise precaution against keeping books, documents or records that would reveal information if lost or seized. In this respect these peasant conspirators were far more secure in their plans than were the educated organisers and leaders of the Fenian Brotherhood…it can be safely affirmed that the more or less uneducated Ribbonmen have shown themselves to be more skilled in the methods of secret conspiracy than the more cultured class of their countrymen who founded Fenianism to large extent upon the Ribbon Lodges of Ireland.[1]

This is the glowing endorsement that Michael Davitt gave to the Ribbonmen, so called because members usually wore a green ribbon in their coat lapels to make them more easily identifiable to fellow members. Today the Ribbonmen are all but forgotten in the narrative of Irish nationalist history, they are rarely mentioned in the historiography. When they are mentioned it is often to dismiss them as either a sectarian cabal or just another reactionary peasant gang, poorly organised without a clear agenda. The following paper sets out, it must be admitted in very broad strokes to re-examine the origins of Ribbonmen, and how incredibly complex its organisation actually was. It will chronicle how it evolved from the remnants of the old Defender network, how it became the expression of nationalism, republicanism and how it functioned as a mutual aid society and a proto-trade union. This paper will also relate how the Ribbonmen kept the flame of Irish Catholic Nationalism alive after it appeared it had been extinguished following the 1798 Rebellion and carried this flame on the wave of Irish famine emigration to Britain and the United States.

The failed rising of 1798 appeared to signal the end of any revolutionary fervour in Ireland. The British response had been swift and brutal. The poorly armed peasantry were no match for the Yeomanry or the regular army Fencible regiments.

[1] Michael Davitt, *The fall of Feudalism in Ireland*, (London, 1904), pp 41-2.

All this was very little different to any number of minor political and agrarian uprisings and revolts that had occurred previously. While a little more wide spread than usual it was not beyond the capabilities of the British and the Irish Ascendancy to restore order and the status quo in due course. What had made this different was the intervention of the French. A French force well-armed and equipped was only prevented from making a landing in Bantry Bay, West Cork by bad weather. Eventually at the second attempt a French expeditionary force succeeded in making a landing in Mayo. The force was too small, it arrived too late, as the risings in Leinster and Ulster had already been crushed. While having some initial successes the French did not receive anything like the local support needed to take control of Connaught and certainly not the country as a whole. The French and their Irish allies were intercepted by British Regulars in Ballinamuck County Longford as they marched on Dublin. Surrounded and in a hopeless position, the French Commander Humbert surrendered, he and his troops were treated as prisoners of war, and eventually were allowed to return home. Their Irish allies were not so lucky they were treated as traitors and hanged. London and Prime Minister William Pitt in particular realised that the security of mainland Britain needed the political Union of Ireland and Great Britain, a United Kingdom. Through a policy of threat, bribery and promises of Catholic emancipation the Irish Parliament voted itself out of existence in 1800. From January 1 1801, Ireland and Britain were politically and economically linked.

The main losers in the upheaval had been the Roman Catholics; they had made up the bulk of the Rebel forces in Leinster and Connaught and it was these who felt the blunt of the repression following the Rising. While the Presbyterian rebels of Ulster had been rehabilitated, some of their more prominent leaders such as Henry Joy McCracken had been executed as examples. However, the majority were accepted back into the Protestant political fold as loyal supporters of the Crown. It was reasoned that they, the Presbyterians, had somehow come bewitched by the Catholics who had used some form of supernatural papist spell, which forced them to join the rebellion. The Defenders of Ulster had not rebelled openly in 1798 and the subsequent repression appeared to signal their death knell. Their obituary proved

to be prematurely penned. From the late 1810s onwards a new organisation began to make its appearance.

Initially this new organisation made its first appearances, in the old Defender heartland of Armagh. It took on various guises, calling itself, The Patriotic Association of the Shamrock, The Northern Union, The Irish Sons of Freedom, eventually being universally recognised as the Ribbonmen from the 1820s.[2] It quickly spread; it was soon prominent in all the old Defender areas of Ulster, Leinster and Connaught eventually even extending to Munster. They made their first appearance in Limerick in 1821 when an attempt was made to evict tenants of the Courtney Estate who had fallen into rent arrears, or who had refused to accept new leases.[3] The birth of the Ribbonmen was primarily in response to economic factors. The end of the Napoleonic Wars signalled an end to the economic growth that had been experienced in Ireland during the conflict. The demand for grain slumped and with it the price. Farmers were unable to pay rents, nor did they need to employ agricultural labourers, with the knock on effect that they deprived of wages could not pay rents either.[4] As a result evictions soared, in response, beginning in Ulster where a new wave of agrarian disorder began. Landlords and their agents were threatened; no one would take the farm of an evicted tenant for fear of reprisal. These activities were carefully planned, and were usually confined to the winter. The unrest spread and it coincided with the advance of the Ribbon lodges. Where a new lodge was established, well organised agrarian unrest would soon spring up in its wake.

The Ribbonmen were taking on the mantle of the Defenders and many of the veterans of ’98 were among its membership. While there is little evidence that the organisations were the same, there appears to be a clear line of continuity between them. The similarities and areas of operation and the organisational structure of the Ribbonmen clearly indicate that the Defenders were the blueprint that the

[2] M.R. Beames, ‘The Ribbon societies: lower class nationalism in pre-famine Ireland’ in CHE Philpin (ed.) *Nationalism and popular protest in Ireland* (Cambridge, 1989), p. 245.
[3] Joseph Lee, ‘The Ribbonmen’ in T. Desmond Williams (ed.) Secret *Societies in Ireland* (London, 1973), p.27.
[4] Ibid., p. 27.

Ribbonmen based their organisation on. It is possibly more correct to describe the emergence of the Ribbonmen as an evolution of the Defenders.[5] Ribbonmen lived in the locality, conspired at fairs, in pubs and in Shebeens, carried out their retaliations and then disappeared back in to the community. [6] They were organised in lodges in similar fashion to the Defenders. Each individual lodge was centred on the public house. It consisted of thirty-six members, run by a three man committee, a treasurer, Master and bookkeeper. Each lodge sent a representative to a Parish meeting, who in turn sent delegates to a county board, who sent representatives to a provincial council. Each provincial council then sent representatives to a national meeting.[7] One such national meeting was reportedly convened in Armagh in either late 1821 or early 1822. From the reported attendance it is clear that the Ribbon network was not only active across Ireland but that it was also in operation in Liverpool. This meeting of delegates referred to its self as the Board of Erin.[8] This is a name that would become much more important later in the nineteenth century with the advent of the Ancient Order of Hibernians.

The Ribbonmen were, despite much contemporary reporting, not simply banditti or highwaymen, they lived by a code. They raided houses just as the Defenders had done but for arms and not money.[9] At the Roscommon assizes of March 1820, Thady Hanley and Pat Guff were sentenced to death for administrating oaths, declaring themselves to be Ribbonmen and raiding a house. Pat Gaetly, Bryan Hardman, Thomas McGuire, Thos. Bryan, Michael Costello, John White, John Mulladay and Pat Rochford were transported for seven years for being Ribbonmen and demanding arms from a home owner in a forcible manner.[10] On other occasions the Orange Order created the spectre of Ribbonmen by provoking the local Catholic population to violence and thus justifying retaliation from the authorities to quell a

[5] Tom Garvin, 'Defenders, Ribbonmen and other underground political networks in pre-famine Ireland' in C.H.E. Philpin (ed.) *Nationalism and popular protest in Ireland, (*Cambridge, 1987), p. 223.
[6] Lee, 'The Ribbonmen', pp 31-2.
[7] Beames, 'Ribbon societies', p. 249.
[8] Diary Major Sirr 3 February 1822 (TCD Sirr Papers, N. 4 /6, 4/7).
[9] Lee, 'The Ribbonmen', pp 31-2.
[10] *Freeman's Journal,* 9 Mar. 1820.

'rising', as occurred in County Fermanagh in 1828.[11] Reports were soon circulating of clashes between Ribbonmen and policemen across the country. In County Galway a number of Policeman were attacked by Ribbonmen and severely beaten. The situation required the presence of the regular army to restore order.[12] Ribbonmen were particularly active during the Tithe War between 1831 and 1838. Their actions could be quite violent as well as between 1821 and 1841, a hundred policemen were killed and 560 were injured as a direct result of the activities of the Ribbonmen.[13]

While the organisation was meant to be secret and exclusively for Catholics, it often ignored these rules at the local level. Georgian traveller William Carleton, during a tour of Ireland in 1813 claimed to have been sworn in to a Ribbon Lodge in Monaghan. At a ceremony where an ordinary Catholic prayer book was used, Carleton swore to keep the Society's secrets, and to be true to the principles of this Society, dedicated to St. Patrick. Recruits also promised to attend to his superior when called, not to fight with brothers and not to introduce any Protestants to the Society.[14] Membership of the Ribbon Lodges was strictly restricted to Catholics, as can be seen from the reported oaths members swore on admittance to the society:

> I John Kelly do of my own free will solemnly swear that of my own free will I join this Friendly Brotherhood of Saint Patrick: That I will do the utmost in my power to extend the same , that I will not divulge the secrets and passwords etc., that I will not write them on paper carve or engrave them that I will obey the Masters and superiors of the society that I will not see a brother in distress having in my power to relieve him, that I will not except in case of necessity deal with any but a brother: that I will uphold and defend the doctrines of the Church of Rome.[15]

There was also as was common among secret societies of the time an aura of mysticism and Free Masonry. The Ribbonmen had Catechisms which were recited at meetings.

[11] *Freeman's Journal,* 2 Apr. 1828.
[12] *Belfast Newsletter,* 3 Mar. 1820.
[13] Lee, 'The Ribbonmen', p. 32.
[14] William Carleton, *Autobiography* (London, 1968), pp 76-84.
[15] O'Farrell's Evidence, Report into the State of Ireland in respect of Crime pp 399, 1414.

C. What are your intentions?

Kelly: To regain the lost rights and privileges since the reformation.

C. Where are your intentions?

Kelly: In my head under my hat in an ivory box locked with a Golden Key.

C. Where is the Golden Key?

Kelly: in the Ocean of Eternity.[16]

As a result of this almost Catholic indoctrination, they were often established in an area in response to the presence of the Orange Order. Marching against it whenever possible until the membership of both organisations was curbed by the enforcement of the Party Processions Act in late 1830.[17] Described as a riot, in Ballymena, 500 Ribbonmen gathered and organised themselves in a military fashion, they then proceeded to march through the town on fair day attacking Protestants and destroying property.[18] The '12th celebrations' in Ulster proved particularly contentious; in Kilrea Country Tyrone during July 1818 there were clashes between the Orange Order and Ribbonmen.[19] The clashes between Orangemen and Ribbonmen could often be quite well organised and violent. A large number of Ribbonmen were ambushed by a party of heavily armed Orangemen on St. Patrick's Day 1828 near Portglenoe Country Antrim. The Orangemen using the cover of hedgerows fired on the Ribbonmen, killing a young man named Mooney and wounding numerous others.[20]

[16] Beames, 'Ribbon societies', p. 253.
[17] Ibid., p. 258.
[18] *Belfast Newsletter,* 9 July 1819.
[19] *Belfast Newsletter,* 13 July 1818.
[20] *Finn's Leinster Journal,* 2 Apr. 1828.

Irish Catholic and Protestant emigrants to Scotland brought with them this sectarianism and before long the Orange Order and the Ribbonmen were establishing Lodges across Glasgow, much to the chagrin of Dr Scott Bishop of the City:

> As to secret societies I know of none existing among Irish immigrants In Glasgow except the Secret Societies of Orangemen, and Ribbonmen. A few Irish Orangemen made a display of Parading the Streets with Flags etc., This Produced the Existence of Ribbonmen in this Country; and though we uniformly refused to admit Ribbonmen to a participation of the Sacraments while they continue members of that Society I am confident It will be impossible to root out the Society of Ribbonmen while the Secret Societies or Lodges of Orangemen in the lower Classes of life are permitted to exist and insult the fellows of their countrymen.[21]

Despite Davitt's fine rhetoric, much of what is known about the inner workings of the Ribbonmen has been gathered from informers and police spies. Far from being the secure society that he describes, the vast majority of what is known about the inner workings of the Ribbonmen has been garnered from the reports of police informers who infiltrated the movement and former members who turned Queen's evidence to avoid prosecution.[22]

The Ribbonmen, originally in the main concerned with agrarian issues, did consist of members whose sole concern was about righting the wrongs of landlords against cottiers (a term for a peasant farmer). It quickly expanded and was soon attracting men who liked the fraternal aspects associated with the Lodges. It was also a refuge for religious fanatics, bent on righting the wrongs imposed upon Catholics. Much of its activities, especially in Dublin during 1821-2 are known from the diaries of Major Sirr, who recorded the reports of informers infiltrated into the Ribbon network. Sirr had been the Chief of Police in Dublin during the early part of the eighteenth century; he had arrested and interrogated Robert Emmett. On his retirement he became a magistrate and it was in this capacity that he kept his

[21] Answer to Doctor Scott to written queries. First report of inquiry in to condition of the poorer classes in Ireland, Appendix G Report on the state of the Irish Poor in Great Britain P.P. 1836 [40] xxiv p. 105].
[22] Beames, 'Ribbon societies', p. 246.

diaries.[23] It is from Sirr's Diaries that it can be seen how diverse the membership of the organisation in Dublin was. Ribbonism was particularly strong in Dublin.[24] The reported supreme leader of the Ribbonmen in 1822 was Michael Keenan who was a coal porter and his assistant was a man called Edward Hughes who was a butcher by trade.[25] Michael Coffey was Keenan's secretary because he was able to write. All these men were employed and lived in Dublin. Coffey was an informer who gave evidence and as a consequence Keenan was tried, convicted and transported on his evidence.[26] Across the country the Masters in the various lodges consisted of men of varied and diverse occupations, in Ardee County Louth they were led by a baker Owen Kennedy.[27] In Newry it was a publican Edward Moone who was the Master.[28]

One of the Belfast Masters was a Falls Road publican John Heuston.[29] A cooper from the Bogside led in Derry.[30] While in Cavan it was a newspaper agent named James Brady that held the reins.[31] The Ribbonmen as well as protecting the rights of the cottiers also morphed in to a mutual aid society, into a proto trade union. They helped men secure employment and raised money to support those who were in need. They often use force or the threat of force to secure their aims, making it difficult for men of a certain class not to belong to the organisation.[32] The movement according to Keenan was primarily responsible in Dublin in any case in supporting those 'Members and Friends' who were out of Employment.[33] The movement was also growing among those whose occupations allowed them to travel almost unnoticed by the authorities, pedlars, teachers, carriers and most importantly canal workers.[34] Boatmen employed on the Grand and Royal Canals distributed

[23] Ibid.
[24] Lee, 'The Ribbonmen', p. 27.
[25] The diary of Major Sirr, 14 Feb. 1821.
[26] The examinations of Coffey, The Reverend Palmer and Sir Gareth Neville in a Report of the Trial of Michael Keenan for administering an unlawful oath (Dublin, 1822).
[27] *The Times,* 13 Nov. 1839.
[28] *The Times,* 14 Oct. 1839.
[29] *The Times,* 2 Nov. 1839.
[30] *The Times,* 7 Nov. 1839.
[31] *The Times,* 17 July 1840.
[32] Kelly's Statement 6 December 1837 PRO CO 904 / 7.
[33] The diary of Major Sirr, 19 Feb. 1821.
[34] Tom Garvin, 'Defenders, Ribbonmen', p. 237.

papers to Masters.[35] Radiating out from its Dublin centre of operations, Ribbon organisers were sent to the large population centres along Ireland's network of Canals.[36]

During Keenan's tenure as leader of the Ribbonmen, the movement was riven by factionalism. Keenan was to find out to his cost that the movement was also infested with informers. Keenan was constantly in a seemingly unending struggle to maintain unity.[37] Despite these problems, the Ribbonmen began to develop a political agenda that was quasi Nationalist in form. According to the informer Coffey, Kenan maintained that their goal was to separate Ireland from English rule and to put down the Protestant religion. To achieve this aim a grand coalition with English radicals was contemplated, the Ribbonmen would stage a diversionary rising in Ireland, thus drawing off troops. The radicals would over throw the British Government and then come to the aid of the Irish Ribbonmen, a grandiose plan that owed more to fantasy than fact.[38] There was however a real belief that there was reason to expect a call to arms. It betrayed perhaps a level of class consciousness an inability of the Ribbonmen to act for themselves above their station. A Dublin lodge master Duffy reportedly declared in 1821:

> Now Gentlemen… there are these classes of us we are the lowest, the great men are obliged to keep their names to themselves and so are we the lowest orders sworn on the test, the head committees are sworn on the Prayer Book…[39]

Keenan confided in Coffey that that his orders came from the most respectable people in Ireland and would be made known at the appropriate time.[40] A Tyrone Ribbonman claimed that people of consequence were 'engaged but unknown to minor committees'.[41] To most observers the leader that the Ribbonmen awaited

[35] Report of the trail of Richard Jones who was charged with being the member of an illegal organization…taken in shorthand by Andrew Bourke (Dublin, 1840), p. 83.
[36] Evidence of John Hutton, report from the select committee of the House of Lords appointed in to the state of Ireland in respect of Crowe Parliamentary Papers, 1839 (486) xi p.239.
[37] Beames, 'Ribbon societies', pp 250-1.
[38] Report of the Trial of Michael Keenan, pp 23-4.
[39] Diary of Major Sirr 14 June 1821.
[40] Report of the Trial of Michael Keenan p. 24.
[41] The Diary of Major Sirr, 30 Nov. 1821.

the call from was Daniel O'Connell. However, this appears unlikely as O'Connell went out of his way to avoid violence and there is nothing in any of his actions to indicate that he was organising an armed revolt behind the scenes. While the Ribbonmen did support O'Connell their aims were completely at variance with his.[42] The Ribbonmen lacked expertise in Military matters, and would never gain enough arms for a full scale rising.by simply raiding houses. The reported Ribbon planning for a rising left a lot to be desired, it consisted of nothing more beyond that at the word all would 'rise up' and at one moment and throw of the English yoke.[43]

The deportation of Keenan did not spell the end of the Ribbon lodges; a new leadership under Andrew Dardis a publican reformed and regrouped the Lodges. Its new grand secretary was Richard Jones, who was valuable for his ability to write in short hand. The Ribbonmen now appeared to have abandoned all hope of a rising and concentrated more on its role as a mutual benefit society. It was still unable to protect itself against police agents and informers, as it is from the unfortunate Jones's trial, who received seven years transportation that we learn about the change in the Ribbon agenda. According to one witness:

> There is no indication of any specific act no contemplation of any direct proceedings of seditious nature, such as the providing of arms and monuments of war.[44]

Even to the British establishment the threat of the Ribbonmen appeared to have passed by the beginning of the 1840s. It had, in the words of FB Halley a stipendiary magistrate:

> Become a social and economic Society rather than a political one 'Ribbonism of late years has assumed quite a different Character from its original nature and has now no defined object. None but the very lowest of the trades and other people chiefly in towns have anything to say in it. It appears to be kind of Brotherhood formed to protect each other at fairs, markets and other public places…and is kept alive and to

[42] Beames, 'Ribbon societies', p. 263.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Report of the trial of Richard Jones, p. 10.

> certain extent encouraged by low publicans who benefited by what they spend in their houses.[45]

This was a rather cynical take on the waning power of the Ribbonmen. It is almost impossible to differentiate between the activities of the Ribbonmen and instances of Ribbonism, where individuals not connected with nor having taken any Ribbon oath committed similar attacks or merely claimed allegiance to avail of the social aspect of the public house.[46] Ribbonism displayed a national, political and most importantly a Catholic consciousness.[47] It had by the 1840s ceased to be revolutionary organisation and its members wanted to reform the system not abolish it, they wished to purge its abuses.[48] In 1842 the Irish Constabulary and Police forces in England and Scotland conducted a number of raids on houses suspected of harbouring Ribbonmen, these raids showed how wide the Lodge network was. The raids took place in Armagh, Monaghan, Leitrim, and Antrim, Down, Sligo, Tyrone, Louth, Scotland and England.[49]

It was the Great Famine that finally broke the back of the Ribbonmen and as with the earlier Defenders; their members simply disappeared underground only to re-emerge at a later date. When Fenianism began its rise, its recruits came from small farmers, and labourers, soldiers, schoolmasters, clerks, shop assistants and urban workers generally.[50] Davitt also had no doubt about the connection between the Ribbon Lodges and the Fenians he declared that, 'James Stephen's recruited from among the younger Ribbonmen while building the Fenian Movement'.[51] In addition, John Devoy, the driving force behind Clan na Gael in the United States, also acknowledged the influence the Ribbonmen had on the foundation of the Fenians:

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[45] Letter from FB Halley Stipendiary Magistrate 2 May 1839, Quoted in Drummond's Evidence, Report in to the State of Ireland in respect of Crime, p. 1134.
[46] Lee, 'The Ribbonmen', p. 27.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Ibid., p. 33.
[49] Police Searches, 14/18 February 1842, Public Record Office CO 04/9.
[50] T.W. Moody, 'The Fenian movement in Irish history' in TW Moody (ed.) *The Fenian movement (*Cork, 1968*)*, p. 106.
[51] Davitt, *Fall of Feudalism*, p.77.

> One of the main recruiting Grounds for the early Fenians in Dublin and the North of England was the Brotherhood of Saint Patrick, which had Ribbon Society Connections going back to 1830.[52]

It is telling that Devoy mentions the Brotherhood of St Patrick, for as Irish emigrants made their way to America in the 1830s and in the great wave of the 1840s the brotherhood would be re-established in New York and would eventually be renamed the Ancient Order of Hibernians (AOH). The AOH would become the largest Irish American Group in the United States. The AOH would become a fraternal and cultural organisation, a major source of funding for Irish nationalist endeavours in Ireland from the Land League to the Irish Parliamentary Party and the Hibernian Rifles. None of this would ever have been possible but for the Ribbon Lodges.

The Ribbonmen, long absent from the narrative of Irish nationalist history and dismissed as an agrarian revolutionary society were far more than that. It was a fraternal organisation and a mutual support society for the proletariat a trade union of sorts for those who were not guild members. While it attracted members who were fascinated by the trappings of Masonry, oaths, ritual, symbolism, mystification, signs and passwords, it was far more pragmatic. It had a nationwide organisational structure that was in contact with a central leadership in Dublin, not forgetting its British Lodges. It had a defined programme of tenant agitation and a less defined one of national independence. However, one of its biggest issues was that spies and informers too easily infiltrated the organisational structure. Thus, the authorities were able to keep it under surveillance. It maintained it was an oath bound society but many of its members did not keep their oaths and turned Queen's evidence when arrested. The one thing it did do was to provide a template upon which a new generation of Irish nationalist and Republican movements that would follow it would be built. This would be readily evident in the AOH, an outwardly Fraternal Society, built on the foundations of providing mutual aid to Irish immigrants in the United States, while inwardly an oath bound society dedicated to a more revolutionary agenda.

[52] John Devoy, *Recollections of an Irish rebel* (Shannon, 1969), pp 33-5.

Historians' debate: The *Historikerstreit* and the search for national identity in post-war Germany

Matthew Jackson

Germany's historical interpretation of its past, in particular the origins of National Socialism and the heinous crimes committed during its epoch, long served to prevent the development of a national identity. The wounds inflicted by Nazism on the minds of the German people have not been cauterised, instead they have festered into post-war historiographical debates—debates that have 'seen numerous attempts to negotiate the abject Nazi past within a discipline closely and publicly aligned with the (re)formation of national identity.'[1] In the immediate post-war years, the 'collective silence' paralysed the development of a legitimate national identity.[2] However, the 'second generation' of the 1960s began to forcefully press for answers to the most troubling aspects of the past. Subsequently, a wave of scholarly research into Germany's recent past facilitated a return of German historical consciousness throughout the 1970s and in particular, the 1980s.

The apparent permanence of the division of Germany together with the unbroken tradition of nationalism in other European states and the nationalistic political programs of the West German chancellorship of Helmut Kohl, resulted in many Germans searching for the historical roots of the German present and ultimately their own place in the history of the world. However, the weakness of this search for national identity was and remains today, the responsibility for the crimes committed during the twelve years of Nationalist Socialist rule. This paper will examine the *Historikerstreit* or 'Historians' debate' of the 1986-8, using it as a focus

[1] Matthew Fitzpatrick, 'The pre-history of the Holocaust? The Sonderweg and Historikerstreit: debates and the abject colonial past' in *Central European History*, no. 3 (2008), p. 481.
[2] See: Barbara Heimannsberg, Christoph J Schmidt, Gordon Wheeler and Cynthia Oudejans Harris, *The collective silence: German identity and the legacy of shame* (San Francisco, 1993); Ernestine Schlant, *The language of silence: West German literature and the Holocaust* (London, 1999).

to identify post-war debates over national identity and the failure of memory in dealing with the legacy of Nazism.

Discourses on national identity and national historical consciousness have long since been extraordinarily broad and complex, attracting polemical attention from historians, sociologists, anthropologists and political scientists. Marxist historians such as Eric Hobsbawn have interpreted national identity as a thinly veiled attempt to cloak some specific class interest. John Breuilly and the Weberian school of thought analyse nationalism largely in terms of an ideology that fulfils and continues to fulfil societal functions. Conversely, others such as A. D. Smith see 'ethnic identity' as the core of national identity. For Ernest Gellner, national identity emerges out of the process of industrialisation and is a key component of modernity while Benedict Anderson argues that national identity is an imagined concept, constructed to fit a certain set of beliefs.[3]

Although the *Historikerstreit* aroused external concern, especially in Israel and the United States, the debate was quintessentially an 'internal German affair, preoccupied with the "national" problem.'[4] Central to the debate were questions over the uniqueness and singularity of the Holocaust, the need for Germany to adequately deal with its difficult past and the desire to create a national identity in which Germans could be proud. The controversy failed however, to produce seminal works, new approaches to deal with the past or new insights on Nationalism Socialism. Its importance lies less in its originality or profundity than in its intensity. The *Historikerstreit* conveys a militant mood of open confrontation. In particular, the use of *Streit* (argument) 'conjures up images of two contending factions, butting heads over the governance of a common ground.'[5] The vitriolic and aggressive tone of the debate's antagonists frequently exceeded the boundaries of academic discourse with the participants confronting issues that questioned their respective

[3] See: Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and nationalism since 1780: program, myth, reality* (Cambridge, 1992); John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the state* (Manchester, 1993); Anthony D. Smith, *National identity* (London, 1991); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined communities: reflections on the origins and spread of nationalism* (London, 1991).
[4] Konrad H. Jarausch, 'Removing the Nazi stain? The quarrel of the German historians' in *German Studies Review*, no. 2 (1988), p. 290.
[5] Rachel J Halverson, *Historiography and fiction* (New York, 1990), p. 73.

identities. Indeed, the 'exchange was as much about the question of historical approach as about personal guilt and loss…and as much about the present as the past.'[6]

Germany's pre-eminent and most polarising post-war social philosopher, Jürgen Habermas, and his severe critique of what he called 'apologetic tendencies in contemporary German historiography', precipitated the debate.[7] In a letter to the liberal weekly newspaper *Die Zeit* on 11 July 1986, entitled 'A Kind of Settlement of Damages', Habermas accused revisionist historians Ernst Nolte, Michael Stürmer and Andreas Hillgruber of being proponents of a sanitisation and cold-blooded trivialisation of the Holocaust, the Third Reich and its crimes, by normalising German history in a neoconservative way. A number of leftist-liberal historians and social theorists including Hans Mommsen, Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Jürgen Kocka and Martin Broszat supported Habermas' arguments. Habermas succeeded in forcing his diverse conservative opponents into a seemingly homogeneous group and perhaps it is now that one must distinguish between the various standpoints of his adversaries.

One could argue that Habermas' most important target, though not immediate, was Erlangen scholar Michael Stürmer who, as political advisor to West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, exerted significant political influence.[8] Habermas labelled Stürmer as an obstacle in the process of "mental opening" and the establishment of firm political ties with the West, which the former saw as vital to the Federal Republic for economic and military purposes. Habermas argued that 'those who want to drive the shame…out of us with phrases such as "obsession with guilt" and those who desire to call all Germans back to conventional forms of their

[6] Christine Richert Nugent, 'German Vergangenheitsbewältigung, 1961–1999: selected historiographical controversies and their impact on national identity' (M.A. thesis, Western Carolina University, 2010).
[7] Jan-Werner Müller, *Another country: German intellectuals, unification and national identity* (New Haven, 2000), p. 90.
[8] Stürmer had advised Kohl on plans for two new museums celebrating modern German history in West Berlin and Bonn.

national identity are destroying the only reliable foundation for our ties to the West.'[9]

In an article in the conservative *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ) on 25 April 1986, Stürmer begins and concludes with the phrase, 'in a country without memory anything is possible'. In a plea for the re-appropriation of history for the construction of a positive national identity, Stürmer argued that:

> Loss of orientation and the search for identity are like brother and sister. But whoever thinks that this (Nazi past) has no impact on politics and the future ignores the fact that, in a land without history, the future is won by those who fill memory, stamp their mark on concepts and give meaning to the past. The search for a lost past is not an abstract striving for culture and education, it is morally legitimate and politically necessary.[10]

In reading Stürmer's analysis, one is reminded of George Orwell's famous dictum; 'He who controls the past controls the future. He who controls the present controls the past.'[11] Indeed, scholar Mary Fulbrook articulates that Stürmer's claims amounted to a 'remarkably non-objective attempt to provide a politically relevant version of the past for current political (and conservative) purposes.'[12]

Berlin scholar Ernst Nolte, whose views were first adumbrated in his 1963 work entitled *Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche* (Three Faces of Fascism) represented in the view of historian Richard J. Evans, 'the most determined attempts to get around the obstacle of Auschwitz.'[13] In addition, Nolte's second book *Deutschland und der kalte Krieg* (Germany and the Cold War), published in 1974, hinted at comparisons between the crimes of Nazism and the crimes of other nations, even going as far as to argue similarities between Auschwitz and the American prosecution of the war in Vietnam. Moreover, his third work *Marxismus und industrielle Revolution* (Marxism and the Industrial Revolution), published in 1983,

[9] *Die Zeit*, 11 July 1986.
[10] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 25 Apr. 1986.
[11] George Orwell, *Nineteen eighty-four* (London, 1949).
[12] Mary Fulbrook, *German national identity after the Holocaust* (Cambridge, 1999), p. 126.
[13] Richard J. Evans, *In Hitler's shadow: West German historians and the attempt to escape from the Nazi past* (London, 1989), p. 24.

stressed that Communism and indeed Marxism was a stimulating influence on the development of Fascism.

Nolte's article in FAZ on 11 July 1986 argued that the crimes of National Socialism followed the causal chain of crimes committed during the Bolshevik revolution of October 1917, the Civil War, Collectivization and the terror of the 1930s. Indeed, Nolte posed the questions: 'Was the Gulag Archipelago not primary to Auschwitz? Was the Bolshevik murder of an entire class not the logical and factual Prius of the "racial murder" of National Socialism?'[14] In other words, Communism showed Hitler the way. The Final Solution was 'an "Asiatic deed", which the Nazis learned from the Bolsheviks as early as 1917-21, adding only the technology of gassing.'[15] However, his contention that the Holocaust was unique only in technical terms and could be compared to other twentieth-century atrocities, such as those committed by Stalin and Pol Pot, disrupts the construction of the kind of harmonious national historical narrative envisioned by Nolte. A letter from Jürgen Kocka appeared in the *Frankfurter Rundschau* on 23 September 1986. Here Kocka argued that 'the singularity of the German development arising from this frame of comparison should not be repressed by comparison with Stalin and Pol Pot.'[16] Indeed, Hitler's crimes cannot be understood as a logical response to Communism, and the Holocaust must be understood as an abject, rather than acceptable past.

However, the controversy surrounding the uniqueness of the Nationalist Socialist extermination of the Jews arguably leads to other implications, namely concerning the meaning of uniqueness within the annals of history. If one terms an event unique, an ahistorical terminology is introduced, therefore decontextualizing the event and rendering it inexplicable. However, as scholar Norman Finkelstein asserts, 'the Holocaust is unique because it is inexplicable, and it is inexplicable because it is unique.'[17] Nolte's comparative study proposed that although the Nazi

[14] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 6 June 1986.
[15] Geoff Eley, 'Nazism, politics and the image of the past: thoughts on the West German Historikerstreit 1986-1987' in *Past & Present* (1988), pp 171-208.
[16] *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 23 Sept. 1986.
[17] Norman G. Finkelstein, *The Holocaust industry: reflections on the exploitation of Jewish suffering* (New York, 2003), p. 45.

regime was indeed evil and criminal, there were many others like it. Therefore, as historian Omer Bartov argues, if Germans subscribed to Nolte's theory they would have 'no more reason to feel guilty about their past than any other people, and could calmly go about re-establishing a proud national identity based on a history of great political and cultural achievements.'[18] The views of Nolte were further endorsed by the Bonn diplomatic historian Klaus Hildebrand, who argued that Nolte was "showing the way", 'because the work does the service of removing the "seemingly unique" quality of the history of the Third Reich.'[19]

Cologne scholar Andreas Hillgruber raised the question; to what extent could Germans legitimately cast themselves as victims? In his 1986 study entitled *Zweierlei Untergang: Die Zerschagung des deutschen Reichs und das Ende des europäischen Judentums* (Two Sorts of Demise, The Destruction of the German Reich and the end of European Jewry), Hillgruber sought to elicit empathy for the German soldiers and civilians who fought to contain Communism on the eastern front. He also made no connection between the prolongation of the war and the continuation of Nazi mass murder.[20] The destruction of European Jewry ascribes to a relatively small circle of high-ranking officials, and therefore isolated from the bulk of the German population. However, Hillgruber's romanticism of the Wehrmacht, based as it was on mass conscription and therefore representative of German society, has 'legitimised the actions of German soldiers in the war as being in no way essentially different from those of all soldiers.'[21]

In examining the *Historikerstreit* and the search for a 'useable' national identity, one must examine the polemical *Sonderweg* or 'Special Path' theory of German historiography, which attempts to define the place of National Socialism in German history, its historical roots and the meanings of its victory and defeat for a post-1945 Germany. The *Sonderweg* theory centred on the peculiarity of German

[18] Omer Bartov, 'Savage war in Confronting the Nazi Past' in Michael Burleigh (ed.), *New debates on modern German history* (London, 1996), p. 136.
[19] *Die Zeit*, 11 July 1986.
[20] Andreas Hillgruber. *Zweierlei untergang: die Zerschagung des Deutschen Reichs und das ende des Europäischen Judentums* (Berlin, 1986).
[21] For an exploration of German conscription and the Holocaust, see: Daniel Goldhagen, *Hitler's willing executioners: ordinary Germans and the Holocaust* (New York, 1996).

history and advocated that nineteenth century Germany was politically backward and consisted of nation-building from above, lacking the experience of a successful bourgeoisie revolution from below and the ability to produce a liberal democracy. Applying modernization models of nation building, the theory suggested Germany was unique among western nations, in comparison to England's political liberalism and France's democratic rationalism, with a stunted path to modernity. Indeed, in his 1935 book *Die Verspätete Nation* (The Belated Nation), German philosopher Helmuth Plessner stressed that Germany had missed the seventeenth century, which was crucial for the development of a modern and liberal democracy.[22] Conversely, in an article in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* on 25 April 1986, Michael Stürmer argued that 'to lament the absence of revolution in our history would be to little understand the agrarian revolution, the demographic revolution, the industrial revolution, the revolution of 1848, and the revolution from above that triumphed with Bismarck.'[23] In addition, proponents of the *Sonderweg* paradigm argued that in German society, national identity and belonging originated from the ruling elites, who manipulated national sentiments and imposed it through imperialism abroad and hatred of enemies of the empire at home. The 'meaning of German nationalism thus became a means to divert attention from a repressive regime.'[24] Henceforth, it is argued that in the absence of the domination and manipulation of Nationalism Socialism, together with the failure of successive post-war governments to confront and memorialise the past, Germany was void of direction in the construction of national identity.

A challenging and controversial pro-*Sonderweg* thesis appeared with Hamburg historian Fritz Fischer's publication in 1961 of *Griff nach der Weltmacht* (translated as Germany's Aims in the First World War). Fischer challenged the widely held assumptions that proportioned equal blame to all European powers for the outbreak of World War I, stressing the belligerent and expansionist policy of the

[22] Helmuth Plesser, *Die verspätete nation: über die politische Verführbarkeit bürgerlichen Geistes* (Stuttgart, 1935).
[23] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 25 Apr. 1986.
[24] Alon Confino, *The nation as a local metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany and national memory, 1871-1918* (Chapel Hill and London, 1999), p. 6.

German government.[25] He exposed the inherent parallels in German war aims in both the First and Second World Wars, thus advocating a continuum in German politics. Moreover, Fischer's thesis was particularly disturbing to the generation of Wilhelmine and Weimar scholars, politically and methodologically conservative and perpetuating the tradition of German historicism, who had bracketed National Socialism into an ahistorical context. In his application of an 'objective' and less literary style of writing, as well as his use of conventional methods, Fischer embodied the motifs of Germany's emerging social historians, who were studying the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in order to understand the historical roots of both Nazism and German modernism. Indeed, as historian Richard J. Evans argues, 'it became clear that Fischer's work had been the starting point for a wholesale revision of German historiography undertaken by a generation of younger historians. Historicism was out, social science was in.'[26]

Moreover, historicism's strict dependence on the philological method, its belief on the individuality of historical reality through intuitive understanding while judging an historical period on its own terms,

> Led in the past to conservative judgements favouring the status quo, together with an avoidance of moral issues and a failure to raise the main questions to which answers were necessary for an understanding of German historical development.[27]

The new social science approach of the aforementioned historians served as the starting point for questions over national identity and the failure of memory in post-

[25] Fischer based his arguments on a mass of research in the German archives, penetrating beyond the published collections of diplomatic documents that had been the basis of earlier accounts. He discovered an explosive memorandum by the then German Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, dated 9 September 1914, known as the 'September Program' – A draft programme of war aims which amounted to complete German domination of Europe, west and east. Fischer claimed that this document was not simply the result of euphoria at a moment of apparent victory, but was in fact the crystallization of views that were common in German ruling circles before the war began, and indeed represented Bethmann's own aspirations. See: John A. Moses, *The politics of illusion: The Fischer-Controversy in German historiography* (London, 1975); Wayne C. Thompson, 'The September Program: Reflections on the Evidence' in *Central European History*, no. 4 (1978), pp 348-354.
[26] Richard J. Evans, "The new nationalism and the old history: perspectives on the West German Historikerstreit" in *The Journal of Modern History*, no. 4 (1987), p. 762.
[27] Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *The German Empire, 1871-1918*, translated by Kim Traynor (Leamington Spa, 1985), preface.

war Germany. The most systematic critique of the thesis of uniqueness and continuity in German history came in the 1970s and early 1980s by historians and intellectuals who began to attack the work of the preceding generation, just as those historians such as Fischer, in the early 1960s, had attacked the work of their predecessors. The period witnessed a contest between two remarkable books, with the ensuing debates acting as an important precursor to the *Historikerstreit*. Hans-Ulrich Wehler's 1973 study *Das Deutsche Kaiserreich, 1871-1918* (The German Empire, 1871-1918) and British Marxists David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley's 1980 study, *Mythen deutscher Geschichtsschreibung: Die gescheiterte bürgerliche Revolution von 1848* (The Peculiarities of German History), argued forcefully both for and against the *Sonderweg* theory. Consequently, on the eve of the *Historikerstreit* in 1986, the intervening 25 years had illustrated the generational dynamics at the core of the evolution of the representation of the Third Reich in West German historiography.

In the midst of the *Historikerstreit* and the German search for national identity, fundamental questions surfaced over the failure of memory in dealing with the legacy of National Socialism. Before his death, the German sociologist Norbert Elias argued that the 'hypersensitivity towards anything that recalls National Socialist doctrine results in the problem of a "national character" being shrouded in silence.'[28] The Nazi regime bequeathed to post-war West Germans a memory corrupted in meaning and void of a proud national heritage. Many theorists of social memory have advocated a presented approach, arguing that historical memory is constructed in relation to contemporary needs.[29] However, there has been more recent work on social memory that has argued for a more complex view of the relationship between past and present in the shaping of collective memory. Collective memory should be seen as a continuous process of sense making through time.[30]

[28] Nobert Elias, *The Germans: power struggles and the development of habitus in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries* (New York, 1997), p. xii.
[29] See: Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, *The invention of tradition* (Cambridge, 1983).
[30] See: Barry Schwarz, 'Social change and collective memory: The democratization of George Washington' in *American Sociological Review*, no. 2 (1991), pp 221-236; Michel-Rolph Trouillot,

Beginning in later stages of 'collective silence' era of the 1950s, Germany, through the process of the *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* (coming to terms with the past), began to tacitly address its recent past, in particular the issues of guilt and how to live with the crimes committed under National Socialism. In 1959, the Marxist philosopher Theodor Adorno delivered an influential lecture entitled *Was bedeutet die Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit?* (What is meant by the working through the past?). Playing on Immanuel Kant's famous essay *Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklarung?* (Answering the Question: What Is Enlightenment?), Adorno retrieved the Freudian trope of 'working through'. Freud compared and contrasted melancholia with mourning. He saw melancholia as characteristic of an arrested process in which the depressed and traumatised self, locked in compulsive repetition, remains narcissistically identified with the lost object. Mourning, however, brought the possibility of engaging trauma and achieving a reinvestment in life. Adorno attempted to show that Germany's 'endemic "inability to mourn" had produced an acute and debilitating psychic immobility, arguing that a people that refuses to confront the depravity of its past remains unable to transcend it. Unmastered, the past persists as trauma and prevents living fully in the present.'[31] Adorno's lecture stood as a turning point, emblematic of the shift in the German socio-political climate and the debates that straddled the ensuing decades in confronting and memorialising Germany's Nazi past.

Contributing to the debates of the proceeding decades was the publication of Alexander and Margaret Mitscherlich's *Die Unfähigkeit zu trauern. Grundlagen kollektiven Verhaltens* (The Inability to Mourn: Principles of Collective Behaviour) in 1967. The Mitscherlich's articulated a view that Germans reacted to the trauma of the sudden loss of their beloved leader in 1945 by derealizing their past and that this self-protective mechanism had effectively prevented any real process of mourning for that loss. A series of essays published in the mid-1980s by the historian and philosopher Hermann Lübbe repudiated the Mitscherlich's thesis. Lübbe defended

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Silencing the past: power and the production of history (Boston, 1995); Yael Zerubavel, *Recovered roots: collective memory and the making of Israeli national tradition* (Chicago, 1995).

[31] 'Adorno rejected an intellectual tradition tainted by Nationalism,' http://www.bookforum.com/inprint/015_02/2483 (accessed 28 November 2013).

West Germany's record of coming to terms with its past and argued that the 'collective silence' in West Germany in the 1950s was the result of an agreement between former Nazis and former victims of Nazism to focus on post-war reconstruction and to renounce questions of guilt and responsibility. The aforementioned works illustrated that 'coming to terms with the past meant different things for different constituencies and generations which, in the process, created one of the most lively, volatile and diverse historical cultures in Europe.'[32]

The Italian-Jewish author and Holocaust survivor, Primo Levi, perhaps best illustrate the failure of memory and of coming to terms with the past. In 1987 in his work *The Drowned and the Saved*, Levi describes an encounter with a fifth-grader in which the boy offered an elegantly simple plan for an escape from Auschwitz. Upon close examination of the camp layout, the boy asserted that Levi could simply have cut the guards throat, stolen his clothes, cut off the power to the searchlights and the electrified fence and walked free. Bemused and disturbed by the boy's nativity, Levi writes that:

> This little episode illustrates quite well the gap that exists and grows wider every year between things as they were 'down there' and things as they are represented by the current imagination, fed by approximate books, films and myths. It slides fatally towards simplification and stereotype… It is the task of the historian to bridge this gap, which widens as we get farther away from the events under examination.[33]

Levi's observations on the inability to confront and effectively 'work through' the hiatus in Germany's history from 1933-45 prohibited the development of a national identity in the post-war era and helps contextualise the vitriolic *Historikerstreit*. In an editorial in the liberal weekly *Die Zeit* on 2 September 1983, the German intellectual Rudolf Walter Leonhardt mused about Germans lack of national pride and on 'the Burden of Being German'. Psychologically speaking he argued, 'we

[32] Wulf Kansteiner, 'Losing the war, winning the memory battle: The legacy of Nazism, World War II, and the Holocaust in the Federal Republic of Germany' in Richard Ned Lebow, Wulf Kansteiner and Claudio Fogu (ed.), *The politics of memory in postwar Europe* (Durham and London, 2006), p. 106.
[33] Primo Levi, *The drowned and the saved*, translated by Raymond Rosenthal (New York, 1988), pp 157-8.

have no national identity with which someone who was a child in 1945—or not even born yet—could identify…Curiously, only few Germans consider the question of national identity to be particularly urgent.'[34] With the transition from the Social Democratic Schmidt government to the Christian Democratic Kohl government in 1982, Germany entered a politically conservative era, an era that was to last well beyond German reunification and which was characterised by nationalist sentiment. This conservative turn, intellectually supported by revisionist historians Ernst Nolte, Michael Stürmer and Andreas Hillgruber among others, illustrates by the 'Bitburg fiasco' of 1985 and the plan to build two new museums of national history in Berlin and Bonn.

The 'Bitburg fiasco' was characterised by a meeting of U.S. President Ronald Reagan and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl at the German military cemetery at Bitburg for a wreath-laying ceremony in commemoration of the fortieth anniversary of Germany's unconditional surrender on 5 May 1985. Kohl's invitation to Reagan to visit Bitburg was an audacious step aiming to facilitate the acceptance of the Federal Republic of Germany as a fully-fledged Western democratic nation, and in turn, offset, 'or at least attenuate the ignominy of Germany's Nazi past by focusing on its proven democratic virtues and reliable support for Western alliance.'[35] However, the discovery that SS soldiers, who had participated in the executions of American soldiers, were buried at the Bitburg ceremony raised international concern and facilitated an outpouring of West German nationalism, in which a broad spectrum of conservative opinion demanded that a line be drawn under the Nazi past. Significantly, Reagan remarked, 'You know, I don't think we ought to focus on the past. I want to focus on the future; I want to put that history behind us.'[36] Furthermore, in a speech delivered on Berlin's 750th anniversary on 28 October 1987, Chancellor Helmut Kohl announced the creation of a German Historical Museum in West Berlin and proclaimed:

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[34] *Die Zeit*, 2 Sept. 1983.
[35] Richard Mitten, 'Bitburg, Waldheim, and the politics of remembering and forgetting' in David F. Good and Ruth Wodak (ed.), *From World War to Waldheim: culture and politics in Austria and the United States* (Oxford, 2009), p. 58.
[36] 'Remarks at a joint German-American military ceremony at Bitburg Air Base in the Federal Republic of Germany, 5 May 1985', http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1985/50585b.htm (accessed 15 November 2013).

> For us Germans, the question of our history presents itself in a special way: We must never forget the experience of the National Socialist dictatorship, which brought immeasurable suffering to other peoples and to our own. It admonishes us to learn a lesson. This requires that we deal with history in a responsible way. According to the conception of the German Historical Museum, the period of National Socialism will also be presented as a significant part of our history and will occupy substantial space in the museum.[37]

For Kohl's critics on the left, the opening a national museum in West Berlin and the 'Bitburg fiasco' were especially problematic because they 'suggested that democratisation and *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* were finite processes. With that work now complete, West Germans could leave the difficult and shameful Nazi legacy in the past and construct a useable national identity for the future.'[38] Moreover, for Stürmer *et al*, *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* stood for a 'purported national self-flagellation deriving from New Left interest in the Nazi past, one that constrained Germany's ability to claim a rightfully proud identity and to achieve a power position commensurate with its size and achievements.'[39]

In conclusion, the *Historikerstreit* exposed the inherent fault lines of competing interpretations in the construction of national identity in post-war Germany. It also demonstrated that West Germany had indeed not come to terms with its National Socialist past. Yet the debate was not to bring lasting resolution. Even though Habermas and his leftist colleagues 'won', reunification was to show how fragile that victory was. Indeed, since 1990, German national identity has undergone considerable changes. Recent developments in German memory politics, encompassing issues of guilt and suffering, have engendered a more positive identification with the German nation. German collective identity, bolstered by its position as Europe's economic powerhouse, is increasingly characterised by signs of patriotism. Moreover, twenty-three years after reunification, the East-West divide has little remaining salience in German political and cultural life. For younger

[37] *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 29 Oct. 1987.
[38] Rita Chin, 'Democratisation, Turks, and the burden of German history' in Warren Breckman, Peter E. Gordon, A. Dirk Moses, Samuel Moyn and Elliot Neaman (ed.), *The modernist imagination: intellectual history and critical theory* (New York, 2009), p. 250.
[39] Jeffrey K. Olick, 'What Does It Mean to Normalize the Past? Official Memory in German Politics' in *Social Science History*, no. 4 (1998), pp 547-71.

Germans, 'war in Europe is no longer a palpable memory or a tangible fear.'[40] However, the legacy of National Socialism continues to exert a moral, political and anthropological weight in Germany. Indeed, scholar Ian Kershaw argues that in a unified Germany within a transformed Europe, 'drawing a line under the Nazi past appears less easily possible. The reawakened problems of fascism, racism and nationalism straddle the decades and ensure a continuing pre-occupation with the Hitler era.'[41] By having done the unthinkable, 'Hitler has permanently warped the categories of German history.'[42]

[40] *New York Times*, 10 Sept. 2010.
[41] Ian Kershaw, *The Nazi dictatorship: problems & perspectives of interpretation* (London, 2000), p. 237.
[42] Konrad H. Jarausch, 'Removing the Nazi stain? The quarrel of the German historians' in *German Studies Review*, no. 2 (2016), p. 1998.

‘A Beacon of Catholic Purity’: Jazz and Dancing in Interwar Ireland

James Keenan

The Carrigan Report published in 1931 referred to the apparent social misconduct in the Irish Free State due to the introduction of new forms of entertainment including jazz and dancing. It is clear that there was high anxiety about these forms of popular entertainment, especially jazz, public dance halls and dancing, in the Irish Free State. In determining the reasons why there was so much anxiety about jazz and dancing in the Irish Free State, this essay will consider a number of arguments. Firstly, examining the reasons why particular groups and movements in the Irish Free State had concerns about the impact of jazz and dancing; ranging from moral concerns, the effect on society especially the youth and women and the fear of foreign influences. The essay will also address the importance of the influence of the Catholic Church and lay organisations in explaining the fears and anxieties. Secondly, examining how anxieties about jazz and dancing relate to other anxieties in the inter war period. Finally, examining how distinctive these concerns were in the Irish Free State in comparison with the rest of interwar Europe. Throughout the essay, relevant historiography and primary source material will be included in support of the arguments made.

In the inter war period, the popularity of jazz and dancing in dance halls grew considerably. Its increased popularity was most evident amongst the youth and led to the spread of dance crazes throughout Europe in the 1920s and 1930s. The inter war period is often widely regarded as the age of mass culture. Not only in respect to dance halls and jazz but with other forms of new technology that were emerging in this period; photography and the camera, cinema and new forms of literature and radio. All of these new technologies caused deep fear among the traditional minded population of Europe. However, it was jazz and dancing that seemed to cause the greatest amount of anxiety and concern in this period. The Irish Free State was no exception to this increased popularity of jazz and dancing and the anxieties that came with it. Barbara O’Connor claims that dancing in public dance

halls was a very popular leisure activity in Ireland in the 1930s, as those who took part looked to jazz and foreign dance more regularly.[1] In the aftermath of independence and Civil War, the Irish Free State and politics was more focused on building the state and institutions alongside debates over the Treaty. Social concerns like these clearly were not widely regarded and debated. Although jazz impacted more on urban elites than the general masses in this period, it still created huge anxiety and fears. Critical responses to all forms of mass culture often cut across political ideologies; both left and right. Individuals on the left and right had issues with the era of mass culture. It is important to note that this emergence of mass culture stoked both moral and political anxieties.

There are a number of reasons explaining why jazz and dancing had created fears and anxieties in the Irish Free State. Moral concerns were perhaps the biggest issue for many of its opponents. These moral concerns, alongside worries of the effect of jazz and dancing with Irish national identity and Irish Gaelic Catholic ideals, principally Irish dancing, were evident. There were concerns that this type of social behaviour did not relate to the conventional Irish beliefs and traditions. To put this into context; the population of the Irish Free State was one that was overwhelmingly Catholic, well over ninety per cent, and also very rural meaning it was no surprise that there was the existence of the 'essential conservatism' of the predominantly rural Catholic electorate.[2] Terence Brown claims that the Irish Free State had a society that was made up of people 'disinclined to contemplate any change other than political change' referring to anxieties around cultural changes.[3] Jazz and dancing in particular had created a huge unease for conservatives who believed that it represented a heavily sexualised culture due to the nature of the music and the various dance crazes. Another concern was perhaps the modest dresses worn by women associated with jazz and dancing. This concern with sexual immorality is echoed by figures such as Father Richard Devane, who noted that jazz was a threat mainly because 'of its association with Black and African sexuality'.[4]

[1] Barbara O'Connor, 'Sexing the nation: discourses of the dancing body in Ireland in the 1930s' in *Journal of Gender Studies*, xiv no. 2 (2005), p. 91.
[2] Terence Brown, *Ireland: a social and cultural history 1922-1985* (London, 1981), p. 45.
[3] Ibid., p. 18.
[4] Diarmaid Ferriter, *Occasions of sin: sex and society in modern Ireland* (London, 2009), p. 179.

On 7 April 1930, an article published in the *Irish Independent* affirmed the concern of jazz's association with African Americans by stating that jazz's 'original impulse and rhythm belong to the American negro'.[5] Irish Catholic Bishops, according to Diarmaid Ferriter, often termed the phrase 'loosening of morals' pointing to the effect of the motor car and dance halls identified as chief facilitators of this.[6] James Donnelly claims that the Irish Catholic bishops waged a long war in the 1920s and 1930s to 'regulate the addiction of the young people of Ireland' to dancing.[7] The public, heavily influenced by sermons and bishops, also took distaste towards jazz. For example, an article published in the *Irish Examiner* on 8 August 1930 included the remarks made that 'there will be a special department in Hades in which there will be nothing but jazz bands'.[8] Ó hAllmhuráin claims that the appeal of jazz's 'snazzy menu of fox-trots, two-steps, and shimmy shakes not to mention the sensual moan of the saxophone and the loose morals of flappers in high heels all became prime targets' to Catholic clergy in the 1920s and 1930s.[9]

Another uneasiness raised was the issue over the effect that jazz and dancing was having towards social issues and social behaviour in the Irish Free State; a worry that it would change the public's behaviour. There was a fear that exposure to jazz, public dance halls and dancing would lead to a rise in sex outside of marriage, unmarried mothers, illegitimate births and venereal disease. The popularity of this activity of public dances amongst the youth in Ireland was deeply concerning for Irish Catholic conservatives in a moral sense. There was a general fear that this type of activity and culture was corrupting the innocent and pure minds of the youth. Brown emphasises the point about the moral need, by Catholic conservatives to ensure the Ireland was moral, pure and healthy.[10] Another concern was the role of gender in this form of entertainment. Jazz and dance were seen as a threat to women and their role within society in the Irish Free State. O'Connor claims that public

[5] *Irish Independent*, 7 Apr. 1930.
[6] Ferriter, *Occasions of sin*, p. 137.
[7] James S. Donnelly, 'Bishop Michael Browne of Galway (1937–76) and the regulation of public morality' in *New Hibernia Review*, xvii no. 1 (2013), p. 30.
[8] *Irish Examiner*, 8 Aug. 1930.
[9] Gearóid Ó hAllmhuráin, 'Dancing on the hobs of hell: rural communities in Clare and the Dance Halls Act of 1935' in *New Hibernia Review*, ix no. 4 (2005), p. 10.
[10] Brown, *Ireland: A social and cultural history*, p. 70.

dance halls were 'constructed as both a dangerous and degenerate space for women'.[11] The vulnerability of women was a notable worry for Irish Catholic elites and clergy, often associated alongside widespread prostitution and sexual crime, and can be seen as one of the reasons behind the establishment of the Carrigan Committee in 1930. The report that was published in 1931 stated that dance halls had led to an increase in young girls being 'lured' and led to an increase in 'forced marriages' and an increase in illegitimate births, which is described as 'increasing throughout the country at an unprecedented rate'.[12] The association with the more liberal minded American influence and sexual culture also lead to a fear of foreign, particularly English and American, influences on women. The concern over women and their vulnerability also related to the perceived threat towards the purity and innocence of the Irish nation; Ireland was often regarded as female.

The threat of foreign and outside influence on the Irish way of life was alarming for many Irish elites in the 1920s and 1930s. Keating stresses the importance of a newly established Free State keen to exert itself as 'a beacon of Celtic Catholic purity in a world otherwise sullied by sin' referencing to the popularity of American cinema, jazz and dancing.[13] The victory of independence and the need to project Ireland's cultural identity in the wake of gaining sovereignty with Britain is also important in the minds of the general public. Wills states that 'the strength of the Catholic nationalistic consensus reflected the needs of a society striving to give cultural expression to its newly won independence'.[14] Wills also highlights the importance of the Catholic ideals in attitudes towards mass culture; claiming that 'Catholic sexual morality and the ideal of the Catholic family were seen as a front in the battle with the secular materialism of Britain and the United States'.[15] It was clear that during the period there was an increasingly more apparent American influence on popular music such as the Hollywood film and musical. Jazz

[11] O'Connor, 'Sexing the nation', p. 92.
[12] The Knitter, 'The full Carrigan Report' in *Days in the Life* (2005), http://the-knitter.blogspot.co.uk/2005/06/full-carrigan-report_24.html, (accessed 25 Nov. 2015).
[13] Anthony Keating, 'Sexual crime in the Irish Free State 1922-33: its nature, extent and reporting' in Irish Studies Review, xx no. 2 (2012), p. 135.
[14] Clair Wills, *That neutral island: a cultural history of Ireland during the Second World War* (London, 2007), p. 25.
[15] Ibid.

became one of the most prominent American imports alongside films. The fear of the Irish population becoming heavily influenced by modern and American liberal values coincided with the fear of new ideals overriding Irish values. The perceived threat of foreign influence arguably led to perhaps the most alarming rhetoric used by cultural opponents. For example, B.G. MacCarthy echoed this concern of Americanisation and modernity on Irish way of life by stating that the Irish people would die to resist an invading army but would do nothing to resist 'an invasion of ideas'.[16] O'Connor states that the idea of foreign dance was seen as 'a contaminant to the purity of Irish culture'.[17]

The deep rooted Catholicization of the Irish Free State and the influence of clergy in political life was striking but not surprising given the political climate of the state. All Irish political parties in this period, both Cumann na nGaedheal (later became Fine Gael) and Fianna Fáil had Catholic values intertwined in their policies and ideology; however de Valera and Fianna Fáil was seen to be more apparent and the Irish Free State was considered to undergo a process of intense Catholicization after 1932. For example, de Valera gave his 'blessing' to the anti-jazz campaign in the 1930s.[18] Whyte, as quoted by Finnane, states that the years between 1923 and 1937 saw the 'Catholic moral codes become enshrined in the law of the state' through different forms of legislation with a Catholic theme.[19] This included legislation enacted on alcohol, 1929 Censorship of Publications Act which placed restrictions and censorship of perceived 'evil literature', 1923 Censorship of Films Act placing censorship on cinema and the 1933 Imported Newspaper Tax Act. A number of county councils also adopted resolutions that condemned jazz and all night dancing, with district judges often spoke of the dangers of 'nigger music'. In January 1934 there was a demonstration of around 3,000 people in Mohill, County

[16] B.G. MacCarthy *et al*., 'The cinema as a social factor [with comments]' in *An Irish Quarterly Review*, xxxiii no. 129 (1944), p. 45.
[17] Barbara O'Connor, *The Irish, dancing - cultural, politics and identities, 1900 to 2000* (Cork, 2013), p. 40.
[18] Jim Smyth, 'Dancing, depravity and all that jazz: The Public Dance Halls Act of 1935' in *History Ireland*, i no. 2 (1993), p. 53.
[19] Mark Finnane, 'The Carrigan Committee of 1930-31 and the "moral condition of the Saorstat"' in *Irish Historical Studies*, xxxii no. 128 (2001), p. 519.

Leitrim holding banners stating 'down with jazz'.[20] All of this culminated in the 1937 Constitution, which considered the Catholic Church and restricted divorce, alongside restricting the role of women to the home. In regards to dancing, the 1935 Public Dance Hall Act placed restrictions on licenses of public dance halls. Smyth describes the legislation as 'draconian' with it being 'practically impossible to hold dances without the sanction of the trinity of clergy, police and judiciary'.[21] However, Ferriter claims that the 1935 Public Dance Halls Act was 'patchily enforced' but it ensured that public dance organisers required 'the sanction of clergy, police and judiciary'.[22] Because of this censorship by the government, Ó Drisceoil used the term of both socially and culturally restrictive to describe the Irish Free State in this period.[23] The role of the press is also important to note in this regard. Keating refers to both Ryan and Ferriter to argue that Irish newspapers, both local and national, covered cases of sexual crime regularly.[24] Many newspapers included articles that discussed the negative impact and often alarming and extreme rhetoric used to describe the effect that jazz and dancing was having on Irish society.

The role of the Catholic Church was an essential reason behind the anxieties and fears surrounding jazz and dancing. McGarry argues that 'in few other modern states did the Catholic Church wield such power and or face so little political or intellectual opposition' as the Irish Free State.[25] As mentioned before, the bishops and clergy were heavily influential in the attitudes during the period. Browne argues that in the aftermath of the foundation of the Irish Free State in 1922 'the influence of Rome was seen everywhere'.[26] Sermons by priests and clergy were often gloomy and provided harsh criticism of modern values and the need for Ireland to remain pure and moral. Jazz and dancing was a heavy target for the clergy. Ferriter states that the clergy believed they 'battled socialism, communism and, of course, the greatest sin of all – lust' in leading public and political opinion against these

[20] Smyth, 'Dancing, depravity and all that jazz', p. 53.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ferriter, *Occasions of sin*, p. 179.
[23] *Irish Examiner*, 26 May 2014.
[24] Anthony Keating, 'Sexual crime in the Irish Free State', p. 136.
[25] Fearghal McGarry, 'Fascism and Catholicism in interwar Ireland' in Jan Nelis (ed.), *Fascism and Catholicism in Europe* (New York, 2015).
[26] Nöel C. Browne, *Church and state in modern Ireland* (Belfast, 1991), p. 11.

activities.[27] Smyth claims that a recurring obsession with the Catholic Church for nearly a decade was 'the dangers attributed to the morals of the young posed by unlicensed dance halls and unsupervised dancing of any sort'.[28] However, it is important to highlight that Smyth makes the argument that while the clergy were not opposed to dancing directly as long as it was Irish dancing, alongside supervision by them.[29] This supports the apparent fear of the effect of jazz and dancing was having on Irish tradition by using the example of Irish dancing.

The interwar period in the Irish Free State also experienced Catholic conservative opinion outside the Catholic Church. This was in the form of various groups and movements set up in the 1920s and 1930s to campaign in favour of censorship. These societies such as the Gaelic League were associated and concerned with projecting the Irish way of life against a foreign threat. Throughout the period, there were other various lay groups and campaigns in the Free State including the Catholic Truth Society of Ireland, Irish Vigilance Association, An Rioghacht and the Legion of Mary. Wills points also to the influence of the Catholic corporatist movement and the rural cooperative movement Muintir na Tíre.[30] The emergence of these new Catholic lay organizations meant that the Irish Free State's 'Catholic identity was further developed'.[31] A notable example of the attempt to censor jazz by these groups includes the Gaelic League's anti-jazz campaign, which launched in 1934. In a statement, the Gaelic League announced that jazz and dancing's 'influence is denationalising in that its references are to things foreign to Irishmen'.[32] The movement even attacked the then Minister for Finance Seán MacEntee for allowing jazz to be broadcast on radio. Another example of the concerns over public dance halls was the case of Jim Gralton and the Pearse-Connolly Hall. Gralton ran a dance hall in County Leitrim against the wishes of the clergy, the police and local representatives including politicians. In the end, Gralton

[27] Ferriter, *Occasions of sin*, p. 178.
[28] Smyth, 'Dancing, depravity and all that jazz', p. 51.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Wills, *That neutral island*, p. 25.
[31] Maurice Curtis, '"Miraculous meddlers": the Catholic Action Movement' in *History Ireland*, xviii no. 5 (2010), p. 36.
[32] Smyth, 'Dancing, depravity and all that jazz', p. 54.

was deported and the hall burnt down for refusing to back down.[33] This incident highlights the real power that the clergy and politicians held in influencing attitudes.

The common theme of the concerns and anxieties in the Irish Free State is not exclusive to jazz and dancing. It is also intertwined with other concerns with mass culture in the same period. These included concerns with film and cinema including literature alongside concerns about the increase in modernity, materialism and consumerism. Opponents of all these new types of technology and themes that emerged in this period saw them all as an interlinked threat. There was a constant fear amongst Irish catholic elites on the matter of sexual behaviour and sexual immorality. Conservatives in Ireland did everything to project Ireland as a pure and moral nation.

The final part of the essay will address the question over the importance of the context of the Irish Free State in comparison to other European states throughout the period. Moral concerns, the worry of the effect on wider society and the potential to change people's attitudes on certain social issues were not exclusive to Ireland. In addition, the concern over the influence of American jazz was similar throughout all Europe, not just the Irish Free State. Many European states were worried about the effect of the English language was having on national language. Throughout many European states, jazz was condemned; it received ultimately very negative responses in Fascist Italy and even created anxiety in Britain. Jazz was banned in the Soviet Union as the Soviet authorities described it, in 1927, as 'bourgeois music' that did not fit with the proletarian society.[34] In Nazi Germany, nightclubs were banned and jazz was condemned. Britain also had concerns about the presence of nightclubs and dancing was having in this period. An anxiety about gender and the connection to jazz and dancing was also evident throughout Europe as well. However, what ultimately made Ireland unique was how the ideology of the Catholic Church and Catholic ideals were behind the motives of different campaigns and movements against jazz and public dance halls. McGarry states that in contrast to the rest of Europe the Catholic Church experienced a dominant position within society and

[33] *Irish Times*, 24 May 2014.
[34] *Irish Examiner*, 25 Jan. 1927.

politics.[35] Catholic ideology was the main driving force behind censorship in the Irish Free State. What also made Ireland unique was the emphasis of the threat towards Irish national identity in recent aftermath of the Free State gaining sovereignty from Britain. Irish moral concerns and responses to mass culture such as jazz and dancing are distinctive but most importantly in the context of inter war Europe the Irish Free State was not unique in its anxieties.

In summary, from the evidence above there were many reasons to explain why there were anxieties about jazz and dancing in the Irish Free State. These reasons include the fear of jazz and dancing threatening the moral and pure Irish Free State as well as the fear of foreign influences effecting Irish way of life and identity. Additionally, the effect on society and social behaviour with a particular worry about the effect on women, the role of politicians, the influence of the Catholic Church, and the role of grassroots movements in this period. It is also important to note that jazz and dancing were part of a wider anxiety over other areas of mass culture such as cinema and literature. Finally, it concluded that while the Irish Free State's anxiety about jazz and dancing were not unique, what was important in the Irish context was the role of the Catholic Church behind these fears and anxieties.

[35] McGarry, 'Fascism and Catholicism', p. 15.

James Henry Hammond and the justification of human bondage in the American South

Hugh Maguire

Revisionist historians like James and Dorothy Volo assert that 'the American form of slavery was 'the most awful the world has ever known' and characterized by 'frightful Barbarities'.[1] However, during the eighteenth and nineteenth-century, slavery was synonymous with American history and many, especially in the Southern States of America, attempted to justify and legitimate the continued existence and practice of slavery as a form of human bondage. Many historians have discussed why the practice of human bondage was so integral to America and how advocates of this practice justified it during the aforementioned period. For example, Miller and Smith assert that the fundamental way in which these pro-slavery advocates set about trying to achieve their aim of justifying and continuing slavery as an institution was by stressing how the American economy, North and South, 'relied upon the labor of Afro-American slaves'.[2] Essentially, the products made in the industrialised North were made from raw materials, like cotton, from the South, without slaves to harvest the raw materials then the economy of the United States would have stagnated, and may even have collapsed. However, this assertion alone was simply not compelling enough to successfully rationalise the continuation of slavery in America, those in favour of continuing the practice of slavery in the Antebellum South in the United States used a wide spectrum of different and separate arguments to justify the continuation of such a 'cruel and abhorrent institution'.[3]

One such policy employed by slave owners and pro-slavery advocates in this era was the power of analogy; B.R. Hergenhahn defines an analogy as 'a partial

[1] James M. Volo and Dorothy Denneen Volo, *Family life in 17th- and 18th-century America* (Connecticut, 2006), p. 395.
[2] Randall M. Miller and John David Smith, *Dictionary of Afro-American slavery* (Connecticut, 1997), p. 471.
[3] *Ibid.*

similarity between like features of two things, on which a comparison may be based'.[4] Essentially, the argument that slave owners and pro-slavery advocates in the American South saw as most promising and persuasive to the American population was that slavery could be compared to a different institution, law or societal norm and by relating and comparing; it to this then slavery would be validated. When discussing this theory as a way of persuading others to believe in a certain ideology, Zarefsky states that the 'power of the analogy is that it uses a known and clear case to frame our understanding of a difficult or ambiguous case'.[5] Thus far, the debate surrounding whether or not slavery, as a form of human bondage in America, could be justified was due to the fact that the 'status of the slave was ambiguous; was it more like that of a human being or more like that of property?'.[6] Pro-slavery advocates exploited this ambiguity and uncertainty surrounding the social, political and anthropological status of a slave in order to legitimate and perpetuate its existence by manipulating the discourse of this topic to coincide with the ideology that 'slaves were like any other class of property and should be treated accordingly'.[7] In essence, these supporters attempted to dehumanise slaves and show those, in eighteenth century United States, that slaves were a commodity and had been traded between plantation owners and countries for decades beforehand and as such, this established market and commerce should be allowed to continue. Furthermore, they also condoned this practice and school of thinking to a wide audience as a result of asserting that slaves were little more than property. This analogy allowed them to justify slavery because one would not claim that a man's house that he had bought or built was not his own and if they did then one would simply show the deeds to that house and prove it to be his. A slave was no different to anything else a man owned, they were property belonging to their master through legally binding documents. Henceforth, by comparing slavery to other social norms such as free commerce, a key actor in a capitalist society like the US, or ownership

[4] B.R. Hergenhahn and Matthew H. Olson, *An introduction to theories of learning* (Prentice Hall, 1988), p. 23.
[5] David Zarefsky, *Rhetorical perspectives on argumentation: selected essays by David Zarefsky* (Berlin, 2014), p. 173.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.

of property and other accepted societal functions in a clear and comprehensive way, slave owners justified slavery.

In his Mudsill speech, addressed to the Senate in March 1858, James Henry Hammond stated that 'in all social systems there must be a class to do the menial duties, to perform the drudgery of life'.[8] This assertion highlights the fact that slave owners and other elite whites in the deep Antebellum South did indeed manipulate and clearly reveal the link between the world's greatest empires and civilisations and their use of slavery in order to grow and develop into the great cultures they became. Thus far, pro-slavery advocates and supporters were quick to illustrate the similarities between the economic, social and political development of the United States and the 'advances made by the centralized societies of the Egyptians and Romans', both of which they affirmed 'were made on the backs of slaves exploited by the elite in society'.[9] For example, the fact that 'the first independent ruler of Muslim Egypt, relied very heavily on black slaves'[10] accompanied by the idea that 'throughout the ancient world, people relied on slaves to do almost all their work'[11] legitimated slavery as a form of bondage in America during the nineteenth century. At the heart of this method of justification for slavery, was that it was necessary for every great culture to achieve the heights that it did. If America wanted to become a great and powerful civilisation then the continuation of slavery was going to play a fundamental role. As such, the incidence of slavery throughout history and throughout the world, especially Europe, gifted these slave owners and white political elites the opportunity to compare themselves and the remainder of the white population in the United States to the most successful civilisations and Empires in history. Additionally, it allowed the comparison on how their reliance on slavery caused them to become so successful and therefore necessitated that America continues the practice of human bondage. Essentially slaveholders and the white

[8] John S.C. Abbott, *Lives of the presidents of the United States of America: from Washington to the present time. Containing a narrative of the most interesting events in the career of each president; thus constituting a graphic history of the United States* (Boston, San Francisco, 1867), p. 439.
[9] R.K. Koslowsky, *A world perspective through 21st century eyes: the impact of science on society* (Victoria, 2004), p. 8.
[10] Bernard Lewis, *Race and slavery in the Middle East: a historical enquiry* (Oxford, 1992), p. 65.
[11] Joyce E. Salisbury, *Rome's Christian Empress: Galla Placidia rules at the twilight of the empire*, JHU Press (Baltimore, 2015), p. 19.

elite in Southern America justified the prevalence of, reliance on and thus continuation of slavery as an institution by insisting that if America was going to be one of these great civilisations then they must use slavery to build its foundations, as these historical examples had shown. A justification that once again proves the power of the analogy; white slave owners compared the similarities that existed between America and previous, celebrated civilisations to justify slavery.

Alternatively, rather than looking to the past for ways in which to validate the institution of human bondage in America, other slave owners looked to the present day and the direction in which America's future was heading for. For example, John Henry Hopkins – a Bishop and key figure in nineteenth-century Protestantism in America – contended in 1857 that the American constitution had an inherently Christian character that all Americans were obliged to consider.[12] As such, pro-slavery advocates in positions of power, like Governor John L. Wilson, John C. Calhoun and indeed Hammond himself, manipulated this idea that America was Christian in nature and its population had a duty to uphold Christian morals and principles in order to rationalize slavery as a type of human bondage. As Morrison states, the whole foundation upon which the slaveholding ethic and the pro-slavery argument was built was the scriptural defence of slavery, he also continues to assert that 'nearly every proslavery pamphlet, or article, or speaker made at least some reference to a biblical sanction of slavery'.[13] An example of how slave owners and pro-slavery advocates manipulated scripture by interpreting it in a literal rather than allegorical sense, is when Reverend Frederick Dalcho, a key factor in the American Episcopalian Church, declared that all Africans, as descendants of Canaan and Ham (figures in the Bible who were cursed by Noah), were to be condemned to the 'lowest state of servitude, slavery'.[14]

Further to this idea that a justification for slavery could be found in religious doctrine and more specifically Biblical scripture, another prominent figure in

[12] John Henry Hopkins, *The American citizen: his rights and duties according to the spirit of the Constitution of the United States* (New York, 1857), p. 76.
[13] Larry R. Morrison, 'The religious defense of American slavery before 1830' in *Journal of Religious Thought*, vol. 37 (Washington D.C., 1981), p. 16.
[14] Ibid.

America Protestantism, Richard Furman, asserted that slavery was morally and lawfully right 'on the grounds that it could serve as a vehicle for the Christianising and civilizing of the slave'.[15] Upon working together, the two ministers decided the best way to validate slavery and avoid danger from clashes with black slaves was not to take the Bible away from the Negroes but to 'take measures to bringing them to a more full & just acquaintance with religious principles'.[16] Essentially, to manipulate and adapt Biblical scripture to perpetuate the repression and oppression of black slaves; converting slaves to Christianity gave them access to the ideas of equality and liberty, however, if slavery was to continue, the way they were taught to interpret the Bible had to be tailored towards a reward in heaven for all the years of work on Earth – an incentive to keep them working for their masters. Henceforth, slave owners and white elites seized the opportunity to relate the practice of human bondage on a largely Christian population by manipulating Biblical scripture in such a way that they could validate the existence of slavery as a moral good and a divine decree.

In addition to the justification of slavery as a form and practice of human bondage in the Southern states, slaveholders also rationalised this institution by stating its paternalistic nature and benevolent origins. Indeed, Furman himself portrayed 'slavery as kindly paternalism'[17] by positively identifying and exploiting the link between the slave master and the guardian or father role in a family accompanied by the contention that slaves became a part of his family and the care of ordering for it, and of providing for its welfare, devolves on him[18]. Thus far, these references to familial bonds and paternal responsibilities, the master caring for his slaves and tending to the provision of welfare (being seen by a Doctor), show how slaveholding whites validated the practice of human bondage by declaring it benevolent in nature and stating that without it these black slaves would be struggling to survive. In other words, slave owners were facilitating a good life for slaves. Despite this, historians like Miller and Campbell contend that the rise of

[15] Janet Duitsman Cornelius, *Slave missions and the black church in the Antebellum South* (South Carolina, 1999), p. 75.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.

paternalism, religious doctrine and the historical prevalence as justifications for slavery was as a direct response to the growing strength of the abolition movement from the 1830s onwards.[19] Essentially, with the advent of the petition and mail campaigns of 1835 - whereby radical abolitionist forced America to address the question of slavery by saturating the postal service with anti-slavery literature and 'bombarding Congress with petitions'[20] – 'Southern politicians and writers constructed a range of new "pro-slavery" arguments that depicted the institution as a positive good'.[21] Although 'expressions of lower south whites' acceptance of paternalism as the dominant ideology of slavery' did indeed multiply after 1835, this ideological doctrine had already manifested itself in Southern slave-owner discourse on slavery.

Upon reading the Secret Diary of William Byrd II of Virginia, and analysing the language, which he uses throughout this document, his assertions on slave ownership, become clear. For example when he writes 'all my sick people were better, thank God'[22], this reveals that despite being a slave-owner he did indeed have genuine concern for his slaves and had a vested interest in their welfare. Further to this, Calhoun and his anti-abolition committee declared that 'in all the old States where it exists, it resembles in a great measure a happy patriarchal state in which the benevolence and kindness of the master, and the fidelity and affection of the slave, combine in the most bland and harmonious manner'.[23] A relationship which directly reflected and mirrored that of a typical white family in the Antebellum South, with the Father in the position of power and respect and the rest of his family looking up to and appreciating the kindness he shows to them; this kindness and benevolence being clothing them, feeding them and protecting them. Henceforth, there are similarities in the relationship between slaves and their masters, whereby their masters housed them on his land, gave them clothes, food to eat, and even showed

[19] James Campbell and Vivien Miller, *Transnational penal cultures: new perspectives on discipline, punishment and desistance* (Abingdon, 2014), p. 57.
[20] John Murrin et al, *Liberty, Equality, Power: Concise* (6th ed., Boston, 2010), p. 303.
[21] Vivien Miller and James Campbell, *Transnational Penal Cultures*, p. 57.
[22] William Byrd II, *The Diary of William Byrd II of Virginia, 1709-1712* (taken from the entry on 31 December 1710)
http://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/pds/becomingamer/economies/text5/williambyrddiary.pdf
[23] John C. Calhoun and William Edwin Hemphill, *The papers of John C. Calhoun, vol. 12, 1833-1838* (South Carolina, 1959), p. 550.

them enough kindness to permit Sundays off. Consequently, this justified the practice of human bondage during this era due to the fact as this rigid patriarchal society, as James Henry Hammond affirms, was 'the sacred and natural system'.[24]

In addition to Hammond's belief that the practice and maintenance of slavery as a form of human bondage was simply the sacred and natural system he also personally concluded, in his diary, that for the black population across America, being kept in this system human bondage would 'be their happiest earthly condition'.[25] He justified this assertion, and thus the institution of slavery, by stating that to free and liberate the Southern slaves would be detrimental to their development, due to the fact that he believed that they were inherently inferior to whites and that 'the least component of black blood made one a black, an inferior, and fitted for slavery'.[26] Indeed this justification of slavery does reveal once again how pro-slavery advocates and slave owners validated this institution through the idea that it was beneficial to them and that 'regardless of race, life in the agricultural South was healthier than in cities'[27], like New York in the liberal North. However, Hammond's beliefs here highlight the significant role racism played in helping to rationalise slavery as a form of human bondage. When discussing the brand of racism that helped justify slavery in the South during the nineteenth century it becomes clear that slave owners and many 'white folk' did not just view them as different because this was the discourse surrounding slaves and black people at the time, their views were validated by science.

As such, it was this scientific racism that justified slavery; scientific racism was 'the belief that racial inequalities were rooted in the biological nature of different human races'.[28] Samuel George Morton's book published in 1868 determined that the differing head sizes and shapes of blacks and whites revealed the black races inferiority, lending scientific support to the idea that blacks were

[24] Lacy K. Ford, *Deliver us from evil: the slavery question in the Old South* (Oxford, 1999), p. 515.
[25] Carol K. Bleser and James Henry Hammond, *Secret and sacred: the diaries of James Henry Hammond, a southern slaveholder* (South Carolina, 1997), p. 20.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Benjamin Frankel, *History in dispute: slavery in the Western Hemisphere, c. 1500-1888* (Boston, 2003), p. 80.
[28] William E. Burns, *Science and technology in Colonial America* (Connecticut, 2005), p. 158.

intellectually and emotionally incapable of coping with free life.[29] Despite this, to grasp the concept of scientific racism in the America during this era one must begin with Jefferson.[30] This is because his 'pseudo-scientific racism in his Notes on the State of Virginia'[31], linking blacks to apes rather than humans – 'helped to invent racism as an intellectually credible viewpoint'[32] and 'created the mythic "American race"'.[33] This served to perpetuate slavery and racial inequality through asserting that non-whites were neither American nor human and thus did not deserve the same rights as either one. Henceforth, by manipulating biological facts and differences surrounding the anatomy of both blacks and whites, slave owners, like Jefferson and Hammond, were able to justify slavery as a brand of human bondage – as to leave these feebleminded and underdeveloped people to govern their own lives would, as Hammond said, be a 'cruelty to them'.[34]

In summary, pro-slavery advocates, like slave owners and other members of the white social and political elite in the American South, were able to justify and rationalise the institution of slavery as a form of human bondage in a number of ways. This included through exploiting the ambiguous status of slaves, asserting that they were an inferior species and vehemently stating that it was a benevolent venture. Indeed, they justified the continuation of this institution in this way. However, they were not wholly successful in actually validating it on a nationwide scale; the Southern States accepted these arguments as their intellectual worlds, 'from which the concepts and categories of thought are invariably drawn.'[35] Incorporated in this is the notion that people are 'constrained by the limitations of'[36] and shaped whilst living and participating in slave societies their entire lives,

[29]Josiah Clark Nott *et al.*, *Types of mankind or ethnological researches: based upon the ancient monuments, paintings, sculptures, and crania of races, and upon their natural, geographical, philological, and biblical history* (Philadelphia, 1868).
[30] Gregory Michael Dorr, *Segregation's science: eugenics and society in Virginia* (Virginia, 2008).
[31] Annette Gordon-Reed, *Thomas Jefferson and Sally Hamings: an American controversy* (Virginia, 1999), p. 134.
[32] Paul Finkelman, *Slavery and the founders: race and liberty in the age of Jefferson* (New York, 2014), p. 268.
[33] Gregory Michael Dorr, *Segregation's science*, p. 27.
[34] Carol K. Bleser and James Henry Hammond, *Secret and sacred*, p. 19.
[35] Anna Green and Kathleen Troup, *The houses of history: a critical reader in twentieth-century history and theory* (Manchester, 1999), p. 7.
[36] Ibid.

whereas the North remained more liberal in nature and thus assumed an anti-slavery position. Slave-owners were able to justify the practice of human bondage during the nineteenth century to an audience already accepting of it, not a demographic opposed to it.

‘Straying from the Shining Path’ How Peru Rejected the Ideology of the Sendero

Darren McMahon

> ‘Our chief is Gonzalo, he of brilliant thought and action, inspired by Marx, Lenin and Mao he develops, our powerful ideology, and brings to a burning world, the invincible people’s war’.[1]

The case of Peru and the Sendero Luminoso (or Shining Path) offers a unique perspective in the examination of how terrorist groups adopt communist theory and practice. As leader of the Sendero, Abimael Guzman built on the writings of communism, formulating an ideology which he believed could liberate Peru from capitalism. It became clear that the teachings of Marx alone would not be applicable to Peruvian life, opting to further develop an ideology that included Leninism and Maoism. Guzman would use the works of Mao Zedong as a template for his party’s ideology and strategy, understanding the importance of rural peasant life in Peru, something that vastly differed from Marx. Describing itself as the fourth sword of Marxism, Guzman set high standards for the Sendero, attempting to stand on par with the great figureheads of communism.[2] This essay aims to exam the ideology of the Sendero, critiquing how successfully the group applied it into strategy. Guzman’s strategy aimed at winning the hearts and minds of Peruvian society and culture, in order to overthrow bourgeoisie capitalism.

Throughout the 1960s and 70s, Peru’s economy suffered many setbacks, creating a large divide between the coastal urban areas, such as Lima, and the rural highland areas of southern Peru. As a result of Peru’s decrepit economy, murmurs of revolt and revolution grew. During the 1960s, leftist politician Hugo Blanco aimed to unite the middle and lower classes in a land revolution**.** Blanco favoured land

[1] A hymn of the Sendero Luminoso quoted in: Orin Starn, ‘Maoism in the Andes: The Communist Party of Peru- Shining Path and the refusal of history’, in *Journal of Latin American Studies,* xxvii (1995), p. 399.
[2] Central Committee Communist Party of Peru, *Don’t Vote! Instead, expand the guerrilla warfare to conquer power for the people* (Peru, translated by the Peru People’s Movement, 1985); Colin Harding, ‘Antonio Díaz Martínez and the Ideology of Sendero Luminoso’, in *Bulletin of Latin American Research,* vii (1988), p. 65.

reform as a good alternative to violent revolution.[3] Undeniably, Blanco had become unable to successfully radicalise the peasants through his strategy. Expanding on the ideals of Peruvian leftist critic José Carlos Mariáteigui, Guzman sought to criticise the anti-imperialist American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) for their lack of ambition.[4] Frustrated with the inaction of the already in-place Peruvian Communist Party, Abimael Guzman formed Sendero after a number of visits to China. At this time, he held the position of Professor of Philosophy at the National University of San Cristobal de Huamanga in Ayacucho, Peru.[5] Guzman used his position in the university as a way of forming a strong pre-war social base in the Ayacucho department. This department would later be the central location for the group after it went to war.[6] The Sendero attempted to marry Marxist, Leninist and Maoist theory in an attempt to radically alter Peruvian culture and society. However, as it pursued its policy of violence, the Sendero lost the appeal of its own proposed proletariat.

The Sendero appeared during a time of economic contraction, which began in the mid-1970s and ran through until the 1990s. During this time, the gross domestic product per-capita declined at an average rate of 2.16 per cent, and wages by 3.89 per cent. Annual inflation raised by an alarming rate, averaging at 293.5 percent, exceeding one thousand per cent at times.[7] Indeed, the situation in Peru at the time could be seen as a perfect opportunity for revolution. Military regimes did not help the flailing economy. By 1980, the military had decided to give control back to the people through the means of democratic elections. Guzman saw this as an opportunity for the Sendero to gain popular support. Huntington writes that '…the broadening of participation transforms the society into a mass praetorian system. In such a system the opportunity to create political institutions passes from

[3] Hugo Blanco, *Land of death: the peasant struggle in Peru* (New York, 1973), p. 120.
[4] Mariáteigui was responsible for setting up socialist trade unions and left organizations such as the CCTP (General Confederation of Peruvian Workers); also see: Starn, *Maoism in the Andes*, pp 407-8. Cyrus Ernesto Zirakzadeh, *Social movements in politics: a comparative study* (New York, 1997), p. 188.
[5] Gordon H. McCormick, *The Shining Path and the future of Peru* (California, 1990), p. 3.
[6] Paul Staniland, *Networks of rebellion: explaining insurgent cohesion and collapse* (London, 2014), p. 23.
[7] Ernesto Zirakzadeh, *Social Movements*, p. 169.

the military, the apostles of order, to… the apostles of revolution'.[8] Huntington's statement has strong resonance for pre-election Peru in 1980. After years of minor peasant revolts and rise of left-wing politics, Guzman saw an opportunity for the Sendero. It is clear that this thinking dominated the strategy of the Sendero at this time, who sought to use the uncertainty of election time to influence peasant workers and Peruvian society.

Moreover, Guzman attempted to build on the work of communist leaders, ushering through a new wave of thinking. This evolved into what was known as Gonzalo Thought, the ideology and strategy of the Sendero. A number of key themes in Gonzalo Thought can be seen which have built on the works of his communist comrades. These include; the emphasis on class struggle, major anti-imperialistic undertones, the Sendero portrayed as a vanguard party or people's party, and the use of political violence to achieve goals.[9] In their waging of this war, the Sendero sought to promote violence in order to gain control of the population.[10] In essence, Guzman created a Marxism-Leninism-Maoism ideology, which he described as the next evolution of communism.[11] This evolved into Gonzalo Thought, with Guzman adopting the nom de guerre of President Gonzalo. Guzman saw himself and the Sendero as the fourth sword of Marxism, ready to take up the fight against capitalism in Peru.[12] The ideology of Guzman's Sendero lies rooted in the teachings and practices of communist theory. More importantly, the ideology of the Shining Path draws from the teachings of Marx, Lenin and Mao. Guzman formulated the ideology of Gonzalo Thought, which blended many of the core principles of these three figures of communism.

Gonzalo Thought's first main principle can be associated with class struggle. Class undoubtedly plays a key role in Marxist analysis, believing that there is an essential harmony of interest between various social groups. As a result, society will

[8] Samuel Huntington, *Political order in changing society* (New Haven, 1968), p. 262.
[9] Starn, *Maoism in the Andes*, p. 410.
[10] Paul Staniland, 'States, insurgents, and wartime political orders' in *Perspectives on Politics*, x no. 2 (2012), p. 245.
[11] Central Committee Communist Party of Peru, *Interview with Chairman Gonzalo, Gonzalo* (Peru, translated by the Peru People's Movement, 1988).
[12] McCormick, *The Shining Path*, p. 3.

also comprise some form of class conflict.[13] Indeed, this conflict became a foundation for the Sendero and it was used as a basis in the formulation of the People's War. Guzman pitted the peasants of the southern highland areas of Peru against the urban, capitalist bourgeoisie. Marxist theory shares the view that the social world should be analysed as a totality. Marxism also follows the idea of the materialist concept of history, outlining that historical change reflects the economic development of society. This change centres on the tension between the means of production and the relations of production, which combined form the base of any society.[14] Indeed, this had become true of Peru from the mid-1960s onwards. The Shining Path addressed a need to combat the imperialism which had dominated Peru since 1960.[15] Indeed this closely relates with some of Lenin's ideology and writings. Indeed, Guzman's war against imperialism collaborates with Lenin's ideas of the core versus the periphery. In Marxist theory, capitalism was seen to have entered the highest and final stage, through the development of monopoly capitalism. Through the lens of monopolies, a two-tier system develops in the world economy, with a dominant ore exploiting a less-developed periphery.[16] Furthermore, Lenin argued that 'that imperialism is leading to annexation, to increased national oppression, and, consequently, also to increasing resistance'.[17] The Sendero played on Peruvian's struggles and pain caused through years of military regimes and pain.[18]

Perhaps the most crucial aspect of the Shining Path's ideology and strategy rests with its identity as a vanguard party, responsible for waging a war of the people. The People's War became a central ideological trait of the Sendero, with Guzman emphasizing his position as its leader. While Guzman saw the Sendero as Marxist-Leninist-Maoist in ideology, his teachings resonated more in practice with Mao. Marx believed that:

[13] John Baylis, Patricia Owens and Steve Smith, *The globalization of world politics: an introduction to international relations* (Oxford, 2014), p. 144.
[14] Ibid., p. 143.
[15] Central Committee Communist Party of Peru, *Interview with Chairman Gonzalo*.
[16] Baylis, *The globalization of world politics,* p. 145.
[17] Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, *Imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism: a popular outline* (Moscow, 1963).
[18] Sendero recruitment and propaganda played on decade's worth of the hardship suffered by the Peruvian people. This tactic is in points one and two of Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, 'Mechanisms of political radicalization: pathways towards terrorism' in *Terrorism and Political Violence,* xx no. 3, (2008), 417-20.

> The bourgeoisie has subjected the country (side) to the rule of the towns. It has created enormous cities, has greatly increased the urban population as compared with the rural, and has thus rescued a considerable part of the population from the idiocy of rural life.[19]

Like Mao, Guzman rejects the Marxist theory of the urban proletariat, focusing on the importance of the rural peasants as a revolutionary army. Indeed, this can also be true of Peru in the years after the formulation of the Sendero. This characteristic of the Sendero became more concerned with the conflict between the landlords and the peasants, rather than the conflict between capitalists and workers.[20] The vanguard would use guerrilla warfare as the strategy against the government, standing up against what Guzman saw as 'bureaucratic capitalism' and thus resulting in '…the development of the political economy of socialism'.[21] Like Blanco, Guzman aimed to unite the peasant communities and organisations, demanding patience in its war against capitalism.[22]

The guerrilla warfare would use political violence as a way of pushing the People's War. This aspect linked itself more closely with the ideology of Mao specifically. Indeed, this need for political violence, especially against the peasant population, raises a cause for concern. Like Lenin and Mao, Guzman saw himself as a revolutionary Marxist, maintaining that imperialism and violence were inevitable under capitalist rule.[23] Combined with the strategy of guerrilla warfare, political violence would dominate the Sendero's activities from 1980. The Sendero's booklet on guerrilla warfare asked the proletariat to give their hearts and minds for the good of the revolution stating that 'He, who is not afraid of death by a thousand cuts, dares to overthrow the emperor'.[24] Indeed, the Sendero believed that members of the proletariat should be prepared to sacrifice themselves for revolution. The first phase of the People's War would begin in the highland areas of Ayacucho. Guzman hoped that the Sendero could drive the government out of the areas surrounding Ayacucho,

[19] Frederick Engels and Karl Marx, *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (Moscow, 1969).
[20] Maurice Meisner, *Mao Zedong: a political and intellectual portrait* (Cambridge, 2007), p. 43.
[21] Central Committee Communist Party of Peru, *Interview with Chairman Gonzalo.*
[22] Blanco, *Land or death,* pp 120-4.
[23] J.A. Hobson, *Imperialism: a study* (London, 1988), p. 34.
[24] Central Committee Communist Party of Peru, *Let us Develop Guerrilla Warfare* (Peru, translated by the people's movements, 1982).

with the Sendero assuming control thereafter. The final phase of the war would result in the Sendero taking the urban areas, like the state capital of Lima. The use of violence would be used to strike fear into those who opposed them. Guzman sought to use violence to strike fear into and paralyze the opposition. This would be followed by overwhelming force that would demolish the enemy.[25]

Most interestingly, through the use of violence, the Sendero actually benefited from early successes, particularly around the areas of Ayacucho. The surge in support for the Sendero came as a surprise. Mario Fumerton outlined that 'the news from Huancayo astounded the entire nation, which was of the general (though erroneous) opinion that Shining Path enjoyed near unanimous acceptance among the Ayacuchan peasantry'.[26] The Sendero became the first group in Peru to successfully apply guerrilla warfare, so much so that fighting obstructed daily life in Lima.[27] From 1980 to 1982, it became responsible for distributing confiscated goods, such as livestock plundered from the wealthy and the merchants. On occasions, the group had been associated with the executions of shopkeepers, or merchants, whom had been accused of exploiting peasants.[28] Furthermore, the Sendero withstood heavily military oppression and still managed to slightly expand its operational base.[29] From 1980 to 1983, the Sendero were responsible for approximately 615 deaths, while also carrying out over 2,500 acts of sabotage.[30] This strategy vastly differed from the works and teachings of Peruvian revolutionaries of the 1960s. The Sendero differed from their revolutionary compatriots of those who came before in Peru. Where Blanco sought to usher land reform as revolution, Guzman aimed to promote violence as a revolutionary catalyst. Members of the party were always indigenous

[25] Stathis N. Kalyvas, 'The paradox of terrorism in civil wars' in *The Journal of Ethics*, viii (2004), p. 100.
See also: Central Committee Communist Party of Peru, *Interview with Chairman Gonzalo, Section III, People's War.*
[26] Mario Fumerton, 'Rondas Campesinas in the Peruvian civil war: peasant self-defence organizations in Ayacucho' in *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, xx no. 4 (2001), p. 471.
[27] Cynthia McClintock, 'Why peasants rebel: the case of Peru's Sendero Luminoso' in *World Politics*, xxxvii no. 1 (1984), p. 48.
[28] Fumerton, 'Rondas Campesinas', pp 474-5.
[29] Sandra Woy-Hazelton and William A. Hazelton, 'Sendero Luminoso and the future of Peruvian democracy' in *Third World Quarterly*, xii no. 2 (1990), p. 21.
[30] McClintock, 'Why peasants rebel', p. 52.

to the regions of conflict. They also became adept at concealing their identities, making government intelligence efforts futile.[31]

Staniland writes that 'in some areas at some times, insurgents and the state are locked in a vicious struggle to the death. In others, both tacit and formal norms have emerged about the "red lines" above which insurgent violence will lead to a state crackdown.[32] Staniland's writings are applicable to Peru, even long before the Sendero came to prominence. The writing of Blanco proves that Peru is an ideal setting to test Staniland's work. Although Guzman's strategy vastly differed from Blanco, both idealised that the proletariat would be willing to sacrifice their lives for the cause.[33] Indeed, the early successes of the Sendero resulted in a brutal response from the Belaúnde regime. While the early 1980's became a time of early success for the Sendero, their reactions to government reprisals resulted in escalated violence from both sides. Mao describes violence as a way of agitating and antagonising the government, which was certainly the strategy of Guzman.[34]

However, as the 1980's progressed, the Sendero's use of brutal violence on peasants and other civilians can be seen as an aberration of its initial strategy. As the war against the government waged on, the Sendero launched a series of attacks against members of the civilian population. These particularly included assassinations of priests, the killings of women and the abduction of teenagers in an attempt to "re-educate" them in the ways of the Sendero. Indeed these tensions became a direct result of the brutal killings carried out by the Shining Path from 1980 onwards. The Shining Path stands alone from the rest of the Peruvian left wing in its continuous killings of members of the Catholic Church, both men and women.[35] The assassination of priest Victor Acuna while he celebrated mass was particularly condemned. Furthermore, the killing of Good Shepard Nun, Sister Maria Agustina Rivas Lopez, who was begging the Sendero to spare the lives of

[31] Ibid., p. 81.
[32] Staniland, 'States, Insurgents', p. 243.
[33] Blanco, *Land or death,* p. 118.
[34] Mao Tse-tung, 'On Contradiction' in *Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Tse-tung* (Peking, 1967), p.102.
[35] Jeffrey Klaiber SJ, *The church, dictatorships and democracy in Latin America* (New York, 1998), p. 141.

innocent villagers, was signified as a clear departure of the original ideology and strategy of the Sendero.[36] Therefore, the use of violence undermines the idea of waging a People's War. Guzman proclaimed that the Shining Path would need to have "ideas pounded into their heads through dramatic deeds".[37] The message to Peru had become clear; terror, not broad support, will drive the Sendero insurgency into power.[38] Indeed, even as the Belaúnde government quickly tried to counteract the hostility of the Sendero; Guzman sought to escalate the party's political violence, to rally to proletariat.

Through this strategy, some saw that Guzman was attempting 'to find the right balance between preserving its identity and ideological purity while building a mass base of supporters and sympathizers'.[39] However, Guzman and the Sendero lost its identity, culminating in a loss of support, through the explicit use of brutal violence against the unprotected civilian population. This can be seen with the Sendero's attempt to hunt down Ashaninka Indians, who lived in some of the mid-highland regions of Peru. The Sendero ruthlessly sought to eliminate the Ashaninka's for not cooperating with them. For failing to comply with their demands, the Sendero brutally tortured and murdered seventeen women and children. Indeed, these acts were another attempt to strike fear into the eyes of the civilians, in the hope of compliance.[40] The early success and resulting violence can also be explained as a form of 'honeymoon period' in the relationship between the Sendero guerrillas and the locals. When the Sendero took control over new territory, power shifts emerged between local communities over land. Manrique accounts that 'this action provoked Shining Path reprisals, which culminated in the execution of thirteen peasant leaders. The victims were kidnapped from their communities and assassinated in the central plaza of Chongos Alto'.[41] Indeed, this suggests that the

[36] Ibid., pp 136-7.
[37] Starn, 'Maoism in the Andes', p. 408.
[38] Robin Kirk, 'Murder in a shantytown: the Shining Path's war on hope' in *The Nation* (1992), p. 412.
[39] McCormick, *The Shining Path*, p. 46.
[40] US Department of Defense, *Ashaninka Indians in North Satipo also under SL attack*, (Washington, 1990), pp1042-3, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB96/900409.pdf (accessed 10 April 2016).
[41] Nelson Manrique quoted in: Stathis N. Kalyvas, 'The ontology of "political violence": action and identity in civil wars' in *Perspectives on Politics*, i no. 3 (2003), p. 480.

Sendero did not fully understand the structure and needs of the periphery. It was unable to peacefully settle land disputes, with the resulting violent bloodshed resulting in severely frayed relations between the Sendero and the periphery. Certainly, when comparing this to the ideology and strategy of the Sendero, it is clear that Guzman made massive assumptions with his strategy, presuming that once the Sendero had control of a territory; the proletariat would simply accept the new governance.

The differences between Gonzalo Thought and Maoism and Leninism can explain its own failure to win the hearts and minds of the Peruvian people. Firstly, Guzman outlined the need for the Shining Path to be as secular as possible. This would later become a problem when the Shining Path looked to counteract a remarkably progressive Catholic Church, which had the respect of Peruvian society. Guzman's decision to target the Peruvian peasants, priests and women fundamentally undercuts the original philosophies of the group. The decision to keep the Shining Path strictly secular undermines the party's own position. However, Guzman believed that the Church remained rooted in the colonialism and feudalism of the capitalist regime. Therefore, the Shining Path had no choice but to remain secular. Guzman believed that 'the Church fiercely defended feudalism- let me repeat, through great struggle it adapted itself to the bourgeois order and became once again an instrument at the service of the new exploiters and oppressors'.[42] This suggests that Guzman was not willing to alter communist teachings to incorporate the social and cultural needs of Peru.

While reports on the success of the group remain somewhat ambiguous and incoherent, the brutal violence of the Sendero had become noticed overseas.[43] Certain United States diplomatic and intelligence organizations showed the tensions

[42] Central Committee of the Communist Part of Peru, *Interview with Chairman Gonzalo.*
[43] The success of the Sendero varied from region to region. Although they were popular in areas like Ayacucho and Andahuaylas, it struggled with expansion into areas further north and less remote. See: Ronald H. Berg, 'Sendero Luminoso and the peasantry of Andahuaylas' in *Journal of Inter-American Studies and Affairs,* xxviii no. 4 (1986-7), p. 170; US Department of State, *Telegram: Peruvian terrorism turn bloodier, but not necessarily according to plan* (Washington, 1983), p. 2 http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB96/830408.pdf (accessed 21 April 2016); Zirakzadeh, *Social Movements,* p. 220.

between the group and the Peruvian people. Indeed, CIA and US State Department documents detail the tensions between the Shining Path and the peasant populations of southern Peru. Even from early in 1981, the CIA documented a number of tensions between the Shining Path and its proposed proletariat. The Shining Path was seen to '…have encountered hostility from peasant communities, which refuse to feed or shelter them'. [44] Indeed, Guzman's interpretation of the Maoist ideologies must be questioned, asking whether they had much relevance to Peruvian culture and day-to-day life. This becomes increasingly clear when examining the influence of the Rondas Campesinas, which became the symbol of the failure of the Sendero's ideology.[45] This questions the influence and success of the Sendero. Interestingly, scholarly works on the group suggest that its widespread support could have been exaggerated. Moreover, as a result of Church killings and the responses of Garcia and Fujimori, the ordinary Peruvian's ultimately rejected the terrorism of the Shining Path.[46] While the group gathered momentum from 1980 to 1982, they struggled to successfully blend the use of violence with expansion. The brutal killings by both the Sendero and the military led to many peasants and workers leaving their villages out of fear. This resulted in the Shining Path occupying zones that had become void of peasants, as a result of continued violence. Indeed, as a result, their legitimacy and success was overplayed. Although they controlled several areas in Southern Peru, they largely failed in winning the hearts and minds of the Peruvian people. However, this contradicts reports from the Directorate of Intelligence in the US. They claimed that the Sendero had gathered momentum up to 1987, severely challenging the presidency of Alan Garcia. Even in 1987, the DoI suggested that the 'Sendero is apparently expanding its ranks with fresh recruits,

[44] National Foreign Assessment Centre, *Latin America Review* (1981), p. 15 http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB96/810703.pdf (accessed 18 April 2016); Directorate of Intelligence, *Latin American Review* (Washington, 1982), p. 17 http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB96/820315.pdf (accessed 21 April 2016).

[45] The translation of Rondas Campesinas can even underline the failings of Sendero ideology. The word *Campesina* contains both class and ethnic connotations, while the literal translation means 'peasant rounds'. When villagers were asked to explain the term, they described it as 'poor, like us'. This improves the significance of the Rondas even more, showing how the Rondas were protectors of the unhappy peasant populace.
Berg, 'Sendero Luminoso', p. 188.

[46] Klaiber, *The church, dictatorships and democracy*, p. 142.

most of whom are Quechua-speaking Indians from the south-central Peruvian highlands'.[47]

Nonetheless, it became clear that Gonzalo Thought took too many outside influences and did not fully appreciate Peruvian heritage and culture. Indeed this suggests why the Shining Path could not develop a strong enough link with the general populace, the proletariat that Guzman strove to idealise. Furthermore, where Mao's Cultural Revolution became synonymous with an anti-intellectual thrust, Guzman's own revolutionary image was that of a college professor.[48] The ideology of Mao simply did not appeal to the Peruvian peasants. As seen above, the Maoist model called for the liberation of the countryside, ending market orientated production and dislodgment of the capitalist market key system.[49] Indeed, accounts from Peru seem to suggest that the peasants would not accept the Sendero way. In 1981, the Sendero had taken control and were openly active in the areas of Sacsamarca, Huanca Sancos and Lucanmarca. Once they had dispelled local police forces, the Sendero drastically altered social and economic life of the townspeople. Travel in and out of these areas was heavily controlled and all non-revolutionary meetings were banned. The life of farmers was also impacted. No farmer could own more than five cows and fifty sheep, while they could only produce the necessary amount in order to subsist. This led to food sources depleting and quality of life diminished, causing discontent among the local population. By 1983, bloody confrontations erupted between the locals and insurgents, resulting in the death of over sixty peasants and eighty insurgents.[50] The ideology of Mao, Marx and Lenin could not maintain or ameliorate the Peruvian economy, or could not hold sway among Peruvians.[51]

[47] The National Security Archive, *The Insurgency Review* (Washington, 1987), p. 19 http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB96/870600.pdf (accessed 20 April 2016).
[48] Starn, 'Maoism in the Andes', p. 410.
[49] Robert B. Kent, 'Geographical dimensions of the Shining Path insurgency in Peru' in *Geographical Review*, lxxxiii no. 4 (1993), p. 442.
[50] Kent, 'Geographical dimensions', pp 444-5; Fumerton, 'Rondas Campesinas', p. 447.
[51] Although debate has raged over the viability of communism in Third World politics, this essay does not attempt to critique to values of Marxist, Leninist or Maoist theory. However, this essay formulates suggests that these theories were not successfully applied by Guzman to the case of Peru.

Counteracting the Sendero cost the Garcia government, and the economy over 10 million dollars per year.[52] The increasing need for a response from the Peruvian government made them accountable for counteracting the violence of the Shining Path. Firstly, the presidency of Alan Garcia made a number of efforts to ameliorate the Peruvian economy. These steps attempted to bridge the gap between the social classes. In essence, this challenged Guzman's attempt to push his ideology by trying to strike a divide between the social classes. Garcia idealised himself as an economic reformer, who sought to protect indigenous businesses from foreign competition, and also to vastly augment the purchasing power of the middle and lower income Peruvians. Once in office, Garcia delivered on his promises through various tax reductions, wage increases and raising the minimum wage.[53] Garcia's vision for Peru's economy however was short-sighted, turning his back on the International Monetary Fund and the US, leading to severe hyperinflation and hampering the growth of the economy. As a result, Garcia's presidency ended in failure, bankrupting the economy and heavily relying on force to eradicate the Sendero.[54] Furthermore, although Garcia initially delivered on his promise of a more peaceful response to the Sendero, he completely backtracked as a result of continued massacres and pain for the Peruvian people, while doing little to halt the Sendero.[55]

Alberto Fujimori initially learned from the mistakes of the previous brutal regimes, while also reversing on the mistakes of Garcia. Fujimori's decision to arm the peasants, forming rural guards was detrimental to the Shining Path. These rural guards were known as the Ronda Campesina, who took the fight directly to the Shining Path. These Ronda's collaborated directly with the government, which completely dented Guzman's hopes of winning the hearts and mind of the working classes. Remarkably, the Peruvian military's recruitment of peasants echoes the Spanish conquest of Peru, where Pizarro was aided by natives to topple the Inca Empire. Indeed, this echo of imperialism shows the failure of the Sendero's

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See Immanuel Wallerstein, *Geopolitics and geoculture: essays on the changing world system* (Cambridge, 1994), p. 2.

[52] Carlos Basombrío, 'Peace in Peru: an unfinished task' in Cynthis J. Arnson (ed), *Comparative peace processes in Latin America* (Stanford, 1999), pp 205-22.

[53] Zirakzadeh, *Social movements,* p. 178.

[54] Klaiber, *Peru: The church and the Shining Path,* p. 138.

[55] Basombrío, 'Peace in Peru', p. 211.

Revolution, underlining the botched attempts to sway the Peruvian peasants join the revolution.[56] By 1990, Fujimori understood the importance of the Rondas in defeating the Sendero, deciding the use the Rondas against the insurgents. The Rondas were successfully for a number of reasons. Comprised of a mostly peasants, they were averse to brutal killings of other peasants, leading to a decline in human right abuses at the hands of the Sendero.[57] Furthermore, once armed by the military they became more autonomous than most other forms of civilian patrols. Once the Rondas had successfully defeated the Sendero in a region, control was quickly given to the military, ensuing that the insurgents could not regain a foothold.[58]

Guzman and the Sendero aimed to capture the hearts and minds of the Peruvian people, in the hope of bringing an end to capitalism in Peru. However, the Sendero lost sight of the true meaning of its ideology and strategy. It eventually lost the respect and support of the working class and peasants of Peru ultimately demolished all hope of achieving total victory. While Guzman acknowledged the work and achievements of revolutionists such a Hugo Blanco, he did not appeal to Peruvian society and culture. The party's ill-advised targeting of civilians meant that it lost support from crucial groups, who needed for the proposed revolution, such as trade unions, peasant associations and farmers. In essence, this shows the frailties and paradoxes in the implementing of Sendero's predominantly Maoist ideology. Guzman's interpretation of Marxist and Leninist theory in his first two principles of Sendero ideology remains unquestionable. However, the implementation of the People's War and the use of violence fundamentally weakened Sendero ideology as a whole, causing widespread rejection by the proletariat and the failure of Guzman

[56] Orin Starn, 'To revolt against the revolution: war and resistance in Peru's Andes' in *Cultural Anthropology*, x no. 4 (1995), p. 550.
[57] However, it is worth noting that Fujimori was later responsible for mass killings and the continued abuses of human rights. Please read: Gretchen Small, 'Amnesty International still trying to save Peru's Shining Path' in *Executive Intelligence Review*, xxii no. 30 (1995), pp 49-50; The National Security Archive, *US Embassy Secret Cable: Reported Secret Annex to National Pacification/Human Rights Plan* (Washington, 1990), pp 1 – 5, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB274/19900823.PDF, (accessed 21 April 2016); The National Security Archive, *U.S. Embassy Secret Cable: Barrios Altos Massacre: One Month Later* (Washington, 1991), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB274/19911204.PDF, (accessed 21 April 2016); The National Security Archive, *U.S. Embassy Secret Cable: Barrios Altos Massacre*, (Washington, 1991), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB274/19911213.PDF, (accessed 21 April 2016); Klaiber, *Peru: The church and the Shining Path*, p. 138.
[58] Basombrío, 'Peace in Peru', p. 217.

as its leader. Overall, the Sendero could not regard itself as the fourth sword of Marxism. Marx, Lenin and Mao remain iron cast figures in history, while Guzman resembles the unworthy figure, unable to take the almighty sword from the stone.

The Kerry War Testimonial: Ambiguity in Stone

Kevin Russell

The steps which lead up to the courthouse in Tralee, County Kerry, are flanked by what represents one of the most significant nineteenth-century war memorials of its kind in the country. First proposed in 1857, it was finally completed in 1862 and commemorates men from County Kerry who fought and died while serving in the British army during the Crimean War, 1854-56, and Indian mutiny in 1857. James Mayo advocates that the central purpose of a war memorial is to express the values of a group towards those persons and deeds that are memorialised. A war memorial involves the social and physical manipulation of space and object to keep alive the memories of people lost to war.[1]

Monuments were used in the nineteenth century to cultivate popular support and legitimate authority. The impact of public monuments on the public psyche of the nineteenth century was not underestimated at the time, nor should it be taken lightly now. For its part, from very early on the Kerry War Testimonial was not only a memorial but also a 'useful public instructor', an 'encouragement to others' to remember those who by dying as they did 'testified their devotion to the Queen'.[2] The memorial was therefore never devoid of a political foundation. It is worth pointing out that monuments were also regularly used to counter the established regime.[3] Whelan points out that the nationalist complexion of Dublin Corporation after 1840 effectively set about creating a nationalist monumental landscape in the centre of late-nineteenth century Dublin.[4] Nor is it is a coincidence that the O'Connell monument in Limerick happened to be located in an area predominantly occupied by the local ascendancy class. This is said to have left one occupant

[1] James M. Mayo, 'War memorials as political memory' in *Geographical Review*, 78.1 (1988), p. 63.
[2] *Tralee Chronicle*, 28 July 1857; *Kerry Evening Post*, 7 Mar. 1860.
[3] Judith Hill, *Irish public sculpture* (Dublin, 1998), p. 118.
[4] Yvonne Whelan, 'Monuments, power and contested space- the iconography of Sackville Street (O' Connell Street) before independence (1922)' in *Irish Geography*, 34.1 pp 11-33.

reluctant to open her blinds in the mornings for fear of encountering O'Connell's 'masterful gaze'.[5]

There is little reason to doubt the commemorative purpose of the Testimonial, but there is less reason to doubt its symbolism as a monument of empire. There is ample evidence to demonstrate a broad public support for the war in Crimea. On the other hand there is also considerable evidence to show that it was riven with the ambiguity, contradiction, division and tension of mid-Victorian Irish society.[6] The Kerry War Testimonial reflects this dissonance. This paper argues that the Testimonial is the product of the specific system of belief and value system of the landed class in late 1850s Kerry. Their worldview, familial ties and military tradition was the impetus behind the scheme and these will be examined in the context of the Testimonials construction. While these elements may have made military service and commemoration logical; defending Britain's glory and empire not to mention their own status and religion, it is questionable if the same could be said for the fallen rank and file they sought to honour.

The first mention of a proposal to erect a memorial in memory of Kerrymen, who fell in the Crimean war, appeared on 13 March 1857.[7] What was suggested was a modest tablet to be erected with a suitable inscription in the Protestant St. John's parish church of Tralee.[8] Throughout the Victorian period, the practice of recording imperial exploits on memorial plaques in Church of Ireland cathedrals and churches was quite common, but was typically undertaken and concluded by immediate family.[9] Subscriptions were capped at one pound and the Kerry War Testimonial Committee was established.[10] The appeal however, failed to consider the

[5] Hill, *Irish public sculpture*, p. 91.
[6] David Murphy, *Ireland and the Crimean War* (Dublin, 2002), pp 7-17; Brian Griffin, 'Irish identity and the Crimean War' in B. Taithe and T. Thornton (eds), *War: identities and conflict, 1300-2000* (Sutton, 1998), pp 113-124; John Morrissey, 'A lost heritage; the Connaught Rangers and multi-vocal Irishness' in M. McCarthy (ed.) *Ireland heritages: critical perspectives on memory and identity* (Aldershot, 2005), pp 73-77.
[7] *Tralee Chronicle,* 13 Mar. 1857.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Hiram Morgan, 'Empire building an uncomfortable Irish heritage' in *Linen Hall Review*, 3 (1993), p. 8; Nicholas Perry, 'The Irish landed class and the British army, 1850-1950' in *War in History*, 18.3 (2011), p. 304.
[10] *Tralee Chronicle,* 13 Mar. 1857.

composition of those who served. Furthermore, by thinking only in terms of a memorial plaque in the Protestant practice, never considered such a plaque germane beyond establishment or Protestant concern. Evidence to this effect is seen a week after the proposal. A letter under the pen-name Miles, pointed out that since 'nine-tenths' of those Kerrymen who served in Crimea were Catholic; a memorial to their deeds 'buried in the Protestant church in Tralee' was inappropriate.[11]The response from Major-General John Day Stokes, by then Secretary of the Committee on 24 March, assured that there was no sectarian feeling in the proposal. Its origin lay instead in a desire by a few admirers to honour the memory of a late Captain James Franklin Bland and other officers, who fell during the war; 'all of whom were Protestant'.[12]

Major-General John Day Stokes from the beginning was cautious regarding a more significant outdoor monument and suggested the establishment of an identical tablet in the local Catholic Church would be a reasonable alternative.[13] Nonetheless, despite his reservations he was acceding to the verbal and written communications he received. The meetings which served to organise the raising of subscriptions and the construction of the Testimonial identify the people behind its support.[14] This included some of the most prominent men of the area including the High Sheriff, both local M.P.s, and Francis Christopher Bland, elder brother to Captain Bland. Some of the most active committee members included George Day Stokes the County Treasurer and brother to the Major-General J.D. Stokes, Captain Thomas Stuart, a retired naval officer from Glanmire in Co. Cork; and William Talbot Crosbie a local landlord from Ardfert.

In the months and years after that first meeting of the committee, the papers carried subscription lists sent in at regular intervals by J.D. Stokes. What is provided by these lists is an idea of the social composition of subscribers. It is immediately apparent that the fund was appealing largely if not exclusively to the figures of

[11] Ibid.
[12] *Kerry Evening Post,* 24 Mar. 1857.
[13] Ibid.
[14] *Tralee Chronicle,* 3 Apr. 1857.

establishment, the nobility and the gentry.[15] It may be argued that the prospective audience for the newspapers of that time and through which much of the communication on the project was carried, must be borne in mind. Those who could read a newspaper in County Kerry 1851 amounted to no more than thirty six per cent of the population, and by 1861 this had risen to forty four per cent.[16] While this represents significant improvement over the course of ten years; nonetheless, more than half the population, which can be safely suggested that the majority of which were the tenant classes of the county, were potentially unaware of the Testimonial project. However, the apparent lack of enthusiasm among the wider population cannot be wholly attributed to a mere unawareness. In October 1854, during the Crimean War, a Patriotic Fund established by Royal Commission to assist the widows and orphans of servicemen was established.[17] Newspaper reports provide evidence of widespread support for the fund among the middle, tenant and labouring classes, with long subscriber lists showing many one shilling or six penny subscriptions from groups of tenants.[18] The Patriotic Fund has been further credited by historians as demonstrating widespread support for the Crimean War among the general public.[19] However the subsequent lack of widespread enthusiastic support for the Kerry War Testimonial would suggest that support for particular fundraising efforts was possibly less about awareness or loyalty to the Crown and more about a perceived application; widows and orphans in themselves and in their need, carrying little political ambiguity.

The project to erect the Kerry War Testimonial pressed ahead and finalised a design with a competition between March 1858 and 1859 in an effort to further public enthusiasm for the project.[20] The winning design was one submitted by the respected architect and author James Franklin Fuller in April 1859. [21]J. F. Fuller was born in Sneem Co. Kerry, but was based in London; his early involvement was

[15] *Tralee Chronicle,* 5 May 1857, 19 May 1857, 26 June 1857.
[16] *The census of Ireland for the year1861, part V general report*, (1863) [3204-IV], Vol LXI, xxix.
[17] *Kerry Evening Post,* 21 Oct. 1854.
[18] *Tralee Chronicle,* 27 Oct. 1854; *Kerry Evening Post*, 1 Nov. 1854.
[19] Griffin, 'Irish identity and the Crimean War' p. 115.
[20]*Kerry Evening Post*, 12 Mar. 1858, 26 Jan. 1859.
[21] *Kerry Evening Post, 2* Apr. 1859; *Tralee Chronicle,* 5 Apr. 1859.

probably due to his close familial ties to the Bland family.[22] Initially a target of £1200 was pitched by Captain Thomas Stuart for the project since in his estimation 'nothing less...will do the thing respectably'.[23] However, it was estimated that Fuller's design would come to the lesser sum of £500 and this became the final target. The following July saw a further appeal for subscriptions, which again decried the lack of local response to the project. A committee meeting complained strongly of 'the apathy exhibited towards this undertaking by the people of Kerry as they were still £150 short of the required sum'[24]. Committee members and those attending the July meeting made further subscriptions themselves, hoping the example would spur others to action.[25] It did, but mostly to the effect of inducing others who already subscribed to make 'second subscription' appearances in the published subscriber lists.[26] It was to be November 1859 before J.D. Stokes advised that, the now lesser £500 target, was reached, nearly three years since subscriptions were first sought.

However, a subscriber meeting on 10 March 1860, resolved that since the locations they sought were no longer suitable to the prize plan selected, or objected to, they would now abandon J.F. Fuller's design. Instead, one of the other designs submitted, that of Mr. George W. Hallam of London, which integrated it into the Tralee courthouse, was to be utilised.[27] In October 1860 a local man, Mr. Arthur Crosbie was declared the contractor. [28] It was the *Tralee Chronicle* which on 19 April 1862 carried a piece expressing pleasure at being witness to construction commencing.[29] No official announcement was made to this effect, nor was there any formal ceremony to mark the eventual completion of the work. J.D. Stokes was by then known to be suffering from serious illness and died in December of that year.[30]

[22] James Franklin Fuller, *Omniana: the autobiography of an Irish octogenarian* (London, 1914), p. 78.
[23] *Kerry Evening Post,* 25 Nov. 1857.
[24] *Kerry Evening Post,* 20 July 1859; *Tralee Chronicle*, 26 July 1859.
[25] *Tralee Chronicle,* 26 July 1859.
[26]*Kerry Evening Post,* 31 Aug. 1859, 13 Sept. 1859; *Tralee Chronicle*, 26 July 1859.
[27] *Tralee Chronicle,* 13 Mar. 1860.
[28] Jeremiah, King, *Kings History of County Kerry: or County Kerry antiquarian notes, queries and answers, Part III* (Tralee 1910).
[29] *Tralee Chronicle,* 19 Apr. 1862.
[30] *Kerry Evening Post,* 17 Dec. 1862.

After almost five years of effort, a singular lack of communication or ceremony surrounded the Kerry War Testimonial's completion sometime in August 1862.

According to Donald Harman Akenson, nineteenth century Ireland consisted of two overarching systems of belief; two different 'cosmologies', which explained both intellectually and emotionally how the world worked.[31] These cosmologies were based on culture which in Ireland meant unavoidably one was dealing with religion. Akenson argues that Catholic and Protestant existed in the same time and place, but each existed within a separate 'mansion of the mind', operating to all intents and purposes like close, but nonetheless distinctive radio frequencies.[32] They had nonetheless, much in common, including a strong awareness of history and its importance. To each, history was useful, not just as facts, but as living symbol with an immediate relevance to the present. However, sometimes one group would incorporate an historical event into its cosmology while the other ignored it.[33] The clear difference in response to fund-raising efforts for the Testimonial could be understood in these terms. In this understanding the largely Protestant loyalist gentry, adopted the mind-set and incorporated the Crimean campaign as a significant and noble imperial event worthy of a monumental expression. The Catholic perspective on the other hand was one that perceives it as Irishmen serving the empire as an issue of pragmatism rather than conviction and certainly not one that will advance or improve their lot. The Testimonial as a result, was a matter of cultural difference at a philosophical or spiritual level; of relevance more to one system of belief than the other.[34] This system of belief was in no doubt reinforced and supported by the, albeit no means unique, nature of the close knit interconnected nature of Protestant landowner families in the area.

Captain Thomas Stuart was one of the more enthusiastic members of the committee, it was he who secured the Testimonial's most striking aspect, its cannon, and it is probable that his enthusiasm like many of the others was born of a

[31] Donald Harman Akenson, *Small differences: Irish Catholics and Irish Protestants, 1815-1922* (Dublin, 1998), p. 127.
[32] Ibid., p. 130.
[33] Ibid., p. 144.
[34] Akenson, *Small differences*, p. 130.

particular partiality, that of family. His wife and Captain James Franklin Bland were first cousins. He was also related by marriage to James Franklin Fuller. The basis for much of the energy behind the erection of the Kerry War Testimonial may be attributable to both the familial and familiarity. Nathaniel Bland Herbert and Nathaniel James Morphy are both commemorated on the memorial and were also of the Bland family. A notice in the press relating to Captain J.F. Bland's death, included a letter received by his brother in Tralee from yet another cousin serving in Crimea, Captain Henry Francis Strange, expressing his condolences.[35] With a brother and three cousins involved, Francis Christopher Bland's large financial contributions and participation becomes more understandable.

Further familial connections can be observed with both J. D. Stokes and William Talbot Crosbie.[36] Stokes was related through marriage to Captain Frank Spring, killed in India, and knew him since he was a child.[37] From the Chute family, Lieutenant Arthur Rowland Chute, another memorialised on the Testimonial, was a son of Richard Chute a regular committee member.[38] The Chutes were very much integrated into the Kerry gentry being connected to the Crosbie, Bateman and Blennerhassett families; all significant landholders in the area. George Day Stokes, while he did not suffer a close loss, had a second son serving as a Captain in the 47th Regiment in Crimea.[39] The Testimonial had therefore, for many of the organising committee, a palpable connection. But such a connection was itself a reflection of how the landed class in mid nineteenth-century Ireland were heavily involved in the British armed services. It is in this regard also where Akenson's different 'mansions of the mind' reside. That is in the division between the officers of the wealthy landed Protestant class and the rank and file which were typically drawn from Catholic low income groups such as rural agricultural labourers.[40]

[35] *Tralee Chronicle,* 8 Dec. 1854.
[36] *Tralee Chronicle,* 24 Mar. 1857.
[37] *Tralee Chronicle,* 20 Nov. 1857.
[38] King, *County Kerry past and present,* p. 66.
[39] Jeremiah King, *Kings History of Kerry: or' history of the parishes in the county, with some antiquarian notes and queries* (Liverpool, 1908), p. 193.
[40] Peter Karsten, 'Irish soldiers in the British Army, 1792-1922: suborned or subordinate?' in *Journal of Social History*, 17.1 (1983), pp 31-64.

It has been estimated that throughout the second half of the nineteenth century approximately seventeen per cent of all officers in the British Army were Irish.[41] The Irish gentry were not only a major source of potential officers but, no less importantly, the military tradition was also a central element of the landed family's sense of identity.[42]Almost exclusively, Irish officers were drawn from landed families who were strongly loyalist and particularly Anglo-Saxon in outlook; they eschewed any form of republicanism and sought to affirm their ties to the crown.[43] Evidence of the degree to which military service could play a part in the lives of Irish gentry was reflected in the extensive involvement of the Chute family in the Crimean campaign. Further evidence is provided through the Stokes family of Tralee, a family which was particularly martial. John Day Stokes career as soldier and colonial administrator has been mentioned. His brother, George Day Stokes, while not military himself had six sons, four of which served as officers in the military.[44] Their brother Robert Day Stokes had six children, five of which led remarkably distinguished military careers. Between them they held the ranks of; Major-General, Divisional Commander, Rear-Admiral, Major and Colonel. Furthermore, Edward Day Stokes, another brother, had three sons serve as officers.[45] Perry relates that while there were exceptional families, like the Stokes, the vast majority of families of the landed gentry had at least one member of the core group serving as regular officers, and that experience of professional military service was widespread.[46]

Up to 1871, when the Cardwell Reforms put an end to the practice of purchased commissions, proof of gentlemanly status and military authority was a buyable commodity, but only to those who could afford it. This was a system where birth not ability was the passport to command, a system which *The Nation*

[41] Keith Jeffery, *An Irish empire? Aspects of Ireland and the British Empire* (Manchester, 1996), p. 106.
[42] Perry, 'The Irish landed class', p. 304.
[43] Thomas E. Jordan, 'Queen Victoria's Irish soldiers: quality of life and social origins of the thin "green" line' in *Social Indicators Research*, 57.1 (2002), p. 85.
[44] King, *Kings History of Kerry,* pp 193-197.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Perry, 'The Irish landed class', p. 310.

considered 'to which her Russian disasters were attributable'.[47] It was not inexpensive; in the late 1850s the price for the entry level rank of Ensign was a minimum of £450, which would equate to approximately £20,000 today, and often much more.[48] The subsequent purchase of a Captaincy could cost as much as £3000. [49] However, successive commissions were sometimes achievable through seniority, patronage and reward for distinguished service.[50] The presence throughout Ireland of garrisoned regiments and depot barracks, of which Tralee was one, led many young men of gentry to look upon a career in the British officer corps as an attractive career choice.[51]Throughout the nineteenth century commissioned rank remained the exclusive preserve of the gentry. Even after the abolition of purchase, good family, financial independence and the right school remained the preconditions of potential officers. There was a cavernous social gap between officer and enlisted men and promotion from the ranks was largely unknown.[52] Irish enlistment into the British Army at the rank-and-file level however, was of a completely different character to that of the officer class.

The ordinary men of the Kerry War Testimonial fall into an ambiguous space of local men dying in uniform, but the same uniform is also seen as having played a role in the maintenance of British rule in Ireland, and its empire. There were many reasons why men in Ireland joined the army, which included adventure, financial, escape, religion, patriotism and even tradition. The degree to which the Irish played a part in the Crimean War and in the makeup of the British Army in general should not be underestimated. Throughout the nineteenth century considerable numbers of Irishmen joined the British Army. In 1840 they made up 37.2 per cent. A gap in published figures between 1840 and 1868 make exact figures at the time of the Crimean War and Indian Mutiny unavailable, but when they do

[47] *The Nation*, 27 June 1857.
[48] The National Archives, 'Currency Converter' (http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/currency/) (accessed 10 Jan. 2013).
[49] Richard Holmes, *Redcoat: the British soldier in the age of horse and musket* (London, 2001), p. 161.
[50] Ibid., p. 158.
[51] Peter Karsten, 'Irish soldiers in the British Army, p 31.
[52] Alan Ramsay Skelley, *The Victorian army at home: the recruitment and terms and conditions of the British regular, 1859-1899* (London, 1977), p. 199.

resume they show the Irish share as 30.8 per cent.[53] Consequently it would not be unreasonable to suggest that some 33 per cent of the British Army at the time of the Crimean War was Irish. Murphy argues that since 4,273 officers and 107,040 men of the British Army served in Crimea, this would represent over 37,000 Irishmen that served with the army in the conflict.[54] This figure is somewhat supported by Sister Evelyn Bolster, in her examination of the Irish Sisters of Mercy's involvement in the Crimean War, where she estimates that a third of the British soldiers were Catholics from Ireland.[55] The extent of Irish participation is further evidenced through an account of a regiment being addressed in Irish by its commanding officer just before going into battle on 18 June 1855. Major-General Eyre addressed them, and said that he hoped 'their deeds that morning would make many a cabin in old Ireland ring again' and this address was said to have had 'a wonderful effect upon the 18th Royal Irish'.[56] Ireland was consciously perceived as a reservoir for Irish recruitment, and Irishmen as a consequence were widely distributed throughout the army in the nineteenth century.[57]

The army in mid-nineteenth-century Ireland was continually seeking recruits to replace those whose service had ended or had invalided out. The actual mechanics of recruitment was that sergeants and officers were assigned to recruiting duties.[58] A recruiting party usually consisting of an officer, two sergeants and a drummer would set up in a number of prominent spots where the drummer would beat his full repertoire of elaborate military rhythms with as much flair as was at his disposal. The officer and sergeants would, for their part, enthusiastically espouse on the unrivalled opportunity army life could offer.[59] It was a loud colourful and bombastic affair which, in often colourless times, succeeded in its efforts to entice young men to 'take the queen's shilling'.[60] The potential recruit was given this as a token of his

[53] H.J. Hanham, 'Religion and nationality in the Mid-Victorian army' in M.R.D. Foot (ed.) *War and Society: historical essays in honour and memory of J.R. Western, 1928-197*1(London, 1973), p. 161.
[54] Murphy, *Ireland and the Crimean war*, p. 22.
[55]Evelyn Bolster, *The Sisters of Mercy in the Crimean war* (Cork, 1964), p. 35.
[56] Timothy Gowing, *A soldiers experience or a voice from the ranks; showing the cost of war in blood and treasure* (Nottingham, 1899), pp 126-7.
[57] Hanham, 'Religion and nationality', p. 166; Murphy, *Ireland and the Crimean War*, p. 17.
[58] Jordan, 'Queen Victoria's Irish soldiers', p. 75.
[59]Holmes, *Redcoat*, p. 140.
[60] Ibid., p. 139.

commitment and would then be medically inspected; a process which although at best perfunctory, still saw about a third fail. Passing the examination would lead to the recruit being attested by a magistrate and his bounty being paid.[61] The demand for recruits was sometimes such as to see not only this bounty, but also the physical requirements being altered.[62] A notice in one of the local papers in Tralee in 1854 publicized that men between sixteen and thirty years of age, standing five feet four and a half, a reduction of one inch, were being sought for enlistment. It also pointed out that the bounty was raised from £4 to £6 per man.[63] The recruiting officials also received a fee for every man enlisted, which of course only encouraged unscrupulous recruiting sergeants. This and the regular use of drink as a lubricating agent lent the system a disreputable reputation in some areas.[64] It is also worth noting that the bounty paid to recruits was subject to deductions for the regulation uniform, shirts, waistcoats and cleaning kit he required which afterwards often left little remaining.[65] It would be 1856, only after hostilities in Crimea that some free kit was finally given on joining.[66]

A nineteenth-century folk ballad, 'The Kerry Recruit', tells the story of a 'fine strappin lad' enlisting shortly before the Crimean War, when a recruiting sergeant 'stuck a bob in me fist'; he joins after years of 'futhing turf' near Tralee.[67] There is a narrative of popular history which has been in existence since the middle of the nineteenth century as to why ordinary young men from Ireland enlisted in the British Army in such numbers. He was invariably a broad-shouldered peasant lad, forced to join up by poverty or evection and thrown into front line service immediately because of his inherent bravery and fighting nature.[68] James Connolly later reinforced the idea with his coining of the phrase 'economic conscription' in

[61] Alan Ramsay Skelley, *The Victorian army at home,* p. 240.
[62] Jordan, 'Queen Victoria's Irish soldiers', p. 75.
[63] *Kerry Evening Post,* 4 Nov. 1854.
[64] Skelley, *The Victorian army at home,* p. 241.
[65] Holmes, *Redcoat,* p. 149.
[66] Ibid., p. 310.
[67] Lyrics mode, 'Dubliners-The Kerry Recruit Lyrics', available: http://www.lyricsmode.com/lyrics/d/dubliners/ (accessed 9 Jan. 2014).
[68] Terence Denham, 'Ethnic soldiers pure and simple? The Irish in the late Victorian British Army' in *War in History,* 3 (1996), p. 256.

reference to the Great War.[69] Many Irish recruits were clearly inspired by economic distress and penury, particularly in the Famine years, but it would be reductionist to suggest it was the complete picture.[70]

E. M. Spires describes the factors that motivated enlistment in terms of push and pull. The push factors came from a desire to escape poverty, lack of prospects and the restricted nature of life in Ireland. The pull factors derived from the attraction of a regular wage and provisions, comradeship and the prospect of action and adventure in far off places.[71] Skelley puts a considerable argument together to establish that economic considerations were the principal impetus to recruitment. He points out that the considered observation of most military people across the second half of the nineteenth century was that the pressure of necessity drove men into the army.[72] Spiers argues that sometimes soldiers also enlisted for a number of reasons which were unconnected with pure economic necessity. Both Skelley and Morrissey argue while economic factors were to the fore, escape played its part, be it from the law, family, or the tediousness of a menial occupation. The opportunity to travel, which would otherwise be impossible, coupled with the desire for the apparent glamour and excitement of a soldier's life were also motives.[73]

The work of David Murphy attaches considerable importance to these alternative explanations for enlistment, suggesting that such enlistment was symptomatic of patriotism or a spirit of adventure. He further claims that the assumption of the majority of enlistees joining due to dire poverty does not hold true.[74] While some did join for loyalist motives there was such a wide variety of reasons that it would be difficult to conclude that Irishmen were making a political statement simply by enlisting, either during the Crimean War or at other times.[75] Nor, as Alvin Jackson points out, did that enlistment automatically induce

[69] Morrissey, 'A lost heritage' p. 76.
[70] Karsten, 'Irish soldiers in the British Army', p. 37.
[71] E.M. Spires, 'Army organisation and society in the nineteenth century' in Thomas Bartlett and Keith Jeffery (eds) *A military history of Ireland* (Cambridge, 1996), p. 336.
[72] Skelley, *The Victorian army at home*, p. 248.
[73] Morrissey, 'A lost heritage' p. 77; Skelley, *The Victorian army at home*, p. 249.
[74] Murphy, *Ireland and the Crimean War*, p. 18.
[75] Griffin, 'Irish identity and the Crimean war' p. 119.

loyalism.[76] Though we can never know for sure exactly why any of the individual men on the Kerry War Testimonial enlisted in the British Army, it is likely that shades of all economic and social circumstances are represented. County Kerry does not appear to have been a particularly vigorous area of enlistment, Thomas E. Jordan points out that County Kerry only ranked twenty-second out of thirty-two counties in 1851.[77] Terence Denman further indicates that the typical recruit from Kerry was thought to be a labourer and in Kerry the emigrant ship was seen as the more attractive alternative.[78] Military records of servicemen in the British Army before 1914 are very sparse, but an examination of three men's records from the Testimonial may serve to illustrate their position at the time of their enlistment.

Private Daniel Sullivan enlisted at the Southern Headquarters at Killarney on 22 October 1847. Born in Killarney and a labourer, he was seventeen years eight months old and stood five feet five and one quarter inches tall. On enlistment he was paid a bounty of four pounds.[79] He enlisted into the 95th (Derbyshire) Regiment of Foot. A depot battalion, they would be regularly moved around to various barracks on recruitment and training duties as well as providing soldiers to the service Battalions as required. Daniel Sullivan's muster roll shows that he served in Cork, Fermoy, Hong Kong, Winchester, Portsmouth, Chatham and Weedon before being dispatched to Crimea, arriving there in July 1854.[80] He was killed at the Battle of Alma three months later on 20 September 1854.[81]

Private Jeremiah Donoghue enlisted seven months before Daniel Sullivan at Killarney on 21st March 1847. Donoghue was from Cahersiveen and a labourer. At the time of his enlistment he was eighteen, standing five feet seven inches tall. His bounty was less than Sullivan's, being £3. 10. 00.[82] Also assigned to the 95th Regiment of Foot, he was similarly moved around with his Battalion before landing

[76] Alvin, Jackson, 'Ireland, the union and the empire, 1800-1960' in Kevin Kenny (ed.) *Ireland and the British Empire* (Oxford, 2004), p. 142.
[77] Jordan, 'Queen Victoria's Irish soldiers', p. 79.
[78] Denham, 'Ethnic soldiers', p. 259.
[79] PRO WO 12/9546.
[80] PRO WO 12/9553.
[81] PRO WO 100/33.
[82] PRO WO 12/9546.

in Crimea in July 1854. Jeremiah Donoghue was wounded at the Battle of Alma on 20 September 1854 and died of those wounds either on board a ship taking him to the hospital at Scutari, or in Scutari itself. The same record recording his death noted that he left all his possessions to a comrade John Dowling who was serving in the regiment. [83] John Dowling went on to write a letter to *The Tralee Chronicle* in October 1854 in which he tells of the battle and the loss of 'Poor Jerry Donoghue'.[84] Private Patrick Sullivan was another who served with the 95th Regiment. Born in Kilgarvan, County Kerry, he enlisted in the army headquarters in Cork on 8 January 1847. He was twenty one years old, five feet seven and a half inches tall and like Sullivan and Donoghue a labourer by trade. His bounty was four pounds.[85] He was killed in action at the Battle of Alma on 20 September 1854.[86]

While only a small sample it is noticeable that all three of these young men were labourers and each made their way to the nearest recruitment centre in 1847, generally considered to be the peak of the Irish Famine.[87] In that respect at least they could be said to fit the typical profile of an Irish economic conscript. It is worth bearing in mind that Ireland in the mid-Victorian era was an integral part of the United Kingdom and these men thought of themselves as joining 'the army' rather than the *British* Army. For a great number of these men the regiment, particularly those regiments dominated by Irish enlistees, was home.[88] It was a focus of pride and honour and they remained vigorously aware of their Irish identity. As Karsten makes clear hundreds of thousands of Irish men enlisted with two minds; that Irishmen were the bravest in the world, he admired the uniform of Victoria's soldiers and he was willing to fight for the Queen's land. However, he made no bones of the fact that should her leaders ever turn on the Irish race he would be the first to raise his sword against her.[89] Cultural signifiers of Irish identity occurred right across the British Army in the nineteenth century, in terms of badges, flags and

[83] PRO WO 12/9553; PRO WO 100/33.
[84] *Tralee Chronicle,* 17 Nov. 1854.
[85] PRO WO 12/9546.
[86] PRO WO 100/33; PRO WO 12/9547.
[87] Cormac O Gráda, *The great Irish Famine* (London, 1989), p. 46.
[88] Tom Dooley, 'The Royal Munster Fusiliers' in *History Ireland,* 1 (1998), p. 34.
[89] Karsten, 'Irish soldiers in the British Army', p. 31.

songs.[90] The men commemorated on the Kerry War Testimonial are situated in what Denman termed a 'historical no man's land'.[91] The only real certainty is that behind each name lies a complex and human reality that is characteristic of the paradoxical nature of Irish involvement in the British Army.[92] The different economic, social and cultural relationship that Catholics had with military service would have certainly coloured attitudes with respect to subscription contributions to the Testimonial.

The monuments and statuary of the Victorian era were not raised in a political and social vacuum. Erected as statements of allegiance to an idea or an ideology, they were essentially public relations in stone. They were designed to have a psychological impact, to act as illustration, as moral instruction and exemplar on the viewer in a way that is difficult to appreciate today. The Kerry War Testimonial reflects the society it emanated from. Post-Famine society was still polarised across religious, social and cultural frames. But while political activism may not have been to the forefront, the non-response of the local general population to subscription appeals does suggest that large scale unconditional embodiment of loyalism at the mid-point of Union was not evident in County Kerry. The project from the beginning had to rely on the often repeated largesse of nobility, gentry, officer-class military and establishment figures to see its completion. Calls for subscriptions through local papers never produced donations from the poorer sections of society in a way similar to that of the Patriotic Fund during the Crimean War which suggests a particular agency by the wider local population with regard to subscription appeals. The Testimonial was the project of a group composed largely if not exclusively of the establishment. The Testimonial project in its inception and development reflected the sensibilities, values, dispositions and systems of belief of the mid-Victorian Irish landed class.

The energy behind the project was also fuelled by familial connection between the organisers themselves and those they sought to commemorate and in a

[90] Morrissey, 'A lost heritage', p. 80.
[91] Terence Denman, *Irelands unknown soldiers: the 16th (Irish) Division in the Great War, 1914-1918* (Dublin, 1992), p. 16.
[92] Ibid., p. 17.

wider sense by a military tradition which was a significant element of the Irish gentry's identity. These factors would generate an emotional investment in the Testimonial which would be largely absent outside of the landed classes. Furthermore, the route and circumstances by which gentry and common men came to the military were entirely different and would certainly influence their approach to commemoration. Military service and devotion to the Queen were central to one system of belief, it was however, largely absent from the other. Irish Catholic involvement in the British Army was for the most part one of difficult economic and social circumstance and in no small measure fraught with ambiguity. The Testimonial for these reasons was a matter of cultural difference at the fundamental philosophical or spiritual level; of relevance therefore more to one system of belief than the other.

‘Industrialising Dixie’: A re-interpretive look at industrialisation patterns in the American South, c. 1865-1910

Matthew Thompson

The idea of a distinct American South, a region symbolised by a seemingly unnecessary attachment to ‘back-ward’ ideals and polluted interests, has been the subject of much scholarly debate since the concept of its formal distinctiveness was developed around the time of the great socio-economic upheaval we like to refer to as the Civil War. As a result of these apparently distinctive qualities, the region’s process of industrialisation and modernisation has, as many historians like to diagnose, been ‘laggard’ and underdeveloped; especially when compared to its northern counterpart. The reasons for this lack of progress during the latter half of the nineteenth century are no harder to define than they are to find, largely because the theatre of debate surrounding its explanation is so vast that coming to an educated and justified conclusion is a seemingly impossible task, yet one we will try our best to arrive at. It is with this in mind that certain terms from the question must be defined and understood clearly within the context of this essay, so that a cohesive argument might be delivered. Before assessing the pattern of Southern industrialisation, and its relative distinctiveness from the rest of the nation, it is important to understand exactly what is meant by ‘Southern.’ According to Susanna Delfino, the idea of the South refers simply to a series of ‘intellectual constructs, largely built upon cultural/ ideological assumptions, measured against a standard reference: the North.’[1]

In continuation of Delfino’s definition, a physical element must be added in order to solidify the region definitively. For the purpose of this essay, the South will therefore refer to the eleven states of the former Confederacy, from Virginia to Alabama, and the Carolinas to Texas. It is with this significant term defined, that a clearer argument may be constructed, and one that will hopefully rise from the ashes

[1] Susanna Delfino, ‘The idea of Southern economic backwardness: a comparative view of the United States and Italy’ in Susanna Delfino and Michele Gillespie (eds), *Global perspectives on industrial transformation in the American South* (Columbia, MO, 2005), p. 106.

of popular debate, and make a change to the general perception of the South's industrial path. The typical discourse consists of three main sources of contention that most historians, including C. Vann Woodward and Fred Bateman, like to use in order to summarise the reasons for Southern Industrial distinctiveness. These involve: the South's antebellum dependence on a slave economy, which resulted in the subsequent lack of initiative to facilitate industrial development; the overarching supremacy of the planter-class, who went out of their way to impede industrial development; and the disunited market economy of the South. All other problems with industrialisation, including the attempts to prevent interracial unions, the exploitation of the southern labour force and the 're-enslavement' of freedmen by another means, are all arguments that, although may be well supported by empirical evidence, lack the kind of explanation required in order to better understand the South's uniqueness in this context. The purpose of this essay, however, is not to denounce these characteristics, but to argue that they are not as generic and 'clear cut' as many historians have emphasised.

It is undeniable to assert that the South industrialised in such a way that made it obviously distinct from the North. However, this assertion raises other problems that must be tackled in order to better answer the question. The most notable problem being that the South cannot simply be regarded as one self-contained model; this assumption is far too basic. The latter may refer to at least nine different sub regions, each of which may be segregated by the other through a gradual, noticeable change in appearance of industrialisation patterns as you move from north to south.[2] Hence, after the Civil War, the US states closest to the North such as Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky and Tennessee, seemed to have possessed a 'greater capacity for structural transformation… [Moving] further and faster away from an agrarian economy,' and as a result, resembled Northern patterns

[2] According to W. W. Freehling, the 'farther north the southern state, the cooler the clime, the fewer the slaves, and the lower the relative commitment to perpetuating slavery.' Therefore, he concludes that throughout the South's development, patterns of industrialisation and change were stronger in the more northern states than in the deep south: W. W. Freehling, *The road to disunion, i: secessionists at bay, 1776-1854* (New York, 1990), pp 17-18; Edward Ayers has illustrated these distinct regions in, Ayers, *Promise of the New South: life after reconstruction: 15th anniversary edition* (New York, 2007), p. 5.

of industrialisation.[3] As with any aspect of history, there are anomalies to the rule. In the same sense: parts of the New South developed a greater affinity to industrial markets than others.[4] The South may not, *ergo*, be regarded as an all-encompassing model in relation to the North. This method of assessment is inaccurate, and leads to generic conclusions and generalised answers that fail to highlight the social, economic and political nuances that such a region contained. We may not accurately analyse the difference in patterns of industrialisation between the South and the rest of the nation without regarding the obvious fact that developments within the South itself were different.

Geography played an intrinsic role in shaping patterns of southern industrialisation and this can be evidenced clearly through the census records. For example, the number of manufacturing establishments in Louisiana between 1870 and 1880 fell from 2,557 to 1,553. While North Carolina, a more northerly state, saw a slight rise in industrial establishments from 3,642 to 3,802; remaining consistently higher than its more southern counterpart.[5] With few exceptions, this phenomenon can be seen across the board: Tennessee amounted 4,326, while Alabama had half that amount.[6] To this end, geographic location may be assigned as one of the main over-bearing factors contributing to Southern underdevelopment during the postbellum era. Whereas the North had a highly differentiated economy, the South was a mixed macrocosm of underdeveloped rural regions and quasi-industrial urban centres that had arisen as a result of a mono-crop culture. A neat and prosperous pattern of industrialisation was impossible to ensure as a result of its economic uniqueness. The Southern state that was closest to, either by distance - or in some cases simply through the physical appearance of its landscape - to the North seemed to industrialise similar to the Northern model. Despite this interpretation,

[3] Patrick O'Brian, *The economic effects of the American Civil War* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ, 1988), p. 23.

[4] This observation seems to correlate with the *diffusion* model of intra-national industrial development discussed by A. L. Kroeber in 'Diffusionism' in E. R. A. Seligman and Alvin Johnson (eds), *The encyclopaedia of the social sciences* (3rd ed., New York, [c. 1930-35]); Kroeber stipulates that the closer a region is to the core (the Northeast in this context), the more the said region will resemble the latter; both institutionally and economically.

[5] *Compendium of the tenth census of the United States, 1880, part 2* (Washington, 1883), p. 928.

[6] Ibid.

however, some sources would suggest that a comprehensible model, such as the one aforementioned, did not even exist and that 'the rate of growth, however, varied considerably from state to state… there was no marked trend relative to the [Southern] country as a whole.'[7]

Hopefully now that the depth and complexity of a question regarding the South's pattern of industrialisation has been successfully highlighted, the dominating themes within popular discourse may be analysed, and pitched against the intraregional hypothesis introduced in the last paragraph. The first, and arguably most prominent of the themes permeating Southern academic discourse regarding her nationally unique process of industrialisation is the *colonial appendage* hypothesis.[8] According to Charles Beard and Barrington Moore Jr., the South was first and foremost an agrarian colonial economy, having changed little since the Civil War as a direct result of its apparent attachment to mono-crop agriculture. Sheldon Hackney forwards this interpretation by observing how 'Southerners bought almost all their manufactured goods, and not a little of their food, from outside the region.'[9] The South, therefore, may be seen as a dependant 'nation-within-a-nation'; the producer of raw materials to feed the industrial economy of the consumer north, just as the Thirteen Colonies were to Britain.[10] This almost Jeffersonian ideology is forwarded by many historians, and stands as one of the hallmarks of Southern industrial patterns, and its subsequent uniqueness from the rest of the nation.

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[7] *Trends in the American economy in the nineteenth-century, studies in income wealth, volume twenty-four by the conference on research in income and wealth* (Princeton, 1960), p. 85.

[8] Michael Hechter, *Internal colonialism: The celtic fringe in British national development, 1536-1966* (Berkeley, CA, 1977), pp 8-12. Hechter's introduction includes an informative account of the *internal colonial* theory that has been stipulated by Lenin since the late nineteenth century. His focus, despite being concerned with the latter theory concerning Britain, is highly appropriate for understanding the form of exploitative industrial patterns that came to characterise the Southern periphery.

[9] C. A. Beard and M. R. Beard, *The rise of American civilisation* (2 vols, New York, 1940); Barrington Moore Jr., *Social origins of dictatorship and democracy: lord and peasant in the making of the modern world* (Boston, 1966); Sheldon Hackney, 'Origins of the New South in retrospect' in *Journal of Southern History*, xxxviii, no. 2 (1972), p. 125.

[10] Gavin Wright, *Old South, New South* (New York, 1986), p. 158.

There is much debate surrounding the origins of the phenomenon concerning Northern economic hegemony over a subservient South, however. The most influential and historiographical steadfast of these interpretations is C. Vann Woodward's ground-breaking work, *Origins of the New South,* in which he ascertains that the South's industrial path was forged, almost exclusively, by 'Southern businessmen' who worked in cahoots with the investors from Northern conglomerates to model the New South upon the 'industrial Northeast.'[11] The famous speeches of Henry Grady do much to support Woodward's observations, illustrating the desperation of Southern businessmen to attract Northern money.[12] The influential study of Eugene D. Genovese in the 1960s, not long after Woodward published his ground breaking, *Origins,* opened up the generally agreed perception that the fall of the South's economy following the Civil War saw the immediate usurpation of power from the old planter class, to the new industrial bourgeois elites who conquered the South and exploited the region for their own financial benefit.[13]

This interpretation, as supported as it may seem through the dominant historiography, is unfounded in its assertions that one class simply stepped down from power to allow the other to continue the natural process of economic evolution: this is an idealistic assumption. William Cooper has offered a far more substantiated and believable analysis in his work, *The Conservative Regime,* within which he highlights the fact that in many Southern states, the planter class of the *Ancien Regime* remained prominent, and simply evolved to suit the necessary change in the Southern economy.[14] Cooper's analysis also supports the interpretation that this process of industrial evolution, and the appearance it adopted during the postbellum period, was markedly different depending on the Southern region in question. The more northern the Southern state, the less of a propensity it possessed to facilitate the continuity outlined in Cooper's analysis. For example, it was the states of the lower South-East that saw the rise of the 'Bourbon' class who were willing to 'wear

[11] C. V. Woodward, *Origins of the New South, 1877-1913* (Baton Rouge, 1951), p. 291.
[12] *Pall Mall Gazette,* 8 Jan. 1887.
[13] I am referring to those northern capitalist investors who came to the South to seek riches through the exploitation of untapped resources. Eugene D. Genovese, *The world the slaveholders made: two essays in interpretation* (New York, 1969).
[14] William Cooper, *The conservative regime: South Carolina, 1877-1890* (Baltimore, 1968).

the halo and absorb the romance of the olden times' without letting it '[retard] the philosophy of the Old South.'[15] This phenomenon of planter-come-industrialist seems counter intuitive to the mind of the student of Southern industrial history, yet one that is blatantly apparent. What made this element unique to the South was that it saw the marked change of incentives from the importance of agricultural cotton to the necessity for Southern development. This, however, was retarded by the high price of industrial equipment, and the 'little help from Northern capital and know how,' and even 'conscious' efforts by the North to thwart manufacturing, which eventually caused a major stagnation in any further attempts to industrialise until, at least, 1880.[16]

External barriers, such as the South's lack of a stable market economy for goods other than cotton set the prerequisite for a devastatingly laggard process of economic development. Despite the fact that by the 1870s many of the merchants and bourgeoisie who sat in the state legislatures were drafting bills to allow for the facilitation of industry, the reality of the South's situation was an almost irreversible one. Whereas in the rest of the nation, sophisticated railroad networks had facilitated the rise of the 'Gilded Age' economy, the South's attempts at catching up were in vain. Although railroad mileage in the South had leaped from around 16,000 in 1880, to in excess of 40,000 by 1890, the 'lavish state bonds' required to fund such development swamped the state treasuries and prevented any further growth.[17] External barriers to industrial development placed upon the South were, understatedly and insurmountable. However, external pressures that limit economic growth were not limited to the Southern regions in isolation; arguably, it was the *internal factors* that qualify the South its uniqueness in relation to the rest of the nation.

[15] E. M. Coulter, *A short history of Georgia* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1933), pp 363-5.
[16] A. M. Tang, *Economic development in the Southern Piedmont, 1860-1950* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1958), p. 62; also, D. L. Carlton, 'The revolution from above; the national market and the beginnings of industrialisation in North Carolina' in *The Journal of American History,* lxxvii, no. 2 (1990), p. 447.
[17] B. A. Weisberger, *The new industrial society* (New York, 1969), p. 62.

A phenomenon that afflicted most of the South's few industrial centres, and an element that set apart the character of its process of industrialisation from trends in national development, was the continued persistence of labour exploitation and racial antagonisms on a level not seen in the rest of the nation. These helped to retain labourers, both black and white, in a perpetual state of social and financial dependence upon the employer, therefore inhibiting the development of a consumer class resembling anything that had already been long established in the prosperous North. In Alabama, for example, the average wage payments were twenty thousand dollars below Rhode Island, and the overall average wage of a southern worker was at least twelve percent lower than anywhere else in the nation.[18] According to Roger Ransom and Richard Sutch, 'the racial barriers built into the southern economic institutions are to blame' for the South's industrial stagnation during the latter half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[19] Deep-rooted racism in the South's burgeoning industrial centres, from Vicksburg to Birmingham, were a direct consequence of the wide spread desire to progress economically, without being forced to carry the social baggage of racial suffrage and blacks who were 'too free.' 'The New South had to contend with the Old' in order to pull itself free from the shackles of economic disparity and realign its industrial patterns with that of the North; but this was done with careful adherence, both on the part of the southern legislature, and the factory owner, to a strict set of restrictive laws which ensured that strong bi-racial institutions did not develop into the strong worker unions that existed in the North and West.[20] Gerald Friedman has, in this sense, applied the rather appropriate label of 'Southern Exceptionalism', referring to the strict code of racial barriers that became one of the main hallmarks of the South's industrial pattern. Such a system strived to keep blacks out of unions, while also uniting white

[18] *Compendium of the tenth census*, p. 874. Total wages for Rhode Island were $21, 355, 619, while in Alabama they were $2, 500, 504; Weisberger, *Industrial society*, p. 63.
[19] Roger Ransom and Richard Sutch, *One kind of freedom: the economic consequences of emancipation* (New York, 1977), p. 120.
[20] Richard M. Current, *Northernizing the South* (Athens, 1983), p. 85.

workers with a shared sense of racial supremacy; henceforth, producing a system that was 'acceptable to planter and industrialist alike.'[21]

This draconian system of Jim Crow laws and restrictive labour conditions were indeed shared across the whole South, and never appear to have increased in severity depending on the geographic location of the Southern state.[22] Instead, this phenomena was isolated to the urban centres such as Birmingham, Mobile, Nashville and Charleston, where the patterns of industrialisation seemed to predominate over the rural agricultural norm found elsewhere. To overemphasise the racial disparities in these areas, however, would be to ignore the more justified argument that, in fact, the South was not alone in viewing the freedmen as possible proletariat threats to the new order of capitalist hegemony. Paul Street, in his more recent analysis, has illustrated how racist, paternalistic employers were by no means isolated to the South. His enlightening study of the Chicago stockyards during the early years of the twentieth century highlight the racial antagonisms within a heavily industrialised Northern centre, and how blacks were barred from union activity as a result of 'white working class racism both North and South,' coupled with the anti-union efforts of Northern employers.[23] Despite Street's analysis, however, labour unions outside the South were markedly stronger than anything that existed below the Mason-Dixon Line. The racial antagonisms and apparent weaknesses of the Chicago labour force that Street highlights are not reflective of the wider consensus. As Friedman emphasises in his more substantiated review, 'strong labor unions connected workers aspirations for higher wages with broader campaigns for social reform.'[24] It would be justified to assume, therefore, that the labour unions that arose as a result of national industrial progress were stronger, and better defined in the rest

[21] Gerald Friedman, 'The political economy of early southern unionism: race, politics, and labor in the South, 1880-1953' in *The Journal of Economic History*, lx, no. 2 (2000), p. 386.
[22] I am indebted to the makers of the influential documentary film, *Slavery by Another Name,* for inspiring the writing of parts of this essay regarding the effects of Jim Crow laws on the social conditions of freed men during the post-Reconstruction era.
[23] Paul Street, 'The logic and limits of "plant loyalty": black workers, white labor, and corporate racial paternalism in Chicago's stockyards, 1916-1940' in *Journal of Social History,* xxix, no. 3 (1996), p. 659.
[24] Friedman, 'Political economy', p. 386.

of the nation. Not only were the wages higher, but the political strength of workers was markedly better that the South, where such institutions were in their infancy.

An obvious marker of the South's pattern of industrialisation, therefore, is that its industrial cities lacked the sort of organisational fervour that helped to develop strong worker's unions like those in the Northern powerhouses. Except for the events at Bogalusa in 1919, Southern workers never exerted much retaliation against their paternalistic employers throughout the South's industrial development. The example of Bogalusa is often overemphasised as a reflective case; that it represented the fact that many blacks were playing integral parts in labour unions' struggles.[25] The truth, however, was very different. Bogalusa was an isolated anomaly in its era; at the same time, for example, 'Pensacola demanded the discharge of all blacks in mechanical positions' and, across the South, 'wide election margins freed southern politicians from dependence on labor voters' allowing them to favour a 'pro-business' ideology, disregarding the rights of both the black and white labour forces because they were at the understanding that there did not exist the ways and means for Southern workers to mobilise against them.[26] The lack of labour union organisation and power in the South presents a clear disparity between her and the North, where unions represented a major cog within the socio-economic and politic wheel.

As with any historical theory, however, there are obvious exceptions to generally preconceived ideas. The widely understood notion that the South industrialised at a 'laggard' rate is one that is clearly advocated within this essay, yet it would be the mark of a poor analysis to blatantly ignore the fact that there were pockets of the South that industrialised at a markedly higher capacity than the rest of the region. These anomalous areas did not, strangely, seem to fit nicely within any obvious pattern that would explain their propensity for growth, yet certain characteristics were present that allowed them to amount to their potential, and, arguably, resemble the cities of the North East to some degree.

[25] S. H. Norwood, 'Bogalusa burning: the war against biracial unionism in the deep South, 1919' in *The Journal of Southern History,* lxviii, no. 3 (1997), p. 596.
[26] Friedman, 'Political economy', p. 389.

Writing in the 1930s, the scholar T. A. Hill, emphasised the important point that 'one should be careful of generalisations when writing about the South'.[27] The temptation to make such assumptions and generic accounts of the South's curious pattern of industrialisation is, at times, an appealing one. It would allow for such a significant epoch within the history of the region to be characterised as simpler and easier to comprehend. With this in mind, the tendency for many historians to over-stress the interpretation that the South was entirely different from the North in economic terms is understandable; yet it is one that should not be over exaggerated. Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman's enlightening analysis of the South's economic position has shown that it was not that different from the North; especially in the antebellum era when the South, if it were an independent nation, would have ranked as the fourth richest country in the world.[28] Certain cities in the South seemed to industrialise at a rate that resembled the Northern model; the most notable of these 'exceptional' cities, for the purpose of argument, were Birmingham, Alabama, and Athens in Georgia. According to Ethel Armes and J. R. Bennett, Birmingham's propensity for a process of exponential industrial growth was due to its 'extraordinary conditions from the geological viewpoint.'[29] The city's geological position was certainly a prerequisite for extraordinary economic growth when compared to the average mill village of the Southern Piedmont that many historians like to use as a marker for the South's industrial stagnation following the Civil War. Its proximity to mountains rich in iron ore and 'several ridges… [and] numerous gaps, which are utilised by transportation lines' to connect the city with the markets

[27] T. A. Hill, 'Negroes in Southern industry' in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, cliii (1931), p. 177.

[28] R. W. Fogel and Stanley Engerman, *Time on the cross: the economics of American negro slavery* (Boston, 1974), p. 249.

[29] Ethel Armes and J. R. Bennett, *The story of coal and iron in Alabama* (2011 ed., Tuscaloosa, 2011), p. xxvii. Michael Hechter attempts to make sense of this phenomenon by suggesting that 'poles of growth crystallise in regions with geographical advantages relative to specific means of production.' His observation shines some light on the otherwise unexplainable cases of some Southern 'boom towns.' See Michael Hechter, 'Regional inequality and national integration: the case of the British Isles' in *Journal of Social History*, v, no. 1 (1971), p. 97.

of the Northeast helped to facilitate an industrial economy, hitherto unseen between there and Pittsburgh.[30]

The city of Athens in Georgia displayed a similar rate of economic growth, facilitated by the rise of the industrial sector. A major difference between the patterns here, compared with those in Birmingham claims Michael J. Gagnon, was the 'growing population seeking to retain or enhance respectability' through such endeavours as promoting industrial expansion. The town possessed Georgia's state university, so educated and industrious men were ample in the burgeoning town. Most had either visited, or had studied in the academic institutions of the North, therefore, bringing back with them the entrepreneurial spirit of the Northeast.[31]

Due to the restrictions imposed by such a condensed essay, it is not possible to outline the wealth of information available on the two cities formerly discussed. Despite this, however, the fact that they were present illuminates the important point that the South was *not* a homogenous region, and the possibility for a clearly identifiable pattern of industrial growth was not a phenomenon isolated to the North. Fundamentally, the key point to emphasise, and one that is often conveniently overlooked by many historians, is that generalisations and sweeping assumptions are rife within the common historiography. Woodward's *Origins* stands as a pillar in the centre of the hall of Southern discourse; yet it is a pillar that is being slowly chipped away, and someday, it must succumb to new interpretations. Let this be a contribution towards the concept of intra-Southern differences. The line between America's two great regions has been blurred somewhat, and it is the intention of this analysis to help and blur them even further. Therefore, although significant differences between the two regions' paths to industrialisation appear contradictory, there were obvious similarities that cannot be overlooked if the South's road to industrialisation is to be understood clearly.

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[30] Information on Birmingham's geological uniqueness derived from, E. E. Burchard and C. Butts, 'Iron ores, fuels and fluxes of the Birmingham district, Alabama' in *United States Geological Survey, Bulletin 400* (Washington, 1910), pp 11-12; cited in, Langdon White, 'The iron and steel industry of the Birmingham, Alabama district' in *Economic Geography*, iv, no. 4 (1928), p. 349.

[31] M.J. Gagnon, *Transition to an industrial South: Athens, Georgia, 1830-1870* (Baton Rouge, 2012), p. 99.

Notes on Contributors

Lesley E.E. Donaldson: Lesley has a B.A. in Social Sciences and a M.S.Sc. in Irish Migration Studies from Queen's University, Belfast. She has just completed (2016) her M.Res. (with distinction) in Irish Local History at Queen's University when her research topic was Improvement in mid-nineteenth century Belfast. She has contributed a chapter, '"The Family Wage" – a factor in migration?' in Olwen Purdue (ed.), *Belfast. The emerging city, 1850-1914* (Sallins and Portland Or., 2013), pp 211-234. She is currently an independent researcher whose main interests are the social and economic aspects of mid- to late-nineteenth century Belfast.

John Harrington: John is a Ph.D. candidate in History in the University of Limerick, where he also completed his BA and MA. His areas of Interest include the origins and evolution of Irish Catholic nationalism and republicanism including the role of the Irish Diaspora. Currently, John is researching the origins and history of the Ancient Order of Hibernians and their role in the 1916 rising.

Matthew Jackson: Matthew is a Ph.D. candidate in the School of History, Anthropology, Philosophy and Politics (HAPP) at Queen's University Belfast. He previously obtained his B.A. and M.A. in Modern History also at Queen's. His research interests relate to cultural representations of the past, difficult history, and historical memory. His thesis 'Representing the Troubles: Contested Histories, Critical Museology and Conflict Exhibitions' examines representations of the Northern Ireland conflict in museums and conflict exhibitions.

James Keenan: James is an M.A. (Taught) student in History at Queen's University Belfast, where he also completed his B.A. James' research interests include the late nineteenth and early twentieth century history including land agitation and the agrarian resurgence and the early Home Rule movement. He is also interested in the study of Irish culture and society in the twentieth century.

Hugh Maguire: Hugh is currently a final year History student at Queen's University Belfast and on course to complete his degree in July of this year. Before university, he was educated in Birmingham, at Bishop Challoner Catholic College. He is currently researching and writing a dissertation on 'The GAA as an expression of Irish Identity and a political entity: An in depth looks at the contribution of the GAA to Cultural Nationalism from 1912-1924' with a particular focus on the significance and role of the Association in Britain during this period.

Darren McMahon: Darren undertook his undergraduate and postgraduate degrees in University College Cork. For his undergraduate, Darren completed Bachelors in French and History, dedicating his time to the study of the French language and modern history. In regards to history, his areas of focus included the development of the EU institutional framework, US foreign policy and contemporary history, international relations, post-World War II US cultural history, and the Vietnam War. In 2016, Darren completed his Master's degree in International Relations, with a specific focus on US foreign policy once again, but also the politics of terrorism and international relations theory. His dissertation focused on the Clinton

administration's development of policy and decision-making in ending the Bosnian War. Currently, Darren is a stagier in the directorate-general for external policies in the European Parliament, working with the Democracy and Election Actions Unit (DEAC). This unit provides democracy support, capacity building and election observation for a limited number of developing countries, provided it is approved by the Members of the European Parliament**.**

Kevin Russell: Originally a Business Studies degree graduate from N.I.H.E in 1982. Kevin returned to the University of Limerick as a mature student in 2011 to study History and Sociology graduating in 2014 with a B.A. in Joint Honours. His research interests revolve around Irish 19th century social history including, estate management, health and the Irish in the British armed forces. Kevin is currently writing his dissertation as part of a Masters in International Archives, Records and Information Management through the University of Aberystwyth.

Matthew Thompson: Having begun his historical studies at Ballyclare Secondary School in County Antrim, Matthew entered Queen's University Belfast in 2014 and is now coming to the close of his undergraduate career. His research interests have varied significantly from eighteenth- and nineteenth-century North American studies, to seventeenth-century Ireland. Recently, however, he has narrowed his interest to focusing specifically on the impact of humanist thought on the writers of seventeenth-century Britain and Ireland, and contemporary perceptions of seminal events such as the 1641 Rebellion, the Interregnum and Restoration, and the Glorious Revolution.

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

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