'A Crisis of the Hearth?' The Post-War Challenge to Gender Order in France 1919-1929

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The First World War brought unanticipated change to French culture, politics and society, and not without impacting on gender order.[1] Its 'challenge' to gender order took many forms. Sexual politics, relationships between the sexes, ideas about male and female separate roles and of course, masculine and feminine identities, were at the forefront of political and informal debates about social morality and welfare. This study will examine the ways in which war directly or indirectly challenged gender order in France 1919-1929, taking into account the debates through which French people at all levels of society engaged with this challenge. It will also investigate whether war directly challenged the 'gender order', or transformed the social institutions which shaped the gender order, indirectly or incidentally challenging gender. If war made very different demands of French men and women in terms of their allocated gender roles, then it must be considered whether the post-war decade 1919-1929, in which

[1] Gender order: men and women's positioning/roles in society based on perceived differences between the sexes.

France attempted to heal itself by returning to a pre-war state, contained traces of these original demands, transformed by peacetime.[2]

Historiography seems, as a first glance, to have realised all possible theories and ideas concerning the ways in which war challenged gender. Roberts, Higonnet, McMillan, Thébaud, and Reynolds, along with Amy Lyford's new studies on 'masculinity' in wartime France, provide a useful network of analysis focusing on sexual politics, feminism, marriage, the New Woman[3], the family, public and private spheres, employment and suffrage. Combining this historiographical base with evidence from the period 1919-1929, this study will initially focus on war's challenge to the gender order through the public sphere, and finally, how it impacted on private lives and personal relationships. This division of 'public' and 'private' is not always absolute; for instance, personal relationships can effect 'public' change. However, in this study, it will serve as the framework through which gender order is most simply analysed.

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[2] See, for example: Margaret Higonnet and Patrice Higonnet, 'The double helix' in Margaret Higonnet, *Behind the lines: gender and the two world wars* (New Haven, 1987), p. 31; M. L. Roberts, *Civilisation without sexes: reconstructing gender in postwar France 1917-1927* (Chicago, 1994), p. 216.

[3] A symbol of social change rather than a gender stereotype, according to M. L. Roberts, *Disruptive acts: the new woman in fin-de siècle France* (Chicago, 2002), p. 21.

War did not seem to empower women politically, or regulate equality in all sectors of employment and education, yet the effects of mass death, rapid industrialisation and wartime politics all impacted on the public sphere during and directly after the war. Politics, the workplace and opportunities offered by higher education were impacted on by war's cultural mobilisation and cultural side-effects; did this produce new opportunities offered in equal measures to men and women in the post-war period? French feminists who had witnessed the failure of their campaign to obtain equal suffrage in November 1922 when the French Senate voted against the Bill passed in 1919 by the Chamber of Deputies, called off their wartime 'truce' and began to campaign not only for suffrage but for social reforms of the Civil Code.[4] However, divisions within the women's movement, just as present in post-war France as they had been before the war, meant that the socialist women's movement, the French Union for Women's Suffrage and the National Council of French Women, among others, remained at odds with each other's campaigns and methods. Bourgeois feminists, Catholic feminists, militants, socialist feminists and nationalist feminists all had very different visions for the future of gender

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[4] Paul Smith, *Feminism and the third republic: women's political and civil rights in France 1918-1945* (Oxford, 1996), p. 213.

order in France. Alternatives to universal suffrage were also suggested by individuals other than feminists during the war. Maurice Barrès' proposal that suffrage be offered to women who had lost a male family member to the war was turned down, yet is an interesting example of the idea that women could be politically empowered by their male relatives' war sacrifices. Hause attributes the failure of the suffrage bill in the Senate to fears that Pope Benedict XV would rally women voters to support a conservative Catholic society in France.[5] Whether due to feminist disunity in the 1920s, or a political unwillingness to accept female suffrage by the governments of the Third Republic, France remained the only western democratic state to withhold suffrage in any form from women in the inter-war era; which of course impacted not only on gender order, but on individual awareness of political and social inequality.

The feminist movement, although it speaks volumes about women's political activism in the post-war era, does not reveal the cultural intersection where public and private merged. The struggles of working-class women, such as their role in the strikes of autumn 1918, and those of middle-class women seeking to obtain an education and career equal to that

[5] S. C. Hause and A. R. Kenney, *Women's suffrage and social politics in the French third republic* (Princeton, 1984), p. 217.

of their male contemporaries, are part of that intersection.[6] War had mobilised women perhaps as much as it mobilised men, but by a different means. According to McMillan, '684,000 women worked in armaments factories at some stage of the war.'[7] This type of work had visible consequences for gender order, consequences which outlasted the war. Women in urban areas had a wage of their own, although this was threatened by wartime inflation, while some women in rural areas experienced, perhaps for the first time, what it meant to run an entire farm either single-handedly or with the help of one or two servants.[8] Women began to dress to meet the demands of their employment, whether in factories or on farms. Skirts became shorter and work overalls were worn in factories where long dresses or skirts posed a danger to the worker. Women were employed in an array of industries, which persisted into the inter-war period. Soap works, explosives factories, metal and armaments industries (in which McMillan notes a 'staggering 913% rise in women workers'), drug factories, and the transport industries, all employed

[6] McMillan separates working and middle classes on the basis that gender and class are interwoven identities; gender therefore, cannot be examined without considering class a factor of influence. In J. F. McMillan, *Housewife or harlot: the place of women in French society 1870-1940* (Sussex, 1981), p. 116.
[7] McMillan, *Housewife or harlot,* p. 132.
[8] J. J. Becker, *The great war and the French people* (Leamington Spa, 1985), p. 16.

women due to the absence of male workers. [9] However, Reynolds has suggested that a 'sexual division of labour' and inequality in wages withstood the test of war.[10] This can be seen also in the Health Service, where women were as a rule limited to nursing, and married women were not considered suitable employees.[11] This division of labour was class-based as well as sex-based; for instance, middle-class women were employed mostly in the tertiary sector. This was also the case throughout the 1920s, indicating that women were subject to the precepts of class as well as gender. In 1906, 779,000 women held commercial jobs and 293,000 held jobs in the 'liberal professions and public services' and in 1921, these figures had risen to 1,008,000 and 491,000.[12]

One feminist writer foresaw the implications of women's wartime work experiences in 1916, predicting that although some women would be happy to return to their domestic roles, others would be 'seized with nostalgia for the effort.'[13] However, the 'sexual division of labour' was supported by restrictions placed upon higher education for

[9] McMillan, *Housewife or harlot*, p. 157.
[10] Siân Reynolds, *France between the wars: gender and politics* (London, 1996), p. 83.
[11] McMillan, *Housewife or harlot*, p. 121.
[12] Ibid., p. 117.
[13] Jane Misme, 'La guerre et le rôle des femmes', *La revue de paris*, 1 Nov. 1916.

women; in Paris, the 'Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales and the Ecole Pratique de Commernce et d'Industrie refused to admit women students' which limited their technical training.[14] Yet, despite the obvious restrictions and the failure of French syndicalists to wholly support sexual equality in the workforce, women's experiences of work on the home front had vital consequences in the post-war period, in highlighting the division of labour and hence, impacting on gender order.[15] Just as men could not ignore their past experiences of combat in the post-war period, women's post-war surroundings, whether they married and returned to the home or remained in employment, seemed to be a reaction to their experience of war.

If war challenged the gender order by necessitating separate roles on the home and fighting fronts, it was in the post-war period that the consequences became more visible. Yet research on gender in wartime and post-war France does not appear to take into consideration the 'generational' aspect of how gender order is shaped. By acknowledging that France's 'young adult generation' (between eighteen and thirty years of age) were either children or in their early teens from the period 1914-1919, the historian must return to war to find

[14] McMillan, *Housewife or harlot*, p. 119.
[15] Ibid., p. 162.

explanations for the way in which these young men and women engaged with cultural ideas of gender conflict and sexual politics in the post-war era. Focusing on the informal and formal education of children, particularly the ideas of masculinity and femininity which were instilled into the minds of children during the war, may explain why and how gender order was transformed in the aftermath of war.

In *Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter* Simone de Beauvoir recalled the ways in which war impacted on her as a child, as something real and imagined:

> I invented games appropriate to the circumstances: I was Poincaré, Jeanne was George V and my sister was the Tsar. We held our conferences under the cedars and cut the Prussians to ribbons with our sabers (...) In my games I was always a valiant Zouave, a heroic daughter of the regiment. I wrote everywhere in coloured chalks: *Vive la France!* The grown-ups admired my devotion to the cause.[16]

De Beauvoir's memoir stresses her complicity in accepting the ideology of war, of which she could not grasp the true gravity as a child. French men and women were inherently different to the Germans, whom to her were 'the last Evil incarnate.'[17]

[16] Simone de Beauvoir, *Memoirs of a dutiful daughter* (New York, 2005, orig. published in Paris, 1958), pp 26-7.
[17] Ibid., p. 27.

French women and children were inherently vulnerable, and were to be protected against the Boche and the 'spies who stuck needles into women's behinds and...distributed poisoned sweets among the children.'[18] Her descriptions of feeling shame for desiring an end to the war 'no matter how it ends' seem to have been a reflection of adult anxieties and adult desires. [19] Her attitudes towards morality and, indeed, gender were influenced by ideas that her adult teachers were forced to engage with during the war, from the *Union Sacrée* to illustrated propaganda. De Beauvoir poses not only as an individual who experienced war, but as a generational symbol of inter-war discontent with pre-war traditions and wartime ideology. Where historians have overlooked the impression which wartime ideology made on children, a story has remained untold about the psychological impact of war on future wives, husbands, mothers and fathers. Many of the children of the First World War became the mothers and fathers of the inter-war period, some reaching a marriageable age by the mid-1920s. Bearing in mind that these children were 'bound by a heavy inheritance and committed to assume

[18] Ibid., p. 28.
[19] Ibid., p. 65.

their debt of gratitude', this study will now turn to their collective experience as post-war mothers and fathers.[20]

The post-war phenomenon of anxiety, individual and collective, often focused on 'depopulation' due to war's casualties and the wartime interruption of marital relations. Fears were also expressed concerning the symbolic figure of the unmarried and childless 'New Woman', increasing divorce rates, the decline of the family as the primary social unit, natality and *fécondité*. These anxieties, whether real or 'imagined', manifested themselves politically and socially. Social activists, pro-natalists and conservative politicians ensured that 'women were not entitled to the right to control their own fertility', or at any rate, they had to comply with state supervision.[21] Not for the first time in French history, politics entered the private lives of men and women, transferring sexual relationships from their 'private' position into public debates. This can also be seen during wartime, when the government 'sought to ameliorate its illegitimacy rate' and allowed 'soldiers to marry by proxy', also passing legislation which allowed the legitimising of children whose fathers were killed in action.[22] As will be shown, in what was

[20] William Kidd and Brian Murdoch (eds), *Memory and memorials: the commemorative century* (Hants, 2004), p. 54.
[21] McMillan, *Housewife or harlot*, p. 130.
[22] S. R. Grayzel, *Women and the first world war* (London, 2002), p. 66.

assumed to be a 'depopulation' crisis in the post-war period, the government increasingly monitored and even intervened in matters where maternity and natality were concerned.

One source shows that 50,000 births were registered in December 1919, compared to a wartime minimum of 21,000 in November 1915, with approximately 126 children born per 10,000 inhabitants in 1919.[23] Historians have disputed the fact that concerns about 'depopulation' were founded in reality.[24] Roberts denies that France was 'dying of depopulation' but acknowledges that anxiety was 'a cultural reality in itself', while McMillan focuses on the attitudes to 'depopulation' immediately after the war, which he sees as 'related to the climate of pessimism and fear for the future engendered by the bloodletting in the trenches between 1914 and 1919.' [25] With approximately 1.5 million casualties of war, besides 3 million wounded and 1.1 permanently disabled, France was forced to endure the loss of almost an entire generation of men of 'mobilisable' age.[26] Mass death tipped the population scales and transformed the demographics of the nation's population,

[23] André Armengaud, *La population française au XXe siècle* (Paris, 1965), pp 18-9.
[24] The absence of a wartime census leaves some demographic questions unanswered.
[25] See Roberts, *Civilisation without sexes*, p. 97 and McMillan, *Housewife or harlot*, p. 130.
[26] Roberts, *Civilisation without sexes*, p. 95.

without doubt impacting on gender order. The 600,000 war widows in France, many of them mothers, were left facing the management of their families and finances alone in the post-war era; some, perhaps, with the help of their extended families.

However, if deaths had been necessary to the government in their campaign to defend the nation, they seemed to consider 'births' to be the key to post-war cultural rebirth. [27] Although the need to 'replenish the ranks'[28] seemed unnecessary during peacetime, 'pro-natalists and family defence groups were able to whip themselves and others into near-hysteria about demographic and moral decline.'[29] Nineteenth-century texts were constantly pulled up as evidence of the dangers of *fecondité* and the widespread use of *coitus interruptus* and male prophylactics, particularly Zola's *Fécondité* which debated the changes in sexual practises and the implications for the French population.[30] In 1919 the First National Congress of Natality was held at Nancy, Rouen and Bordeaux, campaigning for pre and post-natal care and

[27] Bernard Grasset suggested in 1929 that 'war is an undertaking of depopulation' in *Pour une politique sexuelle* (Paris, 1929), p. 23.
[28] Kidd and Murdoch (eds), *Memory and memorials*, p. 56.
[29] Paul Smith, *Feminism and the third republic*, p. 213.
[30] Emile Zola, *Fécondité* (Paris, 1897). E-book sourced from project Gutenberg, translated by E. A. Vizetelly. (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/10330/10330-h/10330-h.htm) (7 Mar. 2012).

housing and tax reductions for large families.[31] Less than a year later, in 1920, a law was passed banning the dissemination of information concerning abortion and contraception, marking the beginning of a legal discourse between sexual activity and public interest in the inter-war period. The increasing emphasis on maternity in welfare debates was perhaps the motivation behind France's first official Mother's Day, which was held in May 1920. It appears that due to multiple anxieties caused by the unforeseen impact of war on the home front, the terms 'contraception, abortion, depopulation, and natality' took on new significance.

To what extent ordinary French men and women were aware of this political intervention in their private lives, is an interesting question. Sartre's *The Age of Reason,* set in 1930s Paris, describes an unmarried couple's difficult attempts to procure an abortion; Marcelle subsequently acknowledges that she in fact wants to keep the child.[32] The connections between sexuality, maternity, paternity, and moral duty were often noted in post-war literature, and were combined with fears of the declining function of the French family in society. One

[31] This was not the first pro-natalist organisation in France to campaign on behalf of large families; in 1898 the *Alliance nationale pour l'accroissement de la population française* was founded by Bertillon.
[32] Jean-Paul Sartre, *The age of reason* (London, 1967, orig. published in Paris, 1945).

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writer spoke of 'a crisis of the hearth'[33] in 1919 while another feared that the French family was becoming 'a sort of hotel for passers through', also suggesting that 'we must facilitate the transition to the new world while never losing sight of the great task that nature has bequeathed women in society.'[34] Debates concerning sexuality and procreation emerged in post-war politics directly because of wartime anxieties – such as depopulation, venereal diseases, prostitution, illegitimacy, sexual immorality and infidelity – and in the period 1919 to 1929 they remained at the centre of welfare politics and social activism. Susan Grayzel has perceptively noted that 'expressing anxiety about women's sexuality paradoxically allowed for more widespread discussion of it.'[35] For instance, Bernard Grasset, writing about the transnational phenomenon of depopulation in 1929, was forced to consider the functions of sex as a private act with public consequences.[36] Paradoxically, the years following the war seemed to be a social tug-of-war between moral anxiety and the need to mobilise women sexually to combat 'depopulation.' Yet as Grayzel has remarked, the need to communicate anxiety

[33] M. Lambert, 'La crise du foyer', *Opinion*, 9 Aug. 1919.
[34] J. Gabelle, 'La place de la femme française aprés la guerre' in *Renaissance politique*, Vol. 7, 17 Feb. 1917.
[35] Grayzel, *Women and the first world war*, p. 111.
[36] Grasset, *Pour une politique sexuelle*, pp. 12-3.

related to morality and sexuality led to debates on other aspects of sex.

War's impact on sexual relationships was undeniable; men of a mobilisable age inhabited the fighting front, while women of a marriageable age inhabited the home front. The difficulty, however, in returning to a pre-war state has been remarked upon by many historians, which can apply to gender order as well as other forms of social classification.[37] Interestingly, the number of divorces increased rapidly after the war, from 9,841 in 1918, to 19,465 in 1919, peaking at 41,279 in 1920, which raises certain questions about the war's impact on marital relationships.[38] Were the divorces a product of wartime strains on marriage – prolonged separation, wartime infidelity, etc – or were the high post-war divorce rates simply the 'surplus' produced by low rates during the war? Men and women, shaped by as well as shaping the gender order, were undoubtedly tested by war and the cultural upheaval it engendered. As previously noted, the 1920s contained traces of a kind of cultural anxiety; a fear that the devastation and upheaval caused by war meant that returning to a pre-war state was impossible. The war undoubtedly posed challenges to personal relationships between men and women,

[37] Jean-Jacques Becker, quoted in Roberts, *Civilisation without sexes*, p. 216.
[38] Li Mon, *Le divorce en France: étude de sociologie* (Paris, 1936).

which in turn impacted on gender order. Relationships, marital or otherwise, were also affected by the widening breach between old and new, confirmed by the presence of the New Woman in the period 1919-1929.

The 'New Woman' bore a great significance in the inter-war period; whether as a symbol of defiant behaviour or female liberation, her presence cannot be overlooked. One historian states that her presence 'does not constitute evidence that the war liberated women,' which implies that the New Woman was a reflection of a desire for sexual equality rather than evidence of 'real' social or political change.[39] Beauvoir described how, as a young woman, she was affected by witnessing public displays of sexuality on the boulevard Montparnasse, how she defied 'convention and authority' through sexual acts, and how she questioned the traditional function of marriage in society: 'Marriage? What would that mean? Whether it was bringing up children or correcting exercises, it was all the same old song; it was useless.'[40] Many women pursued such modes of thought, and did not necessarily consider themselves feminists.[41] Short hair, new

[39] Roberts, *Civilisation without sexes*, p. 216.
[40] De Beauvoir, *Memoirs of a dutiful daughter*, pp 271; p. 273; p. 228.
[41] Anne-Marie Sohn, 'Between the wars in France and England' in Françoise Thébaud (ed.), *A history of women in the west, vol. 5. toward a cultural identity in the twentieth century* (Harvard, 1994), p. 93.

fashions; could appearances be considered a sign of emancipation? And if so, had war indirectly engendered this form of change? If the New Woman was merely a symbol of the desire for change, what did women in such as Madeleine Pelletier hope to achieve in changing their appearances? Victor Margueritte's *La Garçonne* described a young woman trying to make sense of her sexuality and gender in the post-war period of 'sexual anarchy'[42]: 'Marriage? Never!...What advantage could this legalisation of the bond bring her in itself?...What could it add to unions already happy? Nothing.'[43] Yet in flouting tradition, Monique provoked the anger and jealousy of her male companions. This literary expression of discontent with the social traditions which persisted in post-war France reveals that war had somehow changed how many young French women viewed marriage and domesticity, and the perceived limits that they placed on women's position in society.

If the experience of war had unsuspectingly allowed the idea of the New Women to become a social, if not yet politically enfranchised, reality, what impact did this have on men in the inter-war period? War had defined masculinity and femininity in terms of physical strength and weakness, and

[42] Victor Margueritte, *La garçonne*, translated as *The bachelor girl* by Hugh Burnaby (London, 1923), p. 56.
[43] Margueritte, *The bachelor girl*, p. 250.

even in terms of 'life-giving' and 'life-taking', which had a great significance for veterans in peacetime.[44] They were obliged to leave behind narratives of war which had in some cases become intertwined with their personal gender identities.[45] If veterans were indeed confronted by a 'profound sense of personal discontinuity' in the aftermath of war and a feeling that their gender was being eclipsed, how was this played out in intersexual relationships in the 1920s?[46] Roberts has suggested that 'a women's rejection of domesticity and motherhood frustrated a veteran's manhood and belittled the meaning of his war sacrifices.'[47] Whether this was true or not, men's responses to the emergence of the New Woman and other signs of change within gender order in the period 1919-1928 have been poorly documented. In *La Garçonne*, Régis struggles with the fact that Monique is financially independent,[48] and not inclined to marriage:

[44] Amy Lyford, *Surrealist masculinities: gender anxiety and the aesthetics of post-world war I reconstruction in France* (California, 2007), p. 30.
[45] Jessica Meyer, *Men of war: masculinity and the first world war in Britain* (Hampshire, 2009), p. 164.
[46] Eric Leed, *No man's land: combat and identity in world war I* (Cambridge, 1979), p. 2.
[47] Roberts, *Civilisation without sexes*, p. 214.
[48] Margueritte, *The bachelor girl*, p. 228.

> He was humiliated at her escaping in yet another way from the normal- the woman subservient, and the man commanding (…) Women of the kind were multiplying rapidly and must henceforward be reckoned with as equals. A conclusion which far from satisfying him, fortified his repugnance towards all that he classified under that word on which his teeth grated: "Feminism."[49]

While this source does not reveal the personal opinions of men in their entirety, it does document both a man and a woman's interesting responses to the changes within their respective gender roles, and indeed, gender order. With a historiographical move towards studies of masculinity and femininity, men are restored to, rather than excluded from, narratives of gender, which lends more accuracy to the analysis of sexuality and sexual relationships in a post-war context.

A visible trend in transnational inter-war literature can be seen in the repeated use of love, sex, and romance as central themes. France's own 'Lost Generation' alluded to the social changes brought about by war and the many forms that 'loss' itself took, whether it was a loss of sexual innocence or the pre-war gender order. André Breton wrote about 'love and

[49] Ibid., pp 228-9.

desperation' in the late 1920s,[50] while Virginia Woolf wrote about how war had 'changed' men in *To the Lighthouse,* and of how it had mentally injured a veteran beyond repair in *Mrs Dalloway*.[51] André Breton's prose poem 'The idea of love' seems underpinned by a sense of despair and loss, which many poet veterans expressed: 'Who is lost (…) Who? A solitary man whom the idea of love has just left and who tucks in his spirit like an imaginary bed (…) It's just that the idea of love is, it seems, angry with love.'[52]

Love and the expression of love in this case seem to hold a generational significance. War had 'affected everyone', and so the behaviour of men towards women and women towards men was influenced by the memory of war experiences. In an era infused with nostalgia, romanticism and an undercurrent of anxiety, it does not seem likely that any sex was 'liberated' from past values or traditions. The symbol of the New Woman has been used as evidence of a sexual revolution, yet McMillan suggests that this was not the case: 'one is struck more by the persistence of traditional ideas than

[50] André Breton, *My heart through which her heart has passed: poems of love and desperation, 1926- 1931*, translated by Mark Polizzotti (Paris, 1998, orig. published in 1948).
[51] Virginia Woolf, *To the lighthouse* (London, 1977), p. 181 & *Mrs Dalloway* (London, 1925).
[52] Breton, *My heart through which her heart has passed*, p. 24.

by the emergence of a new order of sexual mores.'[53] This paradoxical inclination to look to the past for a foundation for the future is problematic, and was reflected in post-war literature which attempted to give a voice to two contradictory desires; the desire to restore the 'old' and the desire to experience the 'new'.

Although there is no simple or precise way to classify these desires into actual traditions and patterns of social change, the arrangement below may help clarify this partition:

Table 1. Contrasting desires, old and new.

Old	New
Separate spheres	Employment for both sexes
Domesticity	Urbanisation
Marriage & Maternity	The New Woman (single, childless)
Family	Cohabitation, Divorce & Abortion
Rural Communities	Industrialisation

This division is by no means set in stone; for example, women were of course employed before the war and could remain single if they had the financial means and the desire. The

[53] McMillan, *Housewife or harlot,* p. 169.

division drawn is merely an attempt to show the decline of the 'old' and the emergence and consolidation of the 'new'.

If 'war *was* the revolution' and if in fact women did 'replace' men, then this had huge implications for gender order in the period 1919 to 1929.[54] The presence of the 'old' in the post-war world sometimes caused problems for the security of the new, while the existence of the 'new' meant that a return to a pre-war order was unlikely. War appears to have transformed the institutions and traditions which shaped gender order, and in this way challenged it indirectly in the post-war era. In several cases, the political intervention of a gender-conscious government in the private and sexual lives of men and women seems to suggest that this transformation was unforeseen and unwanted by some conservative sections of society; perhaps ironically by those who had desired a military victory at any cost. The post-war refusal to grant suffrage to women could be considered an attempt to preserve the pre-war gender order and reverse the 'revolution', yet as retrospection reveals, in the aftermath of war it was difficult to undo the social changes which transpired during the war.

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[54] 'Introduction' to John Horne (ed.), *A companion to world war I* (London, 2010) pp xvi-ii.