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

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The cover design by Jennifer McCaffrey and Nora McGillicuddy, School of Art and Design, Limerick Institute of Technology, incorporates the concept of past, present and future which is depicted by the use of the Buddhist symbol *aum*. The idea is represented by three heads looking in different directions symbolising the search for history by past, present and future historians.

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Preface

The study of history is not easy, it requires time, effort, dedication and endless patience but it is ultimately a most rewarding and fascinating activity. The reasons are many with the more important ones relating to the search for identity (personal, local, national and international) and the search for truth. Cicero wrote two thousand years ago, 'not to know what took place before you were born is to remain forever a child', thus, it is only in the study of our past that we situate ourselves in the present both as individuals and as part of local and wider communities. Not only do we claim our identity in the past but we look to the past to understand the present and we seek the truth in the past. The past is uncovered through the studying, researching and writing of history. In order to retrieve 'history' and indeed 'herstory', we rely on the work of historians. This collection of essays results from the enthusiasm, interest and commitment of historians.

In 1999, *History Studies*, challenged readers with the variety and quality of the essays. This current volume fulfils the same task. It includes contributions from historians based in educational institutions located throughout Ireland. The scholarship of undergraduate and postgraduate students, university faculty and post-primary teachers is represented herein. Essays are included on a range of periods from the medieval, early modern to modern, on a range of themes such as incarceration, urbanisation, ideology, religion, education, diplomacy and conflict and finally, the essays are situated within an Irish, British, European, American and Asian contexts.

Each of these essays offers new insights and interpretations and makes a valuable contribution to the cannon of history. I commend the collection and congratulate the University of Limerick History Society and the journal editors for maintaining such high production and scholarship values.

Bernadette Whelan M.A. Ph.D.
Patron
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Editorial

Building on the success of *History Studies*, volume one, we are happy to introduce this second volume of history containing the work of students from around Ireland. The collection presents the work of both undergraduate and postrgraduate students on a range of topics and themes. The collection is enriched by the inclusion of a paper read to the 'Vikings' Symposium hosted by University of Limerick History Society in April 2000.

While the essays vary in both style and content, all portray the author's perspective on a particular historical theme. This may sometimes lead the reader to question the arguments and reasoning of the author. This is to be encouraged. Indeed, in selecting these essays, we hope that readers will be infused with a sense of critical analysis which may prompt some to write papers for subsequent volumes, in response to the views stated herein. The long-term success of *History Studies* rests less with the editors than with those who dare to submit their views of history to the scrutiny of publication.

We wish to acknowlege the valuable support and advice given to us by members of the history faculty at the University of Limerick and our generous benfactors. Finally, we thank the authors. We hope that the reader will enjoy this collection and that pleasure and knowledge can be gleaned from it.

David A. Fleming
Edward Horgan

31 October 2000

In hope and fear
The Victorian prison in perspective

Seán-Pól Mac Cárthaigh

The sophistication or otherwise with which a society formulates a critique of deviancy and the manner in which it proceeds to combat the challenges that criminality pose, provides the onlooker with a telling insight into its calibre. This paper charts the assumptions, prejudices and perceptions that impacted on the area of criminal activity and the role of the prison system in Victorian Ireland and Britain. It challenges the assumption that the Victorian prison and the wider intellectual matrix from which it sprung was both irrational, inhumane and essentially worthless. It hopes to illustrate the extent to which popular and sincerely held notions about the nature and extent of criminal behaviour made certain aspects of the penal system not only rational but imperative in the prevailing context. Taking as a starting point the principle that 'the historian cannot look down, but only look around,' a central refrain of the paper is the notion that the Victorian prison was based on the belief that punishment be accompanied by the hope of reformation.[1] Several works on this system have concentrated upon the punitive side of the equation. This paper will consider the other side, emphasising the notions of hope and humanity that underpinned the work of many men within this structure. It seeks to stress the manner in which the prison system was predicated upon the profoundly ideological and optimistic determination that man was essentially a perfectible creature with the active assistance of a benevolent state.[2] Its true significance will be highlighted with reference to eighteenth century penal administration. By scrutinising the situation in Irish prisons, particularly from 1850 to 1880, and by setting the prison system within the wider Victorian mentality, it is hoped that the reader will come to a just verdict on a bold instrument of social engineering.

The development of a prison system during the nineteenth century, based upon a religious mission, a rigorous labour regime, an educational programme embracing industrial training and basic literacy skills, each subsumed within a

[1] J.J. Lee as quoted in foreword to Nicholas Mansergh, *Nationalism and independence: selected Irish papers* (Cork, 1997) p. xvii.
[2] Paul O'Mahony, 'Punishing poverty and personal adversity' pp. 49-52 in Ivana Bacik and Micheal O'Connell (eds.), *Crime and poverty in Ireland* (Dublin, 1998).

grand grade system, designed to reward those who showed signs of improvement and encourage certain character traits, marked a seismic shift in notions of criminal justice and the role of the state in combating social delinquency.[3] Eighteenth century prison life for the most part was marked by arbitrary cruelty, massive administrative inertia and a general air of dilapidation. In this era of exemplary justice, prisons had no role other than as holding centres for, or as places to house the insane. The comprehensive review of the British criminal justice system undertaken by the Bow Street Magistrate, Henry Fielding, in the middle of the 1750s indicates as much in a clear manner. If Georgian society believed that prison life had anything other than hard fare to offer a convict then it was decidedly unimpressive in showing it through its prison service. For the Victorians, however, much of the changes that swirled about their heads might have frightened and disorientated them; there would be no return to exclusively repressive approaches to the crime question. Prisons were regulated in an increasingly thorough and impressive manner, a regime was established based around a religious ethic and the concept of the 'perfectibility of man,' and complaints that there was not any provision for work became a thing of the past.[4] It seems clear that by the last quarter of the nineteenth century the Victorian prison system had learned how to avoid some of the more notorious administrative difficulties that had characterised the earlier system. Utilitarian Victorians saw merit in imprisoning people for years rather than executing, branding or transporting them. Fielding posed several questions in disgust:

> What good conscience then can arise from sending idle and disorderly persons to a place where they are neither to be corrected or employed and where with the conversation of many as bad, and sometimes worse than themselves, they are sure to be improved in the knowledge and confirmed in the practice of iniquity? [5]

To these, Victorians could respond with a confident rendition of the improvements put in place in the interim. Through a strict system of

[3] Philip Priestley, *Victorian prison lives* (London, 1999). See also Clive Emsley, *Crime and society in England 1750-1900* (London, 1987); Sean Mc Conville, 'The Victorian prison in England, 1865-1965' in *The Oxford history of the prison: the practice of punishment in western society* (New York,1995), p. 135; Charles Lysaght, '*The history of crime and treatment of offenders since the Famine*' (Thomas Davis Lecture, R.T.E. Radio One, 9 February 1999).

[4] Andrew Barrett and Christopher Harrison (eds.), *Crime and punishment in England: a source book* (London, 1999), p. 175.

[5] Ibid., p. 175.

classification and separation, the adoption of prison education facilities, a simple yet statutorily established system of prison labour, the inertia and incoherence that marked the inherited system disappeared. Such scenes as were recorded at Newgate prison in the 1830s, where 'ribaldries were lubricated with quantities of beer,'[6] were rarely repeated during the next few decades. Uncoordinated 'parnassian islands'[7] of liquor and lust would not be an accurate description of the Crofton intermediate prisons which would dominate the remaining decades of the nineteenth century.[8]

Central to Victorian notions of the virtuous citizen and worthy existence was a passionate regard for work. The glorification of industry as a virtue resulted from both practical and idealistic calculations. Laziness or idleness of any sort in a society where the market was expanding at a bewildering pace assumed positively vice-like proportions. The middle classes accepted the biblical notion of every single task of the individual being dedicated to the service of the divine creator. Popular sermons of the time went further than either notion of industry or work and insisted on classing the daily grind of every citizen as a divinely rendered mission.[9]

A crucial aspect of the Victorian approach to crime was the manner in which it invested industry with the power of redemption. The penitentiary was designed to be a secure place where the prisoner could reflect and seek a change in lifestyle. This was based on the powerful notion that idleness and disorderliness were akin to ungodliness. By keeping idle hands occupied the time and inclination to commit offences was said to be significantly diminished. Solemn declarations in relation to the necessity of honest industry were not reserved for the parliamentary division or the public pulpit. If the diaries and life-styles of some of the most impressive Victorians are examined then this same regard for work and contempt for fecklessness or casualness emerges with an impressive regularity. The remarkable diaries of William Ewart Gladstone, the symbol and the outstanding example of the era that he bestrode, are no exception in this regard. Possibly because of his Quaker origins, his exhortations to industry and an all consuming belief in the power of faith to redeem the sinner were practised in private just as sincerely as they

[6] Priestley, *Victorian prison lives*, p. 34.

[7] Patrick Kavanagh, 'Canal Bank Walk' in *Collected poems* (London, 1964), p. 150.

[8] For an analysis of the eighteenth century inheritance see ibid., p. 34; G.M. Young and W.D. Hancock (eds.), *English historical documents*, xii (1) 1833-74 (London, 1956), pp. 506-12; See also Joseph Starr 'Prison reform in Ireland in the age of enlightenment' in *History Ireland*, 2 (1995).

[9] W.E. Houghton, *The Victorian frame of mind* (London, 1957), pp. 242-7.

were preached in public.[10] However, there were practical considerations as well as philosophical ones. Reform of the penal code became vital after the Australian colonists' refusal to accept convicts after 1840.

Before examining the internal regimes of mid-nineteenth century prisons, we must endeavour to understand how contemporaries perceived crime and criminals. The two most crucial observations in this regard were the firm beliefs that crime was essentially a class issue and that criminal motivations were unrelated to economic considerations. Crime was the result of idleness, dullness, a degenerate character and a taste for luxury.[11] Darwinian ideas of criminal man, located largely out of the sight of his more refined superiors, assumed positively monstrous proportions, the malcontent scheming continuously in an attempt to turn the tables upon the middle class. In an attempt to reassert control over the lower orders, those horrific, yet fascinating 'prognathous brutes with huge jaws and tiny brains,'[12] were to be allowed no lenience. Crime jarred uncomfortably with such profound notions as middle class status and everlasting privilege. The overwhelmingly hostile depiction of criminal man in the press as being almost as subhuman in form as he was in deed, speaks eloquently for a ruling class almost at its wit's end.[13] If the stakes were as high as Lord Salisbury assumed, and if life amounted to a 'struggle between those who have, to keep what they have, and those who have not to get it', then the hostility of the middle classes to the threatening and roving criminal is understandable.[14]

For most Victorian commentators the relationship between crime and poverty simply did not exist. Interested parties such as W.D. Morrison, the loquacious chaplain at Wandesworth tackled this issue with a pungent declaration to the effect that, 'it is not really destitution but intemperance that

[10] M.R.D. Foot and H.C.G. Matthew, *The Gladstone diaries*, i, iv (Oxford, 1978).
[11] Emsley, *Crime and society*, pp. 56-85. See also John Paul McCarthy, *Cork city gaol: Victorian criminology and the Cork experience* (unpublished paper, Cork, 1998), pp. 3-5. For causes of female deviance in particular see Lucia Zedner, *Women crime and custody in Victorian England* (Oxford 1993), pp. 11-90.
[12] L.P. Curtis, *Apes and angels: the Irishman in Victorian caricature* (London, 1997), p. 102.
[13] Barrett and Harrison, *Crime and punishment*, p. 197-208.
[14] Quoted in Peter Clarke, 'In a class of his own' in *The Sunday Times*, 12 September 1999; John Grigg 'More power than principle' in *The Sunday Telegraph*, 12 September 1999.

leads to crime.'[15] Crime was viewed overwhelmingly in terms of individual failing. The principle of ultimate personal responsibility, occupied a crucial place in the well-thumbed Victorian criminological lexicon. If crime was seen as being the result of innate and sometimes inherited character defects, then for the prison system in its attempt at reformation to concentrate overwhelmingly upon the individual was neither as irrational or surprising, as some would have maintained. If 'character consists in little acts, well and honourably formed; daily life being the quarry from which we build it up, and rough hew the habits which form it,'[16] we can understand how emphasis upon reforming the moral character of the individual while in prison was born out of long standing perceptions as to the causes of deviancy, rather than an arbitrary sense of cruelty.

If the many and diffuse commentators on criminal activity in the nineteenth century shared anything, it was their common belief that the scale of both social delinquency and consequent moral degeneration in their society was rising exponentially. In many of the more popular journals, lamentations at the ever-growing number of recorded violent crimes were frequent and anxious. The criminal, it was assumed, was plotting a turning of the social and economic tables. And what was most disconcerting was the belief that he just might succeed. Thus even a cursory glance at the depiction of criminal man in many drawings as well as in a sizeable portion of the main stream literature indicates that the convicted criminal arrived in prison on the back of a strong current of popular hostility. Punishment and repression were the mainstream press priorities.[17] Education and retraining were distrusted as potentially disastrous courses of action.[18] Having been told in no uncertain terms the type of regime that the media found most congenial, where harshness was assumed to be the most important ingredient, it is worth examining how those charged with the daily administration of the prisons responded.

In a society where religion assumed such importance, the role of the chaplain within the penal project was crucial. What is most significant about these men is the extent to which in many cases, complex and often abstract emphasis upon the elucidation of theological doctrine was superseded by a

[15] W.D. Morrisson 'Crime and its causes' as quoted in part in *Crime and punishment*, p. 197-208.
[16] Samuel Smiles, 'Self-help' (1859) as quoted in Barbara Dennis and David Skilton (eds.), *Reform and intellectual debate in Victorian Britain* (London, 1987), p. 52.
[17] Barrett and Harrison, *Crime and punishment*, pp. 199-201.
[18] H.C.G. Matthew, *Gladstone* pp. 116-9. See also Roy Jenkins, *Gladstone* (London, 1995) and *The chancellors* (London, 1998), pp. 1 –111.

more interventionist and personalised mission. Whereas one Catholic chaplain concerned himself mainly with the 'divine mysteries', others 'took advantage of ... private intercourse with the prisoners to suggest and enforce many practical lessons, especially in reference to their future'.[19] Except when complaining as to the, 'lamentably ignorant'[20] among the flock, their language and level of commitment is impressive in its devotion and sympathy. Evidence is also available that these men took seriously the regulatory role that statute conferred upon them.[21] There can be no doubting that many were utterly convinced that they were the instruments of charity and compassion.

With all the optimism that the advancements of their age brought with them, prison authorities placed a significant emphasis upon the role of education in the quest for reformation. The commitment of individuals in this regard was decidedly impressive. George Farrelly appeared to have been a particularly outstanding example of zealousness and humanity. Offering his pupils at Philipstown an impressively varied curriculum and displaying a highly developed sensitivity to the needs of the individual, his promotion of reformation appears to have been tireless.[22] The following declaration provides an admirable insight into his pedagogic philosophy:

> I take them [convicts] individually and not in the hearing of other prisoners and enter fully with them into their history of their past lives and future prospects. I am thus better enabled to individualise them, and to shape them for a further course of action such as will be calculated to restore them to the social status which they had forfeited by the violation of the laws of God and their country.[23]

When Walter Crofton declared that the greatest task confronting his reformatory project was, 'the depressing opinion that prisoners in general hold of their own qualifications, believing it to be impossible that they are susceptible of improvement,'[24] it appears that he intended his schoolmasters to take up the challenge. One teacher said that 'no prisoner capable of learning or willing to learn should leave the prison unable to read and write at least'.[25] So it appears that many of these men were not in the business of shirking the

[19] *Sixth annual report of the director of Irish convict prisons, 1859*, p. 20. (henceforth *D.I.C.P.*).
[20] Ibid.
[21] *D.I.C.P., 1864*, p. 19.
[22] Ibid. p. 61.
[23] Ibid. p. 62.
[24] *D.I.C.P., 1855*, p. 3.
[25] *D.I.C.P., 1864*, p. 22.

grand plan as laid down by the directors of the prison system. If a depressed sense of self worth was the chief impediment to re-integration then the same teacher who 'had several prisoners able to write letters to their friends outside, after receiving only six months schooling,'[26] could confidently be included among the chosen few who had answered Crofton's clarion call with alacrity.

Time would not lessen the zeal of the staff of Mountjoy prison. Elderly prisoners, 'with broken down spirits'[27] were not dismissed as being lost causes or hardened in crime. Due to the ministering of the head schoolmaster, their progress under the school system, 'was a pleasing fact – only a few have left unable to read and write'. Possessed of an all-consuming confidence in the ability of education to transform and encourage the individual, many of these men contributed in a not insignificant manner at convict self-rejuvenation. Secular education was a suspicious concept for many. Social commentators who put their faith in more 'traditional' remedies for criminal recalcitrance felt sure that secular education 'so far from preventing crime is accessory to it'.[28] When Farrelly and others found a marked improvement in both the behaviour and skills of their charges,[29] one must consider such enthusiastic comments as an eloquent refusal to follow the path constructed by their more excitable contemporaries to a system based exclusively upon repression and punishment. There emerges in these reports a willingness at all times to accentuate the positive, to promote the success story, be it in the new willingness of old female prisoners to respond to the schoolmaster's encouragement or the newly taught literacy skills of men popularly written-off as degenerate.

However content certain commentators may have been to watch prisoners trundle away haplessly upon the treadmill, the combined efforts of some of the best men within this system, particularly teachers and chaplains, amounted to nothing less than a moral crusade, one that refused to simply consign thousands of inmates to the scrap-heap of history. It seems certain that the role that these men had cast themselves in was certainly not that of *Draco*, bellowing for retribution and punishment as the final solution to the problem of the criminal. They envisaged themselves rather as the moral guardians of the men and women under their care, charged with the difficult task of rekindling the flame of their self-confidence and dignity. One particularly

[26] Ibid.
[27] *D.I.C.P., 1876*, p. 16.
[28] Emsley, *Crime and society*, p. 57.
[29] *D.I.C.P., 1859*, p. 62.

enlightening report deals with the case of juvenile offenders at Mountjoy. Arguing for longer sentences so that his project may have enough time to produce results, Edward McGauhran complained that:

> I have always regarded it as cruelty to cast a young person at the tender age of fifteen ... out on this world to do for himself for good or evil, upon his own slender responsibility and without that great mainprop to a youth ... parental control.[30]

However one may wish to class his sentiments, they exude a basic concern that cannot be denied, nor often found within the columns of many popular newspapers.

Walter Crofton and his staff insisted in 1859 that the majority of convicts within the prison system were 'members of the criminal class – burglars, felons and pick pockets,' those in society that pursued crime as a vocation and after a conscious decision.[31] However, despite his pessimistic view that a significant proportion of Irish convicts emanate from the very worst sections of the criminal world, he was determined that his system would endeavour to improve their lives and affect a reformation. A key test for penologists at this time was recidivism. The re-offender undermined the Victorian rationale of self-reformation. Crofton opined that:

> The utmost that a good system of convict treatment can accomplish is by good training and by other appliances, to promote the improvement of, it is to be hoped, the large majority; and by arrangement and system to, as far as possible, ensure the reconviction and the incarceration of the remainder.[32]

This indicates a capacity for optimism not readily available in the literature upon these subjects available to his contemporaries. Despite the incorrigibility of many if not the majority of the convicts under his control, this statement indicates a determination to press ahead with at least a sustained and systematic effort at improvement. Commentators consistently criticised the government for their failure to adequately deal with the question of criminal dementia and the often-shocking conditions in which lunatics were held while in prison.[33] Their repeated insistence upon the importance of education within the prison and their complaints about deficiencies in the particular field of female instruction belie a passionate belief in not only the desirability of

[30] *D.I.C.P., 1859,* p. 29.
[31] Ibid., p. 12.
[32] Ibid., p. 13.
[33] Ibid., pp. 57-60. See also *Forty-third report of the inspectors-general on the general state of the prisons of Ireland,* pp. xxv-xxviii.

reformation but in the possibility of achieving such results within a strictly controlled environment.[34] Their praise for the progress of many of the inmates under their supervision was a profoundly ideological position. As previously noted, the belief in the feasibility of affecting reform was by no means an issue of consensus within the confines of the Victorian intellectual world and the results of their work may be viewed as robust, if oblique repudiations of more pessimistic lines of thought.

Many commentators have seen fit to class this particular system, and more particularly the internal regimes within these prisons, as being rigid and mechanical in its ruthlessness.[35] Yet to dismiss this system as incapable of flexibility, humanity or capacity to take a total view of any given situation seems inadequately absolutist.[36] Perhaps one of the most striking examples of the Victorian prison system's capacity to respond to particular problems and to incorporate new structures into old ones is the evolution of charitable institutions.[37] First mooted by its directors in Ireland as a cheap and efficient manner of promoting the reformation of female offenders, the discourse surrounding this particular venture contains evidence of the extent to which Victorian penal theorists had the capacity to place their own situation within a comparative context. It was based on a seemingly successful continental model of a secure environment outside of the immediate jurisdiction of penal administrators. Recognising the powerful social stigma attached to all inmates of convict prisons, female offenders were particularly vulnerable upon release, being 'totally deprived of any honest means of obtaining a livelihood'.[38] The importance of the refuge sprung out of the recognition that 'great difficulties present themselves in the final disposal of female convicts'.[39]

Promoting re-integration appears to have been the decisive priority in the Victorian mentality. In seeking to strike a delicate balance between the various groups clamouring for attention within the criminological sphere, the impulse at least of the Croftonites seems clear. The refuge was envisaged as a place:

[34] *D.I.C.P., 1856,* p. 22. See also *Thirty-eight report of inspectors-general on the general state of the prisons in Ireland, 1860,* pp. 219-48.
[35] Freida Kelly, *A history of Kilmainham gaol: the dismal house of little ease* (Dublin, 1988), p. 12.
[36] Elizabeth Cunningham, *The status of criminality in County Cork during the Famine years, 1845-52,* (M.A. thesis, N.U.I., Cork, 1997).
[37] *D.I.C.P., 1855,* p. 9.
[38] Ibid., p. 7.
[39] Ibid.

so managed as to produce reformation of the inmates and at the same time afford to society such assurances of that reformation as will be received with confidence by those who are likely to give them the means of earning their bread by honest industry.[40]

The refuges amount to an imaginative attempt by the authorities to co-opt the middle classes into the rehabilitative schema by devising structures that might gain their confidence in the groups that would emerge from the prison. The key notions of industry, regular labour and the individualisation of the offender, found pride of place within the refuge experiment. Armed with a clean moral slate, the female offender was to emerge from these private charitable institutions content in the knowledge that she was now possessed of recommendations which would then be considered satisfactory to obtain her employment. In spite of the inadequacies of these institutions and their almost monastic atmosphere, they amounted to a considerable attempt by the Victorian reformers to counter the social exclusion of ex-prisoners.

The hard labour that took place in many prisons in both Ireland and England was itself part of the grade system that lay at the heart of this structure. Generally unproductive and wearing work, such as working the crank, tread-wheel or picking oakum in the solitary cell, were reserved for the opening portion of the sentence, designed to be the most penal.[41] Through adequate displays of industry, docility and a willingness to submit to the rules of the prison, the convict found that opportunities for better and more satisfying work were opened up. Only through adopting the mantle of model citizens, by becoming 'steady, sober and industrious members of society, a credit to themselves and a pattern to others,'[42] could making boots be replaced by more attractive trades, such as weaving, mat-making, tailoring or carpentry.[43] At Mountjoy under Crofton, prisoners felt the full rigour of his system. Silence, solitude and sewing became the orders of the day. Nine months later, acceptable behaviour assumed, more ambitious trades were taught at one of the intermediate prisons where morality classes went hand-in-hand with mortar work. By placing the enervating next to the rewarding, Wandesworth Scrubs' deputy governor found that this, 'supplies that spur or

[40] Ibid., p. 8.

[41] Evidence to support this point can be found in the various reports of Mountjoy's successive governors in the *Reports of the D.IC.P.* for 1855, 1859, 1864, 1877.

[42] *D.I.C.P., 1876*, p. 17.

[43] For a sample of the trades taught at Cork city prison see *Annual report of the inspectors-general into the state of the prisons of Ireland, 1864*, p. 299. See also *Thirty-eight annual report of the inspectors-general, 1879*, p. 82.

stimulus to continuous effort of the highest kind,' where the majority of his convicts, 'are satisfied to wait patiently on, until by uniform submission and the steady performance of the heavier toil, they gain their reward and are put to more agreeable if not really easier work'.[44] He quotes with satisfaction the graduation of many convicts from the lowest form of work to the skilled labour division, where industry and self reliance supposedly mingled gleefully with a new found obedience and sense of pride. The basic equation model that this paper has insisted upon is handsomely in evidence at this particular point, where the principle of fear lies in the ever present emphasis upon discipline and the danger of demotion to the 'clay', with the element of hope residing in the ability of the industrious prisoner through self-discipline to raise his standard of living by graduating to 'carrying the hod'.[45] This project may be interpreted, at least in this example, not as an attempt to 'grind rogues honest' through a punishing labour schedule but, as an attempt to equip the many with the skills so vital in an industrial age.

More humane considerations did intrude upon the calculations of penal theorists at this time. Many of the most impressive institutions and administrators shared a variety of virtues. An ability to take a total view of any given situation, devising structures capable of harnessing the energy of the philanthropic and idealistic and a capacity to place any situation in a comparative perspective have all been isolated by some commentators. The Victorian prison system, as described, may be said to fulfil all three conditions. The legislative regulations that endeavoured to ensure a basic level of decency amongst its staff along with the important regulatory roles given to the chaplains and medical officers were decisive, if unspectacular, improvements upon eighteenth century practice.[46] An examination of the practice in prisons at this time reveals that the Victorians displayed a passionate insistence upon moving away from the inheritance of their precursors.

The penitentiary experiment was just that, an experiment. The grade system that so personified the Victorian belief in the ability of man to reform himself with the active assistance of the state was very compatible with the beliefs of a society soaked in the rhetoric of self-help. While some may consider the idea of forcing the 'deviants' of society through the hoops of disciplinarians to be a restricted view of humanity, the reports examined by

[44] *D.I.C.P., 1876*, p. 600.

[45] Ibid., p 600.

[46] *An Act to consolidate and amend the laws relating to prisons, 1865* (28 and 29 Victoria).

this author displayed a passion for effecting reformation in the subject, by using the grade system as a stimulus to all the traits that the society felt were so vital. This was by no means a uniquely Victorian practice.[47] 'Grinding rogues honest', did indeed appeal to a certain class of administrator. But the Wormwood Scrubs Report indicated others were convinced that they were actively helping in the creation of model Victorians and took pride in the newly taught skills of their charges. These officers may or may not have been committed Aristotelians. But the sentiments expressed in many of the reports considered here are eminently in tune with the great philosopher's belief that 'those who are capable of recovery are entitled to our help'. While structures may do little to subvert thoroughly injurious intentions, they can, as this system showed, galvanise the genuine compassion of the few while simultaneously limiting the input of the more pessimistic.

The achievement of the Victorian prison system in providing for the basic education and training of prisoners appears all the more impressive when it is set within the context of popular impulses. After all, prison officials were public officials and amenable to political pressure. Powerful sections of the press articulating middle class angst and harassment looked to the prison to punish. Through the provision of the grade system, retraining opportunities and projects such as the refuge, prison officials refused to bow to such pressure. The most significant aspect of the Victorian achievement was its ability to consistently cater for different priorities, be they hostile or more generous, by trying to become all things to all men. The basic equation after all contains two sides, hope and fear. But the fact that they even provided in a substantial manner for the hope dynamic, was itself of huge significance given the level of popular hostility surrounding them. As this paper has demonstrated there was a significant proportion of people within this system that were possessed of these attributes and who were not slow in using them to help their fellows regain a sense of dignity as they walked the risky road of reformation. That they did so in the circumstances detailed above should only add to our admiration at the magnificence of their achievement. [48]

[47] For an analysis of the state of European criminological practice and penal administration at this time see Michel Foucault, *Discipline and punishment: the birth of the prison* (New York, 1979), pp. 231-57. Clive Emsley, 'The origins of the modern police' in *History Today*, (49) 4 (1999) pp. 8-14.

[48] Diarmuid Ó Giollain, 'An bealoideas agus an stáit' in *Bealoideas* (1989), pp. 151-63. For an analysis of a particular prison and the wider Victorian context see an interview the author gave to Radio na Gaeltachta 'Priosun Chathair Chorcaí' on *O thigh go tigh*, first broadcast 1 July 1999.

Kingdom, emporium and town
The impact of Viking Dublin

Howard B. Clarke

In recent years the precise location and nature of Viking Dublin have been much debated. It is now generally accepted that there was a *longphort* phase from 841 to 902, a period of enforced exile from 902 to 917, and thereafter a *dún* phase. Having become the focus of a Scandinavian kingdom in 853, Dublin began to lose its political independence *c.* 980 and was reduced to the status of an under-kingdom in 1052. By the mid eleventh century Dublin was undoubtedly an urban place, an international trading centre with some of the attributes of an unchartered town. So much is reasonably certain. What remains uncertain, apart from matters of topography, is the stages by which Dublin became an urban place and the chronology of that process. Any judgement of this kind is inescapably related to notions about, if not definitions of, what constituted a town in an early medieval European context. In addition, in so far as the origins of most towns were evolutionary by nature, we have to make allowance for and to develop a vocabulary for the transformation of non-urban or proto-urban sites into urban ones. These matters are too complex to discuss here in detail, but a forewarning of this kind is not out of place.

Anyone who is familiar with the documentary sources will be aware that words alone will not suffice. In the early Middle Ages scribes, whether writing in Latin or in vernacular languages, were notoriously inconsistent in their use of epithets to describe towns and other types of human settlement. For this reason, as well as the general lack of evidence about most places in this period (AD 400-1000), a quite different approach has been tried. This is to draw up a list of urban attributes that can be identified archaeologically and/or historically. Such a 'bundle of criteria' might include a permanent and significant non-agrarian population, regular craftworking and trading activity, one or more market spaces, a dense network of streets and laneways, a defensible enclosure, and so on. Some time ago, a list of this kind was produced by J. Bradley and this remains broadly applicable to town sites in Ireland.[1] Since then a much narrower view has been adopted by one writer,

[1] John Bradley, 'Planned Anglo-Norman towns in Ireland' in H.B. Clarke and Anngret Simms (ed.), *The comparative history of urban origins in non-Roman Europe: Ireland, Wales, Denmark, Germany, Poland and Russia from the ninth to the thirteenth century* (2 parts, Oxford, 1985), ii, p. 420.

elevating the single criterion of the house plot or yard to a position of being 'central to the idea of urbanisation'.[2] Apart from the difficulty that house plots or yards were a standard feature of rural settlements in many parts of medieval Europe, it seems undesirable to predicate the concept of urbanisation on the primacy of only one attribute of what everybody agrees is a complex organism. In particular it is unhelpful to select a criterion that is scarcely documented at all in northern Europe prior to the twelfth century.

We ought also to consider briefly the terms 'Viking' and 'Viking Age'. 'Viking' can be as misleading as it has become universal. Old Norse *víkingr* appears to have signified originally someone from Víken in southern Norway. In a land of innumerable inlets from the open sea, this was *the* inlet in the sense of the big one whose low-lying shores constituted the natural geographical focal point of that exceedingly mountainous country. Derivatives from *víkingr* may have been used by Frisians and by Anglo-Saxons to refer to traders from this district. But during the Viking period, when Scandinavian piracy became more extensive than before, the word acquired a more generalised meaning of 'sea-raider'.[3] The era of these sea-raiders (Vikings) has been variously defined by Scandinavian and by non-Scandinavian scholars, representing in particular the academic disciplines of archaeology, history and the history of art. It is important to remember that, as a cultural label, 'Viking Age' and its analogues would have meant nothing to people living at that time. Like the term 'Middle Ages' itself, it is an historiographical construct.

A commonly expressed opinion is that the Viking Age extended from *c.* 790 to *c.* 1100 AD, although there are numerous variations. A recently published chronological list of impeccable vintage starts with the foundation of Ribe in western Jutland *c.* 705 and ends with the elevation of Lund (then also in Denmark) from bishopric to archbishopric in 1104.[4] The first clearly documented raid in western Europe took place in 793 on the island monastery of Lindisfarne, situated directly across the North Sea from southern Norway as

[2] P.F. Wallace, '*Garrda* and *airbeada*: the plot thickens in Viking Dublin' in A.P. Smyth (ed.), *Seanchas: studies in early and medieval Irish archaeology, history and literature in honour of Francis J. Byrne* (Dublin, 2000), p. 263.
[3] Finn Hødnebø, 'Who were the first Vikings?' in J.E. Knirk (ed.), *Proceedings of the tenth Viking congress, Larkollen, Norway, 1985* (Oslo, 1987) pp. 43-54.
[4] Peter Sawyer (ed.), *The Oxford illustrated history of the Vikings* (Oxford, 1997), pp. 273-81.

well as from Jutland.[5] Some archaeologists, however, are now emphasising long-term cultural developments and are projecting the true beginning of the Viking Age much further back in the eighth century.[6] At the other end of the chronological spectrum, historians do not normally regard the twelfth century as part of this period, but again in archaeological circles, and especially in Ireland and more loosely in Scotland, the Viking Age is envisaged as extending from the attack on Rathlin Island in 795 down to the Anglo-French capture of Waterford and Dublin in 1170.

To label such a long stretch of time (nearly four centuries) as 'Viking' begs a lot of questions and causes a lot of difficulties. From an historian's point of view, the last arguably Viking event in Ireland was the second expedition of King Magnus Barelegs of Norway to northern Ireland in 1102-3.[7] Part of the problem of defining this historical period lies in the fact that, whereas the first raids on north-western Europe in the 790s appear to mark the beginning of a new age, no comparable concentration of events can be found to mark the end. It is an age that, proverbially speaking, starts with a bang and finishes with a whimper. One obvious explanation for this phenomenon is widespread cultural fusion between natives and foreigners.

Accordingly we need an agreed periodisation that is meaningful to all types of scholar, while recognising regional variations. In Ireland the main period of Viking raiding, from outside and from inside the country, extends from 795 to the mid tenth century. The last great expedition out of Dublin took place in 951, to the Kells district of present-day County Meath.[8] To be sure there were some later raids, but broadly speaking the third quarter of the tenth century looks like a period of transition from Viking to Hiberno-Norse. From *c.* 980 Dublin came increasingly under the control of the Irish provincial kings, many of them so-called high-kings, beginning with Máel Sechnaill II of Mide and continuing with Brian Bóruma of Munster and a whole succession of other rulers from various parts of Ireland. In what follows, therefore, the

[5] *The Anglo-Saxon chronicle*, ed. and trans. Dorothy Whitelock with D.C. Douglas and S.I. Tucker (London, 1961; reprinted Westport CT, 1986) (henceforth *ASC*) p. 36, but see also p. 35 *sub anno* 789 and nn 4, 5.
[6] For example, Bjørn Myhre, 'The archaeology of the early Viking Age in Norway' in H.B. Clarke, Máire Ní Mhaonaigh and Raghnall Ó Floinn (ed.), *Ireland and Scandinavia in the early Viking Age* (Dublin, 1998), pp. 3-36.
[7] *The annals of Ulster (to A.D. 1131)*, part 1, *text and translation*, ed. and trans. Seán Mac Airt and Gearóid Mac Niocaill (Dublin, 1983) (henceforth *AU*), pp. 538-9, 542-3. For the basic chronology of events this study depends on the annals of Ulster; other annals are cited only for additional details.
[8] *AU*, pp. 396-7.

term 'Viking' is used down to the third quarter of the tenth century and 'Hiberno-Norse' thereafter. The time of change coincides with the important and lengthy reign of Amlaíb Cúarán, king of Dublin from 945 to 980.

Two recent authors have attempted to delineate the Scandinavian kingdom of Dublin on a map, with similar results.[9] This is the case despite the fact that A.P. Smyth's key indicates Hiberno-Norse overlordship of the territory, whereas J. Bradley's map is more concerned to emphasise actual settlement. Drawing lines on maps is a dangerous occupation, as many a military man has discovered to his cost, and historical reconstruction maps of this kind can create a false sense of exactitude and permanency. The medieval boundaries of territories the size of kingdoms were often not precisely demarcated, except where rivers were employed. Thus the medieval province of Leinster came, by a long process of evolution, to be defined with the help of the Liffey and its tributary the Rye Water to the north and the lower Barrow to the south. In between lay a more indeterminate tract of bogland, woodland and the high ground of Slieve Bloom and Slieve Margy.[10] The incident that took place at the Liffey crossing in 770 sounds like a classic border clash and pre-Viking Dublin was probably a border post of some kind.[11]

Dublin's destiny, therefore, lay very much with Leinster before and during the Viking Age, and indeed far into the Hiberno-Norse period. For all of that time, the chief native power centres of the province lay to the south-west of Dublin, at Castlelyons (*Liamain*), Naas and Mullaghmast. These were the royal residences of Uí Dúnchada, Uí Fáeláin and Uí Muiredaig respectively. The provincial kingship circulated among these Uí Dúnlainge septs until the first half of the eleventh century, that is to say, throughout the Viking Age as here defined and well beyond it.[12] Thus the last Uí Dúnchada provincial king was deposed in 1003, the last Uí Fáeláin in 1018 and the last Uí Muiredaig was killed in 1042. Despite the presence of the Scandinavian kingdom of Dublin (except in the years of exile 902-17), all of these sub-dynasties survived the classic Viking Age to supply provincial rulers. As tribute-takers from the whole province, they were probably able to limit permanent territorial

[9] A.P. Smyth, *Celtic Leinster: towards an historical geography of early Irish civilisation AD 500-1600* (Dublin, 1982), p. 149, plate ix; John Bradley, 'The interpretation of Scandinavian settlement in Ireland' in John Bradley (ed.), *Settlement and society in medieval Ireland: studies presented to F.X. Martin, O.S.A.* (Kilkenny, 1988), p. 63, fig. 3:2.

[10] Smyth, *Celtic Leinster*, pp. 8-12, 141-4, plates i-iv.

[11] *AU*, pp. 224-5.

[12] T.W. Moody, F.X. Martin and F.J. Byrne (ed.), *A new history of Ireland*, vol. 9, (Oxford, 1984), p. 134, table 8.

expansion by the Norsemen, though not of course to prevent periodic raiding. Political fortunes were mixed: some of these provincial kings were defeated, taken hostage or killed by Vikings; others succeeded in defeating Vikings; still others allied with Vikings. But where it mattered, in the plain of Life, the Uí Dúnlainge dynasty lasted as a relatively effective force down to the 1030s, despite periods of weakness.[13] It was defeated in a long-term sense not by the Dublin Vikings, but by its southern rivals, Uí Chennselaig, who took over Dublin itself in 1052.[14]

Whereas political relations between the Dublin Norsemen and the Leinster dynasts were varied, those with Brega to the north and Mide to the north-west were usually hostile. Hardly any alliances with southern Uí Néill rulers are on record and for much of the tenth century there was a good deal of raiding and fighting.[15] For a brief period in the 970s, Amlaíb Cúarán's authority may have extended north-westwards beyond a small enclave in southern Brega, but his crushing defeat at Tara in 980 and subsequent retirement to Iona would have put paid to these ambitions.[16] This situation continued into the eleventh century, as when in 1005 Dublin was despoiled by an army from southern Brega.[17] In 1013 the king of that district died after a session of heavy drinking in Máel Sechnaill's house, suggesting that they were allies.[18] That same year Máel Sechnaill's raiding party was caught and defeated by King Sitriuc and his Leinster ally, Máel Mórda, at Drinan near Swords.[19] By this period the territory of the Dublin Norsemen had probably expanded a little in a northerly direction, to the Tolka and some distance beyond towards the Broad Meadow Water. In 1023 they plundered southern Brega and killed the king of Saithne, whereas six years later a member of an intrusive dynasty, Mathgamain Ua Riacáin, captured and ransomed the son of

[13] Edel Bhreatnach, 'Kings, the kingship of Leinster and the regnal poems of *laídshenchas Laigen*: a reflection of dynastic politics in Leinster, 650-1150' in Smyth (ed.), *Seanchas*, pp. 305-7, 310.

[14] *AU*, pp. 488-9.

[15] H.B. Clarke, 'The bloodied eagle: the Vikings and the development of Dublin, 841-1014' in *The Irish Sword*, 18 (1990-2) p. 103, fig. 2.

[16] Edel Bhreatnach, 'Authority and supremacy in Tara and its hinterland *c.* 950-1200' in *Discovery programme reports*, 5 (Dublin, 1999), p. 8.

[17] *Chronicum Scotorum: a chronicle of Irish affairs, from the earliest times to AD 1135; with a supplement, containing the events from 1141 to 1150*, ed. and trans. W.M. Hennessy (London, 1866) (henceforth *Chron. Scot.*), pp. 242-3.

[18] *AU*, pp. 444-5.

[19] Ibid.

the absent Sitriuc.[20] The confused history of southern Brega down to the twelfth century by no means suggests firm and continuous Hiberno-Norse control of the region.

During the Viking period as here defined, the most likely direction of expansion for permanent settlement was towards the south-east, in the territory of Uí Briúin Chualann. Native kings of this district are recorded in the annals occasionally down to the early twelfth century, but they may have found it harder to resist pressure from Dublin, being situated in a confined space between the mountains and the sea, to echo the title of a recent publication.[21] This may have been the original Fine Gall, the territory of the foreigners, first recorded in a context north of the Liffey in 1013.[22] In support of this argument, the process of definitive conversion to Christianity offers two kinds of evidence. One of these takes the form of the Rathdown grave-slabs, which are now thought to represent an expression of Hiberno-Norse Christianity.[23] The existence of these distinctive grave-covers ought to reflect church building and usage, and the distribution of the survivors is an entirely north Leinster one.[24] Some of them were located in or near the main settlement at Dublin. Another expression of this process may have been the round tower attached to the church of St Michael le Pole, as it was known in later times.[25]

The other source of evidence is the early endowment of Christ Church Cathedral, founded around the year 1030. A very corrupt record of the acquisition of lands by the senior church, in roughly chronological order, takes the form of an early thirteenth-century confirmation by King John.[26] The initial grant by King Sitriuc comprised the site of the cathedral and Grangegorman. Next came Lambay Island and Portrane, granted by Murchad, the Uí Chennselaig under-king from *c.*1052 to 1070. Then came Clonkeen *c.*

[20] *AFM*, ii, 804-5; *AU*, pp. 466-7; Bhreatnach, 'Authority and supremacy', pp. 11-2, 13.
[21] Peter Pearson, *Between the mountains and the sea: Dun Laoghaire-Rathdown County* (Dublin, 1998).
[22] *The Annals of Inisfallen (MS Rawlinson B 503)*, ed. and trans. Seán Mac Airt (Dublin, 1951), pp. 182-3.
[23] H.B. Clarke, 'Conversion, church and cathedral: the diocese of Dublin to 1152' in James Kelly and Dáire Keogh (ed.), *History of the catholic diocese of Dublin* (Dublin, 2000), pp. 36-7.
[24] Ibid., fig. 3.
[25] Ibid., figs. 4, 5.
[26] *Calendar of Archbishop Alen's Register c. 1172-1534*, ed. Charles McNeill (Dublin, 1950), p. 28, dated 6 March 1202; Jocelyn Otway-Ruthven, 'The mediaeval church lands of County Dublin' in J.A. Watt, J.B. Morrall and F.X. Martin, O.S.A. (ed.), *Medieval studies presented to Aubrey Gwynn, S.J.* (Dublin, 1961) p. 60 and n. 46, dated *c.* 1203-9.

1075 and a whole series of mainly non-royal donations in the twelfth century: Tully, parts of Cabinteely and Kilternan, another part of Clonkeen, Ballyogan, part of Kilgobbin, Glasnevin, part of Shanganagh and finally Drumcondra, along with a few others that cannot be identified with any degree of certainty. Thus most of the early endowment of the cathedral church of Dublin lay either south of the Liffey or only a short distance north of the river.[27]

In the light of this evidence, the original heartland of the Scandinavian kingdom of Dublin lay in Leinster. The lands of Uí Fergusa, a minor Uí Dúnlainge sept, were probably taken over completely and immediately in 841, after which a certain amount of territory belonging to Uí Briúin Chualann was absorbed. Traces of a possible ninth-century Norse farm have been found at Cherrywood, near Loughlinstown.[28] Leixlip, often cited as evidence of settlement towards the west, may have been no more than a feature of the river itself—where salmon negotiated the natural rise in the river-bed. An early attempt by Dublin Vikings to establish a frontier post towards the south-west, at Clondalkin, was unsuccessful, for the stronghold (Irish *dún*) was destroyed and its garrison massacred.[29] The place-name historian Liam Price suggested that the Dublin Norsemen had built another stronghold at Delgany by 1021.[30] In that year the Uí Muiredaig king, Augaire, defeated Sitriuc Silkbeard there and, according to the Annals of the Four Masters, the foreigners in Uí Briúin Chualann territory were slaughtered.[31] Thus, by the early eleventh century, the Hiberno-Norsemen had probably absorbed the traditional Uí Briúin Chualann heartland, which may have been focused on the Rathmichael and Tully district. The only Norse street name in the Dublin area is a rural one, Windgate, heading south towards Wicklow.[32]

In the year after the battle of Clontarf, the real victor in the military and political manoeuvring that led up to that epic contest, Máel Sechnaill of Mide, came to Dublin and burnt it to the ground, including all of the houses outside

[27] Clarke, 'Conversion, church and cathedral', fig. 3.
[28] John Ó Néill, 'A Norse settlement in rural County Dublin' in *Archaeology Ireland*, 13, no. 4 (1999), pp. 8-10.
[29] *AU*, pp. 322-3.
[30] Liam Price, *The place-names of County Wicklow* (7 vols., Dublin, 1945-67), v, p. 321.
[31] *AU*, pp. 456-7; *Annála Ríoghachta Éireann: annals of the Kingdom of Ireland by the Four Masters, from the earliest period to the year 1616*, ed. and trans. John O'Donovan (7 vols., Dublin, 1851) (henceforth *AFM*), ii, pp. 798-9.
[32] Colmán Etchingham, 'Evidence of Scandinavian settlement in Wicklow' in Ken Hannigan and William Nolan (ed.), *Wicklow history and society: interdisciplinary essays on the history of an Irish county* (Dublin, 1994), p. 131 and fig. 3.2.

the main settlement.[33] His death in 1022 created a political vacuum that would have made northward territorial expansion possible for the Hiberno-Norsemen of Dublin. This process may be related to the stark instance of destruction in 1031, when King Sitriuc burnt a crowd of two hundred people inside the stone church at Ardbraccan and took into captivity a further two hundred.[34] Even so, permanent expansion seems to have been limited for a long time to the Broad Meadow Water, for the northern limits of the diocese of Glendalough (including that of Dublin) in 1111 are recorded as Greenoge and Lambay.[35] The Uí Chennselaig and Uí Briain over-kings of Dublin in the period from 1052 to 1114 (i.e. down to the illness and political enfeeblement of Muirchertach Ua Briain) may well have been supportive of efforts to expand in that direction, as is suggested by Murchad's grant of Lambay Island and Portrane.[36] But, to all appearances, Fine Gall north of the Liffey was long and hard in the making.[37]

Even if we avoid labelling vast tracts of historical time as 'Viking' without qualification, we still need to remain aware of the nuances of historical development, as far as the evidence allows. We need also to be careful with other labels, a case in point being 'urban' along with the corresponding noun 'town'. The cultural conditioning of modern scholars varies, of course, from one country to another, the question here being the concept of town. Archaeologists in Ireland, as in Norway and Sweden, tend almost as an automatic reflex to associate a small number of houses situated in close proximity with the phenomenon of town. A recent example is to be found in the foreword to an interim report on the excavations at Exchange Street, Dublin: 'The ninth century and its *longphort* era must be regarded as urban'.[38] The evidence for this belief comprises a few houses and some property divisions dated by radiocarbon 14 to the mid to late ninth century. These

[33] *Chron. Scot.*, pp. 254-5 (defective); *AFM*, II, pp. 782-3.

[34] *AU*, pp. 468-9.

[35] *The history of Ireland by Geoffrey Keating, D.D.*, (ed.), David Comyn and P.S. Dinneen 4 vols., (London, 1902-14), iii, 306-7; John Mac Erlean, 'Synod of Ráith Breasail: boundaries of the dioceses of Ireland (AD 1110 or 1118)' in *Archivium Hibernicum*, 3 (1914), pp. 3, 5, 11, 16.

[36] *Alen's register*, p. 28.

[37] Cf. the distinction in shading in Mark Clinton, 'Settlement patterns in the early historic kingdom of Leinster (seventh to mid twelfth century)' in Smyth (ed.), *Seanchas*, p. 291, fig. 8.

[38] Linzi Simpson, *Director's findings: Temple Bar West* (Dublin, 1999), p. v (P.F. Wallace).

houses were associated in some cases with small-scale activity involving scattered hearths, leather-working, textiles and amber.[39]

In much of Europe the basic hierarchy of settlement types extends from single farmstead, to farm cluster (hamlet), to village (small and large), to town (small and large), to city. The discovery of houses in clusters, or side by side with fences or other types of boundary marker in between, should not be assumed automatically to be evidence of a town. In medieval Europe, there were tens of thousands of villages, containing houses in clusters or standing side by side, separated by property divisions (fences, hedges, banks, baulks and so on). Villages were often home to craft-workers of different kinds: blacksmiths, carpenters, brewers, millers, spinsters, weavers and potters to cite some obvious examples. Later on in the Middle Ages, villages might have a weekly market and even an annual fair, yet they remained essentially villages with a predominantly agrarian economy. They were not towns, though they may have had some features in common with towns.

In an early medieval context there is an alternative term, borrowed from Latin—*emporium*—signifying a major trading settlement. Trading places could take a very simple form, such as a beach market, a number of which have been identified around the Irish Sea, as at Dalkey Island, Meols in England and Whithorn in Scotland.[40] Such market places became common in Iceland when the Scandinavians settled there and had no urban infrastructure of any kind. Another early type of trading place would have been located at major river crossings, especially on political boundaries such as those represented by the lower Liffey and the lower Barrow and Suir rivers. Pre-Viking Áth Cliath may well have been such a place, commanding as it appears to have done several long-distance routeways across Ireland.[41] A more developed type of trading settlement may be called an *emporium* or port of trade, characterised by permanent habitation, craftworking and regular trading activity. Such places may have had numerous houses, streets and lanes, cemeteries, and jetties, but whether they should be regarded as towns without qualification is a moot point. Many of them lacked the attributes of a fully developed medieval town, such as defences and gates, clearly defined market spaces, town law, record-keeping facilities, tax and toll collecting

[39] Ibid., pp. 17-26.

[40] David Griffiths, 'The coastal trading ports of the Irish Sea' in James Graham-Campbell (ed.), *Viking treasure from the North West: the Cuerdale hoard in its context* (Liverpool, 1992), p. 64, fig. 6.1.

[41] H.B. Clarke, 'Proto-towns and towns in Ireland and Britain in the ninth and tenth centuries' in Clarke, Ní Mhaonaigh and Ó Floinn (ed.), *Ireland and Scandinavia*, pp. 346, 350 and figs. 13.1, 13.2.

mechanisms, public buildings, a managed water supply system, recognised places of religious worship and schools. Many of these genuinely urban attributes are not identifiable archaeologically, while early medieval documentary evidence is usually lacking as well.

A well-known continental model envisages a core, such as a royal palace, a cathedral complex, an important monastery or a military garrison, with a dependent *suburbium*, or more than one of these. For the *longphort* phase of Dublin's history, this seems to be the best way to think about this question, as it is also for the contemporary question of so-called 'monastic towns'. The ship harbour or naval encampment was the core, ships being vital for regular trading and for escaping in an emergency, whilst along the banks of the Liffey there was probably a good deal of informally arranged habitation of the kind discovered at Exchange Street. Dominance by a military élite, rather than by merchants in the later sense, is symbolised by continued reliance on raiding monasteries from time to time down to the middle of the tenth century. On the occasion of the 951 raid on Kells, the loot consisted of cattle, horses, gold, silver and human captives, that is to say, traditional Viking values were alive and well.[42] Townspeople as such do not normally mount horses and go off to plunder a monastery. Down to the mid tenth century at least, slave trading was probably a mainstay, if not *the* mainstay, of Dublin's trading economy. The greatest recorded influx of captives came in 871, when an estimated two hundred ship-loads were brought over from Scotland.[43] The systematic nature of this trade is hinted at in 929, when a raid on Kildare was timed for St Brigid's Day.[44] The question of where captives were held prior to ransoming or sale is pinpointed ten years later when an abbot was drowned when swimming from Dalkey Island to the mainland 'while fleeing from the foreigners'.[45] Early medieval *emporia* and towns had trading activity in common, but they were not the same kind of settlement.

Not long after the death of that unfortunate abbot, a new epithet is applied by the annalists to Dublin—*dún*, which remained in use right down to the third quarter of the twelfth century.[46] Bank two at Wood Quay, the *first*

[42] *AU*, pp. 396-7.
[43] Ibid., pp. 326-7.
[44] *AFM*, ii, pp. 622-3.
[45] *Chron. Scot.*, pp. 202-3; *AFM*, II, 638-9; A.P. Smyth, *Scandinavian York and Dublin: the history and archaeology of two related Viking kingdoms* (2 vols., Dublin and New Jersey, 1975-9; reprinted as 2 vols. in 1, Dublin, 1987), ii, pp. 132-3, 240-2.
[46] *Chron. Scot.*, p. 206.

archaeologically identified defensive feature there, has been dated to *c.* 950.[47] The construction of permanent earth and timber defences marked an important stage in town development. At Dublin, this came after a politically unstable generation under kings descended from the ninth-century Ímar. Thus Sitriuc Cáech had abandoned Dublin for York in 920, as did his successor Gothfrith temporarily in 927, while his successor Amlaíb, son of Gothfrith, pursued military adventures in England in 937 and again in 939.[48] The latter's cousin, Amlaíb Cúarán, made two attempts on the kingship of York before departing for Dublin in 952.[49]

Important evidence for the chronology of true urbanisation has come from an analysis of plot eleven at Fishamble Street by an environmental archaeologist. Here the *first* house was built at level six, in the third quarter of the tenth century, while property boundaries were first established at level eight, towards the end of that century. Before the first house was constructed, the plot was apparently used for pits, the retting of flax, the slaughtering of animals, the drying and storing of grain, and for human burials.[50] None of this highly miscellaneous group of activities strikes one as specifically urban. The most active location for real urbanisation was probably the waterfront along the Liffey, including the present-day Exchange Street area. In the early tenth century the east end became an open-plan industrial site and so remained until the mid twelfth century.[51] Meanwhile, at the west (Fishamble Street) end, six individual plots were laid out, each with a house and related buildings. A substantial wattle path or road, dating from the middle of the tenth century, ran parallel to the Liffey. A single coin of King Edmund (939-46) was found in the second building level, representing slow and hesitant monetisation of trading activity in and around Dublin.[52] The big hoards of English coins found at Castle Street and Werburgh Street have been dated collectively to between *c.* 991 and 997, just prior to the launch of the Hiberno-Norse currency itself.[53]

In 944 Dublin suffered one of its periodic devastations by the Irish, led by the king of North Brega. According to the Annals of the Four Masters, its houses, fences, ships and all other structures were burnt and many of the

[47] P.F. Wallace, 'Archaeology and the emergence of Dublin as the principal town of Ireland' in Bradley (ed.), *Settlement and society*, pp. 130-1 and fig. 6.4.
[48] *AU*, pp. 370-1, 378-9, 384-7; *AFM*, ii, 638-9 (for the events of 939).
[49] Smyth, *Scandinavian York and Dublin*, ii, 107-12, 156-61, 171-2.
[50] Siobhán Geraghty, *Viking Dublin: botanical evidence from Fishamble Street* (Dublin, 1996) pp. 3, 18-19, 29-30 and figs. 2, 4, 6, 7.
[51] Simpson, *Director's findings*, pp. 1, 30, 33.
[52] Ibid., pp. 1, 30-1.
[53] Michael Kenny, lecture given on 20 April 1996.

inhabitants were taken away.[54] In the year following this disaster a new king was set up in Dublin, Amlaíb Cúarán, who represented a novel, forward-looking development in that he had already been king of York in 941-3 (his first attempt).[55] Whilst in England he had undergone at least nominal conversion to Christianity, a point that receives a mention in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle because of its local political significance.[56] The transition from *emporium* to town almost certainly dates from his long reign in Dublin.[57]

To conclude very briefly, there appear to have been two main phases of development after 841. One was Viking and was characterised by an *emporium* specialising in the slave trade in particular. The other was Hiberno-Norse and was characterised by urban development and a partly monetised trading economy. The Viking kingdom was territorially small, corresponding to little more than the ancestral land of Uí Fergusa and adjacent parts of the kingdom of Uí Briúin Chualann. Unlike in Scotland, there are no *-dalr*, *-setr* and similar place-name elements representing extensive rural colonisation,[58] partly because the Scandinavians were not allowed by Uí Dúnlainge and southern Uí Néill dynasts to occupy land on this scale. The occupants of the *emporium* were probably not particularly interested in farming; they had quicker and more effective means of getting rich. The Hiberno-Norse kingdom, eventually dominated by powerful Irish overlords, was more expansive. Place-names that have been used to indicate the extent of Scandinavian settlement are mostly Irish in type.[59] Some colonisation could have been entirely peaceful, through land purchase and intermarriage. It is at least arguable, therefore, that the Viking territorial kingdom of Dublin is almost as much of a myth as the Viking town of Dublin.

[54] *AFM*, ii, pp. 652-3.
[55] Smyth, *Scandinavian York and Dublin*, II, pp. 107-12.
[56] *ASC*, p. 71.
[57] Clarke, 'Proto-towns and towns', pp. 334, 358-61, 363.
[58] Conveniently summarised in P.G.B. McNeill and H.L. MacQueen, *Atlas of Scottish history to 1707* (Edinburgh, 1996), pp. 64-70.
[59] Magne Oftedal, 'Scandinavian place-names in Ireland' in Bo Almqvist and David Greene (ed.), *Proceedings of the seventh Viking congress, Dublin 15-21 August 1973* (Dublin, 1976), pp. 125-33; Etchingham, 'Scandinavian settlement in Wicklow', pp. 127, 131-2.

Physical force or parliamentarianism? Arthur Griffith and the rise of Sinn Féin 1905-17

Jason Begley

In 1905 at the Rotunda in Dublin a new nationalist movement came into being, known as Sinn Féin, or 'ourselves alone'. From fairly inauspicious beginnings, this movement would go on to play a major part in the formation of the new Irish state. The driving force behind this new organisation was Arthur Griffith, editor of the nationalist paper, the *United Irishman*. Griffith derived his inspiration, from Hungarian nationalists like Franz Déak, who had boycotted the Austrian parliament until self-government had been conceded to Hungary.[1] Thus, the original beliefs of Sinn Féin were passive resistance, abstention from Westminster and a self-sufficient independent Ireland. Ideas of separatism were only to become policy at a later date, as concepts such as dual monarchy became increasingly unacceptable to nationalist Ireland.[2] However, it must be noted that Sinn Féin was more than just a 'Green Hungarian Band', as its critics dubbed it. Griffith originally saw Sinn Féin's role as that of a forum for nationalist debate, and the dissemination of propaganda.[3] There were other early influences on the movement, and it is necessary to examine such groups, to fully understand the importance that Sinn Féin's formation had.

Modern Irish nationalism derives from two schools of eighteenth century thought, that of physical force republicanism and parliamentarianism. Physical force republicanism can be traced to the United Irishmen, led by the Protestant Theobold Wolfe Tone and the 1798 rebellion. Later examples of proponents of physical force included Robert Emmet in 1803, the Young Irelanders in 1848 and the Fenians in 1867. The 1916 rising was the culmination of such physical force republicanism, being the ultimate demonstration of the common characteristic these movements shared, that is, the idea of using force of arms to overthrow British imperial rule.[4] Though only 1798 and 1916 caused the British government concern, many writings and speeches kept such insurgency

[1] F.S.L. Lyons, *Ireland since the famine* (London, 1973), p. 251.
[2] R.M. Henry, *The evolution of Sinn Féin* (Dublin, 1920), p. 51.
[3] Lyons, *Ireland since the famine*, p. 249.
[4] E.R. Norman, *A history of modern Ireland*, (London, 1971, p. 117-8.

to the forefront of the public mind. The Young Irelanders in particular, produced some outstanding nationalist writers. Thomas Davis in the *Nation* newspaper, *The Jail Journal* of John Mitchel and articles by James Fintan Lalor in *The Felon*, gave the credo of physical violence a romantic, patriotic appearance.[5]

These physical force advocates were offset by the constitutional tradition of Irishmen, who hoped to obtain a repeal of the Act of Union, or to a lesser degree, Home Rule, by forming an Irish Parliamentary Party of one hundred and three Irish MPs, to bargain with the existing parties at Westminster. Under the leadership of Charles Stewart Parnell the party became a disciplined, organised unit, which would later make Sinn Féin's withdrawal policy feasible. This withdrawal was possible because Parnell provided a bridge between orthodox constitutionalism and the ultra-constitutionalism of Sinn Féin, who insisted on the continued validity of the old Irish parliament.[6] The use of physical force and constitutionalism usually followed each other in cycles of failure and disillusionment. Lines of demarcation were frequently fluid, as exampled by the Young Irelanders who were themselves an offshoot of Daniel O'Connell's constitutional repeal movement.[7]

With the death of Parnell the party split into pro- and anti-parnellites. This divide, in conjunction with the House of Lords' rejection of Gladstone's second Home Rule Bill in 1893, made parliamentary success even more unlikely. Physical force advocates became increasingly disillusioned and lethargic during this period. Force had been tried and proved unavailing. The experiences of 1848 and 1867 had left little doubt that the attempt to regain Irish independence by force of arms was foolish and impossible. Irish nationalism now sought a new avenue for expression. Younger men began to congregate in literary societies to study the Irish language and work out new schemes for the betterment of society. Such societies drew their inspiration from the Young Ireland movements of the 1840s.[8] The publication of journals of literary and political content signalled the beginning of a new cultural form of nationalism, with papers like the *Shan Van Vocht*, becoming semi-official exponents of the new Irish-Ireland movement. The foundation of the Gaelic League in 1893 represented a turning point in the cultural re-awakening then

[5] Henry, *The evolution of Sinn Féin*, p. 102.
[6] Norman, *A history of modern Ireland.*
[7] R. Davis, *The Young Ireland movement* (Dublin, 1987), p. 13.
[8] D.G. Boyce, Nineteenth *century Ireland: the search for stability* (Dublin, 1990), p. 217-9.

occurring. Led by Douglas Hyde, the league was non-sectarian and non-political in outlook, working for the restoration, preservation, and diffusion of the Irish language. It attempted to remain rigidly and sternly aloof from all political parties, but according to Padraig Pearse, one of the leaders of the Easter Rising, 'the revolution which it wrought was moral, intellectual, spiritual and its influence in strengthening and developing the national character cannot be over-estimated'.[9] The vigorous national sense it fostered began to lead to further expression and political action.

The centenary of the 1798 rebellion led to a quickening of interest in the history of Irish separatist movements, and an endeavour was made to keep the interest from dying out with the establishment of '98 clubs. After 1900 both the '98 clubs and the Gaelic league became the focus of republican and advanced nationalist elements such as the Fenians, who increasingly dominated the councils of such groups. Fenianism after 1867 had declined to all outward appearances. It had suffered from the fact that it had put revolutionary action first and preaching republicanism second.[10] Subsequently, Fenians had attempted to make the dissemination of republican ideals an essential part of their propaganda. Yet Fenianism was not the only centre of republican thought. In 1896, James Connolly founded the Irish Socialist Republican Party in Dublin. Under his editorship, the *Workers Republic* became an organ of socialism and republicanism. In spite of the criticism levelled at it, that a labour movement should occupy itself solely with questions of labour, the movement took its place in Irish political activities, involving itself in the organisation of 1798 commemorations. It remained sympathetic to the national movement and was ready to lend aid if needed.[11]

The year 1898 also saw the first publication of the *United Irishman* with Arthur Griffith as editor. Taking its name from the paper published by John Mitchel in 1848, the periodical was published on a weekly basis and had as its aim the creation of a forum in which all real nationalists might have their say. The *United Irishman* ran a diverse set of articles championing the cause of the Gaelic League, of native industries, of native music and games. It was after one such article in 1900 that delegates from various literary and political societies met and a new organisation, *Cumann na nGaedheal* was instigated. Differing little from the Gaelic League, it acted as a front for the activities of the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB). It was while editor of the *United*

[9] Henry, *The evolution of Sinn Féin*, p. 47.
[10] Ibid., p. 89.
[11] J.J. Lee, *The modernisation of Irish society* (Dublin, 1973), p. 149.

Irishman that Griffith first wrote about ideas of abstentionism and dual-monarchy, noting that recourse to force should only happen when circumstances were suitable for such an action, for example in the event of a European war. Griffith himself was no stranger to the physical force nationalism, having been born into a Catholic working class background, with roots in the IRB movement. However, Griffith was no advocate of violence as a means to independence. 'Concentrated nationalism, not parliamentarianism or force of arms, was Griffith's recipe for national independence.'[12] After interest was displayed in his Hungarian articles, Griffith clarified his position, by drawing parallels between the abstentionist policies of the nationalist Franz Déak and the weak efforts of the Irish Party to bring about Home Rule. However, Hungary's significantly more powerful position vis-à-vis the Austrian parliament in comparison to Ireland seems to have been lost on Griffith. His original intention to persuade Irish MPs on the benefits of passive resistance, and the withdrawal en-bloc from Westminster to form an Irish parliament in Dublin became the kernel for the setting up of a new movement to force such an occurrence.[13]

Griffith originally wanted the movement to act in a purely propagandist role, to educate rather than contest. It was his hope to give Irish nationalism a coherent and rational philosophy, to mould the Irish character into habitual acceptance of the solid material values of self-help, thrift, civic discipline and the full cultivation of Ireland's natural resources.[14] However, having outlined these ideas to a meeting in the Rotunda, Dublin, in November 1905, Griffith was voted down and a new nationalist party was instigated. As the most experienced man in the organisation, responsibility gravitated to Griffith, until he became an essential component in the party. Consequently, in the words of historian R. Davis, 'Griffith had leadership thrust upon him'.[15]

Membership of the new party, Sinn Féin, overlapped with that of Cumann na nGaedheal, a technically more militant grouping. To further confuse matters, the Dungannon Clubs, started in Belfast by Bulmer Hobson, began to spread across the country, whose aims were similar to those of Griffith, as they too called for the restoration of the 1782 constitution, and the independence of Ireland. With no central organisation, other than the recognition of Belfast as their place of origin, the Dungannon Clubs competed with Sinn Féin for

[12] R. Davis, *Arthur Griffith and non-violent Sinn Féin* (Dublin, 1974), p. xvi.
[13] Lyons, *Ireland since the famine*, p. 250.
[14] Henry, *The evolution of Sinn Féin*, p. 50.
[15] Davis, *Arthur Griffith and non-violent Sinn Féin*, p. xiv.

members. However, Sinn Féin differed from other national movements, principally in the policy that it outlined for the attainment of its ultimate end, the independence of Ireland. It proposed the breaking of dependence on Britain that resulted from the Act of Union and the de-anglicisation of Ireland, by recovering for the Irish people the management of the departments of public administration in which the anglicising process was working most markedly, and which could be reformed without breaking existing law. The policy further stated that the party sought the stimulation and fostering of native industry and manufacture, which was of extreme importance to Griffith, believing as he did in the need for both agricultural and industrial development in Ireland, to help the country become a secure economy.[16]

Central to these ideas was the belief that Ireland's problems stemmed not from any intrinsic weakness, but instead from mismanagement through foreign rule. As a result, Griffith developed an economic policy on the basis of the most optimistic appraisal of Ireland's industrial potential. Drawing on the ideas of German economist Friedrich List, specifically those of utilising duties to protect industry, Griffith superimposed them on the ideas of John Mitchel and Thomas Davis.[17] Mitchel had opposed British free trade, believing it to be the root cause of Irish industrial underdevelopment. Meanwhile, Davis had concluded that Ireland had a bountiful supply of resources, and, therefore, promoted the ideas of using tariffs to encourage indigenous industry, as had occurred in Germany.

The superabundance of Ireland's resources was an accepted fact and part of the advanced nationalist credo, despite the shortcomings of her geographic position and lack of necessary raw materials such as coal and steel. Thus it was with confidence in these principles of plenty, that Griffith outlined his economic policy, which advocated import substitution by tariff protection and an extended canal system which would allow for the transport of mineral resources such as coal, stone, salt, gypsum, marble and slate. Griffith also included reform of the banking system and stock exchange to facilitate industrial development and the formation of a mercantile marine to help ship Irish goods, as well as the establishment of Irish consuls in European capitals to popularise Irish goods and to help exports of Irish products.[18]

This policy was not without its contemporary critics. Michael Davitt wrote in February 1906:

[16] Norman, *A history of modern Ireland*, p. 243-4.
[17] Henry, *The evolution of Sinn Féin*, p. 49.
[18] Lyons, *Ireland since the famine*, p. 253.

> The corollary of an Irish Ireland, in your sense, is an English England, French France and American America; all economically secluded from each other's markets and living an existence of racial and commercial isolation. The parallel to this condition would be that of a family in Dublin, resolving to be, say, a 'Murphyish Murphy' and determining to grow their own tea, sow and reap their own grain, tan their own leather and cultivate the timber which would supply them with their own furniture.[19]

However, despite such reservations, the Sinn Féin movement began to garner support, mostly due to the forcefulness of Griffith's diatribe.

It is doubtful that Sinn Féin could have remained propagandist, as envisioned by Griffith. The very nature of its doctrine meant a political movement was inevitable. Over time, the Dublin bias of the movement was gradually eroded, making the organisation more national in outlook. The alliance of left and right wing sympathisers, forced Griffith to accept the necessity of branches in the country, gradually allowing Sinn Féin to develop along party lines.[20] This pressure from the left and right wing elements of the movement stemmed from the belief that the organisation needed to meet the parliamentary party step by step, to advance as they retreated. The view that the Irish Party was a separate front, fighting for national Ireland, no longer prevailed; instead the party was seen as an obstacle to independent Ireland.[21]

The 1905 Sinn Féin conference sanctioned the establishment of branches in every electoral district, as well as creating an executive branch of twenty-five members. Eight articles were drawn up outlining rules of membership and acceptance of council decisions. However, despite the move towards decentralisation, the movement still remained Dublin orientated. This centralisation of party rule was demonstrated after 1910, when the number of branches in the country dropped from one-hundred and thirty-five in the same year, to six in 1911 and finally, as the movement became increasingly moribund after 1912, dropping to just one branch outside of Dublin and remaining so until reorganisation occurred in 1917.[22]

One of the major obstacles to the growth of Sinn Féin was the internal dispute emanating from the growing republican element. Griffith had attempted to appeal to more moderate nationalists, by calling for the return of the 1782 constitution or dual monarchy. The movements stance on physical

[19] J. O'Connor, *The history of Ireland, 1798-1924*, ii (London, 1971), p. 245.
[20] Davis, *Arthur Griffith and non-violent Sinn Féin*, p. 75.
[21] Lyons, *Ireland since the famine*, p. 247.
[22] Davis, *Arthur Griffith and non-violent Sinn Féin*, p. 96.

force, which was to neither promote it nor condemn it, left the way open for a more pragmatic policy to be pursued, while not creating tensions between itself and the existing nationalist traditions. However, the growth of the Dungannon clubs had caused an obvious threat to Sinn Féin's position. The two groups had been moving closer together, but could not agree on certain issues.[23]

Bulmer Hobson, the driving force behind these clubs, failed to agree with Griffith on the key issues of the 1782 constitution and the use of force to achieve nationalist goals. Born into a Quaker business background, Hobson had been exposed to the writings of Alice Milligan in the journal *Shan Van Vocht* at an early age and had left school in 1899, a devotee of the ideals of Tone. Having joined Cumann na nGaedheal in 1901, he had become disillusioned by its lack of activity and set up the first Dungannon club in Belfast in 1905, with the aim of restoring the 1782 constitution and creating an independent Ireland. Yet, it became increasingly difficult for Hobson to advance the cause of dual monarchy in Ulster, due to Protestant fears of a Catholic separatist state being set up.[24]

Hobson became more susceptible to republican ideals of the IRB and the '98 club, not least because of their acceptability to many Ulster Protestants. Hobson was also more definite on the use of force, believing that action should be taken if the opportunity arose to do so, for example in the eventuality of a European war, which was becoming ever imminent. Griffith was unable to reconcile himself with Hobson over these points, and both men remained at loggerheads over these issues. Griffith's position was not helped by the release of *The Republic* by Hobson in Belfast in 1906, a paper with a definite republican doctrine. This strained relations between the two, as Griffith did not believe that the bulk of nationalists would want a separatist policy, stating, 'I am a separatist. [However] The bulk of Irish people are not separatists. I do not think they can be united behind a separatist policy'.[25]

The formation of the Sinn Féin League, a more republican movement than Sinn Féin containing elements from Cumann na nGaedhael, in 1907, as well as the amalgamation of the individual Dungannon clubs into a more disciplined organisation in the same year, put Griffith in an untenable position. It seemed to suggest an obvious threat to his authority on two fronts. However, this threat never materialised, as Griffith's policy of dual monarchy

[23] M.E. Collins, *History in the making: Ireland, 1868-1966* (Dublin, 1993), p. 188.
[24] P. Gibbon, *The origins of Ulster Unionism: the formation of popular Protestant politics and ideology in nineteenth century Ireland* (Manchester, 1975), p. 126.
[25] Lyons, *Ireland since the famine*, p. 256.

suddenly bore fruit, with the resignation of John O'Meara, MP for South Kilkenny, as well as C.J. Dolan who agreed to leave the Irish Party and contest a North Leitrim by-election under the Sinn Féin banner. Both Sinn Féin and the Sinn Féin League agreed to shelve their differences and join forces in pursuit of a common goal. Griffith now took charge of the movement, becoming the chief organiser for the coming election.

Although Dolan failed to win the seat, his polling of over one-thousand, one-hundred votes, in an area previously considered a safe seat by the Irish Party, was heralded as a triumph by Sinn Féin and Griffith's position now seemed unassailable. Some authors would question the success of the campaign; Lee in particular notes that many of the votes were for Dolan as an individual, rather than the Sinn Féin movement.[26] Yet, it is interesting to observe that even the unionist paper, *The Irish Times*, was impressed by the achievements of the movement, noting that Dolan had done well, despite the resources mobilised against him by the Irish Party. It went even further by stating that Sinn Féin's policy of self-reliance was somewhat akin to the principles of constructive unionism.[27]

However, the storm clouds were gathering on the horizon for the Sinn Féin party. In 1909 the House of Lords rejected the Liberal Party's budget. The then Prime Minister Lord Asquith, took up the challenge, by calling a general election. The result was to leave both the conservatives and the liberals with almost equal numbers and the Irish Party with the balance of power. The Liberal party, which previously had a sufficient majority to safely ignore the Irish MPs, were now forced to parley, causing Irish public opinion to focus on John Redmond and the Irish Party. Sinn Féin now became sidelined as the country drifted away from the principles of independence and moved towards Home Rule.

With the collapse of the *Sinn Féin* paper in 1910, which had replaced the *United Irishman* in 1909, the movement was at its lowest ebb. It now took on an observer role, retaining the right to examine, criticise and warn, remaining 'wholly free from any moral responsibility'[28] for legislation offered by liberals to the Irish Party. This was not purely an act of self-sacrifice. During this period from 1910-6, Sinn Féin appeared so inactive and static, that its subsequent re-organisation on a national basis was partly due to the fact that

[26] Lee, *The modernisation of Irish society*, p. 156.
[27] Davis, *Arthur Griffith and non-violent Sinn Féin*, p. 49.
[28] Henry, *The evolution of Sinn Féin*, p. 81.

after the rising of 1916, unionist papers wrongly used Sinn Féin's name as a contemptuous epithet for the failed rebellion.[29]

However, the movement was not a complete failure prior to 1916. It never compromised its ideals on independence, allowing a basis for success of National Sinn Féin in the reorganisation of 1917. More importantly, the movement acted as a forum for national debate, providing a breeding ground for a diversity of ideas that were drawn on after 1916. Added to this was the fervour and virulence with which Sinn Féin succeeded in spreading republican ideas to a significant number of young Irishmen. Many inferiority complex's fostered by long years of dependency and frustration were burnt away by Griffith's flame of invective.[30] Therefore, the foundations were laid in these years for the increased militancy of Irish nationals that would culminate in the 1916 rising, catapulting the Sinn Féin organisation to the forefront of the national agenda.

With the success of the Irish Party in 1910, and the passing of the Home Rule bill, the beginnings of a devolved Irish government now seemed assured. However, with the outbreak of the First World War in August 1914, plans for Home Rule were shelved until hostilities were concluded. However support for Home Rule was not total throughout the island. In the north of the country certain Protestant or unionist elements were opposed to Dublin rule fearful of the consequences of a devolved government dominated by Catholics.[31] The unionists' fears were partly to do with religion, but also the possibility of heavy taxation on prosperous northern industry.[32] Sinn Féin attempted to allay unionist fears, by pointing to the non-sectarian nature of their organisation. However, what the nationalists failed to grasp was that unionists feared less the threat to their religion, than the threat to their political ascendancy.[33] Gibbon sees the rise of Ulster unionism as much a political and social struggle as a religious one:

> Ulster Unionism arose ... from a process ... whereby Belfast conservatives were able to establish authority over both the urban working class and rural tenant farmers.[34]

Ulster clubs began to organise throughout the province, and began talking in terms of opposing Home Rule. Meanwhile Conservative Party members at

[29] Boyce, *Nineteenth century Ireland: The search for stability*, p. 254.
[30] Davis, *Arthur Griffith and non-violent Sinn Féin*, p. 153.
[31] Gibbon, *The origins of Ulster Unionism*, p. 126.
[32] Boyce, *Nineteenth century Ireland*, p. 223.
[33] Ibid. p.211.
[34] Gibbon, *The origins of Ulster Unionism*, p. 143.

Westminster, in an irresponsible act, moved outside constitutional rules and began to encourage a small but compact group of unionists, led by Edward Carson, to sign a covenant in opposition to Home Rule. A theory of loyalty was developed, which was compatible with loyalty to the union, while at the same time defying the authority of the king and parliament, in the affairs of government.[35] As the Ulster clubs grew in power and strength, the possibility of opposition by force of arms became increasingly real. The movement was organised into a single entity, known as the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and gave credit to their name by arming themselves accordingly. The landing of rifles at Larne, County Antrim, put guns into the hands of the UVF, with little opposition from the British government, who now backed down and talked of partitioning the country.

The arming of the Ulstermen and the seeming inability of the government to stop them, now encouraged Irish nationalists to organise themselves into a volunteer force of their own, whose aim was 'to secure and maintain the rights and liberties common to all people of Ireland'.[36] Led by Eoin MacNeill, the movement was ready to defend Home Rule and like their Ulster counterparts, were willing to do so by force if necessary. The existence of two militant groups in the country, willing to use force to further their political aims, benefited the republicans, as for the first time since the Fenians, a section of Irishmen had moved to arm themselves against the British. However, while individual Sinn Féin members were prominent in the movement, Sinn Féin as an organisation, remained distinct, preferring instead to remain aloof and to act as a supportive on-looker.[37]

Whether or not a conflict between the two armed camps would ever have broken out, is a moot point, as the outbreak of war in 1914 transformed the situation once again. The UVF promised their loyalty to the crown in time of war, and formed an Ulster regiment to march off to war. Meanwhile the councils of the Irish Volunteers had come under the control of the parliamentary party and after Redmond impulsively offered their services to the British army, all but five percent of the Volunteers joined. Those who remained were led by the IRB, who continued to drill and train. At first these Sinn Féin Volunteers, as they were incorrectly called, were held in contempt,

[35] Boyce, *Nineteenth century Ireland*, p. 201.
[36] Davis, *Arthur Griffith and non-violent Sinn Féin*, p. 136.
[37] Ibid., p. 136.

however the bias shown against Redmond's Volunteers by the British government, saw the beginnings of a change in opinion.[38]

By early 1916, the IRB's supreme council had made definite plans for an early insurrection. Griffith at first tried to prevent the rising, which had little chance of success, but Padraig Pearse, one of the main conspirators, was more interested in redemptive sacrifice. When it became clear that the rising was going ahead, Griffith offered his services, but was rebuffed, on the grounds that he was too useful as a civil leader to risk death. The eventual rising took place on Easter Monday, 1916, and saw approximately one-thousand, three hundred men and women holding Dublin for five days. However, the insurrection was comfortably repressed by British forces, and thirteen of its leaders were put to death. Several hundred were imprisoned, Griffith included.

The rising had not been the work of Sinn Féin, but the general public, some from mere instinct, others from a desire to discredit a movement which they disliked and feared, persisted in calling the insurrection the Sinn Féin rebellion and its participants the Sinn Féin volunteers.[39] It would have been impossible for Sinn Féin, even if it wished to do so, to repudiate all responsibility for the rising. Initial reactions were ones of condemnation by nationalist and unionist alike and Sinn Féin were reviled for the stimulus it provided. However, the subsequent reaction of the government, with internment and execution without trial, turned public opinion.

In fact nationalist support for Redmond and Home Rule had already been waning. British indifference, not directly attributable to the war, had left the bulk of nationalists feeling uneasy, while at home many were unhappy at Redmond's lack of opportunism in the face of British difficulties. The insurrection offered republican ideals and the promise of Irish independence in keeping with the best traditions of Irish nationalistism. Consequently, despite the failure of the rising, what it had stood for now became the policy of national Ireland. Sinn Féin by association profited, but was forced to drop its ideas of dual monarchy and to become a republican party instead.[40] In October 1917, Sinn Féin was reconstituted and Griffith ceded his presidency to Eamon de Valera, a younger man, but the senior surviving commandant from the rising.

The new Sinn Féin party now dropped all pretence of passive resistance; instead it concentrated its efforts on gaining an independent nation, by means

[38] Lee, *The modernisation of Irish society*, p. 156.
[39] Boyce, *Nineteenth century Ireland*, p. 254.
[40] Davis, *Arthur Griffith and non-violent Sinn Féin*, p. 219.

of force if necessary. It also looked to external factors, such as seeking recognition of Ireland's independent status from the international Paris peace conference in 1919. Thus Griffith's original ideals of non-violence and peaceful co-existence were sidelined, as was Griffith himself, with Sinn Féin now falling into the hands of the more extreme nationalist elements.[41] The evolution of Sinn Féin from a propagandist movement, to a fully-fledged constitutional party, was not an unprecedented occurrence. Many Irish parties have started from far less auspicious circumstances. However, the far-reaching effects of the *Sinn Féin* movement cannot be understated. In its attempts to plough a path between two mutually exclusive traditions, that of physical force and parliamentarianism, what it did was to create a bridge between extreme nationalists and constitutionalists. Consequently, it should not come as a surprise that Griffith's plans for dual monarchy and passive resistance should eventually grow into a party with a strong history of both republican and violent activity. Sinn Féin by its very nature could not remain indifferent and impassive, as Griffith would have wished it. Its very name 'ourselves alone' rang out like a challenge to tepid, entrenched nationalists, stimulating thought and encouraging physical action.

[41] Ibid., p. 220.

Unveiling the cloisters
Augustinian nunneries in twelfth century Ireland

Lauryl B. Green[1]

This paper will analyse the importance of the Augustinian nunneries in twelfth century Ireland. Until the 1970s, monastic archaeology focused almost exclusively upon the development of male orders. Churches and cloisters were described by a series of plan types, analysing the archaeology and architecture of male monasteries, be they Augustinian, Dominican or Cistercian. Such research strategies for monastic archaeology prioritised the social, structural and economic developments of monasteries. For example, Moorehouse concentrated almost totally on the economic role of male orders and the methods used by these men to achieve a state of self-sufficiency.[2] Coppack described the development of monastic archaeology as having, 'a growing emphasis on the economic aspect of religious life'.[3] Such research neglected to consider the social and religious roles of the monastery. In addition, it overlooked the lives of religious men and women such as nuns and anchorites who were not associated with traditional orders.[4] Gilchrist has referred to these 'fringe' medieval religious as 'the other monasticism'.[5] The word other refers to those religious vocations that remain on the margins of modern historical and archaeological scholarship. Though neglected in traditional study, this 'other' vocation played a central role in medieval society and is worth further analysis. What is presented here is a brief sketch of one particular female order of the Augustinians.

Previous historical and archaeological scholarship doubted the importance of women religious in the medieval world, describing nunneries as

[1] The author would like to acknowledge the help of Dr. Elizabeth FitzPatrick and Dr. K.A. LoPrete, N.U.I., Galway, and Dr. Terry Barry, University of Dublin, Trinity College.

[2] Robert Gilchrist, *Contemplation and action: the other monasticism* (London, 1995), p. 4.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., p. 5.

[5] Ibid., p. 1.

undisciplined and impoverished institutions[6] and examples of poor or failed monasteries.[7] Butler stated:

> Prioresses lacked prestige ... A Mother Superior was a contradiction in terms ... It was considered that the prayers of women had far less value when offered in intercession to the saint.[8]

This negative image of religious women that developed in monastic archaeology is partly explained by the claim, held by historians such as Butler, that there was inadequate documentation and material from the nunneries to conduct a proper investigation. They ignored the fact that previous antiquaries did extensive studies on various nunneries such as Goring in Oxfordshire by Stone in 1893 and the Augustinian nunneries of Lacock in Wiltshire by Breakspear in 1900.[9]

With the development of gender archaeology, archaeological and historical scholarship has gained an increased interest in the lives of women religious in medieval society and in their unique monastic identity and spirituality.[10] A number of nunneries have recently been excavated in England including Elstow in Bedfordshire, which has revealed textual and material remains which suggest that women in medieval England were held in high regard. For example, Power noted that in a list of inmates at Elstow, some nun's names were accompanied by the title of 'chaplain,' suggesting that these women fulfilled a liturgical role in their community.[11] Such respect is not unique to the women of Elstow. Hildegard of Bingen (1098-1179), who established the convent of Rupertsburg, was recognised for her piety and knowledge. Popes and emperors accepted her scientific treatises and in 1146 Pope Eugenius heard of her revelations and two years later declared that she

[6] For example, see Powers (1922). Though, it is now recognised that Powers was working with biased material, using only published and late documents from a small number of houses and that she accepted the possible male-bias that accompanied these writings. As cited in R. Gilchrist, *Gender and material culture: the Archaeology of religious women* (London, 1994), p. 24.

[7] Gilchrist, *Gender and material culture*, p. 24; Gilchrist, *Contemplation and action*, p. 5.

[8] Cited in Gilchrist, *Gender and material culture*, p. 24.

[9] Ibid., p. 23.

[10] See R. Gilchrist and H. Mytum, *Advances in monastic archaeology* (Oxford, 1994); S. Thompson, *Women religious: the founding of English nunneries after the Norman conquest* (Oxford, 1991).

[11] Cited in Gilchrist, *Gender and material culture*, p. 20.

had the gift of prophecy. The learned read her works such as *Scivias: know the ways of the Lord*.[12]

Unlike England, Ireland has yet to proceed with sufficient levels of archaeological inquiry regarding the architectural, historical or socio-economic functions of nunneries. The historical and architectural study of religious foundations in Ireland only developed in the nineteenth century. By this time, most of the medieval nunneries were in ruins or destroyed. What is left to be described by the archaeologist are architectural remains to reconstruct a ground plan of the destroyed sites. Stalley estimated that in Ireland, thirty large Augustinian houses remain today from an estimated one hundred and twenty-one present in the twelfth century.[13] Of those thirty, only eight of the foundations had any substantial remains. Therefore, analysis and explanation of medieval nunneries in Ireland lack sufficient evidence at present upon which to build a better understanding.[14] Yet, in light of the progress made in gender archaeology and the widening interest in studies of the medieval nunnery, this paper will explore the importance of Augustinian nuns in Ireland and their role in twelfth century Church reform, both through archaeological and historical knowledge.

The religious undertone of twelfth century Europe was one of reform. Corruption amongst the ecclesiastical orders, such as the practice of married priests, was common during the middle of the eleventh century. The popes, most notably Gregory VII (1073-85), set out to purify the Church with ecclesiastical reform, creating a wave of religious enthusiasm throughout Europe, which carried through to the twelfth century. In monasticism, new orders, such as the Augustinians, were established as monks and nuns sought a more pure and uncorrupted religious life. The Augustinians did not offer a precise set of detailed regulations, but general principles for communal life, based around concepts of poverty and chastity, which were suitably flexible for adaptation by unique traditions of various communities.[15]

Like other European countries, Ireland was woven into the fabric of ecclesiastic reform. Irish monasteries had become corrupt with many often becoming heavily involved in political affairs and acquiring great wealth. In

[12] B. S. Anderson and Judith P. Zinsser, *A history of their own: women in prehistory from prehistory to the present* (New York, 1988), p. 188-9.

[13] R. Stalley, *Architecture and sculpture in Ireland, 1150-1350* (Dublin, 1971) p. 125.

[14] Meany, *The Augustinian houses of County Clare*, (MA thesis, NUI, Galway, 1995) p. 82.

[15] J. Watt, *The Church in medieval Ireland* (Dublin, 1998), p. 45.

Ireland, this political interest is not too surprising as many *coarbs* were laymen. In 1172, Pope Alexander III listed the abuses in Ireland as reported to him:

> that men marry their step mothers and are not ashamed to have children by them ... that one man will live in concubinage with his two sisters; and that many of them, putting away the mother, will marry the daughters.[16]

The approach to reform in Ireland, however, was quite different from what was found on the continent. Since the introduction of Christianity in Ireland there was no organised ecclesiastic hierarchy that could enforce these reforms. This monastic structure of Early Christian Ireland is described in Cogitosus's *Vitae of St. Brigit*:

> She [Brigit] built her monastery on the plains of Mag Liffe on the firm foundation of faith. It is the head of almost all the Irish churches with supremacy over all the monasteries of the Irish and its paruchia extends over the whole land of Ireland, reaching from sea to sea.[17]

The claim to be the head of all Irish Churches was also held by other monasteries, such as Armagh, emphasising the lack of a hierarchical structure. Consequently, before Church reform could be contemplated in twelfth century Ireland, a secure hierarchical and diocesan framework had to be formulated. This arrangement was implemented at the Synod of Raithbreasil in 1111 and the Synod of Kells in 1152.[18]

Watt has referred to the Augustinian movement as, 'ultimately the most fundamental change in medieval Irish monasticism'.[19] Indeed, St. Malachy, who died in 1148, was responsible for introducing the Augustinian movement into Ireland and was recorded as being, 'the man who restored monasticism and canons regular' to the country.[20] He is praised in his *Vitae*, written by St. Bernard of Clairveaux as, '[instituting] anew the most wholesome usage of confession, the sacrament of confirmation and the marriage contract, all of which were either unknown or neglected'.[21] Some authorities argue that Augustinian canons were introduced into Ireland well before St. Malachy. Henry suggests the Imar O'Hagen of Armagh introduced the Augustinian

[16] Gwynn, *The Irish church*, p. 168.
[17] S. Connolly and J.M. Picard, 'The Life of St. Bridget' in *Journal of the Royal Society of Antiquaries*, 117 (1987), p. 11.
[18] Meany, *The Augustinian houses of County Clare*, p. 18.
[19] Ibid., p. 19.
[20] P. J. Dunning, 'The Arroasian order in medieval Ireland' in *Irish Historical Studies*, 4 (1945), p. 304.
[21] A. Gwynn, *The Irish church*, p. 178.

order at the Priory of SS Peter and Paul in 1126.[22] Yet, Meany points out that such evidence of Augustinian establishments before Malachy must be disregarded due to lack of substantial proof. While it is quite probable that the widespread popularity of canons regular germinated from numerous sources, Malachy alone is fully credit with their introduction.[23]

However, it remains unknown how Malachy first came into contact with the Arroasian order. It is recorded by the abbot of Arras, France, that Malachy visited this Arroasian community on his way to Rome between 1139-40 and noted their practices so that he could implement them in Ireland. The lack of reference in the Annals to Malachy suggests that he faced few problems to the introduction of reform models and canons. In all probability the Annals would have recorded significant upheaval in the religious community.[24] Though the exact date of the first Augustinian foundation remains uncertain, it is arguable that the first wave of Augustinians came to Ireland in *c.*1140. One-hundred and twenty-one male houses alone were established, sixty-two between 1140-69 and forty founded between the years 1140-8.[25] During this later period, Malachy himself oversaw the adoption of forty Arroasian communities in the north of Ireland, including Bangor and Down.[26]

In the twelfth century, Augustinian canons were linked under a rule or centralised authority. The two most popular were the Premonstratensian and the Arroasian, with the latter being the most preferred in Ireland.[27]

Contemporary records for female Augustinian houses in Ireland are meagre in comparison to those of their male counterparts. Many early Irish nunneries died out long before the Synod of Raithbreasil. This decline was most often the result of a stipulation in Brehon law that land owned by a woman automatically reverted to their families upon her death.[28] As a result only a few nunneries remained by the twelfth century. Those which did persist adopted the Arroasian rule in *c.*1144.[29] The female orders were directed by

[22] F. Henry, *Irish art in the Romanesque period, 1020-1170 AD* (London, 1970), pp. 11-2, 15.
[23] Meany, *The Augustinian houses of County Clare*, p. 23.
[24] Ibid., p. 19.
[25] A. Gwynn and R.N. Hadcock, *Medieval religious houses: Ireland* (Dublin, 1970), p. 153-6.
[26] Stalley, *Architecture and sculpture in Ireland*, p. 2.
[27] S. Thompson, *Women religious: the foundation of English nunneries after the Norman conquest*, (Oxford, 1991) p. 133.
[28] Meany, *The Augustinian houses of County Clare*, p. 89.
[29] Gwynn and Hadcock, *Medieval religious houses*, p. 307.

women, either an abbess or prioress. A priest, however, was still needed to perform the mass and other ecclesiastical services.

Female Augustinian houses in Ireland began later than male congregations, commencing in 1144 with the foundation of Clonard, County Meath. Clonard was the head house of the Arroasian order until 1223.[30] By *c.*1180 there were fifty houses of Augustinian canonesses in Ireland. Six of the houses were located in County Meath, probably due to the location of Clonard. Eight houses were founded in the immediate post Anglo-Norman period with two being of Anglo-Norman patronage in Timolin, County Kildare and Killeigh, County Offaly.

In traditional Arroasian orders, nuns followed a pattern of religious life centred upon the Christian tradition of isolating women. Ireland was unique in that most Arroasian congregations were established for both men and women. Most of the Arroasian canonesses would have dedicated their house to St. Mary while their male counterparts would retain the original name. An example of this can be seen at the double house – a community of male and female religious – at Annaghdown, County Galway where St. Mary, Annaghdown was established for the women religious.[31] Thompson speculates that the development of double houses in Ireland stemmed from native traditions. For example, at St. Bridget's, Kildare, the abbess was head of both the male and female orders. Gerald of Wales spoke of the scandal of this Irish practice as permitting men and women to live in 'dangerously close proximity'.[32]

The importance of these houses in the religious development of Ireland is perhaps best reflected in the distribution and spatial analysis of male and female Augustinian communities in Ireland, in other words, their proximity to population centres and topographical locations. Meany observes that such distribution helps the archaeologist and historian to understand both the human and physical factors which would be considered when establishing these monasteries and nunneries. For example, the wishes of the patron and vocational stipulations of the individual order had to be taken into consideration. This would help to explain why some houses seem to be in conflict with established geographical factors, and locate in areas with no obvious advantages.

[30] Meany, *The Augustinian houses of County Clare,* p. 29.
[31] Ibid., pp. 23-4; Gwynn and Hadcock, *Medieval religious houses,* p. 308.
[32] Thompson, *Women religious,* p. 149.

Both male canons and female canonesses often established their order upon native sites, usually at pre-existing early historic monasteries. Eight known nunneries founded in twelfth century had previous native connections including Killeigh and Nun's Church, Clonmacnoise, County Offaly. It is unknown if this conscious decision to establish Arroasian canonesses on native sites was because of geographical considerations or a desire to provide continuity with the past.[33] A native site that was easily accessible and situated on fertile land would be a tempting location for the canonesses. Indeed, most of these early sites were located in eastern and central Ireland where land was productive. The poorer land in the west as well as bog sites seem to have been avoided both by the Arroasians and their earlier sisters. These native sites were often situated on a well-known road ways such as the *Slighe Mór*, the *Slighe Dala* and the Shannon River. The Nun's Church, Clonmacnoise, for example could easily be reached by both the Shannon River and the *Slighe Mór*. Though possessing economic and geographic advantages, the established atmosphere of holiness at these native sites was also a factor.

The Arroasian movement made a conscious effort to locate in isolated areas in order to pursue contemplative work. Nevertheless, some sites do reveal a location near urban centres to pursue more pastoral work. In these sites the nuns lived in proximity to native ring-forts, native monastic settlements, or Viking or Anglo-Norman towns. The ring-forts were most often located on low-lying ground that was often sought after by the Arroasian orders. Seventeen Augustinian houses were situated on or near crannogs – lake dwellings – four alone were found at Lough Ree.[34] There were some native monasteries, such as Clonmacnoise which boasted urban status by the twelfth century. The decision for the Augustinians to locate at these urban-religious sites was based on piety rather than the large populations of these centres. Nevertheless, by choosing such a site, the order could be assured of maintenance by the existing population.[35] The Viking towns of Limerick, Waterford, Dublin, Wexford and Cork had become Christianised by the eleventh century and were welcoming of monastic orders to promote religious reform. Three Augustinian houses alone were situated in Viking Dublin, such as All Saints Arroasian Priory, established by Lawrence O'Toole in 1162.

The Anglo-Normans often established a monastic house in order to gain a political hold over a particular area. Before the Anglo-Norman settlement of

[33] Meany, *The Augustinian houses of County Clare,* p. 93.
[34] Ibid., p. 97.
[35] Ibid., p. 98.

the late twelfth century, twenty-four Augustinian canonesses houses were in existence in Ireland. After 1171, a further fifteen houses were established, probably due to Anglo-Norman lay politics and the quest for authoritative control.[36] LoPrete suggests that the Anglo-Norman desire to establish Augustinian houses in Ireland may have resulted from their experience of reform in their ancestral lands in Normandy, where Augustinian communities were in existence well before Malachy's arrival in France in 1139.[37]

Anglo-Norman settlement concentrated in Counties Louth, Kildare, Dublin, Kilkenny, Meath, Wexford, Tipperary, Cork, Carlow, Limerick, Westmeath, Wicklow and Waterford. Nine canoness foundations were found in counties Louth, Kildare and Dublin, which boasted the largest population density. Counties Kilkenny, Meath, Wexford, Tipperary, Cork, Carlow and Limerick, which had an intermediate population density, had seventeen female houses in total. County Meath alone boasted eight nunneries, perhaps due to its close proximity to Clonard. Meany suggests that there is a direct correlation between the distribution of Augustinian houses and Anglo-Norman areas, showing that these women favoured a sizeable population as well as good farm land. Their choices might also reflect the desires of their lay patrons.[38]

The availability of water for domestic purposes was of huge importance when Augustinians were choosing settlement locations. The cloistral plan reflects the importance of water. In this design, the water supply would pass from the refectory, then the kitchen before reaching the latrine of the dormitory. The water source was engineered by building drains and conduits, often lead pipes, to create an artificial source from the river. If a river was not in proximity to the monastery the water supply could be obtained from a well or from roof water. In addition, water was fed into an artificially constructed fish-pond for dietary purposes. Indeed, one hundred and seventy-five days each year were designated fish days on the medieval calendar.[39] Meany asserts that future analysis of the water supply and drainage system at Augustinian sites will help to provide information on medieval engineering and diet, thus providing a broader picture of the medieval world.

In addition to layout, one must also reflect upon the architecture of the building in which these canonesses spent their lives. Here, the archaeologist begins to reconstruct daily practices both within the order as well as their

[36] Gwynn and Hadcock, *Medieval religious houses*, p. 5.
[37] In discussion with Dr. K.A. LoPrete, N.U.I., Galway.
[38] Meany, *Augustinian houses of County Clare*, p. 100.
[39] Greene (1992) cited in Meany, *The Augustinian houses of County Clare*, p. 108.

importance to the secular community that lay beyond their walls. The initial plans of most nunneries reflect simplicity. Many cloisters were formed simply with the creation of lean-to roofs against the main ranges. The cloister and its ranges might be built of stone, rubble, cob or timber, with the exception of the church which was always constructed of stone. Nunneries that were particularly poor, or those in regions of little stone, were more likely to have been built of cob or earth.[40]

Like male monasteries, the nunneries, in general, followed a standard monastic layout, a central complex of buildings grouped around a cloister. Variations appear later in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries where variety of monastic plans were considered acceptable for later-founded female houses.[41] The church formed the northern range. The cloister was formed with three ranges of buildings that formed a 'U' shape, attached to the church at its south. At nunneries established at existing parish churches, the cloister sometimes stretched to the south of the nun's choir. Rarely did this arrangement of buildings depart from this standard pattern but there were exceptions as clearly can be seen at the Nun's Church, Clonmacnoise.

The arrangement of the church required special attention so as to maintain the segregation of the nuns from the laity. Most of these churches, therefore, were un-aisled rectangles or parallelograms with the nun's choir placed in the eastern end and separated by the *pulpitum* screen. A second screen then was placed at the west to divide the nun's church from the parish church. The eastern range contained the sacristy, chapter-house, warming-room and a dormitory for the nuns. The dormitories were originally communal, but like their male counterparts, they became divided into individual cells. The range opposite the church was the nun's refectory, usually an upper storey above a cellerage. The western range would accommodate the guest-house, private lodgings for the prioress, storage and sometimes offices. One end would serve as a buttery that opened up into the kitchen in the west end. This west range was usually arranged like a secular manor house with ground floor hall, private parlour and buttery. An inner court was located behind the nun's cloister that acted as a service court, and sometimes provided accommodation for lay visitors or servants. The priest or chaplain of the nunnery also lived here.

Gilchrist speculates that the simple iconography present on many of the buildings portray the founders of nunneries or even female saints as virtuous

[40] Meany, *The Augustinian houses of County Clare*, p. 114.
[41] Gilchrist, *Contemplation and action*, pp. 155-8.

and holy women.[42] Other carved images reflect devotion to Christ and the Virgin Mary, the primary focus of worship in the nunnery. The dedication of nunneries to the Virgin Mary is also overwhelmingly popular throughout Europe as well as dedications to Mary Magdelane, St. Margaret, St. Helen, St. Catherine and the Holy Trinity. Though the iconography of female saints can be found in male monasteries, their presence at nunneries is of particular importance, usually being the only embellishment upon the church and cloister structure. One example, at Killone, County Clare, shows a corbel on the external south-east angle of a female head, hair loose held back with a head band. The woman's hands are raised in a gesture to support the roof of the building, possibly representing a woman who had given notable financial or spiritual support to the women at Killone.

To a certain extent, these nunneries imitated monastic manorial estates as many were surrounded by moats, ordered in discontinuous ranges around courtyards and constructed in the local material, such as stone or cob.[43] To the lay world, this settlement pattern must have made these nunneries appear as worldly places. Yet, the evidence found in the architecture and the landscape of the nunnery shows that most female religious houses in medieval Europe, including Ireland, maintained a frugal and modest existence. This frugality might not be due solely to patrons thinking less of female religious, but also to the spiritual aspirations held by them.

One example of an Arroasian nunnery which most likely followed this traditional set up can be found on the shores of Lough Corrib, County Galway. The ruins remain of a double monastery established by St. Brendan in *c.* 578. The nunnery was established at the same time by his sister Briga.[44] Arroasian canonesses settled at Annaghdown – *Enachdún* – in 1144 soon after Clonard was established that same year, and became one of the dependent Arroasian canoness congregations of Clonard in 1195, remaining so until 1223 when Kilcreevanty became the head house for Connacht. The nunnery's dedication to St. Mary suggests that Annaghdown was indeed a double monastery or attached to an almonry.[45] There are numerous factors behind the adoption of Annaghdown by the Arroasian nuns. Turoulough O'Connor, king of Connacht was the strongest supporter of Augustinian canons. It was also located near a ready water supply, Lough Corrib, and upon fertile land which could provide a

[42] Ibid., p. 142.
[43] Ibid., p. 151.
[44] Duignan and Killanin, *The Shell guide to Ireland* (London, 1969), p. 56-7.
[45] Gwynn and Hadcock, *Medieval religious houses*, p. 312.

source of wealth for the canonesses[46] and was built upon an earlier Irish monastic site, providing continuity with the past.[47]

Unlike many other nunneries, such as Nun's Church, Clonmacnoise, Annaghdown today possess almost no architectural attractions.[48] What ornamentation is left is dilapidated, making it difficult, though not impossible, to make comparisons with known twelfth century motifs to secure an exact date of construction of the nunnery.[49] What remains at Annaghdown today are the upstanding remains of the late medieval priory, the fifteenth century cathedral, Romanesque architectural features of the twelfth century, the nunnery and a holy well. The nunnery's south-west rectangular structures with foundations still survive at approximately full height. The nunnery itself, now a national monument, lies north west of the cathedral.[50]

The decoration at the abbey is found upon a doorway or arch, and a window no longer in its original context. The decoration is in Romanesque fashion which flowered in Ireland in the twelfth century. The Romanesque churches of Ireland were smaller than their continental or English counterparts, yet did not lack in excellence of ornamental design and craftsmanship.[51]

Another example of Romanesque artwork at the nunnery can be seen in what must have been the east window of the nunnery church, now located in the east gable of the cathedral. The window is constructed of blue-grey limestone. This round-headed window which splays inward is wider than most Irish windows. On its jambs and the arch of the window is a carved chevron design, which is in effect an elongated animal. Its legs are at the base of the right hand side and its head is devouring a group of serpents on the left side. The pilasters were decorated with flat foliage caps of palmettes and flowers in an abundant variety. This section of moulding is significant for dating purposes. The sharp, square arris roll is typical of the stages between the

[46] Ibid., p. 312.
[47] Harbison has argued that the cross slab found at Annaghdown, which suggest the site of a sixth century nunnery, may be misleading as it could have been placed there at some later date.
[48] Fahey, 'Galway Excavations' p. 319.
[49] H.G. Leask, *Irish churches and monastic buildings*, I (Dundalk, 1977), pp. 92-3, 100.
[50] Duignan and Killanin, *The Shell guide to Ireland*, p. 57.
[51] Ibid., p. 100.

Romanesque and Gothic styles. Because of this motif, Leask gives it a date no earlier than *c.*1180.[52]

This Romanesque architecture has another significance. The detection of Romanesque in Ireland is often but not exclusively synonymous with the reform communities, such as that of the Augustinians. Most of the Augustinian abbeys which employed the Romanesque style were those established at existing native sites, such as seen here at Annaghdown. While the amount of information at Annaghdown, is scant, there is much that can be inferred regarding the lifestyle of the nuns, especially when compared to contemporary nunneries. The foundations suggest a building construction, similar to elsewhere in Europe and Ireland. Its close proximity to the male order is typical of Irish Arroasian double houses. There is no record of the drainage system, which could tell archaeologists more about diet and lifestyle. The pipes, usually made of lead in the twelfth century, were valuable items and were most likely stolen after the site was abandoned. Perhaps even equally important would be an investigation of the Irish Annals to reveal the involvement of the women of St. Mary, Annaghdown with the outlying community. With both archaeological information and evidence from the Annals being negligible, it is hard to determine the contribution of these women in medieval society. Yet, if we can compare them to their compatriots elsewhere, it would be highly probable that these women were crucial to the religious life in the parish of Annaghdown.

Archaeological studies of nunneries have certainly expanded the knowledge of monasticism in medieval Ireland. Material remains have helped to paint a picture of the daily lives of these women, who opted for a life of celibacy and devotion rather than the traditional occupation of wife and mother. They played an important role in their communities as religious leaders, nurses, teachers and intercessors. Yet, research in this area of monastic archaeology is only beginning. There are many questions still left unanswered, for example, how different were the lives of these women to contemporary lay women in Ireland, how did the reputation of twelfth century religious women compare with the prior role of women in Ireland, and was the experience of nuns in Ireland similar to elsewhere in Europe?

At present, the answers to these questions cannot be found in archaeological remains, thus begging for further research and excavation of female monasteries. Though answers to the above questions are lacking in the archaeological record, they can sometimes be detected in historical text. For

[52] Ibid., p. 157.

example, women in hagiographies, such as St. Brigit in the *Vitae of St. Brigit of Kildare*, composed in the seventh century, and in epic tales such as Queen Medbh in the *Tain*, illustrate that women did indeed play a crucial role in Irish society, commanding respect and reverence from their community. In ancient Ireland, women were employed in important social occupations such as priestess, physician or poetess. Law tracts also show that lay women were often seen as equals with men, though men still held superiority in marriage unions, as male monks did over most double monasteries. For example, the law tract, *Crith Gablach*, states: 'To his wife belongs the right to be consulted on every subject.' With such an established respect for women, it is no surprise that women were allowed a crucial part in the religious devotion of the Irish people.

Answers to questions such as why Irish women chose a religious life can be implied by written documents left by their colleagues abroad. For example, at the beginning of the twelfth century, a young Englishwoman, Christina of Markyate, took the veil to defy her parents who wished her to marry, and escaped secretly dressed in men's clothing to her spiritual mentor. Queen Eleanor of Aquitiane at the end of the twelfth century used the monastery at Fontevrault as her place of retirement. Heloise (1101-63), the woman famed in Abelard's *The story of my calamities*, became a nun to restore her dignity and honour after her affair with Abelard in twelfth century Paris.[53]

Irish religious women, for various reasons and in various locations, joined monastic establishments in twelfth century Ireland, thus becoming an influential force in twelfth century monastic reform. Their lifestyle, as depicted in archaeological remains, reflect, in general, a life of simplicity and a move away from the wealth and ostentation corrupting the Irish Church at the time. Though their voices might be lost to history, their material remains tell of the religious devotion of these women and their efforts to improve Christian life in Ireland, both within the Church itself and in the surrounding lay community.

[53] Anderson and Zinsser, *A history of their own*, pp. 194, 198.

Celtic and Christian cures
Healing wells in the County Limerick[1]

Mícheál Ó hAodha

Written and oral sources confirm that Irish people have been visiting holy wells and other places associated with saints for many hundreds of years. They go there to pray and to ask for favours. Many wells are famous for the cures associated with them and in past centuries people travelled long distances in the hope of a cure. The connection between watery places, religion and healing is a very old phenomenon and is found throughout the world. Archaeological finds at Gaulish sacred wells such as Chamaliéres and Fontes Sequanae indicate that healing waters played a very important role in Celtic religion. It is said that the legendary druid and doctor Dian Cecht prepared a holy well to heal the men injured at the Battle of Moytura and the custom of visiting holy wells is mentioned in our oldest literature. Christianised versions of these well stories can be found in *the Lives of the Irish saints* written before the twelfth century. In later centuries these wells became the scene for patterns and faction fights with thousands of people attending on certain occasions.

This paper will examine some accounts of pilgrimages to holy wells, with specific reference to wells in County Limerick. As with any rural gathering the pilgrimage to a healing well was a great social occasion. Occasionally travellers to Ireland wrote down their impressions of what they saw. One Englishman described a scene he observed at a holy well near Cork city in 1778:

> We went this morning to that [well] of St Bartholomew which being that saint's day was surrounded by vast crowds of Roman Catholics some upon their knees, at their devotion and others walking with their beads in their hands. This ceremony is here called a 'Patron'. The well is enclosed with trees close to the side of the road and even the sight of it looks refreshing. When their devotions were over they retired to several sutlers' tents erected for that purpose, some to eat and drink, others to wrestling and yelling, dancing, noise and merriment which brought on several boxing bouts while we stood there. In short it is exactly what we call a 'wake' in England, setting aside the devotion.[2]

[1] This paper is almost entirely based on oral history material collected in County Limerick during the 1940s by An Cartlann Choimisiún Béaloideasa na h-Éireann. This collection is held in University College Dublin.

At some wells diseases were cured but in other cases the well or the saint seems to have specialised in performing specific cures. Such names as *Tobar na Súl* – the Eye Well – or *Tobar na Plaighe* – the Well of the Plague suggests this. *Tobar Bríde* in the parish of Darragh, County Limerick, was particularly associated with cures for whooping cough in children, the patient being brought there to drink the water on 1 February, the feast of St. Brigid. The blessed well in Ballingarry, County Limerick, was associated with diseases of the stomach and the bowel while other Limerick wells including St. Bernard's in Rathkeale and St. Patrick's in Ardpatrick were associated with a more diverse range of cures including those for rheumatism, lameness and rickets.

The most common cures associated with Irish holy wells are those for sore eyes. If one is to judge by the number and popularity of eye wells, chronic inflammation of the eyes and eyelids must have been common complaints. Presumably many people suffered from myopia as few people would have worn glasses until relatively recently. Another cause of eye inflammation might have been the smoke-filled cabins in which most people lived. One reason why eye wells were so popular may be as a result of the Bible story that tells of Christ curing a blind man at the pool of Siloe. The New Testament account may have boosted the belief in eye cures, but evidence from Europe strongly suggests that eye cures were being sought at wells even in pre-Christian times. Tobarnanoran (*Tobar na nAmhrán*) in the parish of Rochestown has two eye curing legends associated with it, both of which give rise to its name. According to one story a blind man in England had a vision of the well. He came to Ireland and was led to the well where he heard sweet hymns to Our Lady and was cured. Another legend says that an itinerant French monk or scholar was cured of blindness at the well and began to sing songs of praise at the well, thus giving it its name.

The exact ritual carried out by the pilgrims to the holy wells varied from parish to parish and from county to county. It is fair to say however that they were all variations on a theme. After some preliminary prayers – usually some decades of the Rosary – the pilgrim would approach the well and kneel there to say some more prayers. The pilgrims might circle the well, drink some of the water, dip his or her hand and bless themselves while circling. Beside the well there might be a stone or a tree that was associated with the patron saint and these might also be circled while praying. Three circuits of the well were

[2] P.D. Hardy, *The holy wells of Ireland* (Dublin, 1836).

common and pilgrims sometimes did these circuits on their knees. The *turas*, or pattern to the well, would be made on certain days, for example, on a Monday or a Thursday or selection of certain days of the week for certain actions.

Three trips would often be made to the well for a cure. The power of the 'magical' number three appears again and again in all kinds of rituals all over the world, and is solidly reinforced by the role that number has played in the Christian tradition. Tobermacduagh (*Tobar-Mo-chua*) in the parish of Darragh in south Limerick – a well named after the saint Darrach Mochua who was patron of the parish as early as 1185 – would have been a typical example of this ritual involving the number three. A pattern was held there on 31August each year. The ceremonies performed included three rounds of the well with a decade of the Rosary being recited on each round. Drinking cups for the pilgrims were kept in a little wooden shrine in a tree next to the well. Votive offerings of rags and religious objects were sometimes left at the well.

The custom of leaving a votive offering was an essential part of any pilgrimage to a holy well. This tradition goes back at least as far as the Middle Ages when rich people went on pilgrimages and made very generous offerings, thereby making some shrines very profitable. This practice was not confined to Christianity alone. In India pilgrims left votive offerings at holy places. Anyone visiting a holy well in Ireland was expected to leave something behind as a token. This could include anything from a coin to a safety pin. Whether this practice of leaving trinkets or rags derived its inspiration from the desire to please and petition, or from the belief that illness can be transferred by means of contagious magic is not clear. Sometimes the offerings of medals, crosses, pins, rosary beads, coins, flowers, rags, and even crutches, were left on the ground or on a tree near the well. Pins and nails were driven into a tree above the well at St. Bernard's Well in Rathkeale, in what may have been symbolic of Christ's crucifixion. Some wells that were known for a cure for warts saw a practice where the pilgrim lifted a little water on the point of a pin and dropped it onto the wart. When this was done the pin was placed in the water to rust away and it was believed that as the pin rusted the wart would disappear.

Another form of offering particularly common in the penal years of the eighteenth century was the collection for the Roman Catholic priest. This became common practice when people assembled at a holy well on the feast day of the patron saint. Collections such as these were often made at weddings and funerals and it is only in recent times that the custom of paying funeral offerings has come to an end in certain parts of Ireland.

While many sufferers benefited from their contact with healing wells there is another side to them also evident in the tradition. Places believed to convey supernatural power posed a grave danger to those who desecrated them or did not respect the rituals inherent in the healing process. Early examples of the alleged vilification by travelling people are evident in the traditions associated with Sunday's Well (*Tobar Rí an Domhnaigh*) in Askeaton and Patrick's Well in Grean. The well in Askeaton was reputed to have been desecrated by a travelling woman who stopped to wash clothes in it, while the well in the parish of Grean moved because a travelling woman bathed her child in it. Two alternate traditions of why the well moved apply to the holy well at Toberstroke in the parish of Caheravally. One account states that the well moved when a local person washed clothes there. The other says that some passing Cromwellian soldiers washed their clothes in the well thereby descecrating it and causing it to change location. Toberanoran (*Tobar na nAmhrán* or *Tobar an Fhuaráin*) in the parish of Rochestown is also said to have moved because someone washed sheep in the well. The 'movement' of wells is common in every county, but a more natural explanation can be countenanced as a more reliable explanation. Wells, including holy wells, sometimes dry up for geological or agricultural reclamation reasons. Where the reason for a well's disappearance was not obvious, some supernatural reason would be sought to explain what had happened.

Ingratitude in relation to a cure was also a reason for censure according to tradition. Following a visit to St. Colman's Well in the parish of Colmanswell, a Limerick man found that he was no longer lame. He left his crutches at the well as a votive offering. Later, however he repented of his generosity and took his crutches back to sell them. His lameness returned. Another tradition relates the story of a man whose money vanished from his pockets, as he went past St Coleman's well, because he worked on the day of the pattern.

Another phenomenon particularly associated with holy wells in Ireland is the appearance of fish as portents of healing. In Celtic mythology deities were believed to assume the form of various creatures and sometimes fish, who were believed to live in certain watery places from the earliest times. There are many stories of legendary fish in the *Lives of the Irish saints* while another well-known fish legend is that of Fionn Mac Cumhaill and the 'salmon of knowledge'. If a person believed in the sanctity and healing power of the water of the well, it would follow that any fish found in a well must be supernatural. The appearance of fish, especially eel or trout, is associated with the traditions of many holy wells in County Limerick. If the fish was spotted while visiting the well it was a premonition of a cure. Healing fish were associated with

Sunday Well in Askeaton, St. James' Well in Nautenan and Lady's Well or Sunday Well in Cloncagh, Tobermacduagh in Darragh, St. Molua's Well in Emlygrennan and Lady's Well in Ballylanders.

In Ireland there is hardly a parish that does not have a holy well somewhere within its boundaries. Some of these wells are forgotten now and are no longer treated as 'holy' while a number of these sites have seen a revival in pilgrimage in the last ten years or so. Although the customs associated with many of these wells have all but disappeared during the course of this century, increasing curiosity is leading many to visiting holy wells.

From 'castle' bishop to 'moral leader'? Edward O'Dwyer and Irish nationalism 1914-7

Jérôme aan de Wiel

Edward Thomas O'Dwyer was born in Tipperary in 1842. Although he was never a member of any nationalist political organisation, his background suggests an early involvement in Irish politics. He supported Isaac Butt, the founder of the Home Rule Party, in the 1870s and was convinced that Home Rule would bring prosperity to Ireland. O'Dwyer sided with Butt in the first Home Rule campaign during the election of 1871. On that particular occasion, he was the only priest present on the platform.[1]

O'Dwyer, who was consecrated bishop of Limerick in 1886, did much for the neglected working class of Limerick and was rapidly noticed for his shattering declarations on Irish public life. He disagreed vehemently with the Plan of Campaign, during the Land War, that had been adopted by some members of the Home Rule Party. This plan sought to gain a decrease in rent that farmers paid to landlords; if the latter refused, farmers paid no rent at all. Contrary to a majority of prelates of the Catholic hierarchy, O'Dwyer believed that the plan was dangerous as it might provoke unrest. He also thought that it was morally wrong since in County Limerick many tenants were coerced into accepting the plan.[2] As a result of his stand against the Irish Parliamentary Party, O'Dwyer became isolated within the hierarchy and acquired the reputation of a maverick. But his position was soon vindicated as Pope Leo XIII declared in 1887, that the Plan of Campaign was not acceptable from a catholic point of view. Leo's decision comforted the bishop and did much to strengthen his ultra montane tendencies. O'Dwyer became an absolute ruler in his diocese and forbade his priests to absolve anybody who was involved in the Plan. Soon, many nationalists came to believe that he was a 'castle'

[1] E. O'Callaghan, *Bishop Edward O'Dwyer and the course of Irish politics 1870-1917*, (M.A. thesis, N.U.I., Galway, 1976).

[2] L. Geary, *Bishop O'Dwyer and the land question*, symposium on Bishop O'Dwyer, lecture delivered in Mary Immaculate College, Limerick, May 1998.

bishop, working for the British Government, or worse a 'landlord' bishop.

Before the First World War, O'Dwyer was mainly concerned with education. Up to that point, he had always been suspicious of the Home Rule Party's alliance with the liberals in the House of Commons. He suspected that the Liberal Party was trying to suppress religion in schools and that this might eventually lead to the secularisation of Ireland if home rule was put into operation. When John Redmond was appointed leader of the party in 1900, O'Dwyer was reassured since Redmond had been campaigning for home rule and the creation of a Catholic university. His opinion of the party fluctuated according to political events for he questioned Redmond's wisdom in trusting the Liberal Party and their promises concerning Irish autonomy.

However, a few months before the outbreak of war in Europe, O'Dwyer started to doubt seriously the Government's sincerity towards nationalist Ireland, despite Home Rule being approved by the House of Commons in 1912. Ulster's fate, where a majority of people, mainly protestant, opposed autonomy, had yet to be decided. On 21 May 1914, he wrote to Monsignor Michael O'Riordan, rector of the Irish College in Rome, stating that partition was imminent and that John Redmond's party was making mistakes.[3] On the eve of the war, O'Dwyer had reached the conclusion that the Irish Party was not taking into account nationalist public opinion and had, so it seemed, anticipated troubles in the north of the country. When the war broke out in August 1914, home rulers and unionists agreed to shelve home rule until after the war. Ireland was in the grip of war fever; the nationalists under John Redmond, formed the sixteenth Irish Division, symbol of Ireland's new nationhood, whereas Sir Edward Carson and his unionist supporters formed the thirty-sixth Ulster Division, symbolising Ulster's attachment to the United Kingdom. Only a handful of Irish Volunteers remained under the command of Eoin MacNeil, who were more extreme in their nationalism, believing that the war was not Ireland's fight.

Between 1914 and 1915, the war was relatively popular in Ireland. The major newspapers supported it and displayed as much jingoism as their English or continental counterparts. They did much to encourage Irishmen to join the British army. In August 1914, the nationalist *Cork*

[3] O'Dwyer to O'Riordan, 21 May 1914, Irish College Rome, O'Riordan papers (15) 123.

Examiner reported that 'Rule Britannia' could be heard in Cork and that the police had been obliged to baton-charge an overexcited crowd trying to see the soldiers off, and unwittingly preventing their departure.[4] The recruitment figures seem to attest this enthusiasm: between August and December 1914, forty-three thousand men enlisted, and between January and August 1915, another thirty-seven thousand followed.[5] The Irish Catholic Church was overwhelmingly in support of the war although two important prelates, Cardinal Logue from Armagh, and Archbishop Walsh from Dublin, had strong reservations.[6] O'Dwyer's reaction to the war had been quite long in coming. Being ultra montane and not sure about nationalist Ireland's future, he decided to voice Pope Benedict XV's peace appeals and consequently did not specifically blame the Central Powers – Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy – for the war. In November 1914, he declared: 'people talk lightly of the war going on for years; some public men speak of carrying it on until their enemies are beaten to their knees. We must beware of a proud and insolent spirit, which is not the spirit of the Christian religion'.[7] O'Dwyer, inspired by the pope's recent encyclical *Ad Beatissimi*, had warned Redmond indirectly.

In February 1915, O'Dwyer wrote an eloquent Lenten pastoral in which he stated that the war was pure folly and that it had to stop immediately. In Rome, O'Riordan was struck by O'Dwyer's eloquence and his position on the conflict, an identical one to that of the pope. The rector of the Irish College decided to translate the pastoral into Italian and presented it to Benedict XV and to other Vatican officials. Cardinal Gasparri, the secretary of state, declared that the pope was extremely satisfied. O'Riordan would systematically translate O'Dwyer's writings and this would have important consequences as it facilitated a rapprochement between the Holy See and nationalist Ireland.[9]

[4] *The Cork Examiner*, 6 August 1914.
[5] J. Lee, *Ireland, 1912-85: politics and society* (Cambridge, 1989), p. 23.
[6] J. aan de Wiel, '*L'Eglise Catholique en Irlande, 1914-1918: guerre et politique*' (Ph.D. thesis, University of Caen, 1998), pp. 44-146.
[7] *The Tablet*, 12 December 1914.
[9] J. aan de Wiel, 'Monsignor O'Riordan, Bishop O'Dwyer and the shaping of new relations between nationalist Ireland and the Vatican during World War I', in *Etudes Irlandaises*, 24 (1999), pp. 137-47.

On 28 July 1915, the pope made an ineffectual appeal for peace. Only a few days before, Redmond had written to Dublin City Council that the war was the main preoccupation at the moment and that nothing could prevent home rule from becoming law.[10] His letter was meant to reassure nationalist Ireland but Redmond was somewhat worried. His anxieties may have reflected a change in the public mood. A consequence of that change was a rapid fall in the number of recruits. There were several reasons for this. Firstly, Irish nationalist recruits were not well-treated as Lord Kitchener, minister for war, was deeply suspicious of Irish nationalism. Secondly, the war office disliked promoting Irish nationalism in its recruitment campaigns.[11] Thirdly, the courage and bravery of Irish regiments at the front was rarely acknowledged by the poorly organised recruitment authorities in Ireland.[12] Fourthly, there was the new coalition cabinet in Britain, which included Carson and the intransigent unionist James Campbell. To nationalist Ireland, this meant that the English liberal prime minister, Herbert Asquith, would probably not extend home rule to Ulster. Finally, some nationalists opposed to Redmond became more radical as the war dragged on, with home rule rapidly falling from sight as the conflict persisted.

It was at that particular moment that O'Dwyer decided to intervene publicly by asking Redmond to hear the pope's appeal and to work for peace. It was the beginning of a personal confrontation. O'Dwyer was too clever a politician not to know that Redmond was facing some difficulties. He also knew that the people were fed up with the war. He must have known beforehand that his letter supporting the pope's initiatives would cause a sensation in Ireland, especially in republican and nationalist opposition circles and that these nationalists would use his letter against Redmond. It can be argued that it was O'Dwyer's plan to guide this rising radical nationalism before it degenerated into violence. Whatever his hidden motives, the result was a hard blow for Redmond. In the letter, O'Dwyer asked Redmond to think about the hundreds of thousands of men that were being sacrificed in a senseless war and not to follow die-hard politicians and statesmen. But far more interesting was a paragraph which O'Dwyer devoted to the future

[10] *The Tablet*, 31 July 1915.
[11] T. Denman, *Ireland's unknown soldiers* (Blackrock, 1992), pp. 22, 34-5.
[12] G. Dangerfield, *The damnable question* (London, 1977), p. 131.

economic crisis that would hit Ireland after the war and ruin many farmers. England, loser or winner, would not suffer as much:

> Then, the moment the war ceases, there will be a sudden collapse of prices ... Strong men will be hard set to keep their heads over water; but the ordinary farmers will find it enough to do to pay their annuities much less to meet an unheard-of taxation load. England, too, will feel the strain, but she has great resources ... Whatever way the war goes, [she] will recover her prosperity. If [the war] goes on for another year, it will sink us in irretrievable ruin.[13]

O'Dwyer had used the economic argument remarkably well. This could not fail to impress a predominantly agricultural country.

Redmond was in an awkward position. On the one hand, if he accepted O'Dwyer's plea, he risked breaking up his alliance with the English liberals which might lead Herbert Asquith to adopt a more favourable attitude to the unionists. To unionists, very much in favour of pursuing the war, it would justify their fears that home rule would mean Rome rule. Partition would become unavoidable. On the other hand, if Redmond refused, his grip on nationalist Ireland might slacken. He knew well that farmers would be impressed by O'Dwyer's economic arguments, all the more since the country was enjoying an economic boom. Furthermore, the existing gap between his party and more radical nationalists would widen. Eventually, Redmond decided to respond negatively. He still believed that he was able to impress the majority of the nationalist population. His reply, however, was short and not at all appropriate to O'Dwyer's letter. He simply stated: 'to the best of my judgement, the course of action you suggest to me would not be calculated to promote the cause of peace'. He equally said that Germany was the aggressor in the war and that she should repair all the wrongs that she had inflicted upon Belgium and France.[14] Incredibly, Redmond did not even try to show that O'Dwyer was wrong in his economic arguments! It was a monumental blunder. Various nationalist opposition movements attacked Redmond and were full of praise for O'Dwyer. MacNeill wrote in *The Irish Volunteer* that:

> Mr. Redmond has not ventured to controvert the Bishop of Limerick's forecast of twenty million pounds a year to be levied on

[13] O'Dwyer to Redmond, 4 August 1915, Limerick Diocesan Office, O'Dwyer papers, file H.
[14] *The Tablet*, 21 August 1915.

> Ireland – if Ireland submits. He has avoided the disagreeable subject, and blinked the Bishop's questions.[15]

This matter may have hastened Redmond's decline in Irish political life. O'Dwyer was 'satisfied' with the outcome of his correspondence with Redmond. On 13 August 1915, he wrote to O'Riordan:

> I have had a simple refusal from [Redmond] to bring any pressure to bear on the government, but I rather think the popular fear of taxation and poverty will soon bring pressure on himself. He and the Irish Party are afraid to do anything. The Home Rule carrot keeps the Irish donkey moving'.[16]

If the bishop of Limerick's intervention had had impressed nationalist opinion, the population remained willing to change political allegiance. As the political crisis dragged on with no solution in sight, a general apathy or indifference towards the war, home rule and partition took hold over the masses. Redmond tirelessly continued with his recruitment policy. On 18 October 1915, he declared to the representatives of Dublin city, that Ireland had produced magnificent recruitment figures.[17] This was untrue since voluntary enlistment figures had drastically dropped at the end of 1915.[18]

In November 1915, a second confrontation between O'Dwyer and Redmond took place, resulting in further damage to Redmond's reputation. In October 1915, the recently created department of recruitment in Ireland launched a new campaign. The losses of the tenth Irish division at Gallipoli had been critical and public opinion in the country started to believe that Irish nationalist soldiers were being deliberately being used as cannon fodder by British generals.[19] According to *New Ireland*, an opposition newspaper, the police had established a list of potential recruits throughout the country.[20] Some Irishmen panicked and when trying to emmigrate to the United States by embarking from Liverpool, they were prevented from doing so by a hostile English mob. The Press Association interviewed Redmond about the incident. He tried to reassure British public opinion by saying that

[15] *The Irish Volunteer*, 21 August 1915.
[16] O'Dwyer to O'Riordan, 13 August 1915Irish College Rome, O'Riordan papers, (107).
[17] *The Tablet*, 23 October 1915.
[18] Lee, *Ireland 1912-85*, pp. 23-4.
[19] Denman, *Ireland's unknown soldiers*, p. 131.
[20] *New Ireland*, 13 November 1915.

only some people in the west of Ireland had been involved and that 'it was very cowardly of them to try and emigrate'.[21] This last sentence was the beginning of the end of Redmond's political career. O'Dwyer was terribly outraged by Redmond's remark and wrote a vitriolic letter against him and the Irish Party. It was censored in Dublin but it appeared on 11 November 1915 in the *Limerick Chronicle* and the *Cork Examiner*. He denounced the behaviour of the English mob and argued that Irish people had every right to emigrate because the war in Europe was not theirs. He stated:

> Their blood is not stirred by the memories of Kosovo, and they have no burning desire to die for Serbia. They would much prefer to be allowed to till their own potato gardens in peace in Connemara. Small nationalities ... and all the other cosmopolitan considerations that rouse the enthusiasm of the Irish Party are far too high flying for uneducated peasants.

Concerning home rule, he was of the opinion that it would never be implemented and that the war would ruin Ireland. Finally, he made a personal attack on Redmond: 'Yet the poor fellows who do not see the advantage of dying ... are to be insulted as 'shirkers' and 'cowards', and the men whom they have raised to power and influence have not one word to say on their behalf'.[22] To these whom Redmond had called cowards, O'Dwyer had become a defender against conscription.

Incredible as it may seem, Redmond decided not to counter O'Dwyer despite the fact that the bishop's letter had created a sensation. Perhaps the home rule leader believed that to be dragged into a public controversy with a member of the Catholic hierarchy would go against him and give more publicity to O'Dwyer. The difference between the two men was that O'Dwyer took into account the evolution of Irish public opinion to the war whereas Redmond still believed that he would be able to change it. Of course, one should not forget that Redmond was obliged to take into account the unionist and the British cabinet's opinion of the conflict and therefore, from a political point of view, he had far less room for manoeuvre than O'Dwyer.

Arthur Griffith's *Nationality*, MacNeill's *Irish Volunteer* and *The Hibernian*, published and praised O'Dwyer's letter. His popularity and reputation went far beyond the limits of his diocese. The Royal Irish

[21] Ibid.
[22] *The Cork Examiner*, 11 November 1915.

Constabulary reported that O'Dwyer's letter had been found and used against the war and Redmond in at least seventeen counties.[23] On 25 November 1915, Augustine Birrell, the Irish chief secretary, reported that 'the distribution [of O'Dwyer's letter] should not be allowed but I do not think in view of the circulation the letter has had already we can usefully try to stop its further circulation'.[24] Dublin Castle was powerless. It cannot be contested that O'Dwyer had played an important role in sapping the grip of the party on nationalist Ireland. On 12 January 1916, he wrote to O'Riordan that:

> it is very hard to gauge opinion in Ireland now. Redmond and the *Freeman's* speak and write like British Gingos ... The Gaelic League has done good work and has deserved well of the country. The 'Party' are contemptible'.[25]

O'Dwyer's reference to the Gaelic League and his judgement on the Irish Party signalled a radicalisation in his political views. The events of the Easter 1916 would confirm this.

The Easter Rising against British rule was a military failure. The Irish people had largely been against it. However, when Patrick Pearse, James Connolly and other leaders were summarily executed, public opinion turned against the authorities. With the exception of Archbishop Walsh of Dublin and Bishop Fogarty of Killaloe, the majority of the Catholic hierarchy had condemned the rebels. O'Dwyer had not voiced publicly any opinion about the event until 6 May 1916 when General Maxwell, the commander-in-chief of the army in Ireland, asked him to take disciplinary sanctions against two priests of his diocese whom he accused of having republican sympathies. Before answering, the bishop enquired into the matter and found out that the two priests in question had indeed ties with the Volunteers. However, he decided that both men were perfectly entitled to their opinions. This was an indication that O'Dwyer was in a very nationalist frame of mind when he wrote his reply to Maxwell. The vehemence of his arguments against Maxwell and British rule was not surprising when one takes into

[23] David Miller, *Church, state and nation in Ireland 1898-1921* (Dublin, 1973), p. 317.
[24] 'Printed copies of the Bishop of Limerick's letter distributed in County Donegal', 2 December 1915, Public Record Office, London, CO 904/207.
[25] O'Riordan to O'Dwyer, 12 January 1916, Irish College Rome, O'Riordan papers (16) 17.

account his frustration with the Irish Party and the execution of the rebel leaders. O'Dwyer had timed to perfection his public answer to Maxwell for at that precise moment Asquith was in Ireland in order to assess the political situation. His letter also coincided with a debate on conscription in the House of Commons. On 17 May 1916, his letter was published by the *Cork Examiner* and the *Evening Mail*. Firstly, he defended his two priests and then attacked Maxwell. He wrote that Maxwell was a 'military dictator,' and denounced the executions which had 'outraged the conscience of the country'.

O'Dwyer's letter had an astounding impact on nationalist Ireland. The very republican minded Monsignor Curran, Archbishop Walsh's secretary, noted that in Dublin, the *Evening Mail* had published the letter and was sold out despite the warnings of the authorities.[26] The population rallied to O'Dwyer as he became their new champion. He was seen as their best guarantee against conscription, especially in rural Ireland.

O'Dwyer was a shrewd political observer and considered that the executions had not been entirely in vain. According to him, the executions had stirred the nationalist people. On 18 May 1916, he wrote to O'Riordan that 'the country was being hypnotised by the politicians, but it is being revived these days'.[28] He was right. In the summer of 1916, during which the issues of conscription and partition were being debated, new nationalist parties began to offer an alternative to the Home Rule Party. They were the Irish Nation League of George Murnaghan, the Repeal League of Michael Judge, and Sinn Féin of Herbert Pim. The danger for the nationalist opposition was political fragmentation at a crucial time. The parties lacked political leadership, as many were in prison. Quite naturally, it was at this juncture that some nationalists began to consider O'Dwyer. The *Irish Opinion* and the *Irish Nation* published speeches of O'Dwyer, some from before the war. A republican supporter wrote a poem reflecting the situation:

> Who shall write the Easter story
> Who is worthy to relate
> All its romance, hopes, and glory

[26] Monsignor Curran's memoirs, 'Dr. O'Dwyer's famous letter to General Maxwell', National Library of Ireland, Séan T. O'Kelly papers, MS 27728(1).
[28] O'Dwyer to O'Riordan, 18 May 1916, Irish College Rome, O'Riordan Papers, (25).

How our leaders met their fate...
God has left us yet one hero
His pen is like a sword of fire,
Ireland loves him, Ireland thanks him,
God watch O'er you, Bishop O'Dwyer.[29]

If O'Dwyer had become the opposition's hero, it is not surprising that Stephen O'Mara of the Irish Nation League asked him to become a member. But the bishop refused. However, O'Dwyer was well aware of the present difficulties that the nationalist opposition was facing. On 31 August 1916, he wrote to O'Riordan:

> If [William] O'Brien and [T.M.] Healy had not discredited themselves we should have an alternative, but as it is, I do not see who are to displace the 'Party', unless as is not improbable, the Sinn Féin men gather strength enough to rout them.[30]

O'Dwyer feared above all the division of the opposition and had taken a serious interest in Sinn Féin. Since its creation by Griffith in 1905, he had been able to follow its progress and analyse its policy. Sinn Féin did not have an organisation comparable to the Irish Party, but belonged to this new nationalist grouping which included the Gaelic League and the Gaelic Athletic Association. O'Dwyer decided to aid Sinn Féin in becoming the new nationalist political force in Ireland. An opportunity was given to him to do so when the city of Limerick decided to confer on him the freedom of the city on 14 September 1916. During his long acceptance speech, he explained that he understood the rebels, although he did not agree with their use of violence, and he denounced the hypocrisy of the British Government concerning home rule and the war in the defence of small nations. He finally announced his support for Sinn Féin:

> I will state my alternative to the Party, who trust the Liberals, and are now reduced to the statesmanship of Micawber – waiting for something to turn up. ... Sinn Féin is, in my judgement, the true principle, and alliance with English politicians is the alliance of the lamb with the wolf.[31]

What exactly Sinn Féin stood for was problematical. Some of its members, such as Griffith, were in favour of a dual monarchy for

[29] Limerick Diocesan Office, O'Dwyer papers.
[30] O'Riordan to O'Dwyer , 31 August 1916 Irish College Rome, O'Riordan Papers, (17) 140.

Ireland based on the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, while others such as Cathal Brugha favoured the idea of a republic. Moreover, O'Dwyer knew that Griffith had not always been supportive of the Catholic Church.[32] In fact, O'Dwyer had thrown a line to Sinn Féin; if grasped, it could mean a very effective collaboration between radical nationalism and Catholicism. Subsequent events proved this to be true since Sinn Féin played the 'Catholic card' in 1917 and 1918, trying to prove to the nationalist population that the party was not composed of bloodthirsty revolutionaries but of very respectable Catholics.[33] It is difficult to measure with certainty the impact of O'Dwyer's speech on the nationalist population. However, if one takes into account his popularity in the country, his public endorsement of Sinn Féin must have been very significant. The *Irish Opinion* believed it was an historic speech. Another man convinced of O'Dwyer's importance was Herbert Asquith himself. The British prime minister told his cabinet that among the causes that had led to the radicalisation of Irish nationalism was the bishop of Limerick's letter to General Maxwell.[34] As to O'Dwyer, he was decidedly in a combative mood in the months of September and October 1916, so much so that he forgot, or wished to forget, his own political past. He declared to an amused Archbishop Walsh: 'When did we ever get anything by constitutional means? We won the land laws by shooting landlords. We won emancipation by the threat of civil war'.[35]

The executions and the conscription and partition crises of the summer of 1916 had done much to undermine the Irish Party's authority on nationalist Ireland. John Redmond had been seriously undermined by David Lloyd George who had been entrusted with the mission to find a reproachment between nationalists and unionists, so as not to hinder voluntary enlistment in Ireland which by now was almost non-existent. Lloyd George had promised Carson that partition of the country would be definitive but had assured Redmond that it would be temporary. When the matter became public, Redmond was terribly embarrassed. On 12 November 1916, John Dillon, the party's deputy leader, made a very angry speech in London entitled 'Ireland and the war in Europe' in

[31] Limerick Diocesan Office, O'Dwyer papers, file 'Irish politics' 1912-22'.
[32] Patrick Maume, *The long gestation* (Dublin, 1999), p. 54.
[33] J. aan de Wiel, *'L'Eglise Catholique en Irlande*, pp. 443-52.
[34] L. O'Broin, *The chief secretary* (London, 1969), p. 189.

which he denounced all the disastrous decisions taken by the cabinet regarding Ireland.[36] His speech, though certainly objective, was meant to put Redmond back in the driving seat and by using some of the arguments of the nationalist opposition, Dillon tried to neutralise this same opposition. The Irish Party was still solidly implanted in Ireland and the West Cork by-election of November 1916 proved that it was still capable of winning, although no other nationalist opposed the nationalist candidate.[37]

If the Irish Party's influence was diminishing, the nationalist opposition failed to garner this support. It was obvious that the Easter Rising had provoked a nationalist *renaissance* but it remained to be seen if the population was now ready to fight and die for a republic as proclaimed by Pearse and Connolly. Certainly, nationalism had become more radical. The pro-Redmond National Volunteers' decision to repudiate the authority of their leader and re-unite eventually with the Irish Volunteers in July 1917, proves the point. The military reports of the British army provide an important glimpse at the political landscape of the country. From these, it is clear that Sinn Féin was relatively popular from September 1916 until the second half of 1917.[38] However, this was mainly due to the sympathy the people felt for the executed rebels and because Sinn Féin was resolutely against conscription and any kind of participation in the war. British military intelligence noticed that Sinn Féin 'lacked leaders, organisation, and aid from abroad and [that it could not] affect much'. Equally, the intelligence officers had noticed that the Catholic Church was in danger of losing its moral authority with the people if it persisted in advocating voluntary enlistment and that a gap between bishops and older priests, still in favour of the Irish Party, and younger priests in favour of Sinn Féin had taken place. This new trend was also noticed by the French diplomatic corps who believed that if Catholicism was to oppose nationalism, the latter would triumph.[39]

[35] Hagan papers 1916, letter no 100, Curran to Hagan, 15 October 1916.
[36] *The Freeman's Journal*, 13 November 1916.
[37] B. Murphy, *Patrick Pearse and the lost republican ideal* (Dublin, 1991), p. 74.
[38] Public Record Office, London, CO 904/157, military intelligence reports.
[39] Blanche to *Ministère des affaires étrangères*, 19 February 1918, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, vol. 547 *Grande-Bretagne/Irlande*.

O'Dwyer continued his personal crusade against Redmond in 1917. In February O'Dwyer wrote a passionate Lenten pastoral denouncing militarism and pro-war die-hards like Redmond who had recently declared that peace was not conceivable as long as German soldiers were still in France. He denounced the chauvinistic attitude of the press, and its emphasis on German atrocities. He believed that some attrocities had taken place but he compared them with the behaviour of British soldiers during the Easter Rising. He reiterated his most powerful argument, that the war would cause an economic catastrophe in Ireland.[40] O'Dwyer's pastoral had impressed many people, especially those eligible for military service. Indeed, even though David Lloyd George, now prime minister, had decided not to impose conscription on Ireland, the threat was still in the air: the disastrous offensive on the Somme, in July 1916, had resulted in four-hundred and twenty thousand casualties.[41]

On Saint Patrick's Day 1917, Count Plunkett took the initiative of organising a convention of all the various nationalist opposition forces. The debates were stormy but eventually all agreed that Ireland was an independent nation and would send a delegation to the future peace conference to seek international recognition. It was quite natural that Plunkett asked O'Dwyer for help and that the latter authorised the priests of his diocese to attend the meeting in Dublin.[42] On 9 May 1917, the South Longford by-election took place, contested by Sinn Féin and the Irish Party. The possible influence of Archbishop Walsh of Dublin who wrote a letter on the eve of the election, criticising the Home Rule Party's disastrous policy, was decisive. O'Dwyer's letter, however, is rarely mentioned and yet it was distributed throughout the whole country. He firstly attacked the way rebel prisoners were treated in English prisions and wondered how the United States government and the important Irish-American population might react to this as their country had just declared war on Germany. Then, he made vitriolic and ironic comments on Redmond and the Home Rule MPs:

[40] Lenten pastoral, February 1917, Limerick Diocesan Office, O'Dwyer papers.
[41] Dangerfield, *The damnable question*, p. 252.
[42] Plunkett to O'Dwyer, 14 April 1917. Limerick Diocesan Office, O'Dwyer papers, (m).

> They are the 'patriots' that allowed that wretched measure which has been passed by Parliament to be hung up during the war, and having suspended the liberties of their country turned to recruiting in Ireland for the British Government ... They are British Parliamentarians.[43]

Bearing in mind O'Dwyer's popularity, the letter must have had some influence on the outcome of the election. On 16 June 1917, Eamon de Valera, still relatively unknown to the Irish public, was freed from prison and shortly afterwards was campaigning in the East-Clare by-election. O'Dwyer was satisfied with de Valera's speeches and wrote to O'Riordan in Rome that the rising nationalist politician was 'a good Catholic and a clever fellow'.[44] De Valera in turn understood that his chances of electoral success would be increased considerably if he had O'Dwyer's public support, which he got just before the election. During the campaign, he played the Catholic card and did much to convince the people that he was not a dangerous revolutionary.

On 19 August 1917, O'Dwyer died at the age of seventy-six. His political evolution from 'Castle' bishop to moral leader of a disorganised nationalist opposition had been remarkable. He ensured that Sinn Féin had a strong political foundation on which this party could build in the years to come. He hastened the demise of John Redmond's Irish Party by systematically criticising the party's pro-war policy and lack of independence of the English Liberal Party. All nationalist newspapers, including the *Freeman's Journal*, paid tribute to O'Dwyer. But it was de Valera who made the most prophetic statement:

> all Ireland owed a debt of gratitude to Dr. O'Dwyer and she will not forget that debt, and his name will live in history and will be a model for Irish bishops who wish to win the hearts of their flocks. As long as there are bishops such as Dr. O'Dwyer there will never be anti-clericalism in this land'.[45]

The message was clear. If the Church wished to survive as a political force in Ireland, it would have to collaborate with the new increasingly powerful Sinn Féin.

[43] Curran papers, 'Important pronouncement of the Bishop of Limerick', 30 April 1917.
[44] O'Dwyer to O'Riordan, 22 June 1917. Irish College Rome, O'Riordan papers (18) 94.
[45] *The Freeman's Journal*, 20 August 1917.

Relinquishing educational dominance
The Catholic Church and Irish secondary schools 1829-1989

Annetta Stack

The title of 'the island of saints and scholars' refers to the period following the introduction of Christianity into Ireland when many of the great monastic schools were founded. However, during the era of British rule, education for the Catholic population in Ireland experienced repression and neglect. Following Catholic Emancipation, the Catholic Church assumed an increasingly dominant role in the Irish educational system. This paper will examine the role and the influence of the Church in Irish education, particularly in secondary education, and will argue that the relative lack of progress in education until the 1960s may have been due to the dominant position of the Church within the educational structure.

Towards the end of the eighteenth century there was an easing in the implementation of the penal laws. English politicians began to realise that all attempts to abolish Catholicism in Ireland had failed. In order to end the bitter strife in Ireland, they felt that by granting greater freedom and rights to the Catholic Church, the latter would act as a means of pacifying the masses of Irish people. As Wolfe Tone argued: 'Persecution will keep alive the foolish bigotry and superstition of any sect. Persecution bound the Irish Catholic to his priest, and priest to the pope'.[1] Under the Relief Act of 1782, the Irish parliament restored the right of Catholics to teach in schools and as a result, schools specifically for the education of Catholics were established. The Presentation Sisters were founded in 1791, the Irish Christian Brothers in 1802 and the Sisters of Mercy in 1828. The schools that these religious orders established neither required nor necessarily wanted any state intervention, and provided the first educational structure to cater for the needs of Irish Catholics. With the establishment of these schools a strong alliance between the Church and the Irish educational system was created.

As a result of the new approach adopted by the government, Maynooth College was founded in 1795 for the purpose of educating Catholic priests. The British government believed that through the training and educating of priests within Ireland, the possibility of conflict would be reduced, as Church

[1] John O'Beirne Ranelagh, *A short history of Ireland*, (Cambridge) p. 118.

leaders would not be exposed to other societies or cultures, particularly revolutionary France, and therefore any radical thoughts of reform would be extinguished. In 1831 the national system of education was established through which, for the first time the government gave Catholics opportunities to receive instruction in their own religion in schools. In a relatively short time the number of Catholic schools, churches and institutions had grown dramatically and had become a major force in Irish affairs. A parliamentary report in 1838 argued for the support of secondary education on the basis of the mixed denomination principle that had been established for the National School system. The Catholic Church objected to such a principle of integrated education, as they maintained that secondary schools were formative institutions for future clergy, in addition to providing a general Roman Catholic education for other students. The year 1850 marked a milestone in the power and influence of the Church. Cardinal Paul Cullen assembled a synod at Thurles for the purpose of having a unified position in the whole area of education. The Church decided to continue to conduct secondary schools on a private basis unless the state was prepared to fund denominational schools and avoid interference with the Church's authority. As a result, the Intermediate Education Act was passed in 1878, which established examination boards and funding for schools, based on a payment-by-results scheme.

The main effect of this act was to allow the state to give indirect funding to secondary schools on the basis of examination results. The main function of the Intermediate Education Act was to act solely as an examining authority which posed no threat or challenge to the managerial aspect of secondary schools owned by the Church. Fees were paid to the ecclesiastically appointed manager, and who could then distributed those fees. Lay teachers who taught in Catholic schools fared worse under this system. They generally received much less than their ecclesiastical counterparts. Lay teachers had no contract, no security of tenure, no stipulated salary scale and were operating on a results system which did not benefit them financially for examination success, but might punish them drastically for failures by reducing assurance of continuity of employment.[2] The Catholic school system had developed without state assistance during an era of repression and active proselytising, and the Catholic clergy were adamant in maintaing their influence, especially appointing people of an ecclesiastical nature to their boards of management. The lay teachers were often referred to as 'birds of passage' as they were not

[2] S. ÓBuachalla, *Education policy in twentieth century Ireland* (Dublin, 1998), p. 46.

supported by the Church, resulting in some having a very short working life within the teaching profession.

One of the more serious consequences of the Intermediate Education Act was the delay in introducing any specifications of minimum qualifications for teachers in secondary schools. The whole area of teacher professionalism needed reformation. The ecclesiastical ban on Catholics attending Trinity College meant that very few teachers at second level had appropriate qualifications. A report in 1905 revealed that only eleven per cent of male teachers possessed a degree,while eight per cent of female teachers possessed a similar qualification.[3] A cleric in Blackrock College, when asked for his view on the suggestion that all teachers be required to take an examination and obtain a certificate, said that 'it would be a great and unnecessary interference with the liberty we now enjoy'.[4] The clergy objected to a qualified teaching profession because there was no recognised Catholic university in the country. However, in 1908, the Irish University Bill introduced by the chief secretary, Augustine Birrell, established the Queens' University in Belfast and three colleges of the National University of Ireland in Cork, Galway and Dublin. Although the universities enrolled Catholics, the clergy still objected to the whole area of teacher professionalism. Other objections related to the possibility that lay teachers would be better qualified than priests and would be more entitled to teaching positions within secondary schools. Thus, the Church viewed the area of state teacher qualifications as an interference, and a weakening of the control they held over the Irish educational system.

The establishment of the Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction (DATI) in 1899 evoked a new era of reform within the educational system. It was the first department to be set up by the British government to meet Irish needs. The DATI established a system whereby it trained people for teaching posts and provided free summer courses for teachers of technical and private institutions. Therefore, DATI was established without being in direct conflict with the Catholic secondary schools as its focus was on technical and practical training as opposed to academic education.

The passing of the Intermediate Education Amendment Act in 1900, allowed for the temporary inspection of schools. The Catholic Headmasters Association (CHA) agreed to the inspection of their schools by temporary inspectors. Titley has suggested that this decision was the first indication that the Catholic authorities were beginning to comply with state involvment in the

[3] O'Buachalla, *Education policy*, pp. 48-9.

[4] B. Titley, *Church, state and control of schooling in Ireland, 1900-44* (Dublin), p. 14.

day-to-day running of schools. The Dale and Stephens Report of 1905 highlighted that Irish schools were inadequate and inferior compared to their English counterparts and recommended the creation of a permanent inspectorate and the establishment of a system of registration for secondary teachers.

It was only in the late 1890s when secondary schools were coming under review that lay teachers began to unite under the trade union movement. The Association for Secondary Teachers in Ireland (ASTI) was founded in 1909. The main aims of ASTI were firstly to secure a system of registration of secondary teachers, secondly to secure an adequate salary-scale and thirdly to obtain security of tenure and pension rights for members. The question of teacher registration brought the ASTI into direct conflict with the Catholic Church. There was a lengthy correspondence between Murphy, Secretary of the CHA and Birrell, on the issue of teacher registration. A compromise was finally reached where it was agreed that a grant towards teachers salaries would be paid from 1915 and a new body to deal with teacher registration would be established in the amended Intermediate Education Act of 1914.

Educational review was becoming a major issue during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Ireland. Parliament decided that Irish education should be aligned with its English counterpart. Two committees were established to report on the positions of national and intermediate education in Ireland. One of these, the Moloney Committee, drew attention to the defects that it found in Irish secondary schools. These included the urgent need for improvement in salaries, security of tenure and the provision of pensions for intermediate teachers, the need for an organised and centralised authority for primary, secondary and technical education and the abolition of the 'payments-by-results' scheme. In response, Professor Timothy Corcoran gave the apinion of the Church:

> As long as the state confines its services towards such schools, to the 'promotion' of education, as it was rightly termed in the original Intermediate Education Act, no difficulty will occur; but if the state assumes to 'control' or 'direct' the actual education given in Catholic schools, issues of principle arise. The most essential issue in the Catholic nature of Catholic schools is full Catholic control of the choice of teachers, retention of teachers and removal of teachers.[6]

In 1919 James McPherson replaced Birrell as chief secretary. MacPherson's tenure as chief secretary marked the final attempt by the British

[6] Louis O'Flaherty, *Management and control of Irish education: a post-primary experience*, p. 17.

government to regulate the Irish educational system. His education bill supported the concept of one central educational authority and recommended that provision should be made for the establishment of local education councils. He was also very careful to point out that he did not favour a 'Godless education' and that the control of secondary schools would remain with the denominations.[7] However the bill was shelved during the War of Independence. As Titley suggests:

> the abandonment of the Bill meant that the Church could enter an era of independence with school systems, both primary and secondary, largely under its control and with certain confidence that changes would only take place with its consent.[8]

A dependency syndrome, inculcated during the colonial era, was reflected in the new Dáil Éireann of 1922. The new *Cumman na nGaedheal* government did not question the role that the Church had claimed in education and openly avoided any interference in its structure. The principal reason for this was that the political leaders were mainly products of the Catholic schools and were devoutly Catholic in their personal lives. Eoin MacNeill made it clear that he, as minister for education, would not introduce any structural changes into the educational system. In terms of curriculum development, it could be argued that the political leaders of the day placed more emphasis on the 'romantic Ireland' of language, music, history and geography rather than asserting any constructive measures in the pedagogy or curriculum being taught. Education was viewed as a tool in the creation of a new and independent Irish culture.

Despite the strong influence of the Church, the educational system was moving into an era where reform was necessary. The ASTI was gaining recognition and playing a vital role in its fight for better conditions for lay teachers. In May 1920, the ASTI conducted its first strike in Catholic schools for the purpose of receiving a reasonable salary-scale. As a result, the Intermediate Education Act of 1924 abolished the 'payment-by-results' scheme and introduced capitation fees. This act also incorporated an increase in salaries for teachers. However, the department of education was careful to emphasise that, despite government involvement with the issue of teacher salaries, 'the state has assumed no responsibility for the appointment of head-

[7] Titley, *Church, state and control of schooling in Ireland*, p. 60.
[8] Ibid., pp. 69-70.

masters or teachers, and the secondary system remains as hitherto one of purely private management'.[9]

In an effort to improve the quality of education and extend educational opportunities for students, the Vocational Education Act of 1930 was passed, which in effect desolved the DATI system. These vocational schools were built, owned and maintained by local authorities were intended to provide students with practical skills as opposed to purely academic ones. Therefore, these schools were not allowed to teach or prepare students for public examinations that granted access to higher education. The schools were managed by local authorities and represented the first major change in the structure and management of Irish education. Although these schools were not seen to be in direct conflict with the Church, they reflected a new era of change and certainly impinged greatly on the management structure of a highly denominational educational system.

The Church was not solely responsible perhaps for restricting the development of the Irish educational system by trying to maintain the status-quo. Successive Irish governments, through their lack of involvement and responsibility in educational matters were equally responsible. For example, when Fianna Fáil returned to power in 1951, with Séan Moylan as minister for education, the question of teacher's salaries was re-introduced. However, Moylan decided that school buildings were a higher priority than teacher's salaries for budget expenditure. The shortage of teachers was also highlighted at this time, with particular mention being paid to the state's policy of banning married women in the teaching profession. The government refused to rescind the ban and instead began to employ untrained assistant teachers. An examination therefore of the whole educational structure reveals that the Catholic Church cannot be held solely responsible for the deficiencies of the Irish educational system. The state must share some of the responisbillity. Apart from the establishment of vocational schools, the general attitude of the state towards the educational system was *laissez-faire* and this attitude continued until the mid 1950s.

The structure of the educational system was primarily suited to the needs of the élite in society. While this problem was not unique to Ireland, the majority of Irish families were not in a position to pay for a secondary education. In an attempt to encourage more students to enter secondary schools, the government established a scholarship scheme whereby students with high academic tendencies might receive a grant towards their secondary

[9] Ibid., p. 112.

schooling. However, because the number of these scholarships were limited, the scheme was of limited value.

Curriculum issues were not adequately addressed by the state. In fact, the curriculum was applied differently to each gender and the issue of equal opportunities was not addressed until the 1970s. Girls were focused primarily on religious issues, languages and arts-based subjects while the focus for boys prioritised sciences and technical subjects which generally prepared them for the labour market. Gender issues were further promoted through the school ethos, for example, Gráinne O'Flynn refers to her education in the 1940s as a moulding process. Girls were to:

> regard themselves and their bodies as vessels of sin and the best way to rid themselves of this evil was to pray, be modest, adopt low vocal tones and become non-argumentative.[10]

The education of girls was to prepare them for marriage and parenthood. Pope Pius XI stated that 'the functions of a woman is to found a home and rear children; the function of a man is to work for the support of his wife and family'.[11] Because the educational structure was mainly denominational, and the Catholic priesthood was exclusively male, the curriculum being taught in Catholic schools tended to promote gender inequalities.

However, despite these tendencies supporting the status quo, there was a growing realisation that a more efficient public educational structure needed to be implemented in order to align the educational system with social and economic expansion. Higher education expanded as more students completed a second level qualification. The ban on Catholics attending Trinity College was lifted, primarily because Catholics ignored it rather than any fundamental change in the Church's position. This suggests a change of mindset amongst young Irish Catholics toward their Church and its teachings. Other factors also reflected changes in the whole structure of education. A Council for Education was established in 1950, in order to examine both primary and secondary curricula. Its membership of twenty-nine included twenty-six professional educators with eleven clerics.[12] Parents had little power on the board and given no opportunity in promoting curriculum or having their voices heard.

In 1959, Taoiseach Séan Lemass, announced that an immediate policy of the government was to increase the facilities for post-primary education.

[10] Gráinne O'Flynn, 'Girls don't do honours' in Mary Cullen (ed.), *Irish women in Education in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries* (Dublin), p. 84.
[11] O'Flynn, 'Girls don't do Honours', p. 91.
[12] ÓBuachalla, *Education policy*, p. 112.

Extended scholarship schemes were introduced in 1961, and in 1964 the state gave capital grants for secondary school expansion. The key policy of the government was to provide equal opportunities for all students irrespective of gender, social, or economic background. In 1966, the first three comprehensive schools were opened. These schools encouraged a multi-denominational approach to schooling and a comprehensive curriculum for all students irrespective of gender. In order to promote equal opportunities for all students, the two year course in vocational schools was extended to three years with the intermediate certificate course being offered by both comprehensive and vocational schools, thus aligning these schools with other secondary schools which were managed by ecclesiastical interests. By 1966, the new minister for education, Donogh O'Malley, introduced free post-primary education for all students along with a bus transport scheme to facilitate centralisation of schools. In 1972, the minimum school leaving age was raised to fifteen years.

The government introduced the first community schools in the 1970s. These schools were designed to replace secondary and vocational schools so that the whole educational system would become more centralised. The Catholic hierarchy was concerned that these new schools should have at least a minimal Catholic character. Cardinal Conway noted 'the Catholic school authorities cannot be expected to consent to arrangements which would legally de-Catholicise their schools'.[13] It was finally proposed that the school management's board should be made up of two representatives from secondary school authorities (namely clerics), two from vocational schools and two elected representatives of the parents. The establishment of comprehensive and community schools in the late 1960s and early 1970s extended the capacity of post-primary education and thus enhanced educational opportunities in many areas; of the three-hundred thousand enrolled in full-time post-primary courses in 1980, over twenty-five thousand were enrolled in comprehensive and community schools.[14]

Curriculum issues were not neglected either and a new child-centred pedagogy was introduced to national and post-primary schools in 1971. This impinged on the Church's authority as they could no longer dictate what was to be taught within schools. These factors combined with a fall in vocations to the religious life, loosened the grip of the Church over the educational system.

[13] J. H. Whyte, *Church and state in modern Ireland 1923 -79* (Dublin, 1980), p. 391.
[14] ÓBuachalla, *Education policy*, p. 74.

Another aspect to consider is that from the mid 1960s, teachers had acquired a greater voice in policy formation and their conditions of employment were much improved. In a similar fashion, the managerial bodies were no longer solely of an ecclesiastical nature but constituted a local and national management structure.

From the 1960s onwards, the number of Catholic clergy decreased. This led to a reduction of religious power and a diffusion of religious authority. As Irish people gained a better education they asserted their views, opinions and attitudes regarding the educational system. In the 1970s the setting up of boards of management at both primary and post-primary levels allowed parents, teachers and the local community to become involved in educational issues. The National Parents Council was established in 1985 and this further enhanced parental involvement.

The leading headline on the front page of the *Irish Independent* on Thursday, 14 December 1989, read 'Religious should quit secondary schools'. It was suggested that a central post-primary system should be introduced and that in most towns, all post-primary schools should be amalgamated in order to promote equality of opportunity for all pupils. According to an Economic and Social Research Institute report, the dual system of secondary and vocational schools was found to be 'divisive' and wasteful, with in-built inequalities. The report claimed that there should be no difficulties in using unified second level schools to educate all children in an Irish country town.

In conclusion this essay has highlighted the evolving role of the Irish Roman Catholic Church in education, from providing the only education available to Irish Catholics, to an institution striving to maintain their influence against growing secular beliefs. A Roman Catholic priest, Noel Barber, acknowledged the powerful influence exercised by the religious orders in the past but stated 'it might be in the manner of their going from it [that] will be their greatest contribution in the years ahead'.

'Carthaginian peace' The Treaty of Versailles 1919

Gerard Downes

'L'heure du lourd règlement des comptes est venue,'[1] declared French President Clemenceau at the beginning of the Paris peace negotiations on 18 January 1919. Even the choice of date for opening proceedings was significant as it marked the anniversary of the German Empire proclaimed with such pomp in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles forty-eight years previously. The signing of the treaty in the same Parisian suburb, five years to the day that Gavrilo Princip's fatal shots reverberated around the world, was for many on the victorious French side exactly as their president decreed – a squaring of accounts with the vanquished German state. Clemenceau was determined to neutralise Germany militarily, thereby ensuring that France did not succumb to a third invasion by its leviathan neighbour. The conference was dominated not by the smaller nations intent on fulfilling their aims for independence but rather by the so-called Council of Ten and eventually by the 'Big Four' of France, Britain, Italy and the United States of America. It was, in short, 'organised as a congress of victors, not as a general assembly of the European states'.[2] Its aim – to prevent war engulfing the globe again – was to prove incontrovertibly futile. Ultimately the Treaty of Versailles failed because its provisions for abrogating a resurgent Germany were vindictive, myopic, ethnocentric and unworkable. Germany would eventually plunge Europe into another war in order to destroy the provisions of Versailles and regain the glory of empire.

The provisions of the Treaty continue, more than eighty years after its signing, to provoke polemical debate. The more contentious of its four-hundred and forty articles contained the following stipulations: Germany and her allies had to accept all the guilt for the war and reparations were to be paid for damages caused by Germany and her allies during the war. The provinces of Alsace and Lorraine were to be restored to France – they had been in

[1] 'The time for squaring accounts has come.' Quoted in, James Joll, *Europe since 1870 an international history* (London, 1973), p. 277.
[2] Norman Davies, *Europe: a history* (Oxford, 1996), p. 927.

German control since the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1 and the states of Czechoslovakia and an independent Poland were to be created. Unity between Germany and Austria was prohibited. The German army was to be reduced to one-hundred thousand men and its navy to fifteen thousand. A League of Nations to settle international disputes was established. The Saar region was to be transferred to French control under a League of Nations commission for fifteen years, in addition to permanent demiltarisation of the Rhineland. All German colonies were to be allotted to victorious states as League of Nations' trust territories.[3]

In 1961, the Hamburg-born historian Fritz Fischer launched a historiographical revolution in his mammoth study of the First World War, *Griff nach der Weltmacht*. Fischer asserted that, contrary to previous interpretations of the origins of the war, Germany bore the main responsibility for the outbreak of the conflict. In tandem with the onus of guilt was a further indictment, namely that the aims of German foreign policy from Wilhelm II through to Adolf Hitler were virtually identical and that the annexionist policies and blatant racism displayed by the Second Reich during the 'Great War' were a precursor to the notion of a *Herrenvolk* or 'master race'.[4] Retrospectively, the Treaty of Versailles can be perceived as punitive but Germany had instigated the war and her imperialist designs had to curbed. France with a population of forty million and a critically low birth-rate, was understandably wary of a state on its border populated by more than sixty million citizens.[5] Restoring the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine to France was, even at the time of the armistice signing, virtually a *fait accompli*, merely rendered official at Versailles. It was also an act of natural justice given that the inhabitants of the territory were, with some exceptions, more amicable to rule from Paris than from Berlin.[6]

Compared to the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which Germany signed with Soviet Russia in 1918, the terms of Versailles cannot be construed as being unduly harsh. Both treaties were signed after armistices, rather than after surrender by either party. Both involved the transference of huge tracts of land – Russia was to lose the Baltic provinces, Russian Poland and the Ukraine – and both involved the punishment of a fledgling state for the sins of its

[3] David Childs, *Germany in the twentieth century* (London, 1991), pp. 27-8.
[4] Cited in G. Martel (ed) *Modern Germany reconsidered* (London, 1992), p. 55.
[5] William Carr, *A history of Germany 1815-1990* (London, 1992).
[6] Felix Gilbert and David C. Large, *The end of the European era, 1890 to the present* (New York, 1970).

political antecedents. If this was Germany's idea of a negotiated settlement with a defeated power, then the punitive provisions imposed on it at Versailles can be interpreted as justifiable retribution on an imperialist state. That Germany had to be rendered impotent as a military power was not merely a vindictive aim of the victorious powers in Paris. As Brest-Litovsk demonstrated, a triumphant Germany could be as incorrigibly imperious as the western powers proved to be at Versailles. Seven years before a struggling artist turned wartime *Meldegänger* became chancellor, the head of the German armed forces, General Hans von Seeckt dispatched an extraordinary memo to the German Foreign Office on 6 March 1926. Von Seeckt had, as early as 1922 called for the partition of Poland between Germany and Russia.[7] He now demanded the 'reacquisition of those areas essential to the German economy'. Von Seeckt stated that:

> the immediate political aims will produce conflict with France and Belgium and with Poland ... then with Czechoslovakia ... Germany will eventually come into conflict with the American-English powers ... after a new solution to the German-Franco problem has been achieved through either peace or war.[8]

Versailles has often been denigrated as inherently flawed because as Harold Nicholson, a British diplomat to the conference, stated, it was 'taking revenge on a Germany that no longer existed'.[9] Fischer drew on von Seeckt's statement for evidence of the imperialistic intent of the German High Command even in the Weimar years. Wolfgang Kapp's attempted *putsch* in Berlin in 1920, the rapid growth of the *Freikorps* and the collaboration with Russia after the Treaty of Rapallo in violation of its own *Wehrgesetz* – Defence Law – of 1921, all demonstrate that Germany was a nation intent on regaining former glory. Versailles from this perspective was a not unreasonable attempt to contain blatant German expansionism.

The League of Nations, so often derided as a toothless talking shop, had significatant moments of diplomatic sucess after its birth at Versailles. In 1925 it managed to avert near-certain conflict in the Balkans between Bulgaria and Greece. It also solved territorial disputes between Sweden and

[7] Anthony Adamthwaite, *The lost peace, international relations in Europe, 1918-39* (London, 1980), p. 54.
[8] Cited in H.F. Kearney (ed.), *Problems and perspectives in history from Bismarck to Hitler* (London, 1970), p. 111.
[9] BBC Television, *1914-8*, episode 7 '*The legacy*', 1996.

Finland as well as avoiding hostilities between Poland and Lithuania.[10] The League failed ultimately because of US isolationism but this was not a fatal flaw of the Versailles Treaty. None of the delegates to the Paris conference could have envisaged that the US Senate would vote against joining the League or that Woodrow Wilson would be replaced by Warren G. Harding. The latter had railed against US involvement in European affairs during his successful presidential campaign of 1920.

Despite its noble aim of preventing a recalcitrant Germany from rising again, the Treaty endeavoured to do so by pulverising rather than merely punishing the new state. The victorious powers' insistence on the war-guilt clauses, neglect of the rise of Soviet Russia and lack of powerful mechanisms to ensure the treaty's implementation all contributed to its spectacular failure. The economist John Maynard Keynes, himself a delegate to the negotiations, denounced the provisions of the Treaty in his treatise, *The economic consequences of the peace*, published in the summer of 1919. His words were echoed by Winston Churchill who referred to the reparations clauses as 'malignant and silly to an extent that made them obviously futile'.[11] The *diktat* that many Germans felt was being imposed on them was an unqualified humiliation and at total variance with what they had assumed would be the basis of a negotiated settlement, President Wilson's Fourteen Points. Germany had, after all, signed an armistice not a degrading surrender. Most galling for Germany was being forced to sign an admittance of 'war guilt':

> The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.[12]

In retreat the German army had destroyed mines, factories and farms in northern France. Its own industrial complex had remained unscathed.[13] It was deduced as logical to impose some form of sanction for damages caused to the victorious countries. The extent of the reparations bill however, threatened to bankrupt the nascent German republic. Even though Germany defaulted, renegotiated and eventually had its debts eradicated at Lausanne in 1932, the latent discontent at being forced to pay damages and accept total

[10] Norman Davies, *Heart of Europe: A short history of Poland* (Oxford, 1984).
[11] Joll, *Europe*, p.282.
[12] Article 231.
[13] Sharp, *Versailles*.

political antecedents. If this was Germany's idea of a negotiated settlement with a defeated power, then the punitive provisions imposed on it at Versailles can be interpreted as justifiable retribution on an imperialist state. That Germany had to be rendered impotent as a military power was not merely a vindictive aim of the victorious powers in Paris. As Brest-Litovsk demonstrated, a triumphant Germany could be as incorrigibly imperious as the western powers proved to be at Versailles. Seven years before a struggling artist turned wartime *Meldegänger* became chancellor, the head of the German armed forces, General Hans von Seeckt dispatched an extraordinary memo to the German Foreign Office on 6 March 1926. Von Seeckt had, as early as 1922 called for the partition of Poland between Germany and Russia.[7] He now demanded the 'reacquisition of those areas essential to the German economy'. Von Seeckt stated that:

> the immediate political aims will produce conflict with France and Belgium and with Poland ... then with Czechoslovakia ... Germany will eventually come into conflict with the American-English powers ... after a new solution to the German-Franco problem has been achieved through either peace or war.[8]

Versailles has often been denigrated as inherently flawed because as Harold Nicholson, a British diplomat to the conference, stated, it was 'taking revenge on a Germany that no longer existed'.[9] Fischer drew on von Seeckt's statement for evidence of the imperialistic intent of the German High Command even in the Weimar years. Wolfgang Kapp's attempted *putsch* in Berlin in 1920, the rapid growth of the *Freikorps* and the collaboration with Russia after the Treaty of Rapallo in violation of its own *Wehrgesetz* – Defence Law – of 1921, all demonstrate that Germany was a nation intent on regaining former glory. Versailles from this perspective was a not unreasonable attempt to contain blatant German expansionism.

The League of Nations, so often derided as a toothless talking shop, had significatant moments of diplomatic sucess after its birth at Versailles. In 1925 it managed to avert near-certain conflict in the Balkans between Bulgaria and Greece. It also solved territorial disputes between Sweden and

[7] Anthony Adamthwaite, *The lost peace, international relations in Europe, 1918-39* (London, 1980), p. 54.
[8] Cited in H.F. Kearney (ed.), *Problems and perspectives in history from Bismarck to Hitler* (London, 1970), p. 111.
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[12] Article 231.
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guilt for the war was exploited as a powerful propaganda tool, predominantly by right-wing extremists.

Particularly galling for Germany was that its delegation to the conference was not even invited to discuss its fate. The newly born German republic found itself depicted in Paris as the baneful *bête noir* of democracy that had to be strangled at birth. The man more responsible than any other German for plunging his country into the abyss, Kaiser Wilhelm II, was banished into exile in the Netherlands where he lived as a country gentleman until his death in 1941.[14] His erstwhile subjects were forced to accept a 'Carthaginian peace' due to the imperialist designs of its bygone leader. One of the Conference's main failings was that it was, long before its end, monopolised by the major political powers. Its affairs were conducted in an atmosphere of secrecy and deception captured by the French diplomat, Paul Cambon in his diary. Despairingly, he wrote that:

> No matter how hard you try, you cannot imagine the shambles, the chaos, the ignorance here. Nobody knows anything because everything is happening behind the scenes.[15]

The treaty was inherently flawed because some of its provisions had an effect that ran contrary to the intention. For example, the reduction in Germany's standing army to one-hundred thousand men was inadvertently a boon to her military capability. Devoid of unwilling conscripts, the armed forces were transformed into a streamlined, highly professional unit of combat troops. While the French persisted with training its troops in more efficient forms of trench warfare, Germany was busying itself in becoming cognisant of new military technology and tactics. By signing the Treaty of Rapallo with Soviet Russia in 1922 Germany secured a testing ground for weapons banned under the treaty. The French occupation of the Rhur in 1923 exemplified not only the difficulty in imposing the treaty's provisions but also how counter-productive they could be. After Germany defaulted in its reparations payments the French President Poincaré ordered French troops to occupy the Rhur basin. Not only did such an action lead to deterioration in Anglo-Franco relations; it also caused inflation in France due to the high cost of maintaining troops on foreign soil. In a manner unprecedented since the time of Bismarck, France succeeded in uniting German national resentment.[16]

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[14] A.J.P. Taylor, *The origins of the Second World War* (London, 1961).
[15] Alan Sharp, *The Versailles settlement* (London, 1992), p. 19.
[16] Joll, *Europe*, p. 284.

The Treaty of Versailles was inherently flawed due to its vindictive and ultimately self-defeating nature. However, in the bitter, flu pandemic-plagued winter of 1918-9, the mood pervading a paralysed Europe was that conflict of the nature just past had to be avoided for all time and that the means for doing so lay in punishing the perceived chief aggressor, Germany. Despite its failure to prevent a second global conflagration, the treaty's ultimate legacy was in the lessons that it taught the victorious protagonists when Germany was vanquished again, a mere twenty-six years after that fateful conference.

The Treaty of Rapallo
An assessment of Weimar foreign policy 1922

Heather Jones

The Treaty of Rapallo, between Germany and Soviet Russia, was the first independent international political treaty signed by Weimar Germany since the Treaty of Versailles of 1919. It was controversial at the time and took many of the European powers by surprise. It occurred after a period when the German foreign office had adopted the tactic of *Erfullungspolitik* – a policy of fulfilment towards the Western powers. The aim of this policy was to try to meet the victorious powers' demands on Germany, resulting from the Treaty of Versailles, whilst proving at the same time that these demands were impossible to fulfil. However, the Rapallo Treaty marked a notable break with this policy. The timing of its signing, deeply angered the victorious powers, who had wished to draft a treaty at the Genoa conference, which would reintegrate Soviet Russia.

The Rapallo Treaty therefore raises three questions. Firstly, what were the pressures on Germany that caused it to move away from a policy of fulfilment of the Versailles Treaty? Secondly what did the treaty signify for the Western powers. Finally, could it create an eastern alternative to *Erfullungspolitik*?

In the months leading up to Rapallo, Germany was facing an economic crisis with inflation and unemployment levels soaring, with no prospect of reversal. By 8 November 1921, the United States dollar was worth over two-hundred marks and by 19 April 1922, it was at three-hundred marks.[1] The victorious powers' war debts after the First World War far exceeded those of the defeated nations, and consequently added pressure was placed on Germany to pay reparations on time, in order that they could pay their own creditors, chiefly the United States. German foreign policy had devoted itself to obtaining a reduction in the amount of reparations sought, since May 1921, when the London Reparations Conference convened. The latter finally set the sum demanded of Germany at one-hundred and thirty-two million gold

[1] Erich Eych, *A history of the Weimar Republic* (Oxford, 1962-3), p. 176; W.M. Medlicott, *Documents on British foreign policy 1919-38*, series 1, 1919-25 (London, 1947), xix, no.78, p. 456.

marks.[2] Public opinion in Germany was hugely resentful, believing that a generation yet unborn would be in debt to the victorious powers. At a conference in Cannes in January 1922, the German delegation tried to convince the Reparations Commission of Germany's financial difficulties. The French government, led by Alexandre Millerand, refused to grant a moratorium, insisting on guarantees that Germany would renew payments once the financial crisis was resolved. The Commission at Cannes decided, therefore, that Germany should pay thirty-one million gold marks, every ten days, starting on 18 January 1922, and that subsequently a provisional moratorium would occur from 21 March until 31 May. The instalments of five-hundred million marks, due on 15 January, of two-hundred and sixty marks due on 15 February, and the next five-hundred million due on 15 April were not insisted upon. Therefore, at Cannes, the German delegation led by the minister for reconstruction, Walther Rathenau, had successfully demonstrated that the policy of fulfilment could lead to a revision of the reparations payments.[3]

Rathenau became foreign minister in January 1922 and considered the reparations to be of paramount importance. Therefore, his priority for the subsequent conference at Genoa on 10 April 1922, was to obtain further reparations relief before the 31 May deadline when the moratorium expired. The French however stated that they would not attend if there was any mention of revision to the Versailles Treaty.[4] This annoyed the British, as they wished the conference to report on the European economic situation as a whole. It also meant that the main hopes of the German delegation rested with the possibility of private conversations with David Lloyd George. These had been quite successful at Cannes, because the British premier had been impressed by Rathenau.[5] Therefore, when the Genoa conference appeared to be producing no result on the reparations issue, the German delegation may have felt the need to create some other diversion, or result, to offer to the German public. The idea of looking East when the West proved intransigent over reparations, had been tried before: when Germany was presented with the

[2] Marshall Lee and Wolfgang Michalka, *German foreign policy 1917-33: continuity or break?* (New York, 1987), p. 40.
[3] Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, *Walther Rathenau: industrialist, banker, intellectual and politician, 1907-22* (Oxford, 1985), p. 290.
[4] Viscount D'Abernon, *An ambassador of peace* (London, 1944), p. 292.
[5] Eyck, *Weimar Republic*, p. 198.

London ultimatum on 5 May 1921, the text of a provisional agreement between Germany and Soviet Russia was published the following day.[6]

Issues of trade also forced Germany to come to an agreement with the Soviets. There was increasing German business interest in the eastern countries. On 27 March 1922, Germany signed a provisional trade treaty with Latvia, which was not ratified, however, before the Genoa conference.[7] The treaty gave Germany favourable access to Lativan markets. By 1922 German firms and banking institutions were already in place in Estonia and Latvia. It was clear, therefore, that German interests saw the east as a source of potential growth. German trade to Russia before 1914 had provided forty-seven per cent of Russian imports, and although this had represented almost nine per cent of German exports at that time, by 1922, with German access to other Western markets reduced, consideration of the Soviet market took on new importance.[8] Industrialists increasingly pushed for a direct deal with Soviet Russia.[9] Light and specialised industries, which needed Western raw materials, were keen to see the development of the Soviet market. During the winter of 1921-2, active negotiations between German industrialists and Soviet authorities were initiated, both for trade development, and for the granting of concessions: 'the first German-Soviet mixed companies; *Derutra* for transport, *Deruluft* for air traffic, *Derumetal* for trade in scrap metal ore, came into being at this time'.[10] Therefore, pressure from the heavy industrialists for a direct deal led to much of the pre-Genoa, Soviet-German contact.

The Soviet market was becoming a major issue in European politics, despite its shrinkage due to the turmoil of revolution. Moreover, Lloyd George believed the Soviet economy held the key to European reconstruction, and favoured the idea of an international consortium to exploit this idea. Lenin's new economic policy which had commenced in 1921, further encouraged Western powers that Soviet trade might be possible, and led to a trade agreement with Britain and the Soviets on 16 March 1921.[11] The purpose of Genoa, for Lloyd George, was to organise a united European approach for the political and economic integration of Soviet Russia, which would lead to the

[6] R.H. Haigh, D.S. Morris and A.R. Peters, *German-Soviet relations in the Weimar era* (London, 1985), p. 76.
[7] John Hiden, *The Baltic states and Weimar ostpolitik* (Cambridge, 1987), p. 115.
[8] Edward H. Carr, *German-Soviet relations between the two world wars 1919-39* (Baltimore,1951), p. 52.
[9] Michalka, *German foreign policy*, p. 52.
[10] Carr, *German-Soviet relations*, p. 54.
[11] Ibid., p. 51.

economic reconstruction of Europe. It was his idea to expand the international consortium to include a joint approach to political recognition, as well as economic exploitation.

German military pressure for closer ties with the Soviets had also been increasing for some time. The promotion of Hans Von Seeckt to commander-in-chief of the *Reichswehr*, after the Kapp Putsch in 1920, meant that the military were now led by those who believed in accommodation with the Soviets, rather than those who had believed that an overthrow of the Bolsheviks was a prerequisite to German-Soviet agreement.[12] The German military had met and negotiated with the Russian military leadership previously at the treaty of Brest-Litovsk.[13] When Soviet Russia went to war with Poland in 1920, Germany was supportive of the Soviet's drive, refusing the transportation of munitions through German territory to Poland.[14] Von Seeckt was establishing links with the Soviets at this time, through Victor Kopp, the Soviet diplomatic agent in Germany.[15] By 7 April 1921, negotiations were taking place for the establishment of German armaments firms on Soviet soil, among them: *Albatrosswerke*, *Blohm and Voss* and *Krupp*.[16] These firms could develop army equipment and munitions in Soviet Russia that was banned to Germany under the Treaty of Versailles, such as planes and submarines. By the summer of 1921, links developed further, with an exploratory mission to Moscow, headed by Colonel Oskar Von Niedermayer.[17] The German military's intense dislike of Poland had brought a reassessment of the Soviet potential. They believed Poland's existence was intolerable and that it would have to collapse, both through its own internal weakness and through Soviet pressure with German assistance. Von Seeckt could see the advantages of Soviet-German military links, disregarding ideological differences between the *Reichswehr* and the Red Army as irrelevant: 'They might be voodooists, or sun worshippers, or adherents of the Salvation Army, for all he cared'.[18] In September 1921, secret talks in Berlin resulted in von Seeckt adopting a policy of *Abmachungen* – German-Soviet rapprochement. He organised the GEFU, ostensibly a private trading concern,

[12] Haigh, *German-Soviet relations*, p. 63.
[13] Marshall, *German foreign policy*, p. 49.
[14] Haigh, *German-Soviet relations*, p. 73.
[15] John Wheeler-Bennett, *The nemesis of power: the German army and politics 1918-45* (London, 1964), p. 127.
[16] Carr, *German-Soviet relations*, p. 56.
[17] Wheeler-Bennett, *Nemesis of power*, p. 127.
[18] Ibid., p. 139.

but in reality a cover for the armaments factories established in Soviet Russia, as well as tank and flying schools for German and Soviet military personnel.[19] The GEFU was funded by the German government, and disguised as a commercial operation, with the co-operation of Wirth.[20] The Soviets gained German expertise in establishing military plants, and in military training, something Lenin felt was necessary after the failure to defeat Poland in 1921.[21] The German military hoped that by such aid, the Red Army would regain the capability to make war on Poland.[22]

By February 1922, Karl Radek, a leading member of the Communist International and close to Lenin, had a personal meeting with von Seeckt.[23] Thereby, the military connection was well established by the Genoa conference and Chancellor Wirth was aware of it. Rapallo itself did not contain any secret military clauses, simply because they were in the process of being negotiated elsewhere. A secret military treaty was eventually signed on 29 July 1922. In May, von Seeckt wrote: 'Others suspect that the Treaty contains more than is, in fact, the case. Actually there are no political-military agreements whatsoever'.[24] Indeed the controversy in the diplomatic world over whether Rapallo contained military clauses, distracted from the actual real links that existed elsewhere. Wirth's knowledge of the military contacts may well have meant that he desired a broader economic treaty to consolidate the connection. Certainly an increase in economic co-operation would make it less likely that questions would be asked of Germany by those who did not favour the Soviet alliance, such as the German president Freidrich Ebert, regarding the real purpose of the GEFU.[25] Moreover, a general treaty with Soviet Russia at Genoa, involving all the western powers, would reduce Germany's influence as the Soviet's sole source of outside military expertise, and the resulting western involvement in the east would entail the possibility of the military links being exposed.

The final pressure behind the signing of the Rapallo Treaty was that of diplomatic circumstance. The German foreign office was deeply split over whether to adopt an Eastern or Western orientation. Ago van Maltzan

[19] Ibid., p. 128.
[20] Carr, *German-Soviet relations*, p. 59.
[21] Wheeler-Bennett, *Nemesis of power*, p. 126.
[22] Carr, *German-Soviet relations*, p. 60.
[23] Wheeler-Bennett, *Nemesis of power,* p. 126.
[24] Eyck, *Weimar Republic*, p. 210.
[25] D'Abernon, *Ambassador of peace*, p. 304-5.

advocated the former, Rathenau the latter.[26] The League of Nations' decision on the division of Upper Silesia resulted in Maltzan's promotion to head the eastern department, and he was the major influence on the rest of the German delegation in Genoa in the eventual signing of the Rapallo Treaty.[27]

Genoa was the first conference since the First World War that involved Germany as an equal power, a development attributable to the policy of *Erfullungspolitik*. Germany, however, saw the prohibition on discussing the problems relating to Versailles at Genoa as an injustice, and this was probably a factor in their holding talks with the Soviet delegation before they went to the conference, resulting in a draft treaty.[28] This was to act as Germany's insurance should Genoa not progress in their favour, and was clearly why they delayed signing before the conference. The Soviets were also keen on the idea of an insurance treaty as they were under pressure not to return empty handed from the conference. Lenin made this clear in a speech to the Russian Communist Party congress on 19 May 1922: 'We shall ally ourselves not only with Beelzebub but with his grandmother too if it is a question of defending the rights for which the Russian working class bled and starved'.[29]

The British believed their establishment of a financial sub-commission into the European economy at Genoa would prove enough of a compensation to Germany for the absence of any reparations discussions.[30] They therefore believed that any German discontent had been removed and focused their attention on negotiating with the Soviets. For the victorious powers, diplomatic recognition of Soviet Russia was concomitant with the latter granting the western powers economic concessions and, more importantly, honouring the war debts of the tsarist government. Such a deal would then rescue the European economy: 'No one would advance money until peace was established in Europe.'[31] After the opening session the conference established a sub-commission on eastern affairs, on which all the main countries were represented, including Germany. However, at the request of the Soviet delegation, Germany was then excluded. Clearly the Soviets intended to divide Germany from the western powers, and should the western powers' terms to

[26] Carr, *German-Soviet relations*, p. 62.
[27] Ibid.; D'Abernon, *Ambassador of peace*, pp.. 300-3.
[28] Marshall, *German foreign policy*, p. 55.
[29] Jane Degras (ed.), *The communist international*, ii (London, 1965), p. 343.
[30] Medlicott, *Documents on British foreign policy,* xix, 78, p. 458.
[31] Ibid., p. 250.

the Soviet Russia not prove generous enough, they could turn to the isolated Germans, and sign the draft treaty.

Perhaps as Germany had no war debts to the Soviets, the western powers saw nothing unusual about their absence at such meetings. To bring the Soviets to honour war debts, and pay compensation to foreigners who suffered due to the Bolshevik revolution, it was vital that the other powers presented a united front. The Soviets would then be faced with diplomatic isolation if she did not comply. The German delegation felt itself isolated due to these secret meetings, and due to the inaccessibility of Lloyd George, upon whom they had counted for private discussions on reparations. Lloyd George, angered by an unflattering Reichstag speech made about him by Rathenau, remained distant.[32] The German delegation had been working to divide the British from the French for some time, and this coolness alarmed them. This was an even greater blow, because Germany had hoped to regain her status as a world power at this conference, and mollify the right wing danger at home.

The French, British, Belgian, and Italian talks with the Soviets failed to agree a compromise over the tsarist debts; the latter being reluctant to pay. The Soviet delegation presented the western powers with a bill for their civil war intervention.[33] In return, the western powers called Brest-Litovsk a breach of contract,[34] and presented the Soviets with a draft treaty, which offered postponement of these debts, until Soviet Russia was in a better economic condition. The western powers insisted that investment in Soviet Russia could not occur until old creditors were paid. The German delegation came to believe that the possibility of demanding war reparations from Germany, provided for in the Treaty of Versailles, was also being offered to the Soviets.[35] As Eyck himself pointed out, the western powers would not have done this, as the maximum the German economy could pay in reparations had already been decided and divided between the western powers. To allow any new Soviet claim would necessarily lessen their own share.[36] By 16 April 1922 the Soviet position was looking extremely difficult, due to the western powers' insistence on the debt issue. Lenin had instructed his delegation to go to Genoa 'not as communists but businessmen' and to return with a result.[37] Economic links were, therefore, paramount. A return to Moscow with the equivalent of Soviet

[32] Ibid., p. 40.
[33] Medlicott, *Documents on British foreign policy*, p. 413.
[34] Ibid.
[35] D'Abernon, *Ambassador for peace*, pp. 301-5.
[36] Eyck, *Weimar Republic* p. 207.
[37] Degras, *Communist international* p. 342.

reparations to the western powers was out of the question. An economically based treaty with Germany offered the way out. Thus, the Soviet delegation contacted the Germans early on the 16 April, to finalise their treaty.[38]

After failing to contact the British, the German delegation, signed.[39] They wished to end their isolation and perhaps thought that concluding a separate treaty with the Soviets would offer them more leverage against the western powers. They could also see perhaps, that the western powers' own talks with the Soviets had reached a stalemate and that it was unlikely that the conference would result in any international treaty. The speed of the signing, within hours, shows that almost all the work had been prepared in Berlin.[40]

The western powers reaction was one of anger towards Germany, rather than the Soviets.[41] They considered the Germans to have broken the Cannes' conditions, on the basis of which countries had been invited to Genoa: in particular the articles which demanded that all countries who desired foreign credit must undertake to recognise previous debts.[42] Under the Rapallo Treaty, Germany agreed to write off any previous Soviet obligations.[43] The treaty undermined the western powers attempt to force the Soviet Russia to pay her old loans and the compensation for damages and financial loss due to the Bolshevik revolution. German-Soviet debts were also far smaller than, for example, Soviet-French ones. They also considered Germany to have broken the Treaty of Versailles, which stated that Germany was not allowed to dispose of property in favour of any other nation without consulting the Reparations Commission, and also that Germany should recognise the western powers' position on Soviet Russia, whatever that would prove to be.[44] The strongly-worded letter of disapproval that the western powers sent to the German delegation on 18 April, illustrated the annoyance they felt at the German action.[45] The conference was in danger of collapse; Germany signing a separate treaty had rendered a general treaty almost impossible.

France viewed the treaty as a direct threat to her ally, Poland. Since the First World War and the Bolshevik revolution, France had lost the security of

[38] Eyck, *Weimar Germany*, p. 206.
[39] Carr, *German-Soviet relations*, p. 64.
[40] D'Abernon, *Ambassador of peace*, pp. 302-3.
[41] Medlicott, *Documents on British foreign policy*, p. 422-5.
[42] Ibid., p. 425.
[43] *The London Times*, 18 April 1922.
[44] Medlicott, *Documents on British foreign policy*, p. 425.
[45] Medlicott, *Documents on British foreign policy*, app.endix 2 to no.76, Letter sent to the German delegation, p. 445.

an alliance with a major power in the east, and had attempted to compensate for this, by allying with the buffer states lying between Germany and Soviet Russia. The Rapallo Treaty between two countries that deeply resented Poland's existence alarmed France and pushed her to find more security on her Western front. Plans to occupy part of Germany, or split the Rhineland from Germany, were therefore given new currency. The occupation of the Ruhr was a result of this French search for new western securities against Germany.[46] Raymond Poincaré, the French premier, had pointedly stayed away from Genoa as he was opposed to the idea of Germany entering the conference as equals. Lloyd George was hoping that Poincaré's absence from a successful conference would isolate him, but instead when the Germans signed Rapallo, Poincaré's anti-German position was consolidated. France could then claim that Germany should not have been accorded equal status at Genoa in the first place.[47]

The western powers were also highly alarmed by the Soviet Russia becoming part of a potentially rival power block. The alliance of two major European countries in the east, created an alternative power base, which might challenge the western powers post-war hegemony. The Genoa conference had aimed: 'to lay the foundations of a new world,'[48] to reintegrate Germany and, more especially, Soviet Russia, in a manner which would best serve the interests of this western position. The independent alliance of Germany and the Soviet Russia marked a move outside of western control.

Lloyd George was so angered by the German action, that he prepared a draft note for them to offer to the Soviets, announcing their withdrawal from Rapallo.[49] Had Rapallo not been announced in the German press, the German delegation could perhaps have exploited this western desperation and pushed for concessions in return for withdrawal from the treaty. The delegation did not, however, consider this, and were proud of acting independently.[50]

As an alternative to *Erfullungspolitik*, the Treaty of Rapallo was extremely limited. Germany's economy was suffering from increasing inflation and was linked indissolubly to the western powers by the issue of reparations. The Soviet economy had shrunk to one fourteenth of its pre-war size and could not

[46] Marshall, *German foreign policy*, p. 61.
[47] Eyck, *Weimar Republic*, pp. 208-9.
[48] *The Times*, 3 April 1922.
[49] Medlicott, *Documents on British foreign policy*, no.78, meeting between Chancellor Wirth and Lloyd George, p. 462.
[50] Marshall, *German foreign policy*, p. 60.

possibly rescue the German economy on its own. Germany's economic need was for rapprochement with the west. With its economy dependent on reparation revision, an independent foreign policy was unwise and ultimately impossible. The military links, whilst they may have helped bring about Rapallo, were themselves independent, and would have continued whatever the outcome of Genoa. Moreover, the policy of *Erfullungspolitik* had been gradually winning gain for Germany, such as the moratorium on reparations and the invitation to the Genoa conference. There were pressures operating within Germany from the economic, military, and diplomatic spheres, for a liaison with the Soviet Russia, but Germany never really examined Lloyd George's option of an international approach. The statement of German diplomatic independence which Rapallo signified did not win over the German right, as proved by Rathenau's assassination, and Rapallo resulted in France and Britain moving closer together in the area of foreign policy, isolating Germany. The Treaty of Rapallo, finally, did not contain any major links between Germany and Soviet Russia; it consisted only of a return to normal diplomatic relations, cancellation of debts, and favoured trade for Germany.[51] Therefore, it was not heavy-weight enough to warrant offending the western powers from whom Germany required reparations relief; as to German-Soviet relations nothing much had come of it. It was certainly more in Soviet Russia's interests than in Germany's to sign a separate treaty, and Rapallo resulted in Germany being distanced from the western powers and ultimate isolation.

[51] *The Times*, 18 April 1922.

The United Fruit Company
United States intervention in Central America
1899-1970

Alexander Gray

> The cause of our plight is the oligarchy. ... Another cause is industry, foreign and domestic, which keeps salaries at the hunger level to compete on the international market, thus explaining their blind opposition to any type of reform which tries to improve the living standards of the people. Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero, 1980[1]

Latin American history has often been seen as one of unfulfilled promise. Despite apparent wealth in natural resources, the region has not achieved sustained growth in output. Using Central America as a regional example, this paper will argue that external factors both promoted and constrained development in the region. These factors included United States foreign policy and economic penetration by multinational corporations (MNCs). In order to demonstrate the effect that US foreign policy, combined with economic penetration by MNCs, had on the region, the case of a single MNC will be examined. It is argued here that the US-based United Fruit Company (UFCo), supported by the United States government, significantly influenced the economic, political, and social development of Central America. Special emphasis will be given to the role played by (UFCo) in the Central American republic of Guatemala.

US foreign policy towards Latin America was well summarised by Woodrow Wilson's declaration that:

> Since trade ignores national boundaries and the manufacturer insists on having the world as a market, the flag of his nation must follow him, and the doors of the nations which are closed against him must be battered down. Concessions obtained by financiers must be safeguarded by ministers of state, even if the sovereignty of unwilling nations be outraged in the process. Colonies must be obtained or planted, in order that no useful corner of the world may be overlooked.

From the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, to the more recent US administration, Latin Americans have been subjected to demonstrations of US hegemony in the region. These demonstrations manifested themselves in a variety of ways, but with similar results – the preservation of US access to the region.

[1] J. Cockcroft, *Latin America: history, politics, and US policy* (Chicago, 1996), p. 145.

US based MNCs represented the largest group of MNCs operating in Latin America. From the early 1800s the US had viewed Latin America as an extension of its own territory, and a strategic source of raw materials. To this end, US foreign policy had been developed in such a way as to advance US dominance in the region.

In 1823, President James Monroe laid the foundations for the next one hundred and seventy-five years of US/Latin American relations. The Monroe Doctrine created a framework which allowed US-based interests to reign over the region. A 'positive' strand in the Monroe Doctrine held that:

> Latin America's development would mirror the United States' and that united, this hemisphere would become the world's most advanced. A negative 'strategic denial,' in contrast, merely place[d] the hemisphere off limits to any foreign power that Washington DC, view[ed] as a threat.[2]

Essentially, the Monroe Doctrine acted as a declaration to the global community in general, and European rivals in particular, announcing that Latin America was now within the US 'sphere of influence'.

As early as the 1820s, US diplomatic representatives were dispatched to Central America in an effort to secure US interests in the region. Among the first of these representatives was, John Lloyd Stephens, a prominent writer on the Maya people of Central America. Stephens had been contracted by the US President's office to undertake a covert mission 'to locate a Central American government with which Washington could enter into commercial and diplomatic relations'.[3] At this time the US was engaged in, what might be described as, a 'battle of the imperialists' with Great Britain. Both powers wanted to dominate the region in order to secure access to strategic raw materials.

In securing a leadership role, the US sought to create formal structures that would organise the relationships between the countries of the America's. The Rio Pact of 1947 provided for a regional variant of the Truman Doctrine – the Inter-American Treaty for Reciprocal Assistance. It stated that, 'an armed attack by any state against an American state shall be considered as an attack against all American states'. This treaty 'side-stepped the United Nations and provided a legally binding regional 'self-defence' approach for future US covert and overt interventions against reformist democracies in the name of

[2] Eldon Kenworthy, *America/Américas: myth in the making of US policy toward Latin America* (University Park, 1995), p. 3.

[3] Mark T. Berger, *Under northern eyes: Latin American studies and US hegemony in the Americas 1889-1900* (Bloomington, 1995), pp. 26-7.

combating communist aggression'.[4] The ink was barely dry on the treaty before the US embarked on a military campaign throughout Central America. In 1954, Guatemala was targeted under the pretence of ridding the region of so-called communist influences. However, it was the need to secure access to Central America's resources that spurred the US on.

The guise of the 'Cold War' gave the US a pretext in the post Second World War era to be wary of communist influences in the western hemisphere. In fact, a government-inspired media led the fear of communism throughout the United States, empowered the US government with public support to combat any communist threats. Consequently, if the US wanted to mobilise support for a direct military intervention, or other military acts against another American state, all it had to do was shout 'the *commies* are coming' and the faithful media would quickly rally public support.[5] During the Cold War there was little or no threat of a communist take-over of Central America. However, this did not stop the US from fabricating the belief that communists were infiltrating Central American governments, threatening US national security, which therefore had to be stopped. It is ironic to note that the US halted 'communist' forces throughout the region by toppling democratic governments and replacing them with authoritarian military dictatorships. Strong authoritarian governments were, not surprisingly, successful in attracting foreign capital to the region, often to the detriment of the poor majority.

None the less, US policy heightened fears among the people of the region, as it served to enforce social stability of a sort that favoured the local and foreign élite. One method used by US officials was the infiltration of Central American military groups. The infiltration of the Guatemalan military best exemplified this method when the democratically elected government of President Arbenz was toppled by the US-backed Guatemalan military in 1954.

> The 1954 collapse of Arbenz's democratic-capitalist revolution made several things clear. First, the military could not be relied upon to defend the country against aggression ... The traditional ... oligarchy and its foreign allies (the US monopolies) found it easy to topple the Arbenz government and absorb much of its bureaucracy – after wiping out the radical opposition to the 1954 coup and any possible Arbenz or Arévalo 'sympathisers'.[6]

Guatemala, and other Central American countries, could no longer depend on their own militaries, as US military aid and instruction was plentiful, with

[4] Cockcroft, *Latin America*, p. 41.
[5] Noam Chomsky, *On power and ideology: the Managua lectures* (Boston, 1987).
[6] Cockcroft, *Latin America*, p. 130.

many prominent military personnel receiving their training at US military academies. Guatemalan sovereignty had been undermined.

Backing up the objectives of US policy were several institutions including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Pentagon, and the National Security Council (NSC). A unique role was played by each. However, all participated in securing US dominance in the region. The CIA arranged the 1954 military coup in Guatemala, while during the 1980s the NSC drew staff from the Pentagon and the CIA to run its propaganda campaigns for US Central American policy.

It is clear that US foreign policy had been structured in such a way as to favour the dominance of US economic, political, and social interests in Central America. This dominance resulted in the US-based MNCs playing a prominent role in shaping development in Central America. A particular vulnerability was created as the region came to depend heavily on the banana trade. Large foreign firms played a conspicuous role in Latin American politics and economics. Their enormous size and economic strength allowed them to virtually control entire sectors of the economies in which they operated. They had particular influence over the economies of the weakest Latin American states, including those of Central America particularly, when authoritarian governments promoted neo-liberal economic measures. Policies of the World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other international financial agencies and development experts aided MNCs in playing an intrusive role in the region, sometimes leading to foreign MNCs monopolising regional economies.

The Guatemalan economy was particularly effected when foreign MNCs penetrated its agricultural sector. In doing so, they all but completely displaced land ownership by locals. Some MNCs, including the UFCo, played a markedly invasive role in the Guatemalan economy. Cockcroft argues that 'the combined aggressiveness of UFCo and the coffee market *hacendados* and merchants ... left only 7.3 three per cent of all Guatemalans owning land by 1926'.[7] This disastrous situation worsened during subsequent years as the military dictatorship of Jorge Ubico (1931-44) encouraged such agrarian disparity. At the end of Ubico's regime, counting each foreign corporation as a person, ninety-eight percent of all cultivated land was owned by one-hundred an forty-two people.[8] In 1954, following the US installation of the Castillo Armas government, the economic interests of local populations were further

[7] Ibid., p. 128.
[8] Ibid., p. 129.

subordinated to those of the foreign MNCs. By the 1980s 'four-fifths of the largest forty Guatemalan companies were US-controlled'.[9] US policy had played its prescribed role. The Guatemalan economy was now in the hands of the US-based MNCs and the local business élite.

In Guatemala, particularly since the success of the CIA-organised 1954 military coup, the US has been encouraging its MNCs to take advantage of the 'safe' business climate it helped to create. In 1981, the US embassy in Guatemala city released a report promoting investment, on the basis that the Guatemalan government allowed 'full repatriation of earnings and payment for all imports without exception'.[10] National governments in the region accommodated US investment, furthering the already established predatory process of the US-based MNC and its take-over of the Guatemalan economy.

Central America's authoritarian military governments subscribed to neo-liberal ideologies throughout the 1960s and 1970s as they sought to create 'attractive' business environments for MNCs. Neo-liberalism 'aimed at reinvigorating capitalist enterprise, by tax cuts, deregulation, and the transfer of state undertakings to private ownership',[11] which it gained popularity in Central America, as the debt crisis compounded disillusionment with import-substituting industrialisation. Since 1982, Central American 'financial plight has given leverage to the US, working together with the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank ... This coalition urging neo-liberal reforms on developing countries, as a prerequisite for further loans'. For example, during the 1960s the World Bank and other financial agencies and development experts actively encouraged deforestation in Central America for the purpose of cattle ranching. Many US-based MNCs also assisted Central American governments in these deforestation projects.[12]

Some MNCs played an incredibly obtrusive role in their host country, to the point that they dominated public utilities that were integral to the functioning of the country. A definitive account of this sort of MNC power was exemplified in Guatemala during the Second World War. At that time the Electric Bond and Share Company controlled all electric power in Guatemala. In order to protect US economic interests in the region under the guise of protecting the distant Panama Canal during the war, thousands of US troops

[9] Ibid., p. 125.
[10] Ibid., p. 125.
[11] John Ward, *Latin America: development and conflic* (London, 1997), p. 13.
[12] Ibid., p. 13

were stationed in Guatemala, maintaining US supremacy in the region.[13] While the MNCs dominated strategic sectors of Guatemala's economy, the US military was on standby, serving as a deterrent to any local forces that may have been opposed to such domination.

Thus far this paper has discussed, in general terms, the ways in which US foreign policy, and economic penetration by MNCs, have impacted on the politics of Central America. The focus now will be turned to the case of the United Fruit Company and the role that it played throughout the last century in development in Central America. In particular, it will be argued that UFCo abused its economic power, resulting in many harmful consequences for the region. Harmful results were plentiful, and were brought about by UFCo's Washington connections, labour movement repression, encouragement to shop at company stores, and contributions to corrupt judicial systems.

Powerful friends in both the public and private sectors allowed UFCo a sense of security that was not enjoyed by many MNCs. Cockcroft has demonstrated that in 1954 UFCo was able to use its connections with the Eisenhower administration to provoke an invasion of Guatemala.

> UFCo's law staff and shareholders included many top US government officials. The law office of Secretary of State Dulles had drafted UFCo's 1930 and 1936 agreements with the Guatemalan government. The secretary's brother, CIA Director Allen Dulles, had been a member of UFCo's board of directors. The assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs, John Moors Cabot, and Cabot's relatives, were UFCo shareholders. Cabot's brother was UFCo president in 1948. UN Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge was also a UFCo stockholder.[14]

Considering such high-powered Washington connections, it is not surprising that the company was given free reign over the region. In fact, it is arguable that UFCo's Washington allies encouraged the banana giant to engage in aggressive tactics in order to ensure optimal profits for all concerned.

Many of UFCo's Washington friends were also its shareholders. In 1952, when President Arbenz of Guatemala was in the process of introducing land and other social reforms, he nationalised some of UFCo's unused lands. This represented UFCo with the threat of loosing part of its low-cost labour force as its employees returned to peasant farming. Following the 1954 coup, ownership of the unused lands returned to UFCo. More significant, however, was the decimation of the labour movement, as it was reduced from one-hundred thousand to twenty-seven thousand, with more than two-hundred

[13] Cockcroft, *Latin America*, p. 129.
[14] Ibid., p. 124.

trade union leaders killed directly following the coup.[15] When it became clear that the US would not abandon its fight to destroy Guatemalan democracy, a frustrated Arbenz resigned. In his hastened resignation speech he spat out the following words: 'The United Fruit Company, in collaboration with the governing circles of the United States ... is responsible for what is happening to us'.[16] Under its new military government, Guatemala became more dependent on foreign investment. Therefore, it had to offer the reassurance of a 'safe' business climate, secured by political repression.

UFCo employees were subjected to further hardship as company shops were used to both attract workers and to prevent docile, low-cost labourers from retreating into a self-sustaining economy. Consumer values were instilled in the people, creating previously unknown desires. Chomsky notes that the 'device was "repeatedly abused" by the company, its official historian concedes, as goods were sold "at outrageous prices to the workers – all too frequently on credit," driving them on "a straight road to peonage."'[17] The practice of spending ones salary and buying on credit at the company store was a common one throughout Central America. In this one-sided relationship it was the company that benefited.

More recently, UFCo demonstrated its hold over the region by its successful corruption of the Honduran legal system. The reputation and possibly the integrity of the Honduran judicial system was compromised by the underhanded, and often illegal actions of UFCo's progeny, Chiquita. Mangold notes:

> It is sad to say that in today's Honduras, it is all but impossible to obtain justice unless one is prepared to buy it, and Chiquita apparently has been willing to do so.[18]

Chiquita's policy appeared to be reliant on its ability to bribe its way through the Honduran legal system and was therefore viewed more a part of the problem than part of the solution to Central America's successful development.

However, after a century of wealth accumulation and regional dominance, the enormous influence of the Chiquita company was so strong that even the

[15] Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, *The Washington connection and Third World facism: the political economy of human rights,* i (Boston, 1979), p. 274.
[16] P.H. Smith, *Talons of the eagle: dynamics of US-Latin American relations* (New York, 1996), p. 137.
[17] Noam Chomsky, *year 501 the conquest continues* (London, 1993), p. 229.
[18] Alexander Mangold, 'The Honduran Republic of Chiquita', *http://www.coha.org* (1996) p. 19 (October 1998).

United States came to support a reduction in its power. The US government therefore, enacted anti-trust legislation in an attempt to weaken the banana giant.

> For decades, Europe's supply of bananas has been controlled by US multinational corporations led by United Fruit ... putting them in a monopoly position. In fact, Dole's and Del Monte's banana operations were created as a result of anti-trust action by the US Department of Justice in order to break up the existing Chiquita monopoly.[19]

The emergence of new companies in competition with Chiquita demonstrated that US anti-trust legislation enjoyed some success in its efforts to lessen Chiquita's monopoly power, although Chiquita's offensive business tactics continued to dissuade other MNCs from locating in the region[20] In spite of US anti-trust laws, Chiquita still enjoyed a great deal of influence in Washington and Central America.

> Chiquita has spent a lot of money in Washington buying influence, and when the time came to use it, it was at Chiquita's disposal. As for Honduras, the Chiquita *caudillo* [Chiquita's CEO, Carl Lindner] apparently sees the country as little more than his personal banana fiefdom where, for a price, everything is for sale.[21]

The purchase of influence in Washington by business people like Chiquita's Chief Executive Officer Lindner, acted to retard the development process in Central America. Where a foreign MNC makes a mockery of local judicial and political processes, local populations suffer the consequences, as they are often subject to the laws of the MNC that employs them.

In conclusion, the case of the United Fruit Company exemplifies and provides a case study of the ways in which US foreign policy and the economic penetration by MNCs, combined to effect the economic, political and social development of Central America. Regional instabilities, brought about primarily by US foreign policy, appear to have resulted in UFCo enjoying a high degree of autonomy in the region. Moreover, US foreign policy played a significant role in successfully overthrowing democracy in much of Central America. Ultimately, US foreign policy coupled with UFCo's business practices, undermined the economical, social and political systems in Central American countries. Consequently, it can be argued that US foreign policy and economic penetration by United Fruit Company were factors which contributed to constraining regional development in Central America.

[19] Ibid., p. 6.
[20] Cockcroft, *Latin America,* p. 125.
[21] Alexander Mangold, *The Honduran Republic*, p. 3.

Resurgence of Islam
The Iranian revolution
1979

Mark Downes

On 11 February 1979, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, the shah of Iran left the country his family had ruled since 1925 never to return again. In his wake he left a state in turmoil, in the midst of a revolution that would reshape not only its politics and society but would also change the geo-political map of the Middle-East. Few commentators had predicted the revolution and even less could have predicted the final outcome even as the shah flew into exile.

This paper will examine the events surrounding the shah's departure and ask whether the revolution was inevitable. The revolt resulted in the successful establishment of a modern, religiously-led government, in which Iran replaced its western-orientated, dynastic monarchy with a clerically-led Islamic regime. What best symbolised the revolution was the contrast of modernity and tradition, as typified in the two opponents in the struggle: the imperial western-orientated shah of Iran, the self proclaimed *Shahanshah*, the 'king of kings', and the bearded and turbaned Ayatollah Khomeini, 'the spirit of God' who after years of exile, returned triumphantly to Iran to a tumultuous welcome.

The revolution is all the more spectacular, given the fact that it took western commentators and governments by total surprise. In hindsight, the emergence of the Islamic revolution should have been expected, taking into account the recent history of Iran together with the presence of an autocratic and erratic ruler. Even these scholars with a good understanding of the history and culture of Iran, however, could not have predicted the eventual outcome of the revolution through which the clergy would surface as the legitimate government of the country. Even in the throes of the revolt it was not obvious that the establishment of a theocracy would be the outcome, it was only a series of extraordinary events that brought this about. The history of Iran throughout the centuries can be mapped by the constant waves of foreign invasion upon its soil and culture. Foreign interventions in the internal politics of the country and the influence of the *Shiite* faith have been the two constant influences throughout the history of Iran. Both played an important part in the development of the post-revolutionary Iranian society.

The revolt in Iran was a populist opposition to the shah's foreign policy and his domestic politics. The disparate forces of opposition were as united against the de facto alliance with the United States as they were against his repressive rule. Whether one traces the roots of the Iranian revolution to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) engineered overthrow of Mohammad Mossadeq's nationalist government in 1953, to the bloody suppression of the Khomeini led anti-shah uprising in 1963, or to the earlier developments in Iranian society, culture and politics, the fact remains that at no time before the period from 1972 to 1977 had the socio-political exclusion from the Shah's regime reached such explosive levels of populist expression. The sale by President Richard Nixon of an array of conventional weapons, alienated not only the shah from his people at a time of an economic downturn but also brought American influence in the internal affairs of the Iranian government into the limelight. The boom of rising oil prices in 1973 was followed by the sudden economic depression, which transformed the rising expectations of Iranian society into disillusionment with the shah's economic policies. Finally, the creation of the *Rastakhiz Party* in 1975 symbolised the height of the shah's repressive policies and compounded the psychological and financial dislocations from the economic upheaval over the previous years, leading to the explosive levels of populist expression. The result was a revolution born out of the ashes of discontent in a country enveloped in chaos. [1]

Chaos accompanies any revolution, yet in a very short time after the return of Ayatollah Khomeini, the Islamic Republic quickly began to consolidate itself. A referendum in March 1979, less than two months after Ayatollah Khomeini's return from exile, transformed Iran's government from that of a monarchy to a republic based on the Islamic faith. A new constitution was ratified by the end of the year and by mid 1981 the Islamic Republic of Iran was institutionalised, with militant clerics in full control of the reins of government.

The constitution and the government of Iran were based on Khomeini's ideas on Islamic government as developed in his speeches and writing while in exile, especially during his period in Najaf in the early 1970s.[2] The main 'revolutionary idea' of Khomeini's doctrine on Islamic government was his belief, not only in direct clerical rule, but the principle of *velayat-e faqih*, or

[1] R.K Ramazani, *The United States and Iran: the patterns of influence* (New York, 1982).

[2] Ruholla Khomeini, *Islam and the revolution: writings and declarations of Imam Khomeini*, translated by Hamid Algar (Berkley, 1981).

'guardianship of the people'. Khomeini suggests that in the absence of the 'hidden *Imam,*' that the Guardian should, in essence, be the shadow of God on earth and rule in his absence. This principle was enshrined in the constitution that was accepted by the people in the subsequent constitutional referenda. The constitution named Khomeini *faqih* for life and invested him with final authority as the religio-political leader of the state.

With the acceptance of Khomeini's constitution, the consolidation of power in the hands of the clerics was almost complete. The opposition that successfully overthrew the Pahlavi regime was a mixture of religious, secular and various political groupings. In the aftermath of the revolution there was little consensus as to the type of government they wanted in place of the old regime. Only the religious leadership, under the guidance of Khomeini, had a clear plan and framework for government in mind. The initial government appointed by Khomeini was mostly a secular government. However the militant clerics ran the Revolutionary Guards, which had become the military arm of the government in the aftermath of the revolution. In 1980, Bani-Sadr was elected Iran's first post-revolutionary president, but his belief that clerics should have an indirect rather than a direct role in government put him at odds with the clerical classes and numbered his days in office. He was removed in June 1981 and what followed was the eradication of, not only secularist, but also moderate clerics from government. The spate of bombings by the Islamic leftist group *Mujahidin-e Khalq,* throughout the summer of 1981, which killed not only the new president of the Republic, Muhammad Ali Rajaee and a large number of the members of parliament, but also the much revered Ayatollah Beheshti, gave the government the excuse it needed to crack down on all opposition groups and completed the transfer of power into the hands of the militant elements of the Islamic clergy.

Policy decisions in Iran were conditioned by the unique historical experience of the revolution, whereby the new leaders moved from subjugation to domination.

> Nations like individuals, are largely the product of their past. Memories and experience colour their assessment of present day reality, shape their vision of the future and form their national ethos.[3]

Iran is not only a product of is history but also of its geographic location. Bordered, to the south by the contentious Persian Gulf from whence the Arab invasion in the fourteenth century led to the islamification of the country, to

[3] Shireen Hunter, *Iran and the world: continuity in a revolutionary decade* (Indiana, 1990).

the west by Iraq, an historical and ever present enemy, to the north by the now-defunct Soviet Union, which has had a long and varied history in Iran, and, to the east, by the predominantly Sunni dominated government of Afghanistan, a dominion of the Soviet Union until the late 1980s, and by Pakistan.

This perceived threat on the part of Iran in response to its immediate neighbours is further exemplified when one looks at its historic relations with the western powers. The Russo-Iran conflict between 1804 and 1828, resulted in the loss of Iran's Caucasus territories, which severed its economic and political links with central Asia. British policy in the Persian Gulf also worked contrary to Iranian interests. Britain's desire to undermine Russian influence in the area was carried out at the expense of Iran and for the purpose of creating a buffer to protect their valued Indian empire. An examination of the previous fifty years reveals the debilitating impact of the western powers on the internal politics of Iran.

The occupation of Iran by both Britain and the Soviet Union during the Second World War, the forced abdication of the shah in favour of his son, the Soviet occupation of Azerbaijan from 1941 to 1946 and the establishment of a Russian-dominated communist government there and in Iranian Kurdistan, all attest to the abuse of Iranian sovereignty at the hands of the Allied powers in the period during and directly after the Second World War. Western interference in the internal affairs of Iran can be further seen in the 1953 *coup d'etat* in Iran, which re-installed the shah as the ruler of the country and overthrew the nationalist government of Mohammad Mossadegh. The coup was supported and organised by both the US and Britain, not for any moral or humanitarian reason but because Mossadegh's government intended to nationalise the oil industry which would have been detrimental to US and British concessionaires. These examples of interference support the argument that the western powers were only interested in having a colonial view of third world countries such as Iran. This led to the Islamic Republic having a polarised vision of world politics between those who dominate and those who are dominated, along with a deep suspicion of the intentions of western powers when they talk of *détente*.

Most of Iran's foreign policy in the days following the revolution was influenced, not only by geography but also the country's contemporary history at the hands of first world countries. As previously outlined, its strategic location has meant that over the centuries, Iran was vulnerable to attack and occupation at the hands of foreign forces. Consequently, Iran's preoccupation with its position in the aftermath of the revolution led the country to follow

initially an isolationist type of policy. However, explaining the determinants of Iranian foreign policy simply in terms of geography and history, is to give the subject too narrow a focus. When determining a country's foreign policy tendencies, one must look at how the country defines itself and its ideology. This will have a determining effect on its foreign policy formulation and the character of its foreign relations. Most countries with secular tendencies would be more influenced by, and therefore define their policies through nationalism. Where religion is the dominant ideology, it will influence the state's identity. This is the case with countries such as Iran, Pakistan and Israel. In Iran, the Pahlavi regime (which lasted from 1925 to 1979) gained its legitimacy through the triumph of nationalism over religion.

The conflict between nationalism and Islam is a recent phenomenon in Iran. Many saw the fall of the Persian empire and the decline of Iranian culture as a direct result of the Arab invasion, which coincided with the introduction of Islam to Iran. Therefore, for many, the only way to reverse such ills was the implementation of secularisation and the resurrection of pre-Islamic nationalism. Tension between the clergy and the government have always existed in Iran since the foundation of *Shi'ia* Islam as the state religion. However, it was in the last decade of the Pahlavi regime that these tensions came to breaking point. Khomeini opposed nationalism as a political theory because it placed emphasis on Iran's pre-Islamic past and thus diluted Iran's Islamic character.

Nationalism as an ideology has not disappeared from the Iranian psyche. In reality, both religion and nationalism have continued to interact and have shaped the identity and character of Iran and influenced its foreign policy and international behaviour to varying degrees. Whilst looking at religion as an ideology, we must look specifically at Islam and more specifically in relation to Iran, at Khomeini's interpretation of Islam as the political ideology of the regime in the Islamic Republic. Some have argued that the emergence of Islam as a political ideology in the twentieth century has been an attempt by third world countries to reverse the passive acceptance of foreign influence. Modern ideologies have been adapted to suit third world countries: socialism became Nasserism in Egypt, and Ba'athism in Iraq. China developed its own interpretation of Marxism-Leninism after the 1949 'People's Revolution'. However the emergence of the Non-Alignment movement in 1968, of which Iran was a part, was the third world's response to the two major ideological camps that dominated world politics since the Second World War. Nevertheless, whilst the Non-Alignment movement was an attempt to shake off the imperialist influence of first world countries, most countries in it were

influenced to some degree by the two dominant ideologies and this affected the character and implementation of their foreign policies. Since the revolution in Iran, the role of Islamic ideology in formulating foreign policy increased significantly. However, at times, the pursuit of the ideological, as will be argued, threatened national interests and even at times threatened the survival of the regime. In response to the irresistible will to survive, it was inevitable that the regime compromise on ideology.

Iranian foreign policy, being a product of all that has preceeded, can be divided into three phases. In the immediate aftermath of the revolution, countries were viewed in the context of their past deeds and relationship with the previous regime. Iranian foreign policy during this time followed an isolationist tendency along the lines of Khomeini's principle of 'neither east nor west but Islam'.[4] In this context it was maintained that the countries of Europe, were likened to the US and viewed as colonisers or profiteers. For this reason Iran's foreign policy followed the principle of 'the enemy of my enemy, is my friend' and therefore initially turned towards the Soviet Union and Japan. However, this relationship ran into problems because it was perceived that Japan wanted to be an economic superpower and therefore was tending towards the profiteering end of the relationship scale. For their part, the western countries, fearing the expansion of the Islamic movement into its allied states on the western Persian Gulf, categorised Iran as a threat and its relationship therefore can be compared to fear of the Soviet Union.

The policy of exporting the revolution has to be seen in the larger context of revolutionary theory. Promotion of a regime's ideology and revolutionary manifestos abroad have been a phenomenon of revolutions throughout history; the examples of the American, French and Russian revolutions all bear witness to this. In exporting its revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran wished to make the world safe for Islam.[5] The second phase of the development of foreign policy took place during the war with Iraq. Here the foreign policy relations were based on the stance taken by particular nations towards the conflict. For example, during this period useful commercial contact existed between the Islamic Republic and Germany and Italy respectively. This is mainly because their relationship with Iran during this period was not based on any political agenda and therefore bi-lateral trade relations grew. France

[4] Ruholla Khomeini, *Islam and the revolution: writings and declarations of Imam Khomeini*.

[5] R.K Ramazani, 'Iran's export of the revolution: politics, ends and means' in Nikki Keddie (ed.), *Religion and politics in Iran* (Yale University).

and Britain, on the other hand, took Iraq's side predominantly during the war and, therefore, faced a foreign policy backlash for their stance. So the foreign policy relations for the period up to and shortly after the war were influenced by those perceived as allies during the conflict. During this period, and in fact during its first ten years, the Islamic Republic remained committed to the twin goals of Khomeini's ideology, 'to perpetuate the revolution both at home and abroad'.[6] Iran's constitution expressly proclaimed that the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic was the unity of the Islamic world and the liberation of all oppressed throughout the world. This led Khomeini to offer the Iranian experience as an example to other countries and as a guide to the formation of a world-wide Muslim community, thus enhancing his agenda for the unity of all Muslim states in a cultural and political struggle between east and west. This policy led Iran to support morally, and at times financially, other 'struggles' against perceived colonialist and hegemonic powers. It brought Iran into direct conflict with countries ranging from its Gulf neighbours to Britain and other western powers, with the accusation being made that Iran was a sponsor of world-wide terrorism.

The war with Iraq provided the Iranian government at the time with a cause or rallying point to unify the nation. The low-key democratic opposition that existed before the outbreak of the war, felt obliged to support the government of Khomeini in defence of national sovereignty. The war also acted as a distraction from the serious economic and domestic problems that Iran was experiencing. The end of the war brought an apparent shift in Iranian politics both internally and externally. Internally, the political atmosphere was more open as people began to criticise government policies. Newspapers were more open in their discussion of current affairs. Externally, Iran wished to re-integrate itself into the world community after a decade of isolation. It was now less sensitive towards those who had taken Iraq's side during the war. It was a wiser Iran, that was more aware of the political realities of international relations. With the end of the war also came the task of reconstruction. Due to the decline in the price of oil during the 1980s Iran had succeeded in previous years in becoming almost self-sufficient in food production. In addition, this period saw a redirection of Iranian foreign policy as a result of the break- up of the Soviet Union. Iran now sought a new international partner. Since partnership with the United States was not an option, the European Union (EU) emerged as a potential economic trader. The EU was seen as a counter-balance to the growing hegemony of America in international affairs.

[6] Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran article 152 to 155.

The third phase of foreign policy development materialised with the election of President Khatimi. The groundwork for this stage was laid in the previous Rafsanjani presidency and throughout this stage there was a movement away from the isolationist maxim of 'neither east nor west' and towards a more engaging foreign policy. Iran tried to downplay the previous attempts to export the revolution and, as a regime dedicated to democracy, assured its immediate neighbours that it would not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. This was encapsulated in President Khatimi's *Dialogue amongst civilisations*, which was seen as a sign of normalisation of relations with other countries.

It has just been little over twenty years since the advent of the Iranian revolution. Few had foreseen it and its outcome is still uncertain. While it appears certain that the revolution sprouted from the ideals of freedom, the right of assembly, the freedom of speech and of the press, it differed from other revolutions but failed to improve the short-term economic situation of many Iranians. However, the question that may be posed is, whether the freedom that was sought through the shouting of slogans and the spilling of blood in 1979, has been achieved? Many would argue that the objectives of the revolution have not yet been fulfilled, the events which occurred in the aftermath of the revolution, the attack by the Mujahidin-e Khalq and others on the security of the state and the invasion of Iran by its neighbour Iraq, meant that to preserve the integrity of the state all agents of legitimate democratic opposition had to desist and support the government of the time, a government that was controlled by the hard-line elements of the Islamic clergy. The years which followed allowed this group to institutionalise its power and develop the means to enforce its ideas. It was only with the end of the war with Iraq and following a period of reconstruction, that the seeds of the revolutionary ideals of 1979 began to blossom. Recent disturbances within Iranian government and society may be the final act in the play that had spanned over the previous two decades. What is certain is that the Iranian revolution changed the geo-political landscape of the Middle East, led to a resurgence of Islam as a political ideology, moved into the void left by the fall of the Soviet Union and sought to give over half of the world's population a voice in international affairs.

Institutions, ideologies and principles Balkan nationalism 1918-90

Rory Keane

This paper will examine the extent to which both Royal Yugoslavia (1918-41) and Tito's Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1945-90) were hampered by an unequal socio-economic topography and the preponderance of power by specific agents. In this regard the paper attempts to show the extent to which these two realities created the environment upon which ethno-nationalism could flourish. The exact nature of the ethno-national character in the Balkans was vividly displayed both in 1987 when Slobadan Milosevic nullified the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina and in 1990 when the Croatian Republic issued regulations defining its six-hundred thousand Serbs as a 'minority' rather than as a 'constituent nationality'. In 1990, with the collapse of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), the federal republic was thrown into disarray and turmoil. Political theorists and journalists have forwarded many relevant reasons for the break-up of Yugoslavia, including the death of Tito and Mikhail Gorbachev's more co-operative policy towards the west. However, to ascertain a fuller understanding of the causes of sectarianism and subsequent disintegration, it is necessary to undertake a broader and more historical analysis.

Before an analysis of the principal causes which led to the decline of both the Royal Yugoslavia and the Tito regimes, it is first necessary to acknowledge the extent to which nationalism had taken root in the Balkans prior to the advent of Royal Yugoslavia. This development, particularly from the nineteenth century onwards, resulted in the augmentation of gapping chasms between the peoples of the Balkans, which were expressed through the actions and language of nationalism and nationalist parties. Nevertheless there is a strong likelihood that the economic and cultural heterogeneity between the peoples of Royal Yugoslavia could have been lessened if the period of reconstruction (1919-24) had been followed by a period of uninterrupted economic growth. Charles Jelavich argues that:

> The fall of world farm prices after 1925, seriously hurt the agrarian sector of the Balkan economy, while the world economic crisis of the thirties not only provoked a crisis in Balkan industry but aggravated the crisis in Balkan agriculture.[1]

The dire economic situation created the environment in which those opposed to pan-Slavism could promote their ideas successfully. Nationalist groups, therefore, succeeded in winning support in the years following the First World War. Examples of such nationalist parties that emerged included the *Ustasi* who were fundamentally anti-Serb, anti-communist, and anti-intellectual. The *Radical Party* was the continuation of the pre-war ruling party in Serbia, while the *Peasant Party* under Stjepan Radic, won mass support from the Croatian peasants and stood strongly for Croatian autonomy.

After the formation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia discontentment was initially overcome by two popular revolutionary principles, namely the self-determination of peoples and worker ownership of the land. In essence the implementation of these two principles should have had the affect of quelling the strong discontent which expressed itself by way of national consciousness in the pre-war era. However, the implementation of these principles was less straight forward than envisaged. If indeed these two principles had been successfully implemented they may have rectified the unequal socio-economic topography and preponderance of power, which had facilitated the fermentation of ethno-nationalism in the Balkans, initiated by Ottoman and Habsburg domination. On the issue of land, not alone was the agricultural sector going through a period of depression, but the new farm holdings were too small and unproductive, combined with the fact that the new owners lacked both capital and experience of modern agricultural techniques. In addition, many large estates had been economic units with processing industries, and their break-up caused a drop in labour demand in the very areas where labour supply was excessive because there was not enough expropriated land to go around.[2] The reforms liberated and thereby destroyed all vestiges of political strength of the feudal class. Nationally, the land reforms were instrumental in fragmenting the stranglehold that large estate owners had upon political and economic power. Instead political parties elected by general and equal franchise would hold power. The post 1918 agrarian reforms mark the final break-up of feudal power and its replacement by a more equitable system. Fundamental problems arose however, from the

[1] Charles and Barbara Jelavich, (eds.), *The Balkans in transition* (California, 1963), p. 331.

[2] Stevan K. Pavlowitch, *Yugoslavia* (London, 1971), p. 56.

fact that this new system also failed, and perhaps intensified socio-economic deprivation and inequality.

The peasantry suffered most from the post First World War economic depression. There was little they could do about the situation because they were actually, if not formally, disenfranchised. The peasants had very little say in government and any peasant opposition was controlled either by economic pressure or by the police.[3] Nevertheless, the almost destitute plight of the peasants, politically, socially, culturally and economically, caused them to become increasingly hostile to the government bureaucracy based in Belgrade, who in the eyes of the peasants, had replaced the former feudal class as collectors of taxes.

On the complex issue of self-determination, both Croatia and Serbia had differing political traditions which effected their attitudes towards the question of the creation of a new united Yugoslav state. The failure to agree on self-determination arose specifically from their experiences with imperialism and is probably best explained by Edward Said, who argued that the problems of nationalism:

> is that the cultural horizons of nationalism are fatally limited by the common history of coloniser and colonised assumed by the nationalist movement itself. Imperialism after all is a co-operative venture. Both the master and the slave participate in it, and both grew up in it, albeit unequally.[4]

The Serbs through their historic struggle with the Ottoman Empire had come to see a strong centralised state as natural. At each stage in their struggle with the Ottomans, more territory with kindred population had been liberated and integrated into the existing unified and centralised state structures that had given strength to Serbia. According to this version, the Yugoslav state was just the final stage in this process.

The Croatians on the other hand had experienced a tradition of dualism under Habsburg rule and consistently rejected a centralised state. Eventually however a centralist policy was initiated which greatly strengthened the influence of the Serbs, as the largest bloc. This caused many Croats to become suspicious of Belgrade's strategic goals. Political parties such as the *Peasant Party* were enraged by the idea of being administered by a ruler and a government in a distant and unknown capital.

[3] Velimir Bajkic, 'Peasant credit' in Jozo Tomasevich (ed.), *Peasants, politics and economic change in Yugoslavia* (Stanford,1955), p. 249.

[4] Edward Said, 'Nationalism, colonialism and literature: Yeats and decolonisation' in A Field Day Pamphlet, (15) 1988.

> Viewed in retrospect, the constitution of 1921 symbolised the triumph of the unitary, centralist, Serbian tradition over the Austro-Hungarian tradition of ethnic and constitutional complexity.[5]

Increasingly from this point forward the political parties represented sectional interests. In March 1923, a general election was held on the issue of the constitution. Broadly speaking the Serbs voted to keep it centralist, while the Croats voted for change. With the growing increase of sectarianism and chauvinistic politics, King Alexander initiated a policy of direct personal rule from 1929 onwards. Henceforth, parties based on regional, ethnic or religious sectionalism were forbidden. Nevertheless sectarian politics had taken root, culminating in the assassination of Alexander by the *Ustasha* in 1934.

Sectarianism prevailed in a region where the west had collided with the east for centuries in terms of religious, cultural and social practices, as well as militarily. The sectarianism increased after the establishment of Alexander's dictatorship, because he not only further centralised the state, but also limited the principle of self-determination with the establishment of nine *banovine* or regions. These regions consciously disregarded historical provinces and instead utilised gerrymandering to contrive a Serb majority in six of the nine *banovina*.[6] The monarchist period, or the 'first' Yugoslavia, was finally brought to an end in April 1941 by the occupation of most of the country by German forces and the establishment of the *Ustasa* regime as a German puppet state.

The conflict between Serb and Croat was to a large extent created by their union under the jurisdiction of the kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and later under Royal Yugoslavia.[7] A process of political genealogy, however, can by utilised to question whether mantra or repetition of one historical fact can explain history. Instead, it can be argued that the conflicts and animosities experienced on this occasion between Serb and Croat are in fact neither unique nor specific to the 'first' Yugoslavia, but were present in the Balkans from a much earlier period. The government in Belgrade simply took the place of the feudal lord as the collector of taxes and Belgrade took the place of Vienna and Istanbul respectively, as the preponderant capital.

A study Tito's regime reveals a new situation with a new set of institutions, ideologies and principles. Nevertheless, unequal socio-economic topography and a preponderance of power are also among the root causes of

[5] Pavlowitch, *Yugoslavia*, p. 64.

[6] Tomasevich, *Peasants, politics, and economic change*, p. 238.

[7] Iraj Hashi, 'The disintegration of Yugoslavia: regional disparities and the nationalities question' in *Capital and Class*, (48) 1992, p. 44.

the conflict. Reaction to these factors again manifested itself, resulting in the renaissance of ethno-nationalism, a widening of the dichotomy between 'us' and 'them' and finally, the yearning for separate nation states.

Socialist Yugoslavia experienced affirmative reaction to ethno-nationalism. In the aftermath of the Second World War socialist Yugoslavia under Tito faced the uphill struggle of re-building a war-torn economy combined with the much heavier task of national reconciliation. As attempted in Royal Yugoslavia, Tito had to tackle socio-economic inequalities and the concentration of power. Of course these two tasks were invariably interrelated and perhaps if Royal Yugoslavia had paid more attention to regional disparities, the degree to which the grotesque nature of the Second World War polarised the peoples of Yugoslavia could have been, at the very least, reduced.

> It is thought that, of the 1.7 million dead, 1 million were killed in fratricidal struggle between the various groups of Yugoslavs rather than by the foreign enemies.[8]

Certainly one of the most grotesque examples of such fratricidal aggression was executed in the Krajina in the summer of 1941. In April of that year, the Axis Powers had invaded and partitioned Yugoslavia. In Croatia and Bosnia, the Croatian fascists, led by Ante Pavelic, declared the Independent State of Croatia (NDH). Serbs in earlier times, had settled on the *Vojna Krajina* – literally meaning 'military front' – between the Habsburg and Ottoman empires. The Austrians recruited Orthodox Christians who had fled from Ottoman controlled Serbia, and settled them on the land and then employed them as a permanent defensive barrier against Ottoman expansion. The *Ustase* led by Pavelic set about ethnically purifying Croatian territory, which resulted in the massacre of Krijana Serbs. In the desire to impose national reconciliation in the post war environment, the government discouraged signs of ethnocentric nationalism, to prevent ethnic violence.[9] This aspiration was codified in the constitution of 1946, as Tito attempted to implement, what post-nationalist theorists refer to as civic nationalism. This envisaged the nation state as comprising of all its citizens, regardless of their blood, creed or colour.

> From the start, the equality of all nationalities and their right to use their own language, and develop their cultural heritage and identity on the basis of their own conditions, were guaranteed under Article 13 of the constitution. The six constituent republics were given an equal position in the Federation irrespective of their size, population, wealth or level of development.[10]

Regional development needed to be tackled in a fundamental manner if the new regime was to be a success. An examination of national income per capita from the years 1947 and 1948 reveals that Croatia's national income was seven percent above average, whilst Kosovo had an income of forty-eight percent below average.[11] To achieve an equality of nationalities it would be necessary that the richer regions support the poorer regions, or that the relationship between state and citizen be based upon a positive symbiosis. However, the principal of equality would require both a sense of solidarity and altruism on behalf of Yugoslav citizens. The ambitious project to create a nation of nations based upon equality and fraternity would require that all Yugoslav citizens manifest a sense of brotherhood and unity. However individual citizens tended to be more concerned with their own immediate difficulties, rather than with the concerns of the whole of Yugoslavia. Regional animosities and fervent ethno-nationalism was, by the end of the Second World War, an overriding problem in the Balkans. One of the weaknesses of Yugoslavia's first constitution was that it concentrated power at the centre, thus perpetuating the preponderance of power. Although it had a federal character according to the formal constitution, the real power was concentrated in the centre and executed through a bureaucracy based on the Russian system of public administration. 'Vertical lines of command had priority over horizontal co-ordination and integration.'[12] Such a system was bound to create suspicion and paranoia, especially among the less developed regions, leading to growing feelings of alienation and under-representation.

Between the years 1947 and 1952, Tito organised and administered the economy based upon the Soviet model of central planning. Investment and resource transfer was to occur from more developed regions (MDRs) to less developed regions (LDRs). However, competition between different regions for resources, backed by political pressure, resulted in a final distribution which was neither satisfactory to any of the LDRs, nor willingly accepted by the MDRs.[13]

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[8] Fred Singleton, *A short history of the Yugoslav peoples* (Cambridge, 1985), p. 206.
[9] See Laura Silber and Allan Little, *The death of Yugoslavia* (London, 1995), chapter 7.

[10] Hashi, *Disintegration of Yugoslavia*, p. 50.
[11] Ibid., p. 52.
[12] Vuckovic, Gojko, 'Failure of socialist self-management to create a viable nation-state and disintegration of the Yugoslav administrative state and state institutions' in *East European Quarterly*, (32) 3, 1998, p. 358.
[13] Ibid., p. 354.

The failure of this policy was further compounded by Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform in 1948. This inevitably caused a reduction in transfers from the Soviet Union, resulting in scarce investment funds being allocated to the more developed regions and to projects with a higher productivity of investment.

Following the failure of this system, Tito introduced market-based worker self-management programmes from 1952 until 1974. Through this policy the federal government's ability to direct resources for regional development purposes was further weakened. The ability to give loans to LDRs passed from the federal government to a newly established General Investment Fund. Following the subsequent abolition of this body, the banks took on the role of loan-maker. It can strongly be argued 'that the socialist self-management system ... introduced into the Yugoslav political system in 1950, made a significant and largely unrecognised contribution to the ethnic violence and disintegration of Yugoslavia'.[14] Rather than attempting to erect links and connections between the republics, the process transformed Yugoslavia from a community of nations to a community of nation-states through constitutional changes and decentralisation. These changes served to widen the economic cleft between the republics, which in time manifested itself through cultural mechanisms. What was actually required at the time were policies promoting a society based upon economic equality. Economic equality however, was not achieved and the 1960s witnessed a resurgence of Croatian, Bosnian and Slovenian nationalism, because they found themselves receiving fewer foreign currency reserves than they generated. Such discrimination, which was arguably necessary to revamp the poorer regions, led to widespread complaints of unfair treatment. The foundation was now cultivated for the articulation of a growing list of grievances concerning the republics' position in the Yugoslav federal state. The delegates from Bosnia-Hercegovina called an unprecedented meeting of the Chamber of Nationalities in 1967 to air their grievances.

> Croats complained of being treated as linguistically second-class in the preparation of a Serbo-Croatian dictionary; of demographic plots by Serbs to encourage Croats to work abroad; and of Serbian plans to encourage a separate autonomous status for the tourist-rich area of Dalmatia.[15]

Socio-economic dissatisfaction allowed for, or perhaps created the environment on which cultural disquiet excelled. During this period Tito's warnings about the dangers of national exclusiveness became the constant

[14] Ibid.

[15] J. Robert Donia, and V.A. Fine, J.R. John, *Bosnia and Herzegovina: a tradition betrayed* (London, 1994), p. 182.

theme of his speeches. However his insistence on the need for 'brotherhood and unity was enthusiastically applauded, but was largely ignored in practice. Eventually the federal government was forced to act so as to halt the explosive rumblings of revolt. The Chamber of Nationalities was given a greater status and the republics attained greater powers.[16]

In 1974 the federal government saw the failure of their earlier policies and began to restore the authority and guiding role of the party. The League of Communists of Yugoslavia again asserted the primacy of collective interests over those of individual economic units. This post 1974 self-management policy gave republics and provinces the greatest degree of independence in Yugoslavia's short history.

> The Constitution of 1974 invested each Yugoslav republic and province with theoretical 'statehood', and it effectively created a semi-confederative political structure in which powerful sectional leadership emerged.[17]

Such a process only served to codify the sectional interest and growing centrifugal character of Yugoslavia. It is true that national relations did improve under Tito's Yugoslavia, which was principally caused by rising economic prosperity and the prestige enjoyed by Yugoslavia in the international community. These achievements were however overshadowed and eventually overturned in the 1980s by the slow pace of change in the LDRs in comparison with the rest of the country. On another level the gap between MDRs and LDRs had also increased in the same period. Such regional disparity was bound to accentuate animosities between the peoples of the various regions, as many Croats, for example, would not willingly part with their capital, whilst Kosovars felt that Belgrade did little to comfort their economic distress.

Economic crisis certainly provided a breeding ground for spiralling nationalism.

> After 1965, high levels of emigration to offset transitory unemployment and bring hard currency remittances had severe domestic effects. Petro-dollars borrowed in 1975-81 were squandered on consumption rather than productive investment, catching Yugoslavia in a debt trap as the dollar and real interest rates soared.[18]

The drastic economic decline subsequently affected the proper redistribution of income to less developed regions. The decline in the economy also resulted in

[16] Singleton, *Yugolslav peoples*, p. 247.

[17] Vuckovic, 'Failure of socialist self-management', p. 364.

[18] Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, and Pierre Lemaitre, (eds.) *Identity, migration and the new security agenda in Europe* (London, 1993), p. 95.

economic disintegration between the republics. With levels of trade and productivity falling, the republics became more autarchic. Finally in 1990, the Communist Party disintegrated due to political crisis and the fall of communism elsewhere in eastern Europe. The disintegration of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia was followed by the emergence of new political parties that captured the support of ethno-nationalists. Following the multiparty elections of 1990 Ante Markovic came to power and attempted to implement economic reforms in line with democratisation and free trade. However such moves to develop the Yugoslav economy were much too late, as the process of transition towards a multiparty democracy left Yugoslavia in a weak position. The inherited Yugoslav political institutions and administrative state appeared incapable of maintaining stability in the absence of a strong central authority. With the economy in dire turmoil, ethnic animosity developed quickly and manifested itself in the form of ethno-national political parties.

Generally speaking socialist Yugoslavia failed to nullify the regional economic inequalities or to successfully disperse the concentration of power. The economic problems of Yugoslavia could not be solved by way of capital transfers, as the less developed regions of the country were neither cost effective nor productive. The situation would be serious enough in a country with a culturally homogeneous population, but it became explosive in a multiethnic society like Yugoslavia. It is little wonder therefore that the dividing line between rich and poor fuelled the fires of nationalism.

In conclusion, the earlier infiltration by the great imperial powers into the local Balkan communities, in attempting to gather taxes and rationalise their regimes, caused discontent, resulting in opposition which synthesised into nationalism. By the end of the nineteenth century Balkan nationalism had matured. While initially unrest was based upon material problems, the struggle of uprising and revolution caused the original goals to mutate. In their attempts to suppress ethno-nationalism, both Royal Yugoslavia and socialist Yugoslavia considered it necessary to create a sense of solidarity between peoples – Slav brotherhood. The feasibility of this task was considerably jeopardised however by material deprivation and political alienation. Deprivation and alienation cultivated the environment on which the dogma of ethno-nationalism could and indeed did flourish.

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

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