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

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Cover design by Jennifer McCaffrey and Nora McGillicuddy, Limerick School of Art and Design, Limerick Institute of Technology. The cover incorporates the concept of past, present and future, which is depicted, firstly by the use of the Buddhist symbol *Aum*. The idea is secondly represented by three illustrative heads looking in different directions. They symbolise the search for history by past, present and future historians.

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Preface

Researching and writing history is a complex and lengthy process and one of the dangers is that research findings are not published or are not published in appropriate publishing outlets. Publication of historical work is crucial to maintaining a vibrant academic discipline. The publishing landscape has been transformed in the last few years with Irish, English, American and continental European presses receptive to Irish material. However, in the current climate where first, research metrics have been accepted by university leaders and second, the consensus in the historical profession in Ireland, that there is no hierarchy of publishing houses and academic journals in Ireland and elsewhere and that commercial projects such as Thomson Reuters ISI Web of Knowledge database is, according to Canny, 'methodologically unsound where humanities disciplines are concerned', researchers at all levels should give much thought to the placement of books, articles, chapters and reviews. This is particularly apposite to researchers in Irish history who are prolific and play a significant role in elucidating the distinctive Irish dimension to the national past and present. Their material may not always find a home in an ISI journal. Consequently, it behoves established historians to resist the skewing of Irish historical scholarship by the adoption of this commercially driven product in Irish universities. Historians accept that all research must be assessed for its quality. It is how books are received by peers in the profession, rather than as Canny notes 'the imprint of the publisher that determines worth.' This volume includes contributions from scholars in the University of London, University of York, London School of Economic, Trinity College Dublin, University of Limerick, University College Cork, NUI Maynooth, University College Dublin. It provides invaluable insights into Irish, English, Belgian and international history from the medieval to late twentieth century.

I commend the collection and congratulate the University of Limerick History Society for its support of the journal. The often-neglected role of the editor and editorial panel should be recognised also. They conduct a vital

activity in the research process and ensure continuity of output. The journal editors, Mr Paul M. Hayes and Mr Freyne Corbett have maintained high production and scholarship values in volume twelve of the journal.

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Acknowledgments

The editors would like to thank Dr. Bernadette Whelan, Head, Department of History, for her generous sponsorship and encouragement, and her predecessor Mr Raymond Friel. Without which this volume would not be published. Professor Tom Lodge, Dean of the College of Humanities and Professor Brian Fitzgerald, Vice President Research, University of Limerick who also provided valuable financial assistance. We are indebted to Dr David Fleming for his advice and help in preparing this volume. My thanks also go to the contributing authors for their patience.

Foreword

The University of Limerick History Society is delighted to see the continuing vitality of History Studies. The Society is justly proud of the fact that its journal remains the only journal in Ireland edited and managed by students and has published 12 volumes. A central aim of the Society is to provide a vehicle through which younger scholars can see their work in print.

While funding the journal is a matter for concern in a period of shortage and cutbacks, the Society is hopeful that the support it receives from its benefactors can be sustained into the future. In this regard, we are delighted to acknowledge the continuing financial aid provided by the Department of History, the Dean of the Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences, and the Office of the Vice President, Research, without which History Studies could not be produced.

Seamus Kearney

Editorial

I am pleased to present a diverse set of essays in volume twelve of *History Studies.* The high number of submissions shows the abundance of postgraduate history researchers working at this time. Many exceptional essays were rejected wholly on the basis of a lack of space. The essays in this journal are from contributors across Britain and Ireland, encompassing a wide range of topics. From 13th century warfare to political violence in Cork in the first decade of the 20th century, various political themes are also evident spanning a number of countries. The diversity of submissions shows the strength of postgraduate research within the universities on these islands.

Paul Hayes

The report of friar John of Plano Carpini: Analysis of an intelligence gathering mission conducted on behalf of the Papacy in the mid thirteenth century

Stephen Bennett

Qui secundos optat euentus, dimicet arte, non casu.[1]

Intelligence can be defined as the product of analysis of refined and collated data.[2] Ideally drawn from a variety of sources, Intelligence should aim to answer the decision maker's specific information requirements and unlock the deeper processes at work in the target system. The requirement for intelligence is clear in Vegetius' *De re militari*. With some 260 surviving Latin manuscripts it has been presented as the principle work on military doctrine of the age.[3] What evidence is there, however, of the ideas outlined in *De re militari* being applied in practice?

This paper will consider the reliability and value of a report on the Mongol Empire in the mid thirteenth century written by Franciscan Friar John of Plano Carpini for Pope Innocent IV. In doing so this paper will attempt to highlight that Carpini's report was packed with meticulous and precise military data, even if at times it lacked insight into causality.[4] This goes some way to demonstrating the advanced nature of intelligence gathering in the Middle Ages was in line with Vegetiusian doctrine.

Between 1237 and 1241 the Mongols had surged westwards, subjugating the Rus' and defeating the forces of Poland, Moravia and Hungary before withdrawing.[5] Analysing the nature of the Mongol threat was

[1] Vegetius, *De re militari*, preface to Book III in C. Saunders, F. Le Saux and N. Thomas (eds), *Writing War, Medieval literary responses to warfare* (Cambridge, 2004).
[2] Canadian Ministry of Defence, *Joint Intelligence Doctrine* (Ottawa, 2003), pp 1-11.
[3] C. Allmond, 'The *De re militari* of Vegetius in the Middle Ages and Renaissance' in Saunders, Le Saux and Thomas (eds), *Writing War*, pp 15-28.
[4] John of Plano Carpini, 'History of the Mongols' in *The Mongol mission: narratives and letters of the Franciscan missionaries in Mongolia and China in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries*, trans. a nun of Stanbrook Abbey, ed. C. Dawson (New York,1955), pp 18, 22-4, 29.
[5] D. Morgan, *The Mongols*, 2nd edition (Oxford, 2007), p.124.

a priority for Pope Innocent IV at the First Council of Lyons in 1245.[6] For this he required timely, accurate and cogent information. Although some twenty years had passed since the first Mongol raids into Georgia and Russia, little was known of the Mongols, their culture, religious beliefs or military intentions.[7] During the course of the Council, Innocent IV sent three separate embassies to the Mongols; two Dominican missions under Andrew of Longjumeau and Friar Ascelin respectively, and a Franciscan mission under Carpini. Peter Jackson argues persuasively that the information required of them drew from the questioning of a Rus' cleric at the Council in June. In addition, the routes assigned to each embassy matched routes threatened by Mongol armies, and that this can hardly have been a coincidence. Two information requirements were evidently paramount; the religious beliefs of the Mongols and the military threat they presented to Christendom.[8] This paper will focus on the latter.

In modern military intelligence, the quality of data is judged by the reliability of the source and the variety of other sources that can confirm its validity. Carpini was a senior and trusted figure in the Franciscan Order and had played a leading role in its establishment in Western Europe.[9] His report of November 1247 was the first detailed account of the Mongols to reach Pope Innocent IV and he was the only Papal envoy to travel to Mongolia and meet the Great Khan.[10] Amidst the wealth of material provided on Mongol society, history, politics, as well as the local topography, there was detailed information on the Mongol army and the demands of campaigning on the steppe. Given Innocent's likely concerns with the Mongol military threat, this paper will focus on Carpini's report on Mongol

[6] Ibid., p. 121.
[7] For discussion on the information available to Innocent IV see P. Jackson, *The Mongols and the West* (Harlow, 2005), p. 87.
[8] Ibid., pp 87-91.
[9] Carpini, 'History of the Mongols', p. 2; G. Lane, *Genghis Khan and Mongol rule* (Indianapolis, 2004), p. 136; Jackson, *Mongols*, pp 87-8.
[10] The earliest information of value was that of Friar John of Hungary. See Morgan, *Mongols*, p.155; *The mission of Friar William of Rubruck: his journey to the Court of the Great Khan Möngke, 1253-1255*, ed. P Jackson with D. Morgan (London, 1990), p. 28; Jackson, *Mongols*, p. 94.

fighting power and compare it with information drawn from other primary sources.

In addition to drawing from personal observation, Carpini credited Hungarians and Rus' captives taken in the first Mongol raid of 1221-2 or, more commonly, the campaign of 1237-42. Those who had learnt the Mongol language, as well as French or Latin, were useful in providing 'bits of private information about the Emperor', but also 'a thorough knowledge of everything'.[11] From the account of Carpini's companion, Benedict the Pole, it is likely that details were also drawn from Georgians within the Mongol Empire.[12]

In terms of Christian sources, we can compare Carpini with the accounts of Innocent IV's other two envoys and that of Friar William of Rubruck who travelled to Mongolia in 1253-5.[13] Marco Polo's (*c*.1254-1324) account has had a mixed reception from historians, some of whom doubt that he even went to China.[14] Yet, according to John Larner, evidence that Polo had intimate contact with the Mongols is strong and elements of his work are useful to this study.

Perhaps the most complete Persian account of the Mongols is that of 'Ala-ad-Din 'Ata-Malik Juvaini (1226-83). A senior Muslim bureaucrat of the Seljuqs and Khorazm-Shahs, Juvaini was also a governor under the Ilkhanid dynasty and wrote under their patronage.[15] Rashid al-Din Hamadani (1247-1318) wrote a key work on the Ilknanate, the *Jami al-Tawarikh* (Compendium of Chronicles), in the early fourteenth century, also under

[11] Carpini, 'History of the Mongols', p. 66.
[12] Benedict the Pole, 'Relatio', *The Mongol mission: narratives and letters of the Franciscan missionaries*, p. 82.
[13] Andrew of Longjumeau's report in Matthew Paris, *Chronica Majora*, vi, pp 113-6; 'Narrative of Simon de Saint-Quentin, member of the mission of Friar Ascelin to the Mongol general Baiju on behalf of Pope Innocent IV', Vincent de Beauville, *Speculum Historiale*, ed. J Montelin (1473), extracts ed. J. Richard 'Simon de Saint-Quentin', *Histoire des Tartares* (Paris, 1965), pp 94-117. See Morgan, *Mongols*, pp 155-7 and Jackson, *Mongols*, pp 87-92.
[14] F. Wood, *Did Marco Polo go to China?* (Boulder, 1996); J. Larner, *Marco Polo and the discovery of the world* (New Haven, 1999), pp 58-63, 172-82; P. Jackson, 'Marco Polo and his travels', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 61,1 (1998), pp 82-101; and, Gang Zhou, 'Small talk: a new reading of Marco Polo's *Il milione*', *Modern Language Notes* (Italian Issue), 124, 1 (2009), pp 1-22.
[15] 'Ala-ad-Din 'Ata-Malik Juvaini, *Genghis Khan, the history of the world-conquerer*, trans. J.A. Boyle from the text of Mirza Muhammed Qazvini (Manchester, 1997), pp xxvii-xxxiv, xli-xlii.

Mongol patronage.[16] Bar Hebraeus (1226-86), a Syrian Jacobite clergyman and author of *Chronicon Syriacum* provided a more objective view.[17] Chinese sources are gradually becoming available in translation, such as Zhao Hong's *Record of the Mongols and Tartars*, penned by the Chinese envoy in the mid thirteenth century, the *Yuan Shi* and K.A. Wittfogel and Feng Chia-Sheng's work on the history of Liao.[18] Lastly there is a Mongol source, *The Secret History of the Mongols*, which was probably written in the mid thirteenth century.[19]

To consider Carpini's analysis we shall approach his report through the three components of fighting power: conceptual, physical and moral. The conceptual component is the thought process behind the ability to fight, such as education, tactics, military training and decision-making. The physical component is the means to fight, including, equipment, sustainability, manpower and collective performance. The moral component has three fundamental elements: motivation, effective leadership, and sound management.[20]

Starting with the conceptual component, Carpini's linkage of Mongol military education to hunting techniques fitted a perception of the Mongols as a nation that fought as it lived. Training began at an early age and he wrote that:

> They hunt and practice archery, for they are all, big and little, excellent archers, and their children begin as soon as they are two or three years old to ride and manage horses and to gallop on them, and they are given bows to suit their stature and taught to shoot them.[21]

Rashid al-Din provided further evidence for this when he described Genghis Khan's maxims instructing military commanders to teach their sons, 'archery, horsemanship, and wrestling well'.[22] In Zhao Hung we find Mongols being born and raised in the saddle.[23] In addition, the *Secret History of the Mongols* related the skills expected of an adolescent archer.[24]

One area not mentioned by Carpini was the inclusion of sons of subject rulers in the Great Khan's guard. Here they received preparation for subordinate command as well as serve as a deterrent to rebellion. However, Carpini described the system of command even if he did not specify that young Mongol nobles learnt their craft under the guidance of experienced generals prior to being given independent command, 'Two or three chiefs are in command of the whole army, yet in such a way that one holds supreme command'.[25] This was reflected by Juvaini's, 'The right wing, left wing and centre are drawn up and entrusted to the great emirs.'[26]

Although providing comprehensive examples of Mongol tactics and siegecraft, unlike William of Rubruck, Carpini did not see beyond the influence of hunting techniques to link Mongol tactics with the *nerge* (row or column).[27] This formed part of the *battue* (annual hunt) described by Juvaini and Rubruck in which Mongols fanned out over several kilometres to form a large circle. The hunters would then gradually ride inwards over a month or two, driving the prey before them until they were trapped within a ring of horsemen. It was a highly disciplined activity requiring careful control and

[16] Morgan, *Mongols*, p. 183; Rashid al-Din Hamadani, 'Compendium of chronicles: a history of the Mongols', trans. W.M. Thackston, *Sources of oriental languages and literatures*, vol. 45 in three parts (1998-9).
[17] P.J. Bruns and G.G. Kirsch, *The chronicon Syriacum of Bar Hebraeus* 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1789).
[18] Zhao Hong, *Meng-Da Bei-Lu: Polnoe Opisanie Mongolo-Tatar*, trans. N. Munkuev (Moscow, 1975); *Yuan Shi*, trans. Ch'i-Qing Hsiao, *The military establishment of the Yuan Dynasty* (Cambridge, Mass., 1978), pp 72-91; K.A. Wittfogel and Feng Chia-Sheng, *History of Chinese society, Liao, 907-1125* (Philadelphia, 1949).
[19] J.J. Saunders, *The history of the Mongol conquests* (Philadelphia, 1971), pp 193-5; *The secret history of the Mongols, the life and times of Chinggis Khan*, ed. and trans. U. Onon (Abingdon, 2001); *The secret history of the Mongols: a Mongolian epic chronicle of the thirteenth century*, trans. I. de Rachewiltz (2 vols., Brill, 2004).
[20] United Kingdom Ministry of Defence. *British Military Doctrine* (3rd Edition, Swindon, 2008), pp 4, 1-11.
[21] Carpini, 'History of the Mongols', p. 18.
[22] Rashid al-Din, 'Compendium of chronicles', p. 297; note also Paris, *Chronica Majora*, pp 113-6.
[23] Zhao Hong, *Meng-Da Bei-Lu*, pp 65-6.
[24] Rachewiltz, *Secret history*, p. 20.
[25] T. May, *The Mongol art of war, Chinggis Khan and the Mongol military system* (Barnsley, 2007), pp 32-36, 87-8; Carpini, 'History of the Mongols', p. 33.
[26] Juvaini, *Genghis Khan*, p. 27.
[27] T. May, 'The training of an Inner Asian Nomad army in the pre-modern period' in *The Journal of Military History*, 70 (2006), p. 619.

excellent communications.[28] This is in accord with Carpini's description of columns being sent around an enemy's flank and 'in this way surround them and close in so that the fighting begins from all sides' in a double envelopment.[29] An example of which could be seen in Rashid al-Din's account of the campaign against the Rus'.[30] Carpini described the Mongol approach to a siege in a similar manner, 'They surround it, sometimes even fencing it round so that no one can enter or leave'.[31] In the same passage he went on to mention their use of diverted rivers to flood towns and mines to gain entry.[32] All three tactics are born out by other accounts, such as that of the siege of Xi-Xia.[33]

In battle, Carpini added that the Mongols often left an escape route open so that they could destroy the fleeing enemy forces in detail and accounts of the *nerge* mentioned animals being allowed to escape in a symbolic act of compassion by the Khan.[34] It would have been a tactic familiar to survivors of the Hungarian army defeated at Mohi in 1241 and may well have been drawn by Carpini from eyewitnesses. He also made many references to the use of ambuscades and deception such as mounting dummies on spare horses and placing women and children among the reserve to increase the apparent size of the force, which were supported by other sources.[35]

Mongol use of the traditional nomadic tactic of feigned flight was recognised by Carpini. Indeed, on facing a particularly strong enemy, he mentioned the withdrawal lasting days until the enemy has dispersed and was susceptible to a renewed offensive. Polo highlighted the effectiveness of this tactic and examples exist in accounts of Mongol campaigns.[36] However,

[28] Juvaini, *Genghis Khan,* pp 27-8; Jackson, *Friar William of Rubruck*, p.85; May, 'Nomad army', p.620.
[29] Carpini, 'History of the Mongols', p. 36.
[30] Rashid al-Din,'Compendium of chronicles', p. 327.
[31] Carpini, 'History of the Mongols', p. 37.
[32] Ibid., pp 21, 42.
[33] May, *Art of war*, p. 79.
[34] Carpini, 'History of the Mongols', p.37; May, 'Nomad Army', p. 620.
[35] Carpini, 'History of the Mongols', pp 36-7; Onon, *The secret history of the Mongols,* p.121; Juvaini, *Genghis Khan,* p. 406; on deception see May, *Art of war*, pp 79-81.
[36] Carpini, 'History of the Mongols', p. 36; Polo, vol.1, p. 262; see also Sübedei's encounter with the Kipchak Turks, May, *Art of war*, p. 74.

Carpini's description of how the Mongols fought is at the centre of some debate.[37] Two important passages on this highlight their losing three or four arrows before retiring and their aversion to close combat.[38] There is very little data available elsewhere on how the Mongols operated at subunit level with some works seeking to draw parallels with *mamluk* training manuals to fill the gap.[39] It is likely that Carpini also drew his information from veterans he encountered on his journey eastwards or Christian captives of the Mongols held in Asia.

As well as influencing tactics, the *nerge* served as training for war and Carpini's mention of the importance of hunting and archery has already been cited. Contrary to some modern claims that they were average archers, Carpini was clear about their skill.[40] The Armenians, a society familiar with nomadic horse archers, labelled them 'the Nation of Archers'.[41] Moreover, Juvaini wrote:

> they are ever eager for the chase and encourage their armies thus to occupy themselves; not for the sake of the game alone, but also in order that they may become accustomed and inured to hunting and familiarised with the handling of the bow and the endurance of hardships.[42]

The *nerge* also underpinned Mongol military decision-making. It required careful delegation of tasks to trusted subordinates towards a common goal – what today would be referred to as 'Mission Command'.[43] To manage the rapid flow of information, Carpini highlighted the Mongol *yam* ('pony express'), which provided fresh mounts and sustenance to official messengers, bureaucrats and foreign envoys at a series of way stations on specified routes across the Empire. It was a system mentioned by many other

[37] For detail on this debate see, R. Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks, The Mamluk-Ilkanid War, 1260-1281* (Cambridge, 1995), pp 214-29; May, *Art of war*, pp 42-7, 71-4; J.M. Smith, 'Ayn Jalut: Mamluk success or Mongol failure?' in *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 442 (1984), pp 307-45; J.M. Smith, 'Mongol society and military in the Middle East: antecedents and adaptations' in *War and Society in the eastern Mediterranean, seventh-fifteenth centuries*, ed. Y. Lev (Brill, 1996), pp 249-66.
[38] Carpini, 'History of the Mongols', pp 36-7.
[39] May, 'Nomad army', p. 624.
[40] Smith, '*'Ayn Jalut*', pp 315-6.
[41] R.P Blake and R.N. Frye, 'The history of the nation of archers by Grigor of Akanc' in *Harvard Journal of Asian Studies*, 12 (1249), pp 269-399.
[42] Juvaini, *Genghis Khan*, p. 27.
[43] *British Military Doctrine*, pp 4;1–11.

eyewitnesses, but as a bureaucrat, Juvaini was able to provide further detail on its administration.[44] This system allowed the rapid flow of data fed from the Mongol intelligence network. Carpini's identification of the importance of intelligence and the use of spies by the Mongols was also supported elsewhere.[45] The review of other sources demonstrates that the *nerge* and *battua* were the foundation of the conceptual component of Mongol fighting power. Whilst not identifying its causality, Carpini accurately described Mongol military education, tactics, training and decision-making. Carpini's description of the level of preparation of Mongol forces also required the reader to draw their own deductions based on the friar's description of Mongol formations and their varying states of readiness as he travelled eastwards. Detail on the deployment of flank guards to cover approach routes to the empire and supporting forces would have been of utmost use if a crusade were to be launched against them.[46]

Carpini devoted part of his report to the *minutia* that made up the physical component of fighting power. He gave specific detail on Mongol arms and armour, its construction and potential weak areas. Whilst he is the only source to speak of warriors carrying multiple bows, his description of the bow (a compound recurve), and the quantity and types of arrows (three large quivers with two types of arrow) was in accord with Polo. Meng Hung listed three types of arrow, but one of those whistled and may well have been designed for communications.[47] Carpini's account of the single-edged curved sword fitted that in use across the Steppe, but he was unique in mentioning a hook near the tip of the spear, designed to allow the warrior to pull adversaries from the saddle.[48] Unlike Meng Hung, Carpini only described the wicker shield used by guards whilst in camp and, given the detail displayed elsewhere, was clearly not privy to the large tortoise shield used in sieges or

[44] Carpini, 'History of the Mongols', pp 58, 61, 68; Juvaini, *Genghis Khan*, p. 33; Polo, pp 150-5.
[45] Rashid al-Din, 'Compendium of chronicles', p. 3.89.
[46] Jackson, *Friar William of Rubruck*, pp 97-100.
[47] Carpini, 'History of the Mongols', pp 27, 35; Polo, p.300; Jackson, *Friar William of Rubruck*, p. 91; Meng Hung, cited in H.D. Martin, 'The Mongol army' in *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, 1 (1943), p.52.
[48] Carpini, 'History of the Mongols', pp 33-4.

the smaller shields carried by dismounted troops.[49] Carpini's report on armour for warriors and ponies is highly detailed. Use of lacquered leather laminar armour for both, sometimes replaced with metal bands, an iron helmet for the rider and a metal chamfron for the mount fits contemporary illustrations as well the accounts of Andrew of Longjumeau and Rubruck.[50]

In considering an army whose special asset was horsepower, data on the size and number of mounts was vital. A large horse was stronger and could carry a heavily armoured warrior, but required greater sustenance than a pony. Carpini described the small, nimble and highly trained mounts of the Mongols in some detail, of which each warrior would have five. This compensated for a decreased load bearing capacity by providing multiple mounts on the march and also, arguably, maintaining fresh re-mounts during battle. Much research has been conducted on the size and capacity of Mongol ponies and it supports the information in Carpini's report.[51]

In terms of logistics, the seasonal migration of many hundreds of miles between summer and winter pastures was of great benefit in providing experience in the movement of large formations on campaign. Moreover, as Timothy May argues, the *nerge* contributed to producing a disciplined force capable of complex manoeuvres over a broad front.[52] The advantages migration brought was not identified directly by Carpini, but he did describe the process, the level of Mongol self-sufficiency and important logistic functions fulfilled by women in line with Juvaini.[53] Some extrapolation was required, however, to determine the size of the Mongol logistic tail and likely consequences. John Masson Smith estimates that the 170,000 warriors in Hülegü's army of 1256 grew to 850,000 with the inclusion of families and artisans. Assessing that each family of five had some 100 sheep and ten ponies (five mounts and five milk-producing mares), Smiths suggests a herd

[49] Carpini, 'History of the Mongols', p. 35, Meng Hung, cited in Martin, 'Mongol army', p. 53.
[50] Carpini, 'History of the Mongols', pp 33-4; Paris, *Chronica Majora*, p. 115; M.S. Ipsiroglu, *Painting and the culture of the Mongols* (New York, 1966), p. 50, p. 19; Jackson, *Friar William of Rubruck*, pp 210-1.
[51] For Mongol ponies see Smith, 'Mongol society and military in the Middle East', pp 250-1.
[52] May, *Art of war*, p. 46.
[53] Carpini, 'History of the Mongols', p.18; Juvaini, *Genghis Khan*, p. 30.

of 17 million sheep and 1.7 million ponies.[54] These figures have been contested by Rueben Amatei-Priess, but even a ninety percent reduction would leave a substantial logistic burden.[55] Even a modest force of 30,000 warriors, therefore, had a considerable requirement for fresh pasture on which to graze and time in which to do so. Carpini did not ignore Mongol vulnerability in this area when he covered the methodology of confronting them in battle.[56] Carpini was not definite on the extent of Mongol manpower, but his detailed description of a nation in arms is reflected by Juvaini when he referred to them as, 'peasantry in the guise of an army, all of them...in time of battle become swordsmen, archers, lancers and advancing in whatever manner the occasion requires'.[57]

Writing a few decades later, the Armenian cleric Grigor of Akanc stated that the Mongols registered all males aged between fifteen and sixty who were fit for military service.[58] This was confirmed by Meng Hung, whilst the *Yuan Shi* extended the age limit to seventy and gave the age for induction as between fifteen and twenty years old.[59] In relating this to manpower committed to the military, several sources indicated a typical recruitment figure of one in ten with the potential to levy more.[60] This was useful detail on military manning excluded from Carpini's report, but probably unavailable to him. However, Carpini did cover Mongol use of captive craftsman to fulfil those tasks they were unable to perform. He described the process of selection that followed a successful siege and Juvaini gave similar detail in his account of the siege of Otrar, in modern Kazakstan.[61] Moreover, Mongol use of captives and allies appeared in many eyewitness accounts, and Carpini's suggestion that they were under Mongol

[54] Smith, 'Mongol Society', p. 249.
[55] Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, pp 225-9.
[56] Carpini, 'History of the Mongols', pp 46-50
[57] Juvaini, *Genghis Khan*, p. 30.
[58] Grigor of Akanc, 'The history of the nation of archers', ed. and trans. R.P. Blake and R.N. Frye, *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 12, 3/4 (1949), p. 325; G. Lane, *Genghis Khan and Mongol rule* (Indianapolis, 2004), p.136.
[59] Meng Hung, *The Meng Ta pei-lu*, cited in Martin, 'Mongol army', p. 53; *Yuan Shi*, p. 74.
[60] May, *Art of war*, pp 27-31.
[61] Carpini, 'History of the Mongols', p. 37; Juvaini, *Genghis Khan*, p. 85. Chinese specialists see J.M. Smith, 'Mongol manpower and Persian population', *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 18, 3 (1975), p. 275.

leadership is supported by Juvaini in his description of the campaign against the Khwarazmians.[62] Mongol use of captives to augment military capability indicates their progressive adaption in exploiting new technologies and techniques.

Strong collective performance is based on cohesion – the 'quality that binds together constituent parts thereby providing resilience against dislocation and disruption'.[63] Whilst moral cohesion will be considered later, Carpini's description of how the Mongols used captives and subject allies is relevant to collective performance. Carpini placed them in the centre of the battle formation and this did not correspond with the recorded role of auxiliary contingents against the Mamluks or accounts of previous Mongol campaigns by Juvaini.[64] Sources place al-Ashraf Musa's Muslim force with the Mongol left wing at *'Ayn Jalut* in 1260 and the small Armenian and Georgian contingents very probably formed part of the Mongol victorious right wing at the second battle of Homs in 1281.[65] In both examples, allies were integrated into the strongest wing of the army. At an individual level, other sources show how selected captures could be inducted into Mongol units in a manner not related by Carpini.[66] However, Simon of St. Quentin and Muslim sources recorded the levying of indigenous manpower during sieges. These were seemly favoured for the most perilous tasks, which supports Carpini's account.[67]

This topic of subject peoples forms a bridge between the physical and moral components of Mongol fighting power. The induction of subject peoples would have required careful control to avoid damaging the cohesion of the Mongol army – especially those who were not from a steppe nomad background and did not acknowledge the centuries old concept of steppe-

[62] Carpini, 'History of the Mongols', p. 36; Juvaini, *Genghis Khan*, pp 91-2, 107, 122.
[63] United Kingdom Ministry of Defence. Army Doctrine Publication, vol. 1, *Operations* (London, 1994), pp 2-6.
[64] Carpini, 'History of the Mongols', p. 36; on sources see Armitai-Preuss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, pp 40-5, 191-5.
[65] Ibn Wasel, ms 1703, fol. 161a cited in Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, p.26; Amatei-Priess, 'Ayn Jalut' pp 139-40; Rashid al-Din, p.3,162.
[66] Juvaini, *Genghis Khan*, p. 121.
[67] Simon of St. Quentin, 'Narrative', p. 5.

overlordship.[68] John Saunders argues that Genghis Khan was devoid of racism, recruiting ministers and commanders from twenty different nations.[69] It is an argument supported by the positions held by Juvaini and Polo, but some groups were assimilated better than others. Carpini's was the account of an outsider and many of his sources were those on the margins of Mongol society or subject to it rather than favoured bureaucrats or commanders.

Carpini's account did record a clear image of a Mongol destiny that brought moral cohesion to the army and the strict rules that maintained its integrity.[70] A common theme in early Mongol history is that of an imperial destiny in which they would bring the world under their hegemony. Rather than conquerors, the Mongols portrayed themselves as fulfilling their divine role. Those who accepted subjugation were *el* (at peace or in harmony), those who resisted were *bulgha* (confused or disordered) or *yaght* (enemy) and in both cases were regarded as being in rebellion to the divine order.[71] In addition to being held by the family of Genghis Khan, a Chinese source presented this belief as permeating throughout the Mongol army in the mid-thirteenth century.[72]

There is great emphasis placed on discipline as the key to Mongol success and Carpini describes several examples of individual and collective punishment, such as:

> When they are in battle, if one or two or three or even more out of a group of ten run away, all are put to death; and if a whole group of ten flees, the rest of the group of a hundred are all put to death, if they do not flee too. In a word, unless they retreat in a body, all who take flight are put to death.[73]

Discipline was focused on achieving collective action, as 'Umar Ibn Ibrahim al-Ansi al-An'ari, noted 'Retiring [from the battle] and returning [to it] was

[68] Jackson, *Mongols*, p. 46.
[69] Saunders, *Mongol conquests*, pp 66-7.
[70] Carpini, 'History of the Mongols', p. 17.
[71] J.F. Fletcher, 'The Mongols: ecological and social perspectives' in *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 46 (1986), pp 19, 30-5.
[72] Ping Da-ya and Xu Ting, *Hei-da shi-lue*, in Wang Guo-wei.ed. *Meng-gu shi-liao si-zhong* (Taipei, 1975), p. 488, cited in Amitai-Preiss, *Mongol and Mamluks*, p. 10.
[73] Carpini, 'History of the Mongols', p. 33.

denied to each of them'.[74] Juvaini commented that one could leave a riding crop on the ground for many days and only its owner would pick it up, no matter how long it had lain there.[75] The *Secret History* also demonstrated how discipline was at the heart of Genghis Khan's rise to power. Whilst still a subordinate commander of the Kereit, it recorded him insisting that his men defeat the enemy before turning to plunder and be prepared to regroup at a rally point if defeated rather than disperse.[76] As Carpini recorded, 'Moreover, whatever command he [the Great Khan] gives them, whatever the time, whatever the place, be it in battle, to life or to death, they obey without question'.[77] Taking into account the wealth of supporting data, Carpini's report accurately described a system of discipline closely linked with personal leadership through persuasion, compulsion and shared hardship, and where command was earned.

However, just as detail was lacking on recruitment, Carpini was unlikely to be party to the dispositions of the Mongol army.[78] Carpini instead focused on lower levels, such as Genghis Khan's use of a decimal system to organise the army. Troops were formed into units of ten, a hundred, a thousand and ten thousand, which he stated they called a 'darkness' (*düman*).[79] This is broadly supported by several other accounts although the word *tüman* (ten thousand) was used by other writers. Yet there are subtle differences, where Juvaini described a strictly decimal system, Andrew of Longjumeau stated that, 'everyone in command, right up to the king, has under him ten men' – a ten per cent difference.[80] Moreover, Carpini's account was also supported by Polo and Zhao Hong, as well as fitting the traditional

[74] 'Umar Ibn al-Ansi al-An'ari, *Tafrij al-Kurub fi Tadbir al-'urub* (Cairo, 1961), p. 103.
[75] Juvaini, *Tabaqat-i-Nasiri*, vol. 2, p. 181.
[76] Rachewiltz, *Secret History*, p. 76.
[77] Carpini, 'History of the Mongols', p. 27.
[78] Based on a Left wing/eastern army (*jun-qar*), Right wing/western army (*bera'un-qar*) and centre or army of the Imperial *Ordu* (*qol*), Martin, 'Mongol army', p. 55.
[79] Carpini wrote *tenebras* (darkness), probably confusion between *tüman* (10,000) and *düman* (darkness), Carpini, 'History of the Mongols', pp 26, 33.
[80] Juvaini, *Genghis Khan*, p. 31; Paris, *Chronica Majora*, p. 113.

system employed by Steppe Nomads, underlining his reliability on military matters.[81]

From this comparison of the analysis of Mongol fighting power in Carpini's report with other eyewitness accounts it can be seen that, some two and a half years after he had been dispatched eastwards, Carpini presented an accurate and comprehensive study to Innocent IV. Although lacking some detail on Mongol military strength, minor tactics and strategic dispositions, this intelligence would have provided the Pope with the sort of timely and concrete data required for informed decision-making. Following his time with the Mongols and, perhaps, influenced by discussed reforms of the Rus', Carpini made a series of recommendations on the composition of a military force capable of confronting the Mongols that is also seemingly influenced by Vegetius. Whilst it is arguable that he had a Military Order in mind as the basis of his proposed force, it would instead be interesting to consider its value by comparing his commentary with an army that defeated the Mongols on a number of occasions– the Mamluks of Egypt.

[81] May, *Art of war*, p.32; Juvaini, *Genghis Khan*, p. 27; Zhao Hong, *Meng-Da Bei-Lu*, p. 67.

'Consent not to the Wyckednesse': The contribution of Nicodemites to the Elizabethan Church

Angela Ranson

In a letter he wrote to his parishioners in Lucca in 1542, Peter Martyr Vermigli advised 'the weaker brethren' that they flee the country instead of causing damage through their abjuration at home.[1] In 1543, John Calvin said that Protestants who tried to justify conforming to Catholicism were 'looking for cushions to put their consciences to sleep, and for someone to make them believe that they are alive when really they are dead.'[2] In 1554, John Bradford rejected the idea that Protestants could be physically present at the mass and yet absent in mind and spirit, advising his followers to 'consent not to the wyckednesse.'[3] These writings, along with countless others, spoke against the people later labelled as followers of Nicodemism (Nicodemites). Nicodemism can be defined as outward conformity to the dominant religion despite differing internal beliefs, while justifying that conformity through a particular set of arguments. These arguments often used the Biblical examples of Nicodemus and Naaman, separated the beliefs of mind and spirit from the actions of the body, and advocated that it was better to conform than to risk offending other Christians. While never an official sect or confession, Nicodemism could be found throughout the sixteenth century in England. Under Henry VIII, it became well-known during the Act of Six Articles persecutions. It was what Andrew Pettegree calls the 'burning issue of the day' during the time of the Mary I, when it was practiced by some of the Protestants living under her Catholicism.[4] Later in the century, Catholics

[1] John Patrick Donnelly,ed. *Life, letters and sermons of Peter Martyr Vermigli* (Kirksville,1999), p. 93.
[2] Seth Skolnitsky, trans, *Come out from among them: 'Anti-Nicodemite' writings of John Calvin* (Texas, 2001), pp 47-8.
[3] John Bradford, *The hurte of hering masse. Set forth by the faithfull seruau[n]t of god [and] constant marter of Christ. Ihon Bradforth, whe[n] he was prisoner in the Tower of London* (London, 1561), pp A3r–A4r.
[4] Andrew Pettegree, *Marian Protestantism* (Hants, 1996), p. 91.

living under Elizabeth's Church of England used Nicodemite arguments in their deliberations about recusancy. This paper will focus on some of the Nicodemites of Mary's reign, who revealed their Protestantism during the reign of Elizabeth.

Nicodemites inspired much polemic from sixteenth-century reformers, who often portrayed them as fallen believers who avoided martyrdom by denying their beliefs or avoiding confrontation with authorities. Alternatively, Nicodemites were portrayed as well-meaning but weak-willed people who loved the world too much and so risked their salvation by their lack of zeal. This negative portrayal of Nicodemism is largely accepted by modern historians as well. The dominant impression in the historiography is that Nicodemites were the cowards of the Reformation. Andrew Pettegree, in his book *Marian Protestantism*, notes that many English Protestants under Henry and Edward conformed under Mary and then promptly re-adopted Protestantism when it became safe to do so under Elizabeth. Pettegree calls this a 'genuine if flexible commitment' to Protestantism,[5] but many historians disagree that a commitment of that sort is truly a commitment. Nikki Shepherdson considers it damaging, suggesting that Nicodemism in France undermined the rhetoric of martyrdom that was then shaping the identity of the Reformed community.[6] Alexandra Walsham suggests that such conformity might be simply a part of the 'religious vacillations' that occurred during this time of political and religious upheaval, showing neither faith nor the lack of it.[7] Anne Overell calls the English and Italian Protestants who gave in to the pressure to conform Nicodemites, using as examples the recantations of John Cheke and Thomas Cranmer.[8]

This is a one-sided portrayal of Nicodemism. It was possible to be both a Nicodemite and a committed believer, and some of the men and

[5] Ibid., p. 6.
[6] Nikki Shepherdson, *Burning zeal: the rhetoric of martyrdom and the Protestant community in France* (New Jersey, 2007), pp 130, 138.
[7] Alexandra Walsham, *Charitable hatred: tolerance and intolerance in England, 1500-1700* (Manchester, 2006), p. 20.
[8] Anne Overell, *Italian reform and English reformations* (Aldershot, 2008), p. 138.

women who fell into this category later made great contributions to the development of the English Church. The Nicodemism of some leading Elizabethan figures not only saved their lives during the Marian years, but also provided them the skills they needed to lead the government under Elizabeth. Nicodemism gave them an ability to compromise and adapt, which helped them establish and maintain the new Church of England when it came into existence through the 1559 Elizabethan Settlement. Some of the leaders of this church, such as the statesman Nicholas Bacon, the privy counsellor Robert Dudley and the royal secretary William Cecil, developed talents in equivocation and diplomacy while they were Nicodemites that they later used to defend the new church's doctrine and rituals.

Of course, not all Nicodemites adopted Nicodemism for noble purposes. Self-interest motivated many, including John Cheke, who conformed partly because he wanted to keep his lands and his life.[9] Edward Courtenay's Nicodemism was in a large part motivated by self-interest, since he avowed whatever religious beliefs that he thought would free him from the Tower.[10] However, the best example of Nicodemism for the sake of self-interest can be found in the example of Richard Smyth. Smyth was a lecturer and a fellow at Oxford in the later years of Henry VIII, and his conservative views became controversial at the accession of Edward. He immediately recanted in order to salvage his career, which lost him allies both on the conservative side and on the evangelical side. Smyth himself said publicly that he had erred and was repentant, and yet maintained his innocence in private.[11]

Peter Martyr Vermigli replaced Smyth as Regius Professor of Divinity in 1547, and Smyth immediately proceeded to do all he could to unsettle Vermigli, including challenge him to a disputation about the Eucharist. Vermigli accepted, and Smyth ran away into exile the evening

[9] John Strype, *The life of the learned Sir John Cheke, Kt. first instructer, afterwards Secretary of State to King Edward VI. One of the great restorers of good* (London, 1705), p. 169.
[10] Overell, *Italian reform*, pp 61-2.
[11] J. Andreas Lowe, *Richard Smyth and the language of orthodoxy* (Leiden, 2003), p. 39.

before the disputation was to take place.[12] In 1552 he wrote to Archbishop Cranmer, saying that he was under pressure to refute Cranmer's latest book and that it was 'against his conscience' to do so. He promised that if Cranmer arranged for a royal pardon so that Smyth could return to England, he would conform to the Edwardian church and publish a book accepting some of the tenets of the Protestant faith he had previously rejected. He even promised that he would support Cranmer and that Cranmer 'would never regret' arranging to bring him home. Smyth gained his royal pardon, came home and conformed. In 1553, on the accession of Mary, he promptly re-adopted Catholicism, and later presided over the trial that sent Cranmer to the stake for heresy.[13]

Smyth was an extreme case of self-interested Nicodemism. Sometimes self-interest blended with caution or what could be called simple common sense. Andrew Pettegree notes that some of the Stranger communities in London did not dissolve under Mary as one might have expected they would. He thinks that this might reflect practical reasons as well as religious conviction, such as their employment. Some of the people in these communities were involved in trades that required large and expensive equipment – equipment which they were reluctant to move. So if they could 'lie low' and survive, they had reason to do so. Pettegree also notes the financial and social aspects of Nicodemism for many English people. They tended to be 'of middling wealth and status, reluctant therefore to throw up a comfortable standard of living for an uncertain future abroad, and not inclined to court a death sentence by open defiance.'[14]

John Calvin despised the cowardice and duplicity involved in such Nicodemism, calling it 'wicked subtlety'.[15] He understood, to a certain extent, the desire to live in peace, but he felt that even if Protestants chose to conform to Catholicism, their attitude should be one of humble acknowledgement of their sin. They should not try to justify their conformity

[12] Overell, *Italian reform*, pp 104-8.
[13] Lowe, *Richard Smyth*, p. 49.
[14] Pettegree, *Marian Protestantism*, pp 41, 53.
[15] Skolnitsky, *Come out from among them*, p. 9.

with any Nicodemite arguments. It was worse to 'be doubly confounding and condemning ourselves by squirming about and seeking vain excuses.'[16] Calvin identified four types of Nicodemites: first, the preachers who wanted to treat Jesus like their chef 'so he can prepare them fine meals' – in other words, preachers who claimed the promises of Christianity while ignoring the responsibilities of the faith. Second, men who were pleased to have the gospel and chat about it with the ladies, 'as long as it did not prevent them from living as they like'. Third, the people Calvin called philosophical Christians, who would wait around in times of upheaval to see what happened, and finally, the 'merchants and commoners who are comfortable in their households and are irritated that someone should come and trouble them.'[17]

Calvin did not acknowledge a fifth kind of Nicodemite: someone who chose to conform so that they would be alive and ready to challenge and change the dominant religion when the opportunity arose. Bacon, Dudley, Cecil, and many others could fit into this category of Nicodemite. Their decisions to conform were often not made lightly, and it is a mistake to assume that those who made that decision always acted out of cowardice or ambiguity. For people like them, Nicodemite arguments carried more legitimacy. Some firmly believed that their faith allowed conformity. These Nicodemites followed the example of the Biblical Nicodemus, which is how they got their name. Nicodemus came to Jesus in the night to learn about the kingdom of God and remained a Jewish Pharisee during the day. Thus, he lived a double life. He followed the rules and procedures of the Pharisees, and yet believed in the message of Jesus. Nicodemus was saved because his heart was faithful even if his lips were not. To some reformers, such as John Hooper, the faith that Nicodemus showed by coming to Christ was what saved him, and Nicodemus' consistent return to his life as a Pharisee was not

[16] Ibid., p. 49.
[17] Ibid.,pp 105-9.

really important. Nicodemus learned from Christ, and accepted Christ in his heart, and that was enough.[18]

The idea that individuals, like Nicodemus, did not have to proclaim their faith to hold it was also supported by Gregory the Great's *Moralia*. In it, he asked 'what harm is there if in the judgement of man our words differ superficially from the rectitude of truth when in the heart they are in accord with it?'[19] Some Nicodemites claimed that their conformity to the dominant religion was merely a political act, a mark of temporal loyalty. They defended this stance using the case of Naaman the Syrian, a man of faith who bowed in the temple of Rimmon in order to assist his king. Both the Protestants under Mary and the Catholics under Elizabeth used this story to justify their attendance at church. Philip Melanchthon noted in his 1521 *Loci Communes* that laws should be endured 'as we endure any injustice or tyranny, in accordance with Matt 5:41: "If anyone forces you to go one mile, go with him two miles."'[20] Martin Bucer stressed the importance of the internal beliefs of individuals and their personal piety, suggesting that individuals could decide for themselves whether or not to conform to earthly authority.[21] John Bradford also advocated this, saying that: 'it is the duty of every Christian *after their vocation* to disallow all that he cannot obey and do with good conscience.'[22]

Other Nicodemites hid their resistance under a veil of conformity. William Guest, later considered for a bishopric under Elizabeth, was an evangelical under Edward and became a Nicodemite under Mary. As Brett Usher puts it, he kept 'recent theological developments at arm's length during Mary's reign and lived a fugitive life in England.[23] Matthew Parker,

[18] John Hooper, *A declaration of Christe and of his offyce compylyd, by Johan Hoper* (London, 1547), pp 47-8.
[19] Alexandra Walsham, 'Ordeals of conscience: casuistry, conformity, and confessional identity in post Reformation England' in Harald Braun and Edward Vallance (eds), *Contexts of conscience in early modern Europe, 1500-1700* (New York, 2004), p. 39.
[20] William Pauck, ed. *Melanchthon and Bucer* (London, 1969), pp 67-8.
[21] Pettegree, *Marian Protestantism*, p. 93.
[22] Bradford, *The hurt of hearing mass*, p. 37. My emphasis; a vocation was another word for a 'calling', a requirement from God that was unique to the individual.
[23] Brett Usher, *William Cecil and episcopacy, 1559-1577* (Aldershot, 2003), p. 30.

who became Archbishop of Canterbury under Elizabeth, conformed just enough under Mary to live essentially 'untroubled' in England throughout her reign.[24] John Day, a London printer, hid in Lincolnshire and printed subversive tracts under various aliases. One of these was Gardiner's *De Vera Obedientia,* sometimes slyly used by Protestant martyrs when under interrogation by Gardiner himself.[25] It is difficult to determine Day's actions during the Marian years, but it is known that he was arrested for the products of his press and then released. He spent the last two years of Mary's reign in London, and it can be assumed that he conformed because he was allowed to continue his printing business.[26] However, once Elizabeth ascended the throne, Day became the printer of John Foxe's *Acts and Monuments,* arguably one of the most influential books in the Protestant Church of England.[27]

Nicodemites of this sort often provided help and succour for the martyrs in prison, in the form of written encouragement, financial support, or both. They also helped other Protestants escape the country. John Strype, in his *Ecclesiastical Memorials,* lists eighteen people whom he calls 'sustainers of the gospel,' and says that there were many more whose names were 'studiously concealed, for their safety in those times.' Some of these people were gentry, others merchants, others described merely as 'godly ladies.'[28] One of these 'godly ladies' was Anne Warcup, who had a significant if indirect influence on the establishment of the Church of England. It was she who sheltered John Jewel in London when he was fleeing from Marian authorities, and helped him escape into exile.[29] John Jewel, later Bishop of Salisbury, wrote the first *Apology of the Church of England,* which defined

[24] Gary Jenkins, *John Jewel and the National Church* (Aldershot, 2006), p. 39.
[25] John Foxe, *Acts and monuments* (1576 edition) (http://www.hrionline.shef.ac.uk/foxe/, p. 1523) (Jan. 2011).
[26] Andrew Pettegree, 'Day, John (1521/2–1584)' in Matthew and Brian Harrison ed. H. C. G., *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford, 2004).
[27] Elizabeth Evenden, 'The Michael Wood mystery: William Cecil and the Lincolnshire printing of John Day' in *The Sixteenth Century Journal*, 35, 2 (2004), p. 383.
[28] John Strype, *Ecclesiastical memorials: relating chiefly to religion, and the reformation of it, and the emergencies of the Church of England, under King Henry,* Vol 3 (London, 1721), pp 142-3.
[29] Strype, *Ecclesiastical memorials* ,3, p. 144.

the church's beliefs and defended it against continental retractors. He also defended the church against Catholic writers, preached several important court sermons, helped to write the 39 Articles, and became Richard Hooker's mentor. Jewel is generally portrayed as the Church of England's first champion, and his survival can be attributed in part to a Nicodemite.

A third justification for Nicodemism is well summarized in Perez Zagorin's book *Ways of Lying: Dissimulation, Persecution and Conformity in Early Modern Europe.* Zagorin notes that some Nicodemites acted for pragmatic reasons. These could include the fear of martyrdom, the fear of losing property, or a belief that it would better serve others to survive than to make a stand that would end in defeat.[30] It is easy to dismiss such reasons as mere excuses for cowardice, but they are actually more legitimate than one might think. Take, for example, the case of one famous Nicodemite of the Marian years: Elizabeth Tudor herself. Although there is no record stating that Elizabeth decided to conform to Catholicism under Mary's reign for any of the reasons above stated, it is easy to see how they could have legitimately applied in her situation. Her martyrdom would have removed the hope of a future Protestant ruler, and losing her property and thus her status as a major landowner would mean losing part of the power base that allowed her to ascend the throne. Finally, it could be argued that it was better for an heir to the throne to conform and survive than to make a stand that would prove hopeless, for the sake of her subjects.

Elizabeth also developed her skills in equivocation and diplomacy during her years as a Nicodemite. She told her sister Mary that her lack of participation in the Mass was due to her ignorance not her disinterest, and asked for instructors. She also attended Mass with an expression of long-suffering on her face, which allowed people to interpret her participation in different ways.[31] Conyers Read says that, during those years,

> [Elizabeth] had developed extraordinary agility both of mind and conscience, extraordinary quickness in sizing up a situation, extraordinary readiness to go backwards or forwards or sidewise, wherever a new foothold seemed to offer, extraordinary indifference to anything like a logical or orderly progress, along with extra-ordinary self-confidence in her ability to get on somewhere somehow.[32]

[30] Perez Zagorin, *Ways of lying: dissimulation, persecution and conformity in early modern Europe* (Cambridge, 1990), p. 70.
[31] David Starkey, *Elizabeth* (London, 2001), p. 122.

These are early signs of the skilful equivocation she used in her later reign, which is often described as 'answers answerless', and helped her maintain stability in both the country and the Church of England.

Nicodemism also helped the Tudor statesman Nicholas Bacon and his wife Anne Cooke Bacon to survive. Both were strong Protestants under Edward, and Anne's sister Mildred was married to a man who had helped set Lady Jane Grey on the throne, so the Bacons had cause to fear the ascension of Mary. Anne Cooke Bacon's quick thinking greatly assisted in saving them; as soon as Mary came to London, Anne became a Gentlewoman of the Queen's Privy Chamber. That gave her the queen's ear, so to speak, and Anne used it to promote her husband and her brother-in-law. As Robert Tittler puts it in his biography of Nicholas Bacon, Anne 'swallowed her Protestant pride' and remained in Mary's service throughout her reign. Later, during the reign of Elizabeth, Anne contributed greatly to the establishment of the Church of England through her gift of languages. It was she who translated Jewel's *Apology of the Church of England* from Latin into English.

Nicholas Bacon managed to employ equivocation and skilful diplomacy during Mary's reign, which allowed him to stay in a position of authority. His chosen method was through the law. He served in the Court of Wards, as treasurer of Grey's Inn, and as commissioner of the peace in Suffolk. None of these positions were specifically religious in nature, so Bacon was able to avoid getting involved in controversy and maintain his outward conformity. Once Elizabeth ascended the throne, Bacon became Lord Keeper of the Great Seal, and a member of Elizabeth's Privy Council. He assisted in the development of the Church of England through his legal expertise, helped Elizabeth and Cecil create the episcopacy for the new

[32] Conyers Read, *Mr Secretary Cecil and Queen Elizabeth* (London, 1957), p. 118.

church, presided at Elizabeth's first Parliament, and served as Moderator for the Westminster Disputation. The purpose of this disputation, which took place just as the 1559 Act of Supremacy and Uniformity looked likely to fail, has often been debated. Some historians claim that it was meant to provide an excuse to arrest some Marian bishops.[33] Others think that it was meant to legitimize the Protestant side through open debate, or to weaken the Catholic side through a rigged system of debate. [34] Whatever its purpose, its actual accomplishment was that it gathered together the ideas of many fine Protestant minds, including those of John Jewel, and helped alter the balance of power for Elizabeth in her first Parliament. Bacon's moderation helped make this possible. His moderation also helped settle the vestment controversy in 1571, which threatened to violently upset the structure and beliefs of the Church of England.[35]

Another Nicodemite of the Marian years was Robert Dudley, favourite of Queen Elizabeth and later Earl of Leicester. Dudley's father, the Duke of Northumberland, led the uprising against Mary and attempted to place Jane Grey on the throne. Robert Dudley and his brothers led some of the troops in that attempt. He and his brothers were accordingly sent to the Tower, and his father was executed as a traitor. Robert Dudley remained in the Tower until 1554, when he was released on the goodwill of the new King Philip. He was pardoned in 1555 and even participated in some court activities, suggesting that he too conformed to the Catholic mass. He was not completely trusted, however, being one of the people ordered to leave London during the Queen's confinement.[36]

Robert Dudley was still just a rising favourite during the time of the Elizabethan Settlement in 1559, so the most significant of his contributions to the Church of England occurred later. He developed a

[33] Henry Norbert Birt, *The Elizabethan religious settlement: a study of contemporary documents* (London, 1907), pp 107-11.
[34] Norman L. Jones, *Faith by statute: parliament and the settlement of Religion* (London, 1982), pp 114-24. See also Norman L. Jones, 'Elizabeth's first year: the conception and birth of the Elizabethan political world' in Christopher Haigh's *The reign of Elizabeth I* (Hampshire, 1984), p. 43.
[35] Robert Tittler, *Nicholas Bacon: the making of a Tudor statesman* (London, 1976), p. 170.
[36] Simon Adams, 'Dudley, Robert, earl of Leicester (1532/3–1588)' in Matthew and Brian Harrison, (eds), H. C. G., *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford, 2004).

reputation as a champion of the Protestant cause. John Alymer dedicated his response to Knox's treatise against women rulers to Dudley because he thought that Dudley was a person who had a 'singular favour and desire to advance and promote the true doctrine of Christ's Cross.' Many other works were either dedicated to Robert Dudley or published under his promotion: for example, in 1561, a treatise against the doctrine of free will; in 1562, a translation of *The Laws and Statutes of Geneva*; in 1564, a translation of Peter Martyr's *Commentaries on Judges;* and in 1572, a refutation of the papal bull against Elizabeth, written by Heinrich Bullinger himself. Because this refutation was so important, Sarah Gristwood thinks that this dedication 'amount[ed] to an official recognition of Leicester's status as guardian of Protestantism.'[37] Dudley also patronized particular clerics, helping them secure posts in the church. Laurence Humphrey, for example, attributed his placement to Dudley.[38]

The historian Camden notes that Dudley was 'very skilful in temporizing, and fitting himself to the times, to serve his own turn.'[39] It is true that Dudley was a master equivocator, something he learned early and developed during his years as a Nicodemite. He used his skills to promote the reign of Elizabeth and her religious settlement; for example, when he managed to let some of the continental Catholic powers believe in his possible conversion during Elizabeth's marriage negotiations,[40] and when he let himself be considered the champion of the puritans even though he did not specifically adhere to puritan beliefs. His actual beliefs reflected his position in the Elizabethan government, as shown during the controversy of the prophesyings when he followed orders and helped suppress them. Thomas Wood attacked him in print for betraying the puritans over this issue and Dudley wrote back to Wood to deny it. He said that:

> I am not, I thank God, fantastically persuaded in religion but, being resolved to my comfort of all the substance thereof, do find it soundly and

[37] Sarah Gristwood, *Elizabeth and Leicester* (New York, 2007), p.199.
[38] Rev Hastings Robinson, ed. *The Zurich letters, second series* (Cambridge, 1845), p. 219.
[39] William Camden, *Annales the true and royall history of the famous empresse Elizabeth Queene of England France and Ireland* (London, 1625), p. 288.
[40] Gristwood, *Elizabeth and Leicester*, p. 149.

> godly set forth in this universal Church of England...which doctrine and religion I wish to be obeyed duly as it ought of all subjects of this land.[41]

Dudley's support of the Church of England helped it develop, but the Nicodemite with the greatest influence over the fledgling church was William Cecil, the queen's secretary. Cecil was Northumberland's principal secretary and took part in the alteration of succession that attempted to put Lady Jane Grey on the throne, but he managed to escape the consequences of that through diplomacy and equivocation. He was one of the first people pardoned under Mary, and managed to establish himself at a distance from the court, allowing him to both develop a network of connections and keep away from religious quarrels. Like Nicholas Bacon, Cecil managed to take positions that were not by nature religious; for example, he served at Reginald Pole's lord high steward, accompanied delegates for diplomatic missions, and acted as host for some of King Philip's retinue.[42] The most risky move Cecil made was during the Parliament of 1555, when he actively resisted the bill to take away the land of all exiles. His efforts saved the property of many of the Marian exiles, and helped them survive on the continent.[43] Also, although Cecil outwardly conformed and carefully maintained that show of conformity, he did quietly resist in other ways. For example, he owned the land in Lincolnshire on which John Day ran his printing business for the first two years of Mary's reign.[44] Conyers Read thinks that this form of resistance reflects Cecil's sensible, logical nature. As Read puts it, 'Cecil was temperamentally no martyr. He knew that he could accomplish more in office than out of office, more living than dead, more by making friends of the mammon of unrighteousness than by openly opposing it.'[45]

[41] Patrick Collinson, ed. *Letters of Thomas Wood, Puritan* (London, 1960), p. 15.
[42] Stephen Alford, *Burghley: William Cecil at the Court of Elizabeth I* (New Haven, 2008), pp 66, 70, 72.
[43] Read, *Mr Secretary Cecil*, p. 111.
[44] Alford, *Burghley*, p. 67.
[45] Read, *Mr Secretary Cecil*, p. 78.

Once Elizabeth ascended the throne, Cecil became her secretary and remained in her service until his death in 1598. Cecil was involved in the creation of the Acts of Supremacy and Uniformity that established the Church of England, engineered its first bench of bishops, orchestrated the Westminster Disputation, and defended the church against threats of all kinds. He also commissioned John Jewel to write the *Apology*, and to write another anonymous letter called the *Epistle*, which was meant to answer some continental detractors of the Church of England.[46] Cecil's skills in equivocation and diplomacy are well known, and those skills helped bring the Church of England into existence in the form it took in 1559.[47]

As proven through these case studies, a network of Nicodemites emerged from their grim conformity during Mary's reign to take the reins of a new government and a new church. During the years of their Nicodemism, they displayed a range of behaviours, from quiet retirement to active resistance, and developed the skills they needed to help run a Protestant government. They assisted in the formation of the Church of England in many ways, from the indirect sort of help provided by Anne Warcup, to the dangerous underground work of John Day, to the careful diplomacy of William Cecil. These people prove how Nicodemism was not necessarily an act of cowardice or ambiguity. It was often a form of faith, a deliberate course of action based on religious and moral beliefs. One could be both a Nicodemite and a committed Protestant, as long as one did not 'consent to the wyckednesse.'

[46] Ibid., p. 262.
[47] Diarmaid MacCulloch, *The later reformation in England 1547-1603* (London, 1990), p. 27.

How were the 1641 depositions manipulated in England to persuade the English masses of Catholic persecution?

Sophie Cooper

> And all this cruelty that is exercised upon us, we know not for what cause, offence, or seeming provocation its inflicted on us, (sin excepted) saving that we were Protestants.[1]

This article will look at how the depositions taken in the aftermath of the 1641 Irish rebellion were manipulated by authors in England to achieve their own ends. The principle questions that this article aims to answer are: how were the depositions altered to produce an utterly negative image of Irish Catholics in the minds of the English? Who read the martyrologies and pamphlets which were produced? Finally, how were the depositions used to equate the horror of what was happening in Ireland with Protestants being God's chosen people? To answer some of these questions, this article will examine the extracts and stories which were published in martyrologies, like Samuel Clarke's *A general martyrologie*, and compare them to the original depositions to see where disparities exist. Firstly a definition is necessary, the *Oxford English Dictionary* defines a martyrology as 'the histories of martyrs collectively'.[2] Kathleen M. Noonan has described the role of martyrologists as religious people seeking 'to edify, inspire, and cajole the faithful who could occasionally grow faint-hearted.'[3]

The Marian persecutions of the mid-sixteenth century became the focus of many martyrologists, most famous of which was John Foxe's *Acts and Monuments*. Samuel Clarke's reliance on Foxe's work is referenced in

[1] Samuel Clarke, *A general martyrologie, containing a collection of all the greatest persecutions vvhich have befallen the church of Christ, from the creation to our present times wherein is given an exact account of the Protestants sufferings in Queen Maries reign : whereunto is added the lives of thirty two English divines ... : together with the lives of Gustavus Ericson, king of Sweden, Jaspar Coligni, admiral of France ... and Joan, Queen of Navarr ... likewise, of divers other Christians who were eminent for prudence and piety* (London, 1677), p. 280.
[2] Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford,1999).
[3] Kathleen M. Noonan, '"Martyrs in flames": Sir John Temple and the conception of the Irish in English martyrologies' in *Albion: A Quarterly Journal concerned with British Studies*, xxxvi, 2 (2004), pp 223-55.

the introduction to *A general martyrologie* when Clarke writes 'some may think this labor of mine superfluous, because these things have been so largely, and fully handled by that faithful, and laborious servant *of* Christ, *Master* Fox in his Act and Monuments.' He does concede that 'I have turned over many other Authors' and this can be seen by the way that he lifts whole pages from John Temple's *The Irish rebellion*.[4] This will be illustrated in later pages. Foxe's narrative of weak Protestants suffering unprovoked Catholic persecution 'had become entrenched in the English psyche' by 1641 and became a framework onto which new tales of Catholic cruelty could be hung.[5] Martyrologies were often used to explain why God allowed such atrocities to occur to 'His' people. Henry Jones has been considered one of the first writers that presented the idea of the Irish Rebellion as being a general massacre of Irish Protestants.[6] His *A Remonstrance* was published in the immediate aftermath of the Rebellion and recorded a number of depositions which were then used in the martyrologies of Temple and Clarke.[7] The ideas contained in all of these books were spread around the masses of England through a number of mediums, including sermons and also through the rise of cheap print.

The depositions consist of thirty-three volumes of manuscripts held in Trinity College Dublin which were compiled at three different times in the aftermath of the 1641 Irish Rebellion. Joseph Cope has described the depositions as 'an archive of survival stories' and to a huge extent they are witness testimonies.[8] The objective of their compilation differed depending on when they were recorded. The first depositions were taken by a

[4] Samuel Clarke, *A general martyrologie*; also John Temple, *The Irish Rebellion: or, an history of the attempts of the Irish papists to extirpate the Protestants in the kingdom of Ireland; together with the barbarous cruelties and bloody massacres which ensued thereupon – written from his own observations and authentic depositions of other eye-witnesses* (London, 1812).
[5] David A. O'Hara, *English newsbooks and Irish Rebellion, 1641-1649* (Dublin, 2006), p. 30; Ethan Howard Shagan, 'Constructing discord: ideology, propaganda, and the English responses to the Irish Rebellion of 1641' in *The Journal of British Studies*, xxvi, 1 (1997), pp 4-34.
[6] Walter Love in Tom O'Gorman, 'Occurrences from Ireland: contemporary pamphlet reactions to the Confederate War, 1641-1649' (M.Litt thesis, University College Dublin, 1999), p. 6.
[7] Henry Jones, *A remonstrance of divers remarkeable passages concerning the Church and kingdome of Ireland: recommended by letters from the right hon. the Lords Justices, and Connsell of Ireland* (London, 1642).
[8] Joseph Cope, *England and the 1641 Irish Rebellion* (Woodbridge, 2009) p. 57.

commission dating from 23 December 1641 and were quickly followed by a second commission in January 1642. The second commission required the commissioners to ask about British settlers who had been murdered or died due to exposure and famine.[9] Although there was a third group of depositions taken by Oliver Cromwell's men the following decade, they focused on convicting those involved in the rebellion, not the general stories of those people who were attacked. The length of time in between the event and the record also brings into question the legitimacy of the testimony, as people forget things and inadvertently change their story. The focus of this article is on Clarke's martyrology which is based on the depositions recorded in the immediate aftermath of the rebellion, and therefore, they shall be the focal point. The depositions are valuable as they provide insight into the economic and social makeup of Ireland at the time; however, they do supply plenty of problems to the historian. They are practically all made by Protestants, mainly English settlers, to Protestants and therefore the inherent snobberies of the time are evident. The usual problems of witness statements also exist within the depositions. People are subconsciously influenced by stories that they have heard, the way that they were brought up, an added issue with these depositions was that many deponents were illiterate and therefore at the mercy of whoever was transcribing their testimony. Nevertheless, the depositions are a priceless resource for the historian of early seventeenth century Ireland.

The flow of information about events in Ireland throughout the 1640s led to 'a paper war' between the parliamentarians and the royalists.[10] The depositions were utilized by both sides during the English Civil War, and their use did not stop there. They were used as anti-Catholic propaganda for at least a century afterwards; the numerous re-editions of John Temple's *The Irish Rebellion* which continued until 1812 illustrate this.[11] 'The Irish

[9] Michael Perceval-Maxwell, 'The Ulster Rising of 1641, and the depositions' in *Irish Historical Studies*, xxi, 82 (1978), pp 144-67.
[10] O'Hara, *English newsbooks*, p.13.
[11] Kathleen M. Noonan, '"The cruell pressure of an enraged, barbarous people": Irish and English identity in seventeenth-century policy and propaganda' in *The Historical Journal*, xxxxi, 1 (1998), pp 151-77.

rebellion was, therefore, written by Englishmen for a domestic audience, with domestic political objectives in mind, and the domestic reading audience was given timely reminders of the popish threat at key moments'[12] John Foxe regarded print as a 'providential gift from God which allowed the shackles of Rome to be shaken off and the true light of the Gospel to dawn.'[13] David Cressy has estimated that thirty-three percent of adult males, and ten percent of adult women in England could read and write by 1640.[14] The constant stream of information between the world of print and oral culture helped spread the stories found in pamphlets and other print sources. Ultimately, being illiterate did not stop people from utilizing the skills of others.[15] It has been found that, between 1641 and1653, of the 20,767 works that were printed in London, 921 related to Ireland specifically: a total of 4.4 per cent of all printed works.[16] John Ball has shown that the initial stories of the Uprising found in the London cheap print trade were based on existing English notions of Catholic atrocities and cruelty, and these stories were merged with exaggerated accounts of the events found in the depositions.[17] Often the other authors who recycled the depositions and ideas that they found in Temple and Jones' works did not make clear if they had looked at printed, manuscript, or original copies of depositions. This made it easier for a specific set of messages to percolate through the mass of literature available to the English masses.[18]During the 1640s and 1650s, there was a temporary increase in the number of published authors who were drawn from socially and educationally disadvantaged sections of society.[19] This led to a large number of cheaply produced pamphlets and chapbooks which recycled much

[12] Jason Peacey, *Politicians and Pamphleteers: propaganda during the English Civil Wars and Interregnum* (Aldershot, 2004), pp 241-2.
[13] John Foxe in Raymond Gillsepie, *Reading Ireland: print, reading and social change in early modern Ireland* (Manchester, 2005), p. 3.
[14] Eamon Darcy, 'Pogroms, politics, and print: The 1641 rebellion and contemporary print culture' (PhD thesis, University of Dublin, 2009) p. 41.
[15] David Cressy, *Literacy and the social order: reading and writing in Tudor and Stuart England* (Cambridge, 1980), p. 14.
[16] Darcy, 'Pogroms, politics, and print', p. 129.
[17] John Ball, 'Popular violence in the Irish Uprising of 1641: the 1641 depositions, Irish resistance to English colonialism, and its representation in English sources' (Ph.D thesis, John Hopkins University, 2006), p. 11.
[18] Darcy, 'Pogroms, politics, and print', p. 28.
[19] Ian Green, *Print and Protestantism in early modern England* (Oxford, 2000), p. 6.

of the same information with a slightly different headline. Due to this, there were two and a half times more editions printed between 1641 and 1700 than in the preceding century and a half.[20]

The central topic of this article will be the manipulation of the depositions in *A general martyrologie*. The omissions of the work will be as important as that included, as they were, presumably, intentional omissions meant to portray the rebels in a certain light. These will be illustrated by comparing the actual depositions with their portrayals in Clarke's work, as well as through using other depositions not specifically mentioned. The use of 'headlines' in the margins of Clarke's work are also important as they allow for certain elements of the prose to be emphasized. While this technique was used by both Protestant and Catholic authors, phrases such as 'popish malice' and 'popish cruelty' were highlighted by martyrologists to allow quick and directed reading for the English Protestant public.[21] There are many repetitions of images throughout the *General martyrologie* suggesting that they are not all specific to Ireland, but emphasizing the idea that 1641 was a chapter in a long history of Catholic persecution in a religious war between Protestants and Catholics. These images are also used in Temple and Foxe and focus on violence against mothers and children, murder, disembowelment and also violence against the Bible and religious ground. These descriptions were used frequently, and still are, to emphasize the barbarism of invading forces, no matter what religion or race. One only need look at reports from World War One to see this.

A preoccupation of the martyrologists was to warn English Protestants about the threat of a huge and barbaric enemy: International Catholicism. As the Rising spread outside Ulster, the leaders solicited the support of the Catholic Old English gentry claiming to be fighting for King Charles I, but also to protect the liberties, religion, estates and persons of

[20] Green, *Print and Protestantism*, p. 9.
[21] For a Catholic example see John T. Gilbert, ed. *A contemporary history of affairs in Ireland, from 1641 to 1652: now for the first time published with an appendix of original letters and documents* (Dublin, 1880).

Catholics in Ireland.[22] This declaration of fighting for Catholic rights was a trigger for widespread panic in England at the threat of a Catholic invasion. It combined with existing fears that the king was secretly Catholic, and was going to overthrow the Reformation. Samuel Clarke explicitly gives his reason for writing his martyrology as 'we have cause to fear the worst, and to prepare for it; Forwarnd, forearmed.'[23] Sweeping statements about the threat of international Catholicism were supported by stories of the Irish rebels wanting to kill all English people. Depositions such as Elizabeth Gough's were relied on to provide the 'proof' for people. She deposed that:

> she demaunded of Cahil O Reily the reason of these outrages against the English above others: the said Cahil answering that it was pitty that all the English in England & Ireland were not hangd drawne and quartered before now. this deponent demaunding the reason he replied, ther they had hanged & quartered the Queenes priest in her presence: & had put gunpowder in her sadle to blowe her up: *the* said *English* calling her whore & her children bastards [24]

Depositions such as these were used both to illustrate Catholic violence, but also in some cases to demonstrate the support of the Catholics for Charles I and his Catholic wife. These were used by the parliamentarians eager to undercut English support for the king. Accounts of rebel support for the king were relevant in the immediate aftermath of the Rising, but also later on after the succession crisis when England was yet again faced with the prospect of a Catholic monarch. Adam Glouer's testimony included reference to the rebels having Charles I's support,

> *Phillip Rely* spake & vttered these traiterous words that he had the kings broade seale for doing the same & shewed a writing by which he *said he* had authority from the king [25]

[22] Aidan Clarke, 'The genesis of the Ulster Rising of 1641' in Peter Roebuck, ed. *Plantation to partition: essays in Ulster history in honour of J. L. McCracken* (Belfast, 1981), pp 29-45.
[23] Samuel Clarke, 'Epistle to the reader' in *A general martyrologie*.
[24] Deposition of Elizabeth Gough 8 Feb. 1642, 1641 Depositions Project (http:// 1641.tcd.ie/deposition .php? dep ID < ?php echo 833002r003) (accessed Monday 13 Dec. 2010) all references to the online depositions were accessed on 13 Dec. 2010 unless otherwise stated.
[25] Deposition of Adam Glouer 4 Jan. 1642 (http://1641.tcd.ie/deposition.php).

For those supporting the king, this statement of rebel support for the king was attributed to the sly and devious natures of the Irish, who would lie to fool and harm the Protestants in Ireland, but also to harm and slander the king. In some instances, the use of the king's seal was simply ignored. In the deposition of Margaret Fermeny, John Temple wrote about how she was robbed, her husband was killed, and then she was stripped seven times in one day on the way to Dublin.[26] This humiliation of an old woman, combined with the material and emotional losses served to illustrate Irish barbarity. However, Mrs Fermeny also testified that the rebels claimed to be the king's soldiers and had a warrant from the king, but Temple deleted this part and chose to focus on the uncouth and malicious behaviour of the Irish Catholics.[27] After the Reformation, Irishness became 'increasingly defined in terms of Roman Catholicism, and Roman Catholicism in Ireland becomes increasingly an assertion of non-Englishness.'[28] These acts of betrayal were further evidence of their un-English ways in the eyes of many contemporaries.

Other instances of Catholic betrayal seized upon by Samuel Clarke and his peers were used as a moral lesson to Protestants not to trust 'others'. An example of this betrayal in Samuel Clarke's work was when chief Irish gentlemen promised their Protestant neighbours that if they gave them their chattel and goods, the Protestants would be safe. Clarke argues that the Catholic neighbours, whom 'the English Protestants...never provoked them thereto, yea that had always lived peaceably with them, administring help and comfort to them in distress, putting no difference betwixt them and those their own Nation, and cherished them as Friends and loving Neighbors', promised to 'secure them from the rage of the common people'. This, according to Samuel Clarke, did not happened as the Catholics double-crossed the Protestants, stealing their goods and then murdering them.[29] It is

[26] Temple, *The Irish rebellion*, p. 89.
[27] Noonan, 'The cruell pressure'.
[28] Joep Leerssen, 'Wildness, wilderness, and Ireland: medieval and early-modern patterns in the demarcation of civility' in *Journal of the History of Ideas*, lvi, 1 (1995) pp 25-39.
[29] Clarke, *A general martyrologie*, pp 270-5.

possible that this story came from the deposition of John Glasse who accused Florence Fitzpatrick of taking people into his protection in exchange for their belongings and then 'in most bloodie & barbarous manor, murthered those betooke themselues to him for safetie.'[30]

Instances of Catholics helping their Protestant neighbours are wholly excluded from Clarke's martyrology although they are relatively common within the depositions themselves. An example of this is in the deposition of Robert Maxwell, who Samuel Clarke quotes while discussing the rejection of Catholicism on pain of death that was chosen by some English Protestants. The instance of eleven year old Robert Ecklin who refused to go to Mass on pain of death is emphasized by both Clarke and Temple, as is the story of Henry Cowel who was offered his life if 'he would marry one of the base Trulls' or go to Mass. Cowel refused this offer and chose death.[31] However, in the same deposition it becomes clear that these stories are hearsay: Robert Maxwell did not witness either event. He did, however, receive aid from the 'best frends amongst the Rebells', Katherine Hovenden, the mother of Sir Phelim O'Neill.[32] Katherine apparently provided food and protection for twenty four English and Scots for thirty-seven weeks. The fact that these three stories are recounted in one deposition illustrates the ease in which John Temple or Henry Jones could have related instance of kindness if they had so wished. Samuel Clarke, however, would probably not have had access to the actual depositions and therefore would probably have recycled the testimonies detailed in other tomes and thus would have been oblivious to these conflicting stories. The compassion shown by Katherine Ne Mahon (Katherine Hovenden) was related in other depositions, including Thomas Crant's in which he credits Katherine with saving his life and the lives of his family.[33] This image of Irish succour, however, did not fit with the portrayal of Irish Catholics that was being presented by English

[30] Deposition of John Glasse 8 Apr.1642 (http://1641.tcd.ie/deposition.php).
[31] Clarke, *A general martyrologie*, p. 278.
[32] Deposition of Robert Maxwell 22 Aug. 1642 (http://1641.tcd.ie/deposition.php).
[33] Deposition of Thomas Crant 13 Feb.1642 (http://1641.tcd.ie/deposition.php).

martyrologists, and indeed most English pamphleteers, at a time when an emphasis on Catholic malice and uncouthness was important.

More in supporting the ideas and sentiments of the English masses, and the idea of a long history of Catholic persecution of innocent Protestants, were illustrations of Catholic violence. These were often literally illustrated with the use of woodcuttings of the genre that are seen in *Teares of Ireland* and throughout Clarke's work.[34] These enabled the illiterate to understand the atrocities that were occurring, and also to drive home to those who could read what they were reading about. These woodcuttings were often recycled and took images from anecdotes from all around Europe at the time. In fact, *A general martyrologie* dedicated only sixteen out of 574 pages to the 1641 Rebellion, while the images used during these sixteen pages are reused throughout. Clarke presents 1641 as a confessional conflict, not one that had its roots in economic, political, or social reasons and this fits with his narrative of Catholic persecution. Most of the images of violence used throughout are typical of the time and genre: children being roasted on spits, young children who are murdered in their mothers' arms before the mother is killed, drowning, burnings, and rape.[35] Within the actual depositions, however, it is possible to note that most of these stories are hearsay and were not actually witnessed by the person relating them as fact. To emphasize the un-Christian nature of those involved in the rebellion, Temple set in motion the idea that the Irish Rebellion was the responsibility of Irish Catholics friars and priests set on overthrowing the Protestant community in both Britain and Ireland. The depositions contain images of Irish Catholics desecrating the Bible, the focal point for Protestants who were allowed to read the Bible themselves, and murdering members of the Protestant clergy. Samuel Clarke relates stories of priests giving the sacrament to all the Irish as long as they would promise to kill all the English Protestants, saying 'That it did them a

[34] James Cranford. *The teares of Ireland wherein is lively presented as in a map a list of the unheard off cruelties and perfidious treacheries of blood-thirsty Jesuits and the popist faction: as a warning piece to her sister nations to prevent the like miseries, as are now acted on the stage of this fresh bleeding nation* (London, 1642).
[35] Clarke, *A general martyrologie*, p. 240.

great deal of good to wash their Hands in their Blood.'[36] Henry Jones was the head of the deposition collection commission, and would have therefore been deeply influenced by the depositions such as that of Adam Glouer. Glouer's deposition testified to the sacrilegious role of the Irish Catholics:

> James o Rely of or nere vnto the parish of Ballyheyes yeoman and Hugh Brady of *or nere the parish of* Vrnagh and divers others of the Rebells, did then often take into their hands the protestant bybles & wetting them on the *durty* water did 5 or 6 seuerall tymes dash the same on the face of the deponent & other protestants saying come I know you love a good lesson. Here is a most excelent one for you & come to morrow & you shall have as good a sermon as this: & used other scornfull and disgracefull words vnto them [37]

Again, instances of the Catholic clergy helping Protestant refugees were not recorded although they do exist.

Martyrologies were popular as they were a way of equating what was happening in Ireland, and elsewhere, with the existence of God. They were also a way of forming a British identity which made the English people God's chosen ones. By the time of the third edition of Samuel Clarke's *A general martyrologie*, Britain was engulfed by another presumed threat of a popish plot. This had been brought about by the succession crisis which occurred due to Charles II's lack of legitimate children. The heir presumptive, therefore, became his brother James who was a Catholic. The Earl of Shaftesbury's campaign to exclude James from the succession led to a period of huge anti-Catholicism with fears that the Irish Catholics, always a presumed backdoor for continental Catholicism in to Britain, were ready to rise up with the help of the French. The 1641 Rebellion had been included in Clarke's work since 1651 and was portrayed as just one chapter in a long history of Catholic persecution of Protestants. The ideas which were encompassed by Clarke, and previously John Temple's work *The Irish Rebellion* which was republished in 1672, were therefore at the fore in the

[36] Ibid., p. 269.
[37] Deposition of Adam Glouer 4 Jan. 1642 (http://1641.tcd.ie/deposition.php).

minds of many English Protestants as the international threat of Catholicism was again at large. *A general martyrologie* emphasized the threat posed by Irish Catholics and their allies in Spain and France, and helped remind waning Protestants of their long persecuted ancestors. When Roger L'Estrange allowed Clarke's work to be reprinted in1679 'The Popish Plot' (brought about by Titus Oates' declarations that Catholics were going to push Protestants out of England in September 1678) was spearheading another wave of anti-Catholic hysteria.[38]

The reasons varied but there are two main explanations for what the Protestants in England went through at the hands of the Catholics. One of these explanations seems to be God was punishing the English Protestants in Ireland for the tolerance showed to Catholics by Charles I and many of the Protestants in Ireland. [39] Another reason given was that God was testing the Protestants in Ireland, as he had tested Protestants throughout Europe, as to cleanse them and allow them to go to Heaven. Samuel Clarke outline this in the introduction to his martyrology writing that 'He knows that heavy afflictions; and that grace is hid in nature here, as sweet Water in Rose Leaves, which must have the fire of affliction put under to distil it out.'[40] God did not just test the Protestants however, in certain situations He showed His love for His Chosen People. Elizabeth Price's deposition about the events in Portadown have been widely reused, the images of corpses emerging the River Bann screaming 'Revenge' made a huge impact. There are, however, other stories which were utilized by Samuel Clarke in his martyrology. In Tipperary, a number of rebels murdered around twenty-five English Protestants on a fair and clear Sabbath day,

> But just at that time, God sent a fearful storm of Thunder, Lightning, Wind, Hail and Rain' which the rebels confessed 'that is was a sign of Gods anger against them for their cruelty.' Two of the Protestants miraculously survived and 'as God shewed his great mercy in preserving them, so he

[38] John Gibney, 'Edmund Murphy, Oliver Plunkett and the Popish Plot' in *History Ireland*, xii, 4 (2004) pp 20-4.
[39] O'Gorman, 'Occurrences from Ireland', p. 107.
[40] Clarke, *A general martyrologie*, p. 3.

> shewed his just judgement upon Hugh Kennedy, the chief of those murtherers...till about Eight days after he drowned himself.[41]

In the depositions, the only reference found by this researcher, was that of Ralph Lambert who claimed that 'he hath likwise beene *credibly* tould both by Irish and English' of the drowning.[42]Another instance of these wonders found in the depositions was the testimony of Elizabeth Crooker:

> the Rebells often publiquely said to this deponent and the other English That they were noe Christians & there was noe salvation for them: And saith *alsoe* that as some of the Rebells were robbing & prophaneing of the Church one of them those robbers fell downe in the Church *of Newry* & fell into such *a* trembling [ ]ing and extasy that other Rebells were gladd to carry him out of the Church as a frantick man [43]

Although this 'miracle' was witnessed by the deponent, many other depositions were based on hearsay. This reliance on hearsay was not made clear in the original depositions as they were not recorded in a court of law where a conviction cannot be made on any unconfirmed reports. However, martyrologists such as Temple and Clarke make no attempt to make the audience aware of this and portray it all as fact to support their claims. These depositions, or portrayals of depositions, do help to support the view of Protestants as God's people, who are either saved in life or whose eternal life shall be spent at God's right side. For this reason, stories from the depositions were utilized by preachers and religious people to invoke renewed belief in God from those whose belief was waning when confronted with so much atrocity, in Ireland and in England. They were also used as moral guidelines, stories of girls who shouted out God's name and then could not be stabbed by a rebel, they were people that the common people of England could look up to and emulate.

The ideas contained in the martyrologies were spread more easily than in previous years, due to the decrease in real price of books there was a

[41] Ibid., p. 277.
[42] Deposition of Ralph Lambert 9 July 1645 (http://1641.tcd.ie/deposition.php).
[43] Deposition of Elizabeth Crooker 15 Mar. 1643 (http://1641.tcd.ie/deposition.php).

'downwards dissemination' of print to the masses.[44] Another way of spreading the ideas included in many of the more expensive books was through the theatre and play pamphlets, which did not require literacy as they were heard not read.[45] Martyrologies had been popular in England and throughout Europe since the sixteenth century, due to cheap print and the increase of literacy levels, they had become more accessible to the masses. When whole martyrologies were not available, excerpted versions published as pamphlets were popular and cheaper.[46] John Foxe's *Acts and Monuments* was also available for perusal in parish churches while it was said that Temple's *The Irish Rebellion* was 'a book worth chaining to every church's desk and reading over once a year by every family.'[47] Martyrologies were important because they put current events into a wider historical and European context, for those in England they widened the outlook of many. They were utilized by politicians and the elites however, to drum up popular support for anti-Catholic crusades, for example Temple's work was produced in some ways to provide support for his patron's son, Lord Lisle.[48] Many of the original depositions were first published to find military and monetary support for the Protestants in Ireland, and they were manipulated for many years to come for similar reasons. The portrayal of the Irish Catholics as a superstitious 'other' was already being fashioned by 1641 due to Mary I and also the Gunpowder Plot of 1605. These ideas were simply built on by Clarke and his peers to emphasize the threat in a time of Puritanical fervour, which existed at the time of *A general martyrologie*'s original two editions.

[44] R.A. Houston, *Literacy in early modern Europe: culture and education, 1500-1800* (London, 2002), p. 203; Nigel Smith, *Literature and revolution in England, 1640-1660* (London, 1994), p. 24.
[45] Smith, *Literature and revolution*, p. 80.
[46] Noonan, 'Martyrs in flames'.
[47] Raymond Gillespie, 'Temple's fate: reading *The Irish Rebellion* in late seventeenth-century Ireland' in Ciaran Brady & Jane Ohlmeyer (eds), *British interventions in early modern Ireland* (Cambridge, 2005), pp 315-33.
[48] Aidan Clarke, 'Temple, Sir John' in James Mcguire and James Quinn (eds), *Dictionary of Irish Biography* (http://dib.cambridge.org/) (accessed 11Dec. 2010).

The origins and inspirations of the Celtic revival

Deirdre Kelly

This article will examine the background to the Celtic revival and focus on the specific individuals who influenced its leading figures. In doing so it will take into account the universality of folkloric tradition and its influence over a wider dimension. It will attempt to formulate an understanding as to why this particular period in Irish cultural nationalism has maintained such a fascination well over a century after it first developed.

The birth of the Irish Renaissance or Irish revival can be said to have begun with Thomas Davis (1814-45) who founded *The Nation* newspaper in 1842 to promulgate the regeneration of pride in Ireland among Irishmen. Davis was extremely important because he was the first to argue effectively that the future of Irish writing lay in bridging the gap between Celtic Catholic Ireland and Protestant Anglo-Ireland.[1] Davis did not belong to a revolutionary organisation in the defined sense but rather to a group that inspired antiquarian belief and interest in the Gaelic past. He and his friends aimed to establish Irish culture on its own foundations, to go back as it were, and to take up at the point where this culture had left off, when the Gaelic aristocracy fled the country with the Flight of the Earls in 1607 . Davis was active in every group which was working for the improvement of the country, and as editor of *The Nation* encouraged literary effort. As such he exercised a certain influence and garnered a following.[2]

Samuel Ferguson (1810-86), poet and antiquarian, was an admirer of Davis. Writing in the *Dublin University Magazine*, he spoke

[1] Richard Fallis, *The Irish renaissance: an introduction to Anglo-Irish literature* (Dublin, 1978), p. 5.
[2] Terence de Vere White, *The Anglo-Irish* (London, 1972), p. 145.

out about how he, along with every other Irishman, was outraged at the tone of contempt directed at Ireland in the English press. Following the traumatic years of the Famine, there were persistent rumours that the system of Government in Ireland was to be changed. The office of viceroy, and even the law courts were supposedly under threat. Ferguson as a barrister, felt that he could not hold back any longer. A new approach was needed to inculcate a sense of self-identity and he declared that the Anglo-Irish must save themselves by identifying thoroughly with the Irish past.[3] He turned to men of his own kind for inspiration such as Standish O'Grady (1846-1928) and George Petrie (1790-1866). Both were integral to the growth and surge of interest in Irish cultural history.

In many ways the Famine had marked a watershed in Irish life, demographically, economically, socially and culturally. Through death and emigration, it dealt a near fatal blow to the still powerful Gaelic culture and particularly to that of the largest and most traditional social grouping, the rural proletariat who disappeared almost completely from the face of the land within a couple of generations. During its immediate aftermath Ireland remained in a somewhat sluggish state until the late 1870s and early 1880s when the post-Famine generation emerged.[4] This generation sought to reshape Ireland through a series of radical creations which included the Gaelic League (1893), the Gaelic Athletic Association (1894) and the literary revival.

Standish O'Grady's *History of Ireland* with its stories of heroic Irish tales in particular, influenced many leading figures of the Celtic revival, most notably, Lady Augusta Gregory(1852-1932).[5] For O'Grady, romance, epic, drama and artistic representation were crucial in writing history. Archaeology culminated in history, he asserted, history

[3] Oliver MacDonagh, *States of mind* (London, 1983), p.109.
[4] Kevin Whelan, 'Cultural effects of the Famine' in *The Cambridge companion to modern Irish culture* (Cambridge, 2005), p.137.
[5] F.S.L. Lyons, *Culture and anarchy in Ireland 1890-1939* (Oxford, 1979), pp 22.28.

culminated in art. Artistic documentation whether literary or visual, were just as important historic contextual aids as straight historical fact.[6]

Part of the appeal of folklore for Lady Gregory, Douglas Hyde (1860-1949), and W.B Yeats (1865-1939), was that through its study one could demonstrate and claim 'Irishness' at the very time when this was being defined more and more restrictively. The disestablishment of the Church of Ireland in 1869, the Land War, Gladstone's legislation of 1881 enabling the tenant to become a partner with the landlord, the growth of land purchase under subsequent Tory governments and the imminent adoption of Home Rule, all contributed to the feeling that the whole social order and way of life of the Anglo-Irish minority was coming to an end.[7] It has been suggested that these Anglo-Irish artists and writers were the first generation to have grown up in the realisation that the ascendancy of the class to which they belonged was no longer secure and inevitable. F.S.L. Lyons maintains that this was the tragedy of the Anglo-Irish class, subsisting as they did between two worlds, and never accepted by either. To the English they came increasingly to seem an anachronism and to the Catholic nationalist Irish they remained an abnormality.[8] In simple terms therefore, the only alternative in the position of the minority was to rebel against their class and religious heritage by adopting an alternative identity.

When it came to a 'reinvention' of a Gaelic tradition, it must be remembered that these major figures of the revival, such as Lady Gregory ,W.B. Yeats and George Russell (1867-1935), were artists before they were nationalists and as such their strength lay in cultural interests.[9] They realised, however, that if Ireland were ever to gain political freedom, they would have to provide the climate for it by

[6] Michael McAteer, *Standish O'Grady, AE and Yeats* (Dublin, 2002), p. 18.
[7] F.S.L. Lyons, *Ireland since the Famine* (London, 1963), p. 233.
[8] F.S.L. Lyons, *Twentieth Century Studies*, iv (1970), p. 10.
[9] Nick Pelling, *Anglo-Irish relations, 1798-1922* (London, 2003), p. 79

helping create a national imagination which was distinctively Irish.[10] Folklore and anthropological interests opened a way into nationalism via 'national tradition'.[11] Traditional Gaelic literature had a wealth of stories, situations, characters, imagery and folklore, mostly drawn from oral culture, which Standish O'Grady had revealed to an avid readership. Irish myth contained a distinctiveness which was seen as purely Irish. It had to inspire and resonate with the Irish psyche so that although the themes of sacrifice, death and resurrection were universal, it was only through the distinctive sacrifice, death and resurrection of Irish heroes like Cúchulainn that a familiarity, immediacy and a particular sense of ownership evolved. A vital part of this conscious garnering of the past for the present and future was the recording of oral tradition.[12]

The oral tale is the most universal of all narrative forms and oral tradition is a body of information that belongs to a particular group of people. Its continued existence is by word of mouth passed from one generation to the next. What is transmitted and how it is done is decided by what social memory deems important . It enhances the sense of togetherness that is sanctified by the mystery of a distant past. Oral tradition further ensures and entrenches a sense of identity in a people in the face of disasters, like loss of land, conquest, exile and colonialism. It can always be the property of the people whatever else is lost.[13] The study of the folktale and oral tale took pride of place in international folklore scholarship from its nineteenth century beginnings until the middle of the twentieth century, based on the comparative scholarly framework established by the Grimm Brothers, Jakob (1785-1863) and Wilhelm (1786-1859). The pioneering tale

[10] Fallis, *The Irish renaissance*, p. 5.
[11] R.F. Foster, *Paddy and Mr Punch* (London, 1993), pp 205, 227.
[12] Nicola Gordon Bowe and Elizabeth Cumming, *The arts and crafts movement in Dublin and Edinburgh* (Dublin, 1998), p. 15.
[13] N. Tisan, 'Classified material in oral tradition and its survival and transmission' in Edgard Sienaert, Meg Cowper-Lewis and Nigel Bell (eds), *Oral tradition and its transmissions* (Durban, 1994), p. 169.

collection of the Irishman Thomas Crofton Croker (1798-1854) was translated by them and introduced with a scholarly essay of their own in 1807.[14]

The early Irish stories based on the oral tales were probably first documented around the eighth century, and they represent the foremost written repository of the oral tradition of the Iron-Age Celts who flourished in Europe during the seven centuries before Christ.[15] Christian Ireland preserved, as a legacy from paganism, the belief in a time when the supernatural was natural and the unexplained normal. They have a value far beyond the tale of actual events and daily recorded facts.[16] Standish O'Grady's *History of Ireland* provided the first translations of these stories into English. They had been preserved to some extent in the oral Irish language culture. Due to uncertainty when it came to translation, O'Grady used 'artistic licence' which enabled him to omit any material or point of information he felt did not subscribe to his ideal.[17] As Michael McAteer points out, the history of one generation is mythologised onto the next, and so the cumulative histories of successive generations must therefore result in a qualitative transformation between myth and history. The concept of history that interests O'Grady is not one of chronicle but of historical patterns informing mystic narratives, patterns whose historical constancy, in his view, give rise to the myth in the first place.[18]

The two earliest and most important surviving manuscripts, date to the twelfth century. The period up to the end of the sixteenth century, was in Ireland, Wales and Scotland, a time of literary revival after the turmoil of the previous epoch. The first of the manuscripts, *Lebor na hUidre* or *The book of Dun Cow* was copied from an earlier

[14] Diarmuid O'Giollain, *Locating Irish folklore* (Cork, 2000), pp 33, 44. Croker was a collector of ancient Irish poetry and folklore. His *South of Ireland* was translated by the Brothers Grimm.
[15] Jeffrey Gantz, *Early Irish myths and sagas* (Middlesex, 1981), Introduction.
[16] Ibid., p. 2.
[17] Martin Williams, 'Ancient mythology and revolutionary ideology in Ireland 1878-1916' in *The Historical Journal*, xxvi, 2 (June, 1983), p. 310.
[18] McAteer, *Standish O'Grady*, pp 37, 40.

manuscript written on the skin of a favourite animal, belonging to Saint Ciaran, who lived in the seventh century and gave the book its name. An entry on one page reveals the name of the scribe as Maelmuiri who was killed by raiders at Clonmacnois in 1106.[19] Only a fragment of this book remains, amounting to 138 pages, sixty- seven leaves of vellum, but it contains some of the most invaluable stories including the complete account of the epic saga the *Táin Bó Cuailgne*, or *The raiding of the Cattle of Cooley*, in which the hero Cúchulainn performs some of his greatest feats. This is an epic account of the struggle between Medb of Connaught and Conchubar Mac Nessa of Ulster, as to who should possess the Brown Bull of Cooley, which can be compared to Homer's *Iliad* with its tale of warriors, weapons and deities. *Lebor na hUidre* was discovered by George Petrie (1790-1866) in 1837 when it turned up in the Hodges Smith Collection of 227 manuscripts that were purchased by the Royal Irish Academy for 1,200 guineas in 1844.[20]

Petrie was a writer, musicologist, archaeologist and historian who dominated the newly emergent field of Irish studies in the first half of the nineteenth century. He was also curator of the Royal Irish Academy's Museum of Antiquities. In 1831 the library of Austin Cooper which had originally belonged to Colonel Burton Conyngham was offered for sale. Among this collection was the *Annals of the Four Masters* which Petrie subsequently donated to the Royal Irish Academy. As a result, he was made a life member of the Academy and subsequent manuscripts which he required on their behalf including the Hodges Smith Collection where *The Book of Dun Cow* was discovered.[21] These Annals or collections of manuscripts were edited by

[19] *Lebor na hUidre* , Royal Irish Academy (RIA MS 23 E 25: Cat. No. 1229)
[20] Ibid.
[21] Peter Murray (ed.) *George Petrie (1790-1866); the rediscovery of Ireland's past* (Cork, 2004), pp 83, 89. The principal source for the information on Petrie is William Stokes's *The life and labours in art and archaeology of George Petrie LL.D, MRIA* (Dublin, 1869).

Petrie's fellow scholar, John O'Donovan and transformed the nineteeth century historiography of Gaelic Ireland.[22]

The second most important surviving manuscript is *The book of Leinster.* Of somewhat lesser importance are *The yellow book of Lecan* and *The book of Ballymote,* both dating from the fourteenth century. *The Books of Lecan* and *Lismore* are attributed to the fifteenth century.[23] The language of these tales varies considerably , and it is therefore not possible to give the exact dates of origin. Yet it appears that the oldest surviving manuscript dates to the eighth century.

These stories, translated by O'Grady in his own style, form the context within which the revivalists based their 'reinvention' of Gaelic tradition. For instance, according to *Lebor Gabála* (The book of invasions), the earliest copy of which dates to the twelfth century, Ireland was subjected to six invasions.[24] Within this mythological account, the narrative of the history of Ireland is traced back to Noah and his daughter, Cessair, who arrived forty days before the flood. Some 268 years later, came the first of the two divine dynasties recognized by Gaelic tradition, 'The Race of Partholón' and the Tuatha De Danaan commonly called the Sídh.[25] The third invasion was led by Nemed, which means gods or sorcerers from Northern Greece. When Nemed died his people were defeated and subjugated by the Fomorii.[26] The Fomorians were a race of powerful and cruel demons whose name means literally 'under the sea'. They were dark, chthonic forces, peoples of monstrous shape and titanic size, the children of darkness. Nemed rebelled and the Fomorii king was killed but only thirty of Nemed's followers survived , ultimately leaving Ireland, in search of

[22] Joep Leerssen, 'Petrie: polymath and innovator' in Murray, *George Petrie,* p. 9.
[23] *Celtic mythology* (New Lanark, 1999), p. 19.
[24] Royal Irish Academy (RIA MS 23 M 70). See image of manuscript at Irish Script on Screen www.isos.dias.ie
[25] *Celtic mythology*, p. 57.
[26] Fomorians, compound of 'fo' under a root which appears in the German 'mahr', name of a female demon who lies in the breast of people while they are asleep, and constantly driven back to the limits of the world, from Marie-Louise Sjoestedt, *Gods and Heroes of the Celts,* translated by Myles Dillon (Dublin, 1994), p. 5.

somewhere else to settle. Next came the Fir Bolg or 'bag men' who got their name because at one point they were slaves, perhaps in Thrace (an historic and geographic area in south-east Europe), and had to carry bags of soil from the fertile part of the country to the rocky, barren area. They are said to have divided Ireland into five provinces called 'cóiceda' or 'fifths': Ulaid (Ulster), Connachta (Connaught), Lagin (Leinster), Mumu (Munster), of which tradition says there were two provinces, North Munster and South Munster.

The Tuatha De Danaan, the children of the light, ended the Fir Bolg's rule of Ireland when they defeated them at the first Battle of Magh Tuiredh. The vanquished remainder are said to have fled to Aran but another source claims they were kept by the Tuatha in Connaught.[27] These fifth invaders, the Tuatha De Danaan, the gods of pre-Christian Ireland, also defeated the Fomorii at the second Battle of Magh Tuiredh. MoyTuire, as it is now known is situated near Cong in County Mayo. This battle between the children of the light and the children of the dark generated much of the heroic mythology and resembles the battles between the gods and giants in pre-Homeric Greece.

The name Tuatha De Danaan means 'people of the goddess Danu', skilled in magic and all the arts with powerful warriors, popularised as the *Sidh* in Irish folklore (fig.1.2). Their chief and father god, the Daghda was the son of Eladu. They were finally defeated by the invasionary forces of the Sons of Mil Espaine or Milesians, the first human rulers in Ireland now known to be the Celts. Standish O'Grady believed that through emulation something like these stories of Heroic Ireland could be fashioned again through his writing, while his followers of a more mystical turn felt that Heroic Ireland lived on invisibly, as they believed the Tuatha De Danaan lived on after their defeat by the Milesians. Heroic Ireland could be

[27] *Celtic mythology*, p. 375.

witnessed in vision and if the mystical effect were intense enough, reincarnated.[28]

Fig.1.2 George Russell AE, *A spirit or sidh in the landscape*,Canvas laid on board, 25 x 19cm, National Gallery of Ireland, Presented by Mrs. F. Hart, 1973[29]

These stories proved inspirational for revivalists of the late nineteenth, early twentieth centuries in their attempts to revitalise a sense of national pride and renewal in Ireland. For George Russell in particular, O'Grady represented the 'only Irish writer who exalted the hero or the doer' and as such the heroic life was beyond the contemplative or the aesthetic consciousness. Those looking to the future salvation of Ireland, needed to look no further than the past, as

[28] John Wilson Foster, *Fictions of the Irish literary revival* (Syracuse, 1987), p. 59.
[29]Courtesy of the National Gallery of Ireland, cat. no. 4073

O'Grady said that the ancient legends of Ireland were less history than prophecy.[30]

W.B. Yeats also saw the necessity to build a new tradition because, as he saw it, 'there was no help for it,' seeing his country, he felt, 'was not born at all.'[31] Yeats attempted to re-educate public taste by acquainting his fellow countrymen with an imaginative tradition in Irish literature, that made Ireland beautiful in memory.[32] He wrote in his autobiographies, that he was haunted all his life with the idea that poets should know all classes of men as one of themselves and that he should combine the greatest possible knowledge of the speech and circumstances of the world, else the artist would grow more and more distinct and lose grasp of the always more complex world.[33] Folklore and anthropological interests opened a way into nationalism via 'national tradition.'[34]

The disgrace and death of Charles Stewart Parnell (1846-1891) had profoundly shaken national self-confidence and perhaps there was a sense of safety in groups as there seemed to be distrust in the idea of a single leader who could inspire a country. The 1890s saw the Irish revivalists desperately seeking some sense of identity within a group as way of defining what it meant to be an Irish writer. Thus, a notion of Celticism emerged as a means of common purpose. Studies into mythology and religion from a 'modern' perspective, such as Sir James Frazer's (1854-1941) *The golden bough,* had reached a broad audience and influenced many writers. Through a revival of Celtic mythology and the study of folklore, believers hoped to restore an appreciation of the beauty and holiness of Ireland. John Hutchinson maintains that it was in the arts where we find perhaps the greatest impact of cultural nationalism. The artist-creator is conceived as the paradigmatic figure of

[30] AE, 'Literature and life: Standish O'Grady' in *The Irish Statesman,* 26 May 1928, p. 231.
[31] W.B. Yeats, *The Celtic twilight* (Dublin, 1902, reprinted Bucks, 1991), p. 17.
[32] Peter Kuch, *Yeats and AE: the antagonism that unites dear friends* (Bucks, 1986), p. 24.
[33] W.B. Yeats, *Autobiographies* (London, 1955), p. 470.
[34] Foster, *Paddy and Mr Punch,* pp 205, 227.

the community, dramatizing the reasons for its historical experiences and thereby inspiring future generations to individual and collective self-realisation.[35]

Cultural nationalism is quite independent from political nationalism. Its aim is the moral regeneration of the national community rather than the achievement of an autonomous state. Historical memory, Hutchinson believes, serves to define the national community. The cultural nationalist is a moral regenerator who seeks to re-unite the different aspects of the nation, such as tradition, modernism, agriculture and industry, science and religion, by returning to the creative life-principle of a nation. It is only by recovering the history of the nation through all its triumphs and disasters that its members can rediscover *their* authentic purpose. These histories typically form a set of repetitive mythic patterns, containing a migration story, a founding myth, a golden age of cultural splendour, a period of inner decay and a promise of regeneration. These result in an explosion of the genetic sciences, including archaeology, folklore, philology, and topography in order to resurrect the civilisation of the people from the cultural substratum.[36] For the revivalist, this invocation of the past seeks not to regress into an arcadia but aims to inspire the community to ever higher stages of development. Two groups are always prominent in cultural nationalist movements: human intellectuals and a secular intelligentsia defined by John Hutchinson as self-made individuals imbued with an egalitarian ethos and by a conviction of their duty to the community. Revivalists emerge from an intelligentsia, usually comprising of historical scholars and artists, who construct new matrices of collective identities created from myths and legends and seek to re-unite these traditional aspects of the nation by returning to the creative life-principle of the nation. Although small in number, the

[35] John Hutchinson, *The dynamics of cultural nationalism: the Gaelic Revival and the creation of a native state* (London, 1987), p. 197.
[36] Ibid., pp 10, 14, 49.

intelligentsia play an important role as moral innovators, constructing new matrices of collective identity at times of social crisis.[37]

Herbert Dhlomo (1903-53), one of the major founding figures of South-African literature, believed that it is one of the contradictions of colonial society that it is the members of the dominating group, in this case the Anglo-Irish ascendency, who are expected to be the interpreters, spokesmen and the voice of the oppressed groups.[38] It is precisely because the colonised were not allowed to speak for themselves that the nature of traditional art forms was distorted, misinterpreted and perpetuated as myth. Mythology, the study and interpretation of myths therefore served the same purpose for the Irish as for other races: it provided an explanation for the mysteries of life as experienced by an unlettered but far from primitive people. The realisation of this fact gave the Irish literary revival its strength and made its proponents opt for a native mythology rather than a classical one.[39]

During this period in Irish history, the interest in the past and folklore in particular was one among a growing trend throughout Europe. People were examining their culture in the light of an age of new industrialisation and modernism. This inward pre-occupation centred on a nostalgic yearn for what had gone before but in truth it was probably a reaction to what was coming ahead. Like the fear of death, the fear of what the future had in store made the past seem all the more appealing. Folklore and anthropological studies and stories opened up a way for a new approach to defining Irish identity at a time when this identity was being challenged by ever increasing nationalist fervour culminating in the Easter Rising of 1916 when the mythologies of the Irish past would be employed more stridently than the romantic aspirations conjured up by the revivalists.

[37] Ibid., pp 9, 255.
[38] Sienaert, Cowper-Lewis and Bell, (eds), *Oral tradition and its transmissions*, p. 179.
[39] Maeve Walsh, *A guide to Irish mythology* (Cork, 2000), p. 13.

Political violence in Cork: case studies of the Newmarket and Bantry Riots, 1910

John O'Donovan

Irish nationalism was divided in 1910 between controlling factions, each vying for political pre-eminence. After the 1910 general election, the tensions exploded into violence. The Mansion House Convention of February 1909 and the foundation of the All-for-Ireland League (AFIL) just over a month later are the two key events in attempting to chart the growth of violence in the city and county during this year. Internal squabbling within the ranks of the Irish Parliamentary Party and its grassroots organisation the United Irish League (UIL) led to open conflict at the Mansion House between supporters of UIL founder William O' Brien, and those of the Ancient Order of Hibernians (Board of Erin) led by Joseph Devlin.[1] Thereafter, previous covert hostilities between O'Brien supporters and supporters of the Party leadership came out into the open.[2] Since 1904, O'Brien's support had come from the ranks of landless agricultural labourers, small tenant farmers who had not benefitted from the passage of the Wyndham Land Act twelve months previously, and a small coterie of urban working class. The majority at the inaugural meeting of the AFIL at Kanturk in March 1909 were members of these classes.[3] There was therefore more than an element of class violence in Cork during 1910. In addition, much of the violence was fuelled by personal differences between the AFIL and the UIL, which underwent a major reorganisation following the crushing AFIL victory in the January 1910 general election. This essay will examine two case studies of the violence: in Newmarket in May and Bantry in August.

[1] Patrick Maume, *The long gestation: Irish Nationalist life, 1891–1918* (Dublin, 1999), pp 99-100.
[2] The Party or the Irish Party refers to the Irish Parliamentary Party, the UIL, the AOH (Board of Erin) and numerous other affiliates.
[3] Diarmaid Ferriter, *The transformation of Ireland, 1900 – 2000* (London, 2004), pp 42-4, 64; Stephen McQuay Reddick, 'Political and industrial Labour in Cork 1899-1914' (Unpublished MA Thesis, University College Cork, 1984), pp 12-13, 80-4, 86-7, 94, 135-42, 148-9, 197.

The aftermath of the January 1910 general election was particularly violent, especially in the North Cork constituency. A serious riot was narrowly averted in Kanturk on 29 January, not long after AFIL candidate Patrick Guiney had unseated sitting Party MP James Flynn. A Guiney supporter from Newmarket, James Sweeney, was shot in the hand and leg by a neighbour, from a reported 'distance of 50 yards.' Florence Sullivan of Kanturk was assaulted twice within a month; on the second occasion he was assaulted near Newmarket and 'struck several times on the head'. There may have been a connection with Guiney and this incident, as on the following day the newly-elected MP held a protest rally outside Sullivan's farm near Kanturk. In the first few weeks of April, shots were fired at the houses of two known Party supporters in the Kanturk and Newmarket districts; one of the targets was the brother of the holder of an evicted farm. A local band, who counted the chairman of the local I.L.L.A branch among their number, was the targets of gunshots in the environs of Newmarket on the night of Sunday 1 May.[4]

It was within these contexts that large numbers of people descended on the north Cork town of Newmarket on Thursday, 26 May. Being a Catholic holy day as well as market day in the town, the majority of those who came into the town were labourers and smaller tenant farmers. Tensions were exacerbated by the amount of alcohol freely consumed during the course of the day. In the evening two large groups began to form in the town square, one from the New St. end (the western side) and the other from the Church St. end (the eastern side). Many of these were armed with revolvers, but sticks, stones and hurleys were also used. For a few hours both groups charged at each other, the mobs ebbing and flowing between Church St. and New St. The small police contingent in the town, led by District Inspector Robert Price, proved unable to quell the rioting. They were patently under pressure, and were driven off the streets on several occasions, only to

[4] CI Monthly Reports for Cork East Riding, Jan. to May 1910, CO 904/80, 12-13, 14, 57-8, 266-7, 270, 669-73; CO 904/81, 15-16, 61-2 (Boole Library, University College Cork: *British in Ireland Series* microfilm [B.L.U.C.C.]).

regroup in the square within a short time. Shortly after 10 o' clock that night Price made the decision to use firearms to quell the disturbance, and dispatched a couple of officers to the station to retrieve the Lee Enfield rifles stored there. Once armed, the police fired a number of volleys over the heads of the rioters in Church St. This caused them to disperse from the town at the eastern end of the street. After the police had dealt with the New St. crowd, twenty-five-year-old labourer Cornelius Regan was found prostrate on the ground close to the square. He died a short time later.[5]

Reaction in the press to the events at Newmarket was divided. The nationalist newspapers blamed the political tension in the town following the January general election for the riot. The *Irish Independent*, perhaps reflecting its strong Catholic moral ethos, called into question the excessive amount of alcohol consumed.[6] The *Cork Examiner*, mindful of the growing opposition coming from the AFIL quarter, stated that there was no one clear reason for the riot, and that reports of the scenes contained conflicting evidence.[7] The *Freeman's Journal*, free from the constraints of localism, laid the blame implicitly but squarely at the door of the AFIL.[8] On the unionist side and despite implicit support among the Cork unionist papers for the AFIL – or perhaps because they had contributed to the split among Irish Nationalists– the violence was condemned strongly. A report in the *Irish Times* stated that:

> The inhabitants describe the encounter as one of the most desperate and prolonged ever seen in Newmarket. The police stated that the actual combatants did not number, perhaps, more than fifty, but that the large crowds at each side with party cries made matters worse. Missiles were

[5] *Irish Independent*, 28 May1910; *Freemans Journal*, 28 May 1910; *Cork Examiner*, 28 May 1910; *Irish Times*, 28 May1910; RIC IG Report, May 1910, CO 904/81, 14-16 (B.L.U.C.C.) ; CI Monthly Report, Cork ER May 1910, CO 904/81, 61-4, 65- 6 (B.L.U.C.C.). Many newspapers reported that during the proceedings Guiney returned to the town and apparently offered to disperse his supporters. This was refused by Price, who insisted that he had the situation under control. Regan was a labourer in the employment of the mother-in-law of the defeated candidate at the January general election, Michael Barry.

[6] *Irish Independent*, 28 May1910.

[7] *Cork Examiner*, 28 May 1910.

[8] *Freeman's Journal*, 28 May 1910. The paper stated that it was 'sad to reflect that the descendants of the men..., who a quarter of a century ago made such a valiant fight against the common foe, should now be wasting their strength in an internecine conflict.' It also cited the riots in Cork City a few nights before, occasioned by conflicting rallies held by the UIL and AFIL, as a contributory factor.

hurled, and shots discharged from laneways, from windows, and from every point of vantage.[9]

In a follow-up report the paper commented that many of those engaged in the violence had spent some time in America during the previous decade, 'but there is little satisfaction in concluding that the prevalent readiness to use firearms is a habit learnt elsewhere than at home.'[10] The *Cork Constitution* in a leading article remarked that the riot had its roots in Cork City, but also condemned the Liberal administration then in power at Westminster and Whitehall for its readiness to de-regulate the sales of revolvers at the insistence of the Irish Parliamentary Party. The article concluded: 'the readiness with which these shooting-irons are flourished is growing unpleasantly frequent'.[11]

The inquest into the death of Regan opened on Saturday 28 May in Newmarket, and was principally concerned with investigating whether the fatal shot came from a police rifle or elsewhere. During the proceedings the policemen testified to a number of scenes that they alleged had occurred. Head Constable Jeremiah McKee, for example, stated a man loaded a double-barrelled shotgun in front of him, and a number of people brandished revolvers during baton charges. He also alleged that the Newmarket scenes 'were worse' than the Belfast riots of 1886, where he had also been present.[12] In response to a number of charges made by parties at the inquest, the *Irish Independent* reported on Friday 3 June that, according to official RIC regulations, the police were 'compelled to fire directly at the opposing sides ... as their fire must be directed with effect when they are compelled to resort to the extreme course of using their firearms.' Also in answer to charges made by the *Irish Times* the paper noted that witnesses testified to its reporter

[9] *Irish Times*, 28 May 1910.
[10] *Irish Times*, 30 May1910.
[11] Nor were papers such as the *Cork Accent* and the *Freeman* let off the hook: 'Nationalists ... take their political rivalries far too seriously, and their leaders, whether standing upon platforms or seated in their editorial chairs, would do well to bear the fact in mind.' *Cork Constitution*, 28 May 1910. The London *Globe* reported that the trouble resulted 'from the recent eruption of Redmondites into what may be described as the O'Brien Country.' (reprinted in the *Irish Independent*, 30 May 1910)
[12] The allegation was only carried in the report published in the *Irish Independent*, 1 June1910, and not in any of the other major papers.

'that the worse scenes have been witnessed in the district, and that the conflict during the late elections was of an altogether fiercer nature, though no fatality occurred.'[13]

The return of an open verdict into Regan's death by Coroner James Byrne on Monday 6 June was greeted with silence from the majority of the papers, save for the *Irish Independent* and the *Irish Times*. The former in a lengthy leading article laid the blame for Regan's death at the door of the police. However, the paper also commented that the 'indiscriminate free use of revolvers' revealed during the inquest was 'disquieting'. This comment, which had appeared in the *Irish Times* a few days earlier, was indicative of the unease felt by many members of the middle class, the majority of the papers readership. The *Irish Times* in its reaction to the verdict called on the Liberal government to convene a parliamentary committee to conduct 'a strict inquiry into the extent and consequences of the circulation of dangerous weapons in this country.'[14] RIC County Inspector Howe reported in June that Newmarket and its environs still lay under 'a feeling of unrest ... by reason of the number of revolvers and firearms, and their use by irresponsible individuals.'[15] Two months later he reported that, though the factions in the town were 'at any time likely to re-open hostilities' police were now present 'in sufficient numbers to prevent serious conflicts.'[16] The same could hardly be said of Bantry.

Tensions between AFIL and Irish Party supporters in and around the Bantry area had been at a heightened state since the January general election, when supporters of Party candidate Daniel O'Leary and sitting AFIL MP James Gilhooly repeatedly clashed. West Cork rural society was

[13] *Irish Independent*, 3 Mar. 1910.
[14] *Irish Independent*, 7 June 1910; *Irish Times*, 7 June 1910. The following quote from the former is important: 'The rioting at Newmarket, minimise it as much as possible, was a senseless and disgraceful outbreak. Those engaged in it brought discredit on the district without serving any cause which had the misfortune to attract their allegiance ... But badly as they behaved, we believe more restraint on the part of the police would have been wiser ... Evidently neither faction meant to attack the police, and it is hard to believe that a force of eight or nine men could not keep the mobs apart without firing upon them ... Perhaps if the local leaders on both sides had exerted themselves a little more, the 26th of May [sic] would also have passed off without leaving so sad a memory behind it.'
[15] CI Monthly Report, Cork ER, June 1910, CO 904/81, 306 (B.L.U.C.C.).
[16] CI Monthly Report, Cork ER, August 1910,CO 904/81, 715(B.L.U.C.C.).

also described by the police as disturbed, with many small 'rent combinations' in force on many estates in the hinterland of Bantry (including one co-owned by members of the extended White family of Bantry House). The majority of these had wished to obtain 'sales, or ... better terms than those which the rest of the tenants have agreed to.'[17] Both O'Leary and Gilhooly played their part in cultivating these tensions, harnessing their potential energy to drive the motors of their respective political machines. During the spring and summer both men addressed gatherings of tenants through the West Cork constituency, the former exhorting the benefits of the Birrell Land Act, the latter doing the same for the Wyndham Act.[18]

As the summer drew on, the likelihood of a general election loomed large on the political horizon, and preparations for large rallies in the town of Bantry increased. In the middle of July O'Brien travelled to Bantry to address a large AFIL rally in the town, attended by Gilhooly and Patrick Guiney, as well as several prominent AFIL supporters in the town, including Michael Healy, John Kelly and Benjamin O'Connor. This was the latest in a series of rallies that the AFIL had conducted in the major towns of west Cork. RIC County Inspector Fawcett noted in his report for July that in preceding meetings in Bandon and Clonakilty 'the police had some difficulty in keeping the rival parties from coming into conflict.'[19] The Bantry meeting, though infused with O'Brien's characteristic fiery rhetoric – and vitriol aimed squarely at the Board of Erin and its dupes, the Irish Party and the UIL – passed off almost without incident.[20] Several publicans in the town were prosecuted for displaying orange flags in the days preceding the meeting. O'Leary was forced, via a public letter, to disown suggestions that he had encouraged police to prosecute the publicans; he also used the letter to attack Jasper Wolfe, a fellow solicitor but a well-known personal friend of James Gilhooly. Wolfe was, in O'Leary's eyes, the 'politico-legal advocate' of 'the

[17] IG Report, January 1910, CO 904/80, 17, (B.L.U.C.C.).
[18] See, for example, *Southern Star*, 26 Feb., 5, 12, 19 Mar., 2, 10 Apr., 7, 14, 21, and 28 May 1910
[19] CI Monthly Report, Cork WR, July 1910, CO 904/81, 516-7(B.L.U.C.C.).
[20] *Southern Star*, 23 July 1910.

leading O'Brienites of Bantry'.[21] The publication of O'Leary's letter days before a major League rally in the town did little to cool the simmering tensions between O'Brienites and Redmondites in the town.

The 14 August dawned dull, with the threat of rain on a moderate south-westerly wind, blowing in off Bantry Bay. This was unsurprising, for the previous month had been beset with frequent heavy rain, making conditions exceedingly difficult for effective farming of root crops, the staple of the local agricultural economy. A sense of anger and frustration, already latent in the region since January, now bordered on the hostile; the Irish Party came in for the brunt of this backlash. Bantry town had seen an influx from surrounding districts over the previous twenty-four hours: a huge contingent from the Beara peninsula made their way towards the town on Saturday afternoon and evening. Public houses reported a very brisk trade, and a few minor scuffles were reported to police. However, once the train carrying a large UIL contingent from Cork arrived, violence erupted which did not abate until the contingent left for the city at approximately seven o'clock. A force of eighty RIC officers and men attempted to keep both groups apart, but were pelted with stones and rotten eggs for much of the duration of the meeting. The contingent was also continuously showered with stones, rotten eggs, and lumps of tar-macadam (present in the square as part of a major resurfacing project) even while speaking during the rally. Once the speeches had concluded, a large group attempted to storm the stage. The police were struck repeatedly by members of the group 'with "batons" longer [and] heavier than their own.' Other smaller squads of constables were attacked in Main St., Mill St., and High St. After holding their ground, all squads of police attempted to baton-charge the aggressors from the main square. This took repeated attempts, during which District Inspector Fred Wallace was struck on the head with a stone, and carried to nearby Vickery's Hotel to receive treatment. One member of the police struck a man in the vicinity of the Hotel with such force that his baton 'broke in half.' An arch erected to welcome the

[21] Ibid., 13 Aug.1910.

UIL back to the town was destroyed during the fighting.[22] The violence did not stop after the Irish Party contingent left the town. Approximately 30 police were retained in the town for the rest of the weekend, when 'great excitement prevailed, but no serious collisions took place.' Unconfirmed reports suggested that a man from the Borlin Valley area had died from injuries sustained in the riots. A party of Glengarriff Redmondites were set upon on their return home from the Bantry rally, and were badly beaten. Similar scenes were reported in Castletownbere, where street fighting occurred.[23]

The riots received significant amounts of press coverage, and the slants presented reflected the usual political leanings. The *Freeman's Journal* chose to accentuate the reports of the attacks by 'All For' supporters on the UIL groups with 'batons of a dangerous description'.[24] The *Irish Independent*, reflecting its more downmarket approach, contained graphic descriptions of all the major incidents, but chose to focus on the police charge of the crowd, and the assaults on three speakers 'by baton-wielding men who claimed to be supporters of the AFIL.'[25] The *Southern Star*, mindful of the deep sensitivities among its readership, gave no editorial comment on the scenes, and chose to develop a composite report on the meeting and its aftermath.[26] The *Cork Examiner*, by this stage an unashamed mouthpiece for the Irish Party, argued that the Party 'has more to commend it to thinking men than the cry of "conciliation", which in practice means intolerance, bludgeons, and potshots or deadly missiles.'[27] The *Irish Times* noted that the most militant of the AFIL party were 'a crowd of young men, about 100 strong', thus infusing the rioters with the free-spirit and recklessness of

[22] *Cork Weekly News*, 20 Aug.1910; *Southern Star*, 20 Aug. 1910; *Freeman's Journal*, 15 Aug. 1910; *Irish Independent*, 15 Aug. 1910; *Irish Times*, 15 Aug. 1910.
[23] *Irish Independent*, 16 Aug. 1910; *Freeman's Journal*, 1 Sept. 1910.
[24] *Freeman's Journal*, 15 Aug. 1910.
[25] *Irish Independent*, 15 Aug. 1910.
[26] *Southern Star*, 20 Aug. 1910.
[27] *Cork Examiner*, 15 Aug. 1910. The paper noted with unabashed satisfaction that 'the advocates of the new-fangled politics' were unable 'to mar the success of yesterday's meeting at Bantry ... it will afford much gratification to the supporters of the Irish Parliamentary Party to know that the trusty electors of Bantry and its district are in entire harmony with the views of the country ... are not to be intimidated or terrorised when engaged in holding perfectly legitimate meetings in support of the cause and the Party.'

youth.[28] The *Cork Weekly News* report was a composite of the reports carried in that week's *Constitution*, supplemented with some perspective pieces. The paper pithily concluded that the 'feeling of both sections of Nationalists towards each other is, unfortunately, most bitter.' [29]

In September 1910 arrest warrants were issued for thirty-three people (many of whom were subsequently identified as AFIL supporters) in connection with the riots in Bantry. The names and addresses of those arrested were published in the *Cork Weekly News* and, subsequently, in the *Southern Star*. Once these lists are checked and cross-referenced, it is possible to scrutinise census returns for 1901 and 1911 in order to build profiles of the people involved. Discounting those whose records could not be retrieved at the time of writing, those arrested ranged in age from sixteen to sixty years. There were four females in the group, including a mother and daughter. Of those whose age could be determined, one-third of those arrested were between fifteen and twenty years of age; another third were between twenty-one and forty. Of those whose occupations are known, six were labourers, four were fisherman, three were farmers or farmers' sons, two were butchers, as well as a drapers' assistant, miner, carpenter, shoemaker, coal porter, blacksmith's apprentice and a tailor.

While it is not possible to draw general conclusions from such a small sample, a few provisional conclusions may be attempted. The majority of those arrested were under forty, pointing to the predilection of the young men of West Cork for settling differences with violence. It must be borne in mind that, during this period violence and faction fighting was more than just a political tool. It was also a method of releasing social tensions and settling scores among not just political classes, but social classes as well.[30] Nothing could be more satisfying for a labourer earning a subsistence wage than taking physical revenge upon his wealthier neighbour. Although the growth of sports organisations such as the GAA had, on the whole, moved this kind

[28] *Irish Times*, 15 Aug. 1910.
[29] *Cork Weekly News*, 20 Aug. 1910.
[30] K Theodore Hoppen, *Elections, politics and society in Ireland 1832 –1885* (Oxford, 1984), pp 342-3, 390-1, 423, 482-3

of physical altercation from the streets to the pitch, nonetheless a certain amount remained. A second related point may be made here, and that is that the general election of January 1906, at which a flimsy agreement was reached between the O'Brien and his cohort and the Irish Party not to force contests, placed a lid on growing political tensions that were postponed to the following general election, which did not take place until January 1910. This 'pressure cooker' idea can be strengthened if one bears in mind that the origins of the violence which swept Cork city and county during the year lay both before 1906 and after 1909.

The third point raised by the Bantry riots was the political nature of the judicial process. Most Nationalist politicians were also appointed Justices of the Peace in their area. This entitled them to sit on the judicial bench at the local Petty Sessions and, in some cases, to act as chair of the hearings. James Gilhooly, by dint of his lengthy stint as MP for West Cork, acted (when available) as the chairman of the local Petty Sessions court. However, his reluctance to see justice administered was, in the eyes of the police, a source of irritation. At Bantry Petty Sessions on Monday 22 August Gilhooly summarily dismissed a number of cases brought by the police in relation to relatively minor incidents which transpired after the riots. Sergeant Denis Dennehy remarked that 'he thought that it was time that such a state of things was put a stop to ... The people and the police wanted some rest.'[31] Pressure on Gilhooly also came from predictable quarters. At the opening of the hearings into the thirty-five cases at Bantry Petty Sessions on Monday 19 September, O'Leary – present in the court to defend himself in a civil case brought by one of the defendants, William McSweeney – accused both Gilhooly and Benjamin O'Connor of being biased against him, having clearly identified themselves with the AFIL at the rally in July. Another magistrate, Dr J.J. O'Mahony, was accused of political bias, having been named in court as an officer of the Kealkil AFIL branch. O'Leary was fined *2s 6d* for assaulting McSweeney, a fine which he contested all the way to the Court of

[31] *Irish Times*, 23 Aug.1910; *Irish Independent*, 23 Aug.1910.

King's Bench division in Dublin, which later quashed the verdict and made Gilhooly responsible for the 1s 6d costs incurred by O'Leary.[32]

Many of the police who gave evidence could barely disguise their contempt for either side of the Nationalist divide. Despite this, proceedings passed off without any major attempt to break up the hearings. This may have had something to do with the confidence the majority of the defendants had in Gilhooly and his 'parish pump' political methods. Another plausible reason was that Gilhooly as an ex-Fenian, had more than a little sympathy for the struggle to bring self-government to Ireland regardless of the method. Therefore, he was more sympathetic to acts viewed by the state – in the guise of the RIC – as 'considerable disturbance'. Whatever the real reason, reaction to the trials did indeed centre on Gilhooly, much of it based on the speech he delivered on the final day of the hearings, when eleven defendants were sent forward for trial at the Cork Spring Assizes. Gilhooly condemned the actions of the police on the day and their subsequent investigation, questioning why none of the rowdies that accompanied Messrs Thomas Condon, Augustine Roche and David Sheehy were arrested, nor any of the League members from the locality. He accused Chief Secretary Augustine Birrell and Attorney General R.J. Barry of colluding with the RIC against the AFIL. Referring to some of the comments made by members of the RIC in west Cork, Gilhooly thundered that people could not have

> respect for the law ... when we have parties guilty of gross blackguardism, breaking windows even in the policemen's houses, here allowed to go scot free because they belong to one political party.

In compiling the monthly report for October in place of CI Fawcett, DI Wallace noted that the judgements had done little to remove the 'state of unrest' around the Bantry district. Gilhooly's ill-judged speech led to him

[32] *Irish Independent*, 20 Sept.1910; *Cork Weekly News*, 24 Sept., 8 Oct., 26 Nov.1910. County Inspector Fawcett noted in his report for September that 'the partisan action of the local Benches of Magistrates' had 'a very bad influence' on the noxious political atmosphere in and around Bantry town. He then went further, condemning those in political office for their 'general contempt for [the] law'; these people were 'not politicians at all but hooligans.' CI Monthly Report, Cork WR, Sept. 1910, CO 904/82, 53 – 4 (B.L.U.C.C.).

being deprived of the Commission of the Peace during November. Fawcett noted with no little satisfaction that the decision would

> make the duty of the police in enforcing the law less difficult as the rowdies and ill-disposed relied on him to either get them out of any trouble or let off with a trifling punishment.[33]

In his study of political violence in Ireland since 1848, Charles Townshend identified three major categories of violence: open insurrection, covert intimidation (or terrorism), and social violence, which he defined as 'spontaneous collective violence ... which may have no explicit political intention but has political implications.'[34] While the political violence discussed above may not have been spontaneous, they certainly had political intentions and political implications. The tradition of violence in rural Irish society had deep roots, as far back as the agrarian movements of the early nineteenth century, and had been resurrected with the advent of the Land League from 1879.[35] The roots of the violence witnessed in County Cork during 1910 are partially explained by reference to this tradition. The second key component in this boiling pot was, inevitably, the Parnell Split. Though the Irish Parliamentary movement was reconstructed using the framework of the United Irish League, divisions remained submerged.[36] These were partially exposed after the resignation of League founder William O'Brien in November 1903, and appeared to have been defused with the pact election of January 1906. The general election of January 1910, when combined with excessive drinking and the AFIL, unleashed these latent tensions. Thereafter ill-feeling between the newly fractured Nationalist movements erupted with

[33] *Freeman's Journal*, 21, 29 Sept., 11, 12, 13, 12, 15, 17 Oct., 3, 4, 5, 7 Nov. 1910; *Irish Times*, 21, 29 Sept., 5, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17 Oct., 3, 4, 5, 7 Nov. 1910; *Cork Examiner*, 20, 21, 29 Sept., 11, 12 Oct. 1910; *Irish Independent*, 20, 21 Sept.1910; *Cork Weekly News*, 24 Sept., 16, 23 Oct., 12 Nov.1910; CI Monthly Report, Cork WR, October 1910, CO 904/82, 255 (B.L.U.C.C.); CI Monthly Report, Cork WR, November 1910, 446 (B.L.U.C.C.).

[34] Charles Townshend, *Political violence in Ireland: government and resistance since 1848* (Oxford, 1983), pp 407-8.

[35] Tom Garvin, *The evolution of Irish nationalist politics* (Dublin, 1981), pp 76-110; Patrick O'Mahony and Gerard Delanty, *Rethinking Irish history* (Basingstoke, 1998), pp 69-73.

[36] Fergus Campbell, *Land and revolution: nationalist politics in the west of Ireland 1891-1921* (Oxford, 2005), pp 42-165, 289-96; Philip Bull, 'The formation of the United Irish League, 1898-1900: the dynamics of Irish agrarian agitation' in *Irish Historical Studies*, xxxiii, 132 (2003), pp 404-23.

increasing frequency, including the two cases examined above. The political implications of the violence are more difficult to quantify in the long-term. The almost complete defeat of the Irish Party-UIL combination in Cork in the December 1910 general election may have justified the violence in possibly the second of Townshend's three categories, that of intimidation. This point was emphasised by the pro-Party Nationalist press in their coverage of the riots discussed above. The high incidence of political violence during 1910 in Cork was the product of a multitude of factors, all of which had deep roots, and which in different ways acted as a harbinger of the decade to come.

Farce and tragedy in Eupen-Malmedy: the public expression of opinion in 1920

Vincent O'Connell

As a result of the Treaty of Versailles the two former German districts of Eupen and Malmedy were ceded to Belgium in part recompense for the devastation inflicted during the Great War. However one condition attached to article 34 of the treaty concerned the holding of a popular consultation or as worded in the Treaty 'a public expression of opinion' where those who wished to object to having the two districts annexed by Belgium could do so by signing a register of protest in either Eupen or Malmedy.[1] This was to take place within the first six months of the treaty coming into effect. The exercise was to be conducted under the auspices of the Belgian authorities. This effectively meant that the consultation would be administered by the transitory government of Eupen-Malmedy headed by Lieutenant General Herman Baltia and no neutral observers were required to be present. Baltia had been appointed by the law of 15 September 1919 and granted full legislative and executive powers.

Both districts were predominantly German speaking with a combined population of over 60,000. However the district of Malmedy contained some 9,000 French speaking Walloons who for over a century had comprised an enclave of Latin tradition in the German Empire.[2] Albeit now widely understood to have been a most undemocratic exercise, the public expression of opinion or what became known as *la petite farce belge* was nevertheless the first encounter the people of this contested territory would have with Belgian democracy. Once the period of consultation had ended only a handful of signatures were entered in protest. From the outset, the

[1] Klaus Pabst, 'Eupen-Malmedy in der belgischen Regierungs- und Parteienpolitik 1914-1940' in *Zeitschrift des Aachener Geschichtsvereins*, 76 (1964), pp 206-515.
[2] *Commissariat Royal d'Eupen Malmedy. Rapport sur l'Activité générale du Gouvernement d'Eupen et de Malmedy*. July1920-July1921, p. 71 (Staatsarchiv Eupen [S.A.E.], C.3.3.III/193).

controversial nature of its execution gave rise to allegations of intimidation and coercion by Belgian officials, with the result that the memory of this episode became an indelible stain on the fabric of Belgian democracy. However, the residual effect which this episode had in terms of undermining Baltia's transitory regime and the extent to which this singular event impacted on the historical consciousness of the inhabitants of Eupen-Malmedy remains somewhat understated.

As shall become evident, the low level of participation in the public expression of opinion was not due solely to fear of intimidation by the Belgian authorities, although this certainly played a significant part. The choice facing many inhabitants caught in the vortex of post-war turmoil was a stark one. Either one clung to the floating wreckage of a defunct Empire weighted down by the cargo of postwar demands or took one's chances in the unchartered waters of Belgian annexation.

This article portrays the public expression of opinion as a salient on Eupen-Malmedy's troubled historical path. Due to the dubious nature of its execution the consultation would later become the touchstone for much inflamed rhetoric and demands from Stresemann to Hitler for a revision of the Versailles Treaty and the holding of a new consultation. Following the termination of Baltia's transitory regime in 1925 the increasingly indifferent attitude displayed by Brussels towards the two districts and the parallel rise in the intensity of pro-German activity saw these new Belgians in Baltia's own words 'quite naturally throw themselves into the arms of German propagandists who endeavoured to assist them.'[3] This lack of assertion by Brussels paved the way for the emergence of a counter process of cultural inculcation later tainted with the hue of nazi ideology. The annexation of Eupen-Malmedy by Nazi-Germany in May 1940 whilst seen by many to have been the inevitable epilogue to a series of farcical events would also prove to be the first act in a greater tragedy for the inhabitants of Eupen-Malmedy.

[3] *Erinnerungen des belgischen Generals Balita, Gouverneur (Hochkommissar) für die abgetretenen Gebiete Eupen-Malmedy aus seiner Tätigkeit* (Landesarchiv Nordrhein Westfalen, Düsseldorf ,[L.A.N.R.W.], Sammlung Baltia [SB], RW 0010/5, p.32).

Long before Baltia entered Malmedy to read aloud the proclamation outlining the aims and objectives of his transitory regime, the battle lines for the hearts and minds of the population had been well and truly drawn. Shortly after his nomination as Royal High Commissioner in September 1919 he wrote to the Belgian Foreign Minister Paul Hymans stating: 'I am assembling the various methods which Germany is employing to work on the opinion of the native population.' [4] Throughout the preceding few months that followed the conclusion of the Treaty negotiations in Paris, a propaganda war had raged from pulpit to pavement in the troubled territory and for many Belgian observers the chances of acquiring Eupen-Malmedy especially those parts inhabited mainly by ethnic Germans seemed highly unlikely. Writing to his Chief of Staff in the summer of 1919, Lieutenant General Coppejans of the Belgian army of occupation in the fourth zone noted how few truly envisaged a separation from the *Vaterland*.

Whilst talk of a Republic of the Rhine did not seem viable to most, some considered the possibility of a union with the left bank region of Westphalia. As for Germany, neither the German President Ebert nor its Chancellor Philipp Scheidemann were believed to possess the qualities necessary to rescue the German State. In this light a number of people expressed their hope for a return of the monarchy. [5] This is another consideration which one should keep in mind in attempting to understand the high level of non-participation in the public expression of opinion. For many of the Kaiser's former subjects the prospect of being ruled by anything other than a monarch was beyond the realms of consideration. Perhaps a Belgian monarch who after all was a direct descendant of the first Belgian King Leopold I, himself of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha seemed a more endearing

[4] Baltia to Hymans, 25 Sept. 1919, (Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères Belges (A.M.A.E.B.), 10.792/II/213).
[5] 'La population demeure au fond très allemande. Elle manifeste bien de temps á autre des sentiments d'hostilité contre la Prusse qu'elle rend responsible de la défaite allemande; mais elle ne semble pas envisager la possibilité d'une spéparation'. Lieutenant General Commandant Le Chef d'État Major Coppejans, Ministry of War to Foreign Ministry, 3ème Rapport mensuel sur l'état d'esprit des populations de la 4ème Zone d'Occupation, 7 Mar. 1919 (A.M.A.E.B.10.791/13).

prospect than being party to a revolutionary republic as was being fought over in Germany.

As well as monarchical allegiance however the Catholic Church also held considerable sway over the mindsets of the inhabitants of this largely rural territory. The vast majority of clerics were as devoted to the *Vaterland* as they were to the Holy Father. The Belgian authorities were well aware of what they saw as the menacing role being played by many German clerics on the ground spurred on by their superiors in Germany. Not least the Archbishop of Cologne to whose diocese both Eupen and Malmedy were still attached. Archbishop Felix Hartmann was seen as meddling in the affairs of the region having issued his own proclamation in July of 1919, which in essence was a call to all German inhabitants to 'search their consciences as to the right thing to do.'[6] Hartmann was an unapologetic imperialist and a favourite of the Kaiser. He urged that the public expression of opinion be conducted in secret; hardly a revolutionary concept at the time. He furthermore echoed the German delegation'scontention that instead of territorial annexation 'One could remedy this situation by an agreement to deliver wood to Belgium.'[7]

Other activities aimed at ensuring a successful outcome to the popular consultation from a German perspective had the imprimatur of the Weimar Government. In the town of Charlottenburg near Berlin an association called *Vereinigte Landsmannschaft Eupen-Malmedy* arranged for German residents of *Eupenois* origin to visit the *Kreis* and impress upon locals the importance of declaring in favour of Germany. In addition the German Government published notices in the *Berliner Tageblatt* newspaper over a number of days inviting inhabitants to do just that.[8]

[6] Le Chef d'État-Major Général, P.O., Le Sous-Chef d'E.M.G. Armée Belge G.Q.G., L'État Major to Ministère des Affaires Étrangère, 3 July 1919 (A.M.A.E.B.10.792/9689).
[7] 'On pourrait remédier á cette situation par une convention de livraison de bois á la Belgique. En tout cas, ce n'est pas pour une cause de bois que des habitantss d'un pays doivent passer d'une souveraineté á une autre'. Aux habitants des cercles d'Eupen et de Malmedy [sic], Proclamation du Cardinal Archevêque von Hartmann, archevêque de Cologne, Malmedy 1919 (A.M.A.E.B.10.792/I).
[8] *Berliner Tageblatt*, 15,16 Oct. 1919; Ministère des Affaires Étrangères to Vincent Ernst de Bunswick, Consul Général de Belgique, Berlin, 18 Nov. 1919 (A.M.A.E.B.10.792/II/6279).



Fig 2. Map of Eupen-Malmedy with Germany to the east, Luxembourg to the south and Holland to the north, 1919, (F.O.371-3644B/Eupen-Malmedy).

In order to limit the spread of such propaganda the Belgian authorities regularly intercepted post in the region and this activity would continue throughout the six months of the public expression of opinion. This gives us some insight into the level of anxiety that prevailed in the territory on the threshold of transition. Fears were also prevalent in local business circles that Belgium lagged behind Germany in terms of commercial life.[9] Rumours abounded that the Belgian Government would not recall German marks but would instead deem them no longer legal tender. If this were so one leading industrialist in Malmedy predicted that many of the inhabitants

[9] Rapport sur les mouvements politiques et sociaux dans les populations. Le Chef d'Etat-Major Général P.O., Le Sous-Chef d'E.M.G., Maglinsen, G.Q.G., Armée Belge, to M.A.E., 9 July 1919, No.9783 (A.M.A.E.B.10.792/I ,July-Aug. 1919).

of the region would go to ruin and that 'a veritable revolution would suddenly explode and the vast majority would manifest their desire for a return to Germany.'[10]

That said the Belgian administrative controller in Eupen Léon Xhaflaire, who had been appointed during the period of Belgian occupation was approached by one *Bürgermeister* in April 1919 who gave him the impression that all of his colleagues were pro-Belgian and that if they could be assured of their jobs they would openly canvass in favour of the annexation. He told Xhaflaire how 'The people suffer from a lack of everything. The foodstuffs distributed by the *comité de ravitaillement* are insufficient and when the people have to procure food stuffs on the black market, they are obtained at exorbitant prices.'[11] He continued, 'The *cercle* of Eupen has 27,000 inhabitants, give to each two kilograms of peas or beans with a kilogram of margarine each week and I assure you that everyone will be with you.' 'There you go', wrote Xhaflaire in a memo to the Belgian Chiefs of Staff; 'a string to pull, why not take advantage of it.'[12]

The transitory regime over which Baltia reigned supreme came into being on 10 January 1920 with the coming into force of the Versailles Treaty. On the steps of the *Hôtel de Ville* in Malmedy the following day he read aloud the proclamation which he believed would ensure that the essence of Belgian law was maintained in its absence.[13] Apart from assuring the inhabitants that their rights would be respected, and that both languages would be on an even footing, he also promised that 'whatever their social position, opinions or aspirations' they would be free to air their 'wishes and

[10] 'Je crois même devoir vous dire que si les marks n'étaient pas repris, une sorte de révolution éclaterait soudainement et la grande majorité des malmédiens manifesteraient nettement leur désir d'être rendus á l'Allemagne ne pouvant supporter la ruine.' Léon Goffart to Pierre Nothomb, 12 July 1919,(A.M.A.E.B.10.792/I).

[11] 'La population souffre du manque de tout. Les aliments distribués par le comité de ravitaillement sont insuffisants et lorsque le peuple doit se procurer les produits alimentaires en cachette, c'est á des prix exhorbitants qu'ils les obtient.' Léon Xhaflaire, *C.A. du Cercle d'Eupen,* 3 May 1919. Annexe I to A.O. Direction du Controle Administratif to Chef d'E.M.G.,12 May 1919 (A.M.A.E.B.10.792/I/812).

[12] 'Le cercle d'Eupen a 27,000 habitants, donnez á chaque habitant par semaine 2kgs de pois ou 2kgs de fèves et je t'assure que tout le monde sera avec vous' (A.M.A.E.B.10.792/I/812).

[13] 'A charter was necessary during the period of transition since Belgian law would not be *en vigeur.*' *Erinnerungen des belgischen Generals Balita*, iii (L.A.V.-N.R.W., SB., RW 0010/10, p.15).

complaints.' However within a short-time a blanket ban was placed on German newspapers in both districts. [14]

Baltia shared the view held by most Belgians that the country had been betrayed by its erstwhile allies and failed by its leaders at Versailles. He noted how:

> The Belgians show themselves to be disappointed enough after the *belles promesses* which were made to them during the war, and which our Government was seriously wrong not to act upon.' He likened the granting of Eupen-Malmedy to Belgium in place of the great expectations demanded by the Belgian delegation in Paris as to 'giving a gourmand a bone to chew. [15]

That said he was more than a little surprised with the rather lax attitude displayed by the Belgian Prime Minister Léon Delacroix in terms of the in-coming transitory administration. In his memoirs Baltia writes, Delacroix 'appeared to me to have thought no more about giving me directives.' When asked how he should brief the Prime Minister on his progress Delacroix responded 'See that it goes well and that it doesn't cost too much. When you will have good things to communicate to me, do so. You will be like a colonial governor but a colony directly connected to the Metropolis.' [16]

With such freedom to act Baltia set about administering the popular consultation with zeal. However he clearly understood the perils attached to such a far from assured endeavour, lest the failure to secure a positive outcome, be laid at his door. Just a few weeks after the consultation had gotten underway he told Delacroix that, 'If the results… and the decision of the League of Nations will go against us, I could not alone with my

[14] *Sir F. Villiers to Earl Curzon*, 26 Jan. 1920 (The National Archives Kew [T.N.A.], FO 371/3644B/53).
[15] Erinnerungen des belgischen Generals Balita, Gouverneur (L.A.V.-N.R.W.,SB.,RW 0010/5).
[16] 'Táchez que cela aille bien et que cela ne coûte pas trop cher.Quand vous aurez des choses agréables á me communiquer, faites-le. Vous serez comme un gouverneur de colonie, mais une colonie avec contact direct avec la Métropole.' Erinnerungen des belgischen Generals Balita (L.A.V.-N.R.W.,SB.,RW 0010/5, p.7).

functionaries bear the responsibility.[17] The registers were opened on 26 January to protestors both male and female who had reached 21 years of age either before or during the period of the consultation. Only two registers were opened one each in Eupen and Malmedy. The level of intimidation meted out by the Belgian authorities both prior to and during the consultation was highlighted by both German and neutral observers alike. One German newspaper noted how what they termed the political police was so prevalent that cars followed the elecrtic trams bound for Aachen stopping them to look for suspects among the passengers.[18] The radio service from Nauen in Germany informed listeners that the administrative controller in Eupen was threatening to throw the first voter down the stairs who dared to come to sign the register. He was also alleged to have threatened to close the registry if too many people came to vote. Lack of access was a recurring complaint throughout the period of consultation.[19]

A journalist with the *Manchester Guardian* based in Malmedy at the height of the popular consultation wrote 'I am unable to mention the names of the many people who supplied me with personal information, or to give precise details, because everyone with whom I spoke implored me not to mention names or particulars that might lead to discovery or victimisation.'[20] This fear of discovery and victimisation was something that would continue to inscribe itself upon the psyche of the people of Eupen -Malmedy for many decades to come. Denunciation of certain individuals was commonplace, and if the allegation invloved propagandizing in favour of Germany this would result in expulsion from the territory. Quite often such denunciations had their origin not in political partisanship however but in personal vendettas, providing an opportunity for the settling of scores often over some trivial matter. One young teacher who taught at the *École pour Jeunes Filles* in

[17] 'Si les résultats de la consultations populaires [sic] est la décision de la ligue des nations se retournait [sic] contre nous je ne pourrais pas emporter seul avec les fonctionnaires la responsabilité.' Baltia to Prime Minister Léon Delacroix, 9 Feb. 1920, Brussels (A.M.A.E.B./10.792/II/1654).
[18] *Deutsche Tageszeitung*, 25 Oct. 1919.
[19] Transcript from Radio Nauen, 8 Oct. 1919 (A.M.A.E.B.10.792/II).
[20] *Manchester Guardian*, 17, 18 May 1920; Memorandum on Eupen-Malmedy question, 23 June 1920 (A.M.A.E.B.10.792/III).

Malmedy, *Frauleine* Steinmetz, was relieved of her duties having been denounced by a local whose daugher had been recently disciplined by the teacher. Her colleague frauleine Gall was also relieved of her teaching position and given three days to leave the territory for spreading pro-German propaganda.[21]

At the Council of Ambassadors meeting in Versailles in May, following numerous representations by the German authorities, the British ambassador to France Lord Derby declared that while he did not see the need for any modification to article 34, he nevertheless took issue with a number of operational matters concerning the consultation. In particular he referred to a Belgian circular which he had in his possession and which promised to inflict a special treatment on those inhabitants who dared to sign the register. He noted, 'They are refused all kinds of favours, they are presented with difficulties when changing marks and in the provision of basic necessities which their fellow inhabitants receive, they are refused passports and exportation permits'. Lord Derby however doubted that such practice was official Belgian policy and he was assured by Belgium's envoy to France, Baron de Gaiffier d'Hestroy that perhaps one district commissioner had dictated a circular which 'constituted manifestly an excess of zeal'. According to Baron d'Hestroy Governor Baltia had immediately annulled the directions given by his subordinate once he had become aware of them.

When the registers finally closed on 23 July, only 271 of the more than 33,000 inhabitants eligible to partake in the exercise had signed in protest. The result was later endorsed by the League of Nations on 20 September, and the sovereign status of the territory resolved or so it seemed in the eyes of the international community. However, what was to have been the coping stone of a new beginning for the people of New-Belgium would instead prove to be the rock on which the legitimacy of Baltia's regime would perish. [22]

[21] *Vorwärts*, 25 Oct. 1919.
[22] Alfred Minke, 'La communauté germanophone; l'évolution d'une terre d'entre-deux' in *Wallonie, une region en Europe* (Nice-Charleroi, 1997), pp 166-85.

Over the next couple of years Baltia and his Eupen-Malmedy Government set about the legislative, juridical and administrative incorporation of the two districts into the Belgian State, as well as the assimilation of their inhabitants. They would eventually become three separate districts with St.Vith being separated from the district of Malmedy. Whilst the rather turbulent period which followed the end of Baltia's regime in 1925 saw the administrative and legislative foundations withstand the various political tremors that shook the territory, his project of assimilation was however undermined by a seemingly insouciant Belgian Government which showed itself either unable or unwilling to build upon his efforts. The doomed attempt by Belgium to sell back most of the territory to Germany was a case in point.[23] Pierre van Werveke the former general secretary to Baltia's government was incredulous to such suggestions. 'How' he argued, 'after having governed these peoples... and having attempted to assimilate them... do Belgians dare to propose that we throw in the towel and push for' what he termed 'this abominable exchange.' Van Werveke likened such notions to 'selling souls'. [24]

In 1925 Belgium's new citizens were able to participate in their first Belgian national election. The first representative for Eupen-Malmedy elected to the Brussels parliament was the socialist deputy Marc Somerhausen. Somerhausen believed that to tie the matter of territorial retrocession to that of financial reimbursement was 'a nonsense.' The way forward in his opinion was to give Germany an assurance that a new plebiscite would be carried out and Germany could then reciprocate by returning monies owed to Belgium since 1918. Somerhausen believed that the people of Eupen as well as Malmedy were 'Germans of heart and soul.'

[23] *Der Landbote*, 10 Dec. 1925; *La Nation Belge*, 15 Dec. 1925; Manfred J. Enssle, *Stresemann's territorial revisionism, German-Belgium an the Eupen-Malmedy question, 1919-1929* (Wiesbaden, 1980), pp 115-72.
[24] 'Comment après avoir gouverné ces populations pendant six mois [sic], et taché de les assimiler au Régime législatif, judiciare et administratif belge, après avoir tenté de ramener l'industrie vers d'autres débouchés, d'attirer l'agriculture et les agriculteurs vers l'ouest, après qu'une classe moyenne importante s'est formée dans ce pays et est devenue prospère, grâce au rattachement á la Belgique, des Belges osent proposer de jeter le manche après la cognée et pousser á ce troc abominable de vendre des âmes.' Pierre Van Werveke in a letter to Bien Public, 11 Aug. 1926 (A.M.A.E.B.10.792/II/63).

He added rather controversially that the Walloons of Malmedy had hardly been assimilated to the Belgian State. Harking back to the discredited public expression of opinion he argued that 'these people who had lived under a dictatorial regime hardly dare express their true sentiment'. Albeit unsure as to the outcome which any new plebiscite would bring he noted how 'One must not lose sight of the fact that the majority of these people served voluntarily and courageously under German flags.'[25]

However the Belgian High Commissioner for the Rhineland Edouard Rolin-Jacquemyns writing to the Belgian ambassador to Berlin in 1926, whilst rejecting any attempt to sell the cantons to Germany believed furthermore that the organization of a new plebiscite was 'unjustified.' After all, the public expression of opinion according to Jacquemyns had nothing to do with appeasing the will of the people. 'They were only consulted', he believed, 'to verify if an accentuated national will was going to become an obstacle to a more important annexation demanded by the Belgian Government for economic and strategic motives.' Whilst conceding that the execution of the consultation in 1920 was not without criticism, Jacquemyns believed that if anything the result demonstrated 'beyond doubt, that the population of the annexed territories was largely lukewarm and indifferent to the outcome.'[26]

Indeed lukewarm and indifferent are fitting words to describe Belgium's attitude toward its newly annexed territory and more particularly toward its inhabitants. The power vacuum that emerged following Baltia's departure saw the ever waning process of assimilation become eclipsed by a wave of pan-Germanism, later imbued with pro-Nazi fervour. Organizations such as the *Kameradschaftliche Vereinigung and the Eifelverein* which

[25] 'Imaginez-vous la révolte intérieure de ces gens qui lisent dans les manuels de leurs enfants que les Allemands se caractérisent par leur fourberie et leur barbarie. Forcément, il doit avoir une violente réaction.' Marc Somerhausen, *Le Peuple*, 26 Dec. 1925.
[26] 'J'ajoute qu'á mon avis le Gouvernement belge ne peut que repousser l'ouveture de M. Stresemann. L'organistation d'un plebiscite dans les territoires annexées serait injustifiée. En effet, l'annexion de ce territoire, en 1918 [sic], n'a pas été consultées qu'afin de verifier si une volonté nationale accentuée ne faisait pas obstacle á une annexion plus importante, désirée, á tort ou á raison, par le Gouvernement belge pour les motifs économiques et stratégiques.' Strictement confidential, Rolin Jacquemyns to Robert Everts, 26 Apr.1926 (A.M.A.E.B.10.792 /I/ 40).

organized cultural outings to Germany for the children of Eupen and Malmedy were seen now not only as instruments of German cultural inculcation but also as incubators of Nazi ideology.[27]

Yet from the vantage point of the Belgian minister in Berlin Count de Kerchove de Denterghem as late as 1933, 'since the arrival of Hitler an almost complete calm [reigned] between Belgium and Germany, contrasting strangely with the daily incidents and recriminations produced previously.' Indeed the count believed that the disturbances reported in Eupen and Malmedy were of a more localized character and confined mainly to agitators in the Rhineland. Nevertheless he supported the Belgian prime minister's proposals that Brussels assume a more hands on role in the territory to deal effectively with the disturbances and to strip individuals of Belgian nationality. He even went so far as to recommend that Belgium take a lead from the policies employed by Hitler. 'Hitler', he wrote, 'did not hesitate to employ vis-à-vis immigrants, an identical method to that being advised by the Prime Minister and he succeeded in ridding himself of his principal adversaries without any difficulty.[28]

However when the result of the Saar plebiscite became known in January 1935 events took a very different turn. Few had expected such a definitive result where over ninety percent of the population voted for a return to Germany.[29] The evident acclaim with which the Saar plebiscite was greeted throughout Germany and in Eupen was tempered by reflections in some German publications as to the lack of transparency associated with other plebiscites conducted under Versailles. Publications such as the *Germania* once again focused attention on the legitimacy of the public

[27] Heidi Christmann, *Presse und gesellschafliche Kommunikation in Eupen-Malmedy zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen* (München, 1974), pp 4-10.
[28] 'Hitler n'a pas hésité á employer, vis-á-vis des émigrés, un moyen identique á celui préconisé par le Premier Ministre et il est parvenu, ainsi, á se débarrasser, sans coup férir et sans aucune difficulté, de ses principaux adversaires.' *Le Comte de Kerchove de Denterghem, to Paul Hymans, M.A.E.*, 28 October 1933 (A.M.A.E.B. 10.792 / 4800).
[29] 'Nobody had ever believed the possibility of seeing such a formidable majority declare itself in favour of Hitler's Germany', wrote Belgium's representative in Berlin.' *Count de Kerchove de Denterghem to Paul Hymans*, 14 Jan. 1935 (A.M..A.E.B.11.047/574-257/Jan-Fév).

expression of opinion of 1920 deeming it 'a farce'.[30] In Belgium, the socialists had by now split on how best to interpret events in the region.

Pierre Van Werveke described the situation that prevailed by the late thirties as a 'malaise' due to the fact that 'Belgium had misunderstood the value of its conquest'.[31] Looking on from afar and now in the last few years of his life, Baltia noted how since his departure, 'the Eupenoise and Malmedians, so used to waiting for directions under a German regime or being able to address a functionary during the period of transition' had now been left to their own devices, with the feeling that nobody cared about them anymore.[32] The eventual annexation of Eupen-Malmedy by Nazi Germany in May 1940 would see the beginning of yet another phase of uncertainty and upheaval in the lives of its inhabitants.

One recalls the analogy made by Nicolas Pietkin, the abbot of Sourbrodt, a village on the outskirts of Malmedy, when comparing the coercive character of Bismarck's *Kulturkampf* to the actions of the Greek mythological character Damastes who enticed his victims to spend the night in a bed which he had prepared for them. If they proved too long for the bed he would proceed to cut off their limbs. If too short he would stretch them until they fitted the contours of his fatal lure.[33] The dubious means by which the public expression of opinion had been executed was another instance where people were forced to fit the contours of a historical narrative written with the ink of present-day exigencies. Yet following the end of Baltia's regime these once redeemed brothers found themselves being pulled in two directions by the whims of political expediency.

During the period of repression which followed the Second World War they were once again suspected for their 'unBelgian activity'. The rather

[30] *Völkischer Beobachter*, 19 Jan. 1935.
[31] 'Plus exactement la Belgique méconnaît la valeur de sa conquête.' Pierre Van Werveke, *La Belgique et Eupen-Malmédy: où en sommes nous?* (Brussels,1937), *avant-propos.*
[32] *Erinnerungen des belgischen Generals Balita* (L.A.V.-N.R.W.,SB.,RW 0010/5, p.32).
[33] Abbé Pietkin Nicolas Pietkin, the beloved abbé of Sourbrodt a village on the edge of Malmedy was a dedicated to the promotion of Walloon values and culture. However his concern for the welfare of the Walloon community in Prussia did include that they break away from Prussia. Joseph Bastin, 'L'abbé Nicolas Pietkin' in *La terre wallonne*, 21 June 1921, pp 152-53.

controversial manner in which they had become Belgian in the first place together with the reality that the two districts had been re-annexed by Nazi-Germany were conveniently overlooked in an attempt to cleanse the national conscience of a Belgian state struggling to come to terms with the events of the past few years. But where the Belgian state may have succeeded in its project of *épuration* those most affected by it in Eupen, Malmedy and St.Vith would once again absorb its effects into the collective consciousness already traumatised by the events of the inter-war period. In this way the *petite farce belge* that was the public expression of opinion was just the first act in a tragedy that continues to play itself out up to the present day.

Supplying an army:
IRA gunrunning in Britain during the War of Independence

Gerard Noonan

As a military endeavour, the Easter rising was a failure. As a political exercise, however, the rebellion proved very effective, for it encouraged those who re-formed the Irish Volunteers and the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) in 1917 to continue the struggle to overthrow British rule in Ireland. However, with only a limited amount of munitions available in Ireland for purchase or theft, rebels were forced to source materiel abroad. Britain was the main source for armaments procured overseas, and republican gunrunners there engaged in illegal and dangerous activities in order to provide munitions to their comrades in Ireland.[1] This essay discusses these gunrunning efforts in terms of the people involved, the types and quantities of materiel obtained, and the arrangements made for the storage, transport, and distribution

On 10 May 1919, Joseph Vize, chief IRB gunrunner in Scotland, wrote to Michael Collins, head of the IRB or 'fenians'. '[W]e are now on a few good lines that I expect to work with good results very soon ...', he declared. One line of inquiry concerned a big army stores, containing machine guns, revolvers, rifles and grenades. The rifles were broken down into their constituent parts. All the parts were included except the wooden sections, which could be manufactured in Ireland. '[I] intend to give it extra attention and try to strike something good,' Vize declared.[2] Two-and-a-half weeks later, Vize was empathetic: 'We've struck oil. There is now passing into our hands 500 Revolvers and 200,000 rounds of .303 [ammunition],

[1] Paddy Daly to Michael Collins, 28 Sept. 1921 (University College Dublin Archives [UCDA], Richard Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/7); I would like to thank Trinity College Dublin (TCD) and Limerick County Council for funding the research for the doctoral thesis on which this essay is based: Gerard Noonan, 'Irish physical-force republicanism in Britain, 1919–1923' (PhD thesis, TCD, 2011).
[2] Joe Vize to Michael Collins, 10 May 1919 (UCDA, Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/11).

don't think I've made a mistake in the figures, it['s right, ...'.[3] The following week, Vize informed Collins that the first raid on the army stores was scheduled to take place on Tuesday night, 10 June. Between twenty-five and thirty thousand rounds of .303 ammunition were to be removed by motor car, along with revolvers by hand. Six dumps were arranged to receive the projected haul. The motor car would distribute the munitions between the dumps in the countryside, while a horse and cart would do likewise in the city. Vize and his men expected to get a large haul of munitions: 'Everything is looking the best for us, (unless something unforeseen happens) and I have great hopes of doing something extra big for you (God grant it).'[4] However, on 22 June, Vize told Collins that, 'meeting our old luck', the operation had been cancelled. The day before the scheduled raid, Vize's agent, the army range-keeper, was sentenced to thirty days' imprisonment for pawning army boots while the range-keeper's wife was given three weeks to vacate the family's lodgings at the base. Vize hoped that they might be able to acquire some of the munitions within that period. Nevertheless, he was keenly disappointed: '[T]he worst part of it is filling you and the boys with such hopes only to be dashed to the ground, it has not been for the want of working up the job I can assure you, we could only do our best'.[5]

Scarcity of weapons was a perennial problem for the Volunteers or Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Ireland. As raids on private houses failed to provide an adequate quantity of arms, the Volunteers were forced to exploit sources abroad in order to augment their arsenal.[6] In this, the IRA was continuing a tradition of enlisting foreign aid to overthrow British rule in Ireland, one which stretched back to the birth of Irish republicanism in the late eighteenth century. The source of these armaments was often Britain itself.

[3] Ibid., 28 May 1919 (UCDA, Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/11); original emphasis.
[4] Ibid., 6 June 1919 (UCDA, Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/11); original emphasis.
[5] Ibid., 22 June 1919 (UCDA, Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/11).
[6] Return showing by monthly periods the number of murders of members of the Royal Irish Constabulary and of the Dublin Metropolitan Police ... from the 1st day of January, 1919, to the 30th April, 1920 [Cmd. 709] 1920, xl, p. 2.

In the decades between the Fenian rebellions of 1867 and 1916, IRB men in Britain procured small amounts of weapons and sent them to their comrades in Ireland in the hope that they would someday be used to fight for Irish independence.[7] Joe Vize was one of a small number of men who continued the tradition of Fenian gunrunning during the War of Independence. At that time, a handful of people dominated gun-smuggling in each of the four major centres of Irish activity in Britain. In London, Sean McGrath, Sam Maguire, and the Carr brothers were the men of importance.[8] In Manchester, the comparable figures were Paddy O'Donoghue, John McGallogly, and Matt Lawless.[9] On the Liverpool scene, activities centred on Neil Kerr and his three sons, Tom, Jack and Neil Junior, along with Steve Lanigan.[10]

As the War of Independence progressed, some changes occurred in the gunrunning personnel. In July 1920, Joseph Furlong, a Wexford man, replaced Joe Vize in Scotland.[11] During the truce, Furlong was in turn succeeded by D. P. Walsh.[12] The IRA's arson attack on Liverpool dock warehouses in November 1920 led to the internment and imprisonment of the Kerrs and Lanigan. The leadership on Merseyside was then assumed by Offaly man Paddy Daly.[13] Following his arrest in February 1921, Sean McGrath's shoes were filled by Dennis Kelleher.[14] Michael Collins' injunction that 'the enemy must not be allowed to break up our organisation, no matter whom he takes' was therefore obeyed.[15]

Until December 1920, the gunrunners received their orders from the IRB in Dublin, the leadership of which during the War of Independence

[7] Mark Ryan, *Fenian memories* (Dublin, 1945), pp 40, 47, 61, 171.
[8] Sean McGrath interview (UCDA, Ernie O'Malley Notebooks, P17b/100); John J. Sherlock Statement (National Library of Ireland [NLI], Ms 9,873), pp 1-3; Joe Carr to Art O'Brien, 31 May 1938; Sean McGrath to Art O'Brien, 13 June 1938 (NLI, Art Ó Briain Papers, Ms 8461/26); Martin Walsh to ? Military Service Pensions Board, n.d. (UCDA, Ernie O'Malley Papers, P17a/154).
[9] Bureau of Military History Witness Statement [BMHWS] no. 847, Patrick O'Donoghue, pp 5-6; ibid., no. 244, John McGallogly, pp 18-19 (National Archives of Ireland [NAI]); Paddy Daly interview (UCDA, O'Malley Notebooks, P17b/136).
[10] BMHWS no. 824, Paddy Daly, pp 17-18 (NAI).
[11] Ibid., no. 828, James Byrne, p. 2 (NAI).
[12] Ibid., no. 777, Patrick Mills, pp 5-6 (NAI).
[13] Ibid., no. 824, Paddy Daly, pp 1, 20-21 (NAI).
[14] Michael Collins to Art O'Brien, 1 Mar. 1921 (NAI, Dáil Éireann [DE] file 2/328).
[15] Michael Collins, 'Memo to Liverpool', 9 Dec. 1920 (UCDA, Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/3).

was dominated by Michael Collins. In the summer of 1920, IRA general headquarters (GHQ) was re-organised and a number of new departments were created. Among them was a department of munitions purchases, headed by a director of purchases (D/P). Joe Vize was the first occupant of this office. In November 1920, following his arrest, Vize was succeeded by Liam Mellows.[16] Despite Mellows and his lieutenants making extensive visits to gunrunning centres in Britain in 1921, Michael Collins continued to send orders to Liverpool and London. Liverpool's Paddy Daly states that he succeeded in working with both IRA and IRB leaders in gunrunning matters.[17]

Mellows' appointment as D/P in 1920 both coincided with and stimulated the increased involvement in gunrunning of the IRA in Britain. The home rule crisis of 1912–14 had seen the establishment of Volunteer companies in Britain as well as in Ireland. An estimated two hundred republicans travelled from Britain to Dublin to fight in the Easter rising, seven being killed.[18] In early 1919, GHQ sent Joe Vize to Scotland to re-organize the Volunteers and take charge of gunrunning. Later that year, re-organisation efforts got underway in London and Manchester. Branches of the IRB, Cumann na mBan, the women's auxiliary, and Na Fianna Éireann, the republican boy scouts, were also established.[19] Previous to Mellows' appointment, Volunteer companies in such English cities as London, Liverpool, and Manchester had been involved in gunrunning, but only under the auspices of the IRB. Now IRA companies were becoming involved in their own right. This was signified by the development of Birmingham, Tyneside and south Wales as centres of procurement. On Tyneside, gunrunning operations were run by the officer commanding (O/C) the Tyneside brigade, Richard Purcell, the quartermaster, Gilbert Barrington, and

[16] Piaras Béaslaí, *Michael Collins and the making of a new Ireland* (2 vols, London, 1926), ii, p. 161.
[17] BMHWS no. 824, Paddy Daly, pp 24-5 (NAI).
[18] Ibid., no. 510, Frank Thornton, p. 3 (NAI); Joe Good, *Enchanted by dreams: journal of a revolutionary*, ed. Maurice Good (Dingle, 1996), pp 13-17; Art Ó Bríain, 'Gaedhil thar sáile: some notes on the history of the Gaelic League of London' in *Capuchin Annual* (1944), p. 126; Máirtín Seán Ó Catháin, 'A land beyond the sea: Irish and Scottish republicans in Dublin, 1916' in Ruan O'Donnell (ed.), *The impact of the 1916 Rising: among the nations* (Dublin, 2008), pp 38, 45-6.
[19] Noonan, 'Irish physical force republicanism in Britain', ch. 2.

the adjutant, J. P. Connolly.[20] As in Birmingham, the procurement of munitions on Tyneside had begun on the initiative of the men themselves, without direction from GHQ or other gunrunning centres.[21] In the spring of 1921, Barrington was summoned to Dublin to meet Mellows. The D/P gave him instructions and money for the purchase of arms.[22] Connolly later moved to south Wales to source munitions there.[23]

In Scotland, the IRA had become involved in gunrunning somewhat earlier than in England and Wales, due to the fact that the re-organisation of the Volunteers there occurred earlier than south of the border. Patrick Mills, a native of Belmullet, county Mayo, was the 1st lieutenant of the Motherwell Volunteers. He remembered that the company's main activity was 'the collection of arms, ammunition and explosives to send to Ireland'.[24] The types and quantities of munitions acquired by gunrunners in Britain during the War of Independence varied through time due to a number of factors. These included the orders they received from Dublin, the financial resources at their disposal, and the nature of the armament sources available. Michael Collins frequently made specific requests of his gunrunners in response to the demands of IRA units in the field. Many related to ammunition, the shortage of which was a constant problem for the IRA.[25] 'Is there any chance of getting ammunition for these forty fives [i.e. .45 revolvers] [?]', Collins asked Seamus Barrett, a Manchester gunrunner, in early 1919. 'Of all things we want it more badly than anything else.'[26]

Of course, the provision of weapons themselves, in addition to the ammunition, was also a concern of the IRA leadership. 'Don[']t fail to [be] keeping all your eyes open for arms,' Collins told Liverpool's Steve Lanigan

[20] Mary A. Barrington, *The Irish independence movement on Tyneside 1919–1921* (Dublin, 1999), p. 13.
[21] BMHWS no. 922, James Cunningham, pp 1-2 (NAI).
[22] Ibid., no. 773, Gilbert Francis Barrington, p. 8 (NAI).
[23] Gilbert Barrington to J. P. Connolly, 21 Sept. 1921 (NLI, Ó Briain Papers, Ms 8442/5).
[24] BMHWS no. 777, Patrick Mills, p. 2 (NAI).
[25] Tom Barry, *Guerrilla days in Ireland* (Dublin, 1981 [1949]), pp 82, 125-6; Florence O'Donoghue, *No other law* (Dublin, 1986 [1954]), p. 135.
[26] Michael Collins to Seamus Barrett, 24 Apr. 1919 (UCDA, Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/9).

in 1919, '... we[']re awfully short of .45 [revolvers]'.[27] Writing in *An t-Óglác*, the IRA journal, the O/C of a flying column declared that the Webley and Smith & Wesson .45 calibre revolvers were 'ideal weapons for the average Volunteer'.[28] Handguns were short range weapons, useful at distances up to seventy-five yards (69 m).[29] Rifles were long range firearms and Michael Collins considered them to be 'the best of all' weapons.[30] Types of rifles included the Winchester, Mauser, Martini-Henry and Remington. The most famous, however, was the Lee Enfield, the rifle acquired in the largest quantities by Irish gunrunners. The gun-smugglers consistently fail to specify the models of Lee Enfield they acquired, but most were probably the Mark III .303 calibre with short magazine, the standard issue British army rifle during the Great War.[31]

Explosives were another form of munitions the sourcing of which taxed GHQ. 'If there is any chance at all, go ahead as quickly as you can laying in the stuff [i.e. explosives],' Michael Collins told Liverpool's Neil Kerr Senior in late 1920, adding that the Glasgow gunrunners also be requested to do likewise.[32] Explosive materials such as gelignite, ammonite, dinitrobenzene and trinitrotoluene, and chemicals such as potassium chlorate, were used in the manufacture of bombs. These were then employed in attacks on police stations and army barracks.[33]

The financial resources at the disposal of the gunrunners also influenced the types and quantities of munitions they acquired. As well as sending orders, Michael Collins and GHQ provided the money to fund the purchase of the munitions, be they ammunition, firearms or explosives. Such

[27] Michael Collins to Steve Lanigan, 24 May 1919 (UCDA, Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/1[66]); original emphasis.
[28] *An t-Óglác*, 1 Mar. 1921.
[29] Ibid., 8 July 1921.
[30] Michael Collins to Seamus Barrett, 24 Apr. 1919 (UCDA, Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/9).
[31] Ian Skinnerton, *The British service Lee: Lee-Metford and Lee-Enfield rifles and carbines 1880–1980* (London, 1982), pp 99-115.
[32] Michael Collins to Neil Kerr, 4 Nov. 1920 (UCDA, Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/3).
[33] Rudolf Meyer, Josef Köhler and Axel Homburg, *Explosives* (Weinheim, 2007), pp 114, 147, 210-11, 260; BMHWS no. 1713, James O'Donovan, pp 8-9 (NAI).

money was raised from a number of sources including the Dáil.[34] Between April 1919 and September 1920, Collins sent around £1,500 to Manchester.[35] Between June 1919 and July 1920, he gave at least £2,550 to Vize in Glasgow.[36] In March 1921, D/P Liam Mellows sent £1,000 to Glasgow and £500 to Edinburgh.[37] As well as providing the funds, Dublin often advised on the prices to be paid for the weaponry. Thus, Collins directed one gunrunner to 'Never on any account give more than £6 without consulting' his Liverpool colleagues. This applied to rifles and handguns. A price greater than £6 might be agreed in the case of a German automatic handgun, complete with stock and fifty or one hundred rounds of ammunition, he continued. Still, if he were to be made such an offer, the gunrunner should consult the Merseyside men before agreeing to it.[38]

In the acquisition of materiel, funds were employed in two different ways. In simple deals, money was handed over in return for weapons. Buying weapons from gunsmiths and British army soldiers recently returned from the World War were examples of such transactions. Other deals were more complicated, sometimes necessitating that financial expense be incurred ever before the munitions were actually acquired. Asking Michael Collins for an additional £500, Joe Vize explained that he had spent all his funds pursuing many different channels of inquiry, each of which required deposits and outlays. 'I must have money in those places,' he wrote in February 1920, '... [for] if one of them start[s] on a large scale, I would like to be able to meet them without calling in money from the other places ...'.[39] Even the theft of munitions, from an army barracks for example,

[34] David Fitzpatrick, *Politics and Irish life 1913–1921: provincial experience of war and revolution* (Cork, 1998), p. 175.
[35] Correspondence between Michael Collins and Manchester gunrunners, Apr. 1919–Jan. 1921 (UCDA, Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/9–P7/A/10).
[36] Correspondence between Michael Collins and Joe Vize, Feb. 1919–July 1920 (UCDA, Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/11).
[37] D/P to Commandant Carney and Messrs Burke, Byrne and Fagan, 3 Mar. 1921 (UCDA, Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/19[36-8]).
[38] Michael Collins to Seamus Barrett, 31 Jan. 1920 (UCDA, Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/9).
[39] Michael Collins to Joe Vize, 15 Feb. 1920 (UCDA, Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/11).

incurred costs. The munitions themselves were not purchased, of course, but soldiers had to be bribed so as to facilitate the theft.[40]

As well as the orders received from Dublin and the financial resources at their disposal, the quantities and types of munitions acquired by the gunrunners was dictated by the nature of the weapons sources available to them. As mentioned earlier, British army soldiers were a particularly fertile source, as on their return from the Great War many brought munitions home with them as souvenirs. Acting on initiative, individual Volunteers would approach the former soldiers and ask if they were willing to sell their weapons. Motherwell's James Byrne later stated that around one hundred rifles, and 'a couple of hundred revolvers' costing between £3 and £3 10*s*, were purchased in this way, along with a small amount of ammunition.[41] Paddy O'Donoghue remembered that the gunrunner Seamus Barrett similarly secured 'a big number of revolvers' from soldiers in Manchester.[42] As well as selling their own weapons to them, soldiers sometimes helped Irish gunrunners gain access to munitions held in army barracks. Such barracks, drill halls, shooting ranges, and similar facilities, with their arsenals of firearms, ammunition, and more, were alluring targets for gunrunners. Glasgow's Joe Vize was very interested in mounting raids on such arsenals. In July 1920, he issued orders to all IRB centres in Scotland 'to report without delay, any rifle ranges, drill halls or army stores in their districts ...'.[43] By then, he had already mounted a number of thefts. His first raid, on Hamilton army barracks, seems to have taken place in August 1919. Vize made contact with a quartermaster sergeant in the barracks. On the appointed night, a small group of Volunteers travelled to the barracks. At a location arranged by the quartermaster, two of the party climbed over the wall. They soon return with the rifles and handed them to their colleagues, who hid them under their coats. In all, ten rifles were seized, along with a quantity of

[40] Joe Vize to Michael Collins, 28 May 1919 (UCDA, Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/11).
[41] BMHWS no. 828, James Byrne, pp 3-4 (NAI).
[42] Ibid., no. 847, Patrick O'Donoghue, p. 6 (NAI).
[43] Joe Vize to Michael Collins, n.d., but date-stamped 7 July 1920 (UCDA, Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/11).

ammunition.[44] In June 1920, a second raid on the barracks netted Vize forty German rifles and bayonets.[45] Republicans in other parts of Britain mounted similar raids, although much less frequently. In September 1921, for example, a party of Liverpool and Birmingham Volunteers raided a drill hall in Birmingham, netting four Lee Enfield rifles and just under 3,500 rounds of .303 ammunition. Liverpool's Paddy Daly was disappointed with the haul. Michael Collins, however, was more upbeat: 'If the Cork no. 3 [IRA Brigade] had had it [i.e. the 3,500 rounds of ammunition] at one period in last February, they would have smashed up 650 of the enemy'.[46] IRA companies in Lanarkshire in Scotland and Lancashire in England also stole explosives from local coal mines.[47]

Once the munitions were acquired, they were usually hidden in dumps until an opportunity arose to despatch them to Ireland. In Liverpool, such dumps were mainly located in the private houses of the Irish working class. 'They were the only people who would take a risk over there,' commented Paddy Daly.[48] Volunteer Michael O'Leary agreed, remembering that although plenty of people sympathised with the Volunteers, few were willing to take the risk of storing munitions.[49]

The smuggling of munitions to Ireland took a number of forms. Sometimes, the gunrunners and their friends travelled to Ireland on passenger ships, carrying the armaments on their persons or in their luggage. This seems to have been a favoured method of the London gunrunners for a time, though Michael Collins frowned on the use of women as munitions couriers.[50] In the early stages of gunrunning in Birmingham, the men there used the normal postal service as the most convenient method of despatch.[51] However, the main method of smuggling was the hiding of armaments

[44] BMHWS no. 777, Patrick Mills, p. 3; ibid., no. 776, Joseph Booker, p. 3 (NAI).
[45] Joe Vize to Michael Collins, 25 June 1920 (UCDA, Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/11); BMHWS no. 828, James Byrne, pp 4-5 (NAI).
[46] Paddy Daly to Michael Collins, 22, 24 Sept. 1921; Michael Collins to Paddy Daly, 26 Sept. 1921 (UCDA, Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/7).
[47] BMHWS no. 828, James Byrne, p. 3; ibid., no. 824, Paddy Daly, pp 31-2 (NAI).
[48] Ibid., no. 824, Paddy Daly, p. 4 (NAI).
[49] Ibid., no. 797, Micheal O'Laoghaire, p. 20 (NAI).
[50] Michael Collins to Art O'Brien, 24 June 1920 (NAI, DE 2/284).
[51] BMHWS no. 922, James Cunningham, p. 2 (NAI).

onboard trading vessels plying between Britain and Ireland. A number of the seafarers on these boats were Irishmen, and some were willing to smuggle munitions. Paddy Kavanagh and Billy Verner worked on the *S.S. Blackrock*, the virtual flagship of republican gunrunning out of Liverpool. Other prominent Merseyside seafarers included Paddy Weafer on board the *S.S. Wicklow*, Michael Byrne on the *S.S. Kildare*, a man named Morris on the *S.S. Kircaldy*, Paddy Larkin on a Dundalk boat, and a man named McGlew on the *Clarecastle*, a Guinness boat. Paddy Nolan, meanwhile, was the main seafarer used to carry munitions directly from Glasgow to Dublin in 1919 and 1920.[52] William Nelson worked onboard the *S.S. Killiney*, which plied between Dublin and Liverpool. Upon reaching Merseyside, Nelson would make contact with the gunrunners, often in a pub called the 'North Star', which was owned by an Irishman named Hegarty. He would then be taken to the place where the munitions had been readied for despatch, often a house on Dublin St. 'Revolvers and ammunition were easy enough to handle,' remembered Nelson,

> as they could be stowed on the person; but rifles were a different proposition. Ways and means were found, however. Sailors in those days always used long canvas bags to carry their personal gear (Bed-clothes, sea boots, oil-skins, etc.); and those same canvas bags were ideal for carrying rifles. The modus operandi was to put the rifles into the bags, then stuff them around with anything available such as old newspapers and old rags, just to take the corners off. The bags were then taken on their owner's backs [sic] through the dock gates and on board ship ... [53]

Aboard the ship, the munitions were hidden as best as possible. 'Secrecy was the key note of the whole operation', Nelson wrote, 'for even their [i.e. the seafarers'] own ship-mates were not aware of what was going on under their very noses'.[54] Once the munitions reached Dublin, they were transferred from the ships onto ferry boats crossing the river Liffey. 'Q' Company, a section

[52] Ibid., no. 824, Paddy Daly, pp 6-7, 11 (NAI); Michael Collins to Joe Vize, 11 June 1919 (UCDA, Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/11).
[53] William Nelson, '"Q" Company' in *An tÓglach*, ii, no. 2 (1966), p. 12.
[54] Ibid.

of the Dublin Volunteers, was specially charged with transporting the armaments from the ships to nearby armaments dumps.[55] GHQ's method of distributing munitions to IRA units around Ireland was rather precarious, Mayo's Richard Walsh remembered. Periodically, provincial brigades sent men to the capital to claim some of the arsenal. It was then their responsibility to transport the munitions to their brigade area. The main method of transport was by rail, and many railway workers risked their lives by helping IRA men to smuggle munitions around the country. Another method involved placing munitions amongst the normal supplies being sent from Dublin to shopkeepers or merchants around the country. Once the box of supplies was delivered, the munitions would be removed by Volunteers in the businessmen's employ. Overall, Walsh described the distribution system as 'chancy'.[56]

The quantity of munitions smuggled to Ireland from Britain during the War of Independence is difficult to estimate accurately due to the lack of a complete set of primary source records for the period and also because of the lack of precision in some of the extant correspondence. In the ten months from May 1919 to March 1920, the extant correspondence reveals that the Glasgow men despatched directly to Ireland at least twelve rifles, fifty-seven handguns, 161 sticks of gelignite, another 109.35 kg of gelignite, 2,702 detonators, 203 fuses, and 270 rounds of ammunition.[57] In 1919, four gunrunners in Manchester procured £223 6*s* 6*d* worth of munitions, including revolvers, gelignite, fuse wire and fuse caps.[58]The extant records in relation to London indicate that 1919 saw the despatch of at least three rifles and twelve handguns directly to Dublin, along with a parcel of munitions, the contents of which was not stated.[59]

[55] William Nelson's Story (NLI, Ms 41,722), pp 2-3; Nelson, '"Q" Company', p. 12.
[56] BMHWS no. 400, Richard Walsh, pp 140-7 (NAI).
[57] Correspondence between Michael Collins and Joe Vize, Feb. 1919–July 1920 (UCDA, Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/11).
[58] Correspondence between Michael Collins, Seamus Barrett and Paddy O'Donoghue, Apr. 1919–Jan. 1921, esp. Paddy O'Donoghue to Michael Collins, n.d., but marked 'Recd 5.12.19' (UCDA, Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/9-P7/A/10).
[59] Correspondence between Michael Collins, Art O'Brien and Sean McGrath, Mar. 1920–July 1921 (NAI, DE 2/321–2/331).

In March 1920, worried about the security of the armaments accumulating in Glasgow, Joe Vize suggested the opening of a new transport route to Ireland. Michael Collins recommended that he send the munitions to Liverpool instead, where 'Our communications ... are extremely good and our men are extremely good'.[60] Soon Liverpool was also receiving munitions from London, Birmingham, Manchester and Tyneside, and forwarding them to Ireland. Munitions from New York and Antwerp were also sent to Ireland via Merseyside.[61] According to the extant sources, the two-year period from June 1919 to the truce in July 1921 saw the Liverpool men smuggle to Ireland seven machine guns, twenty-seven rifles, 285 handguns, 24,450 rounds of ammunition, and 483.75 kg of explosives, mainly gelignite and ammonite.[62]

These figures, tentative as they are, do not represent the total amount of gunrunning in Britain during the War of Independence. Provincial IRA units in Ireland, dissatisfied with the quantity of supplies they were receiving from GHQ, engaged in gunrunning in Britain outside of the official IRA and IRB channels. Mayo's Richard Walsh, Sligo's Alderman Lynch, and members of the Wexford IRA, among others, engaged in such unauthorised missions.[63] Michael Collins opposed this development. Arguing that 'People who have not a long experience in working these [gunrunning] matters don't know the harm [they do] by spreading things about in a larg[e] circle', he ordered gunrunners in Britain to shun such unauthorised missions.[64] Despite Collins' orders, however, some gunrunners continued to help comrades from Ireland. The quantity of munitions acquired by IRA units in these unauthorised missions is unknown, but it may have been significant.

[60] Correspondence between Joe Vize and Michael Collins, 7, 14, 15 Feb., 3, 14 Mar. 1920 (UCDA, Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/11).
[61] Paddy Daly interview (UCDA, O'Malley Notebooks, P17b/136); Paddy Daly to Michael Collins, 8, 11, 16, 18 Mar. 1921 (UCDA, Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/4); Edward M. Brady, *Ireland's secret service in England* (Dublin, 1928), p. 94.
[62] Correspondence between Michael Collins and Neil Kerr, Steve Lanigan, and Paddy Daly, June 1919–July 1921 (UCDA, Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/1–P7/A/6).
[63] BMHWS no. 400, Richard Walsh, pp 125-36 (NAI); Michael Collins to Paddy Daly, 5 May 1921 (UCDA, Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/5); J. P. Connolly to D/P, n.d., but c. Sept./Oct. 1921 (NLI, Ó Briain Papers, Ms 8442/5).
[64] Michael Collins to Paddy Daly, 5 May 1921 (UCDA, Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/5).

In January 1921, Michael Collins told Manchester gunrunner Paddy O'Donoghue that the supply of munitions would prove to be 'the main feature in overcoming the enemy'.[65] In the event, the IRA in Ireland did not defeat the British. However, with the aid of rifles, handguns, explosives and other paraphernalia sourced in Britain the Volunteers did succeed in forcing a stalemate in hostilities, which in turn led to the truce of July 1921 and the Anglo-Irish treaty five months later. At least fifty-five people were convicted of involvement in republican gunrunning and related offences in Britain during the War of Independence.[66] A number of others were deported to Ireland and interned on suspicion of gun-smuggling. Meanwhile, two IRA men were killed while handling munitions: Liverpool's Neil Kerr Junior in September 1920 and London's Michael McInerney in July 1921.[67]

During the Civil War, both Free State and Republican forces procured munitions in Britain. The former received armaments from the British government through official channels, while the latter was forced to continue clandestine gunrunning. However, mindful of the role played by gunrunners in Britain in supplying the IRA during the War of Independence, the Free State authorities worked with their British counterparts to frustrate the gun-smuggling activities of the anti-treaty Volunteers. The vigilance of customs officials, police, and the British navy ensured that Republican gunrunning during the Civil War failed to match that of the War of Independence period in terms of the quantity and quality of munitions smuggled to units in the field.[68]

[65] Michael Collins to Paddy O'Donoghue, 5 Jan. 1921 (UCDA, Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/10).
[66] *Freeman's Journal*, *Irish Independent*, *Irish Times*, *Manchester Guardian*, *The Observer*, *The Times*, 1919 – 1921; list of fifty-five prisoners granted remission on 11 Feb. 1922; list of fourteen prisoners granted remission on 1 Apr. 1922 (TNA, HO 144/4645); gunrunning is defined here as the contravention of either, some, or all of the following, sometimes in addition to other convictions: Explosives Act 1875, Explosive Substances Act 1883, and the Firearms Act 1920.
[67] Michael Collins to Neil Kerr, 6 Sept. 1920 (UCDA, Mulcahy Papers, P7/A/3); *Manchester Guardian*, 30 July, 2 Aug.; *The Observer*, 18 Sept. 1921.
[68] Noonan, 'Irish physical force republicanism in Britain', ch. 3.

A cadre-style party? Cumann na nGaedheal organisation in the constituencies of Clare and Dublin North 1923-27

Mel Farrell

Much scholarship on pro-Treaty politics identifies a casual approach to political organisation within the Cumann na nGaedheal party. Historians such as John Regan and Maryann Gialenella Valiulis have dealt with Cumann na nGaedheal's structural weaknesses while also highlighting numerous divisions within the party.[1] Recently, Ciara Meehan has documented some of Cumann na nGaedheal's more innovative electioneering techniques although this approach has not yet extended to the realm of the party's organisation.[2] It remains a general consensus, among historians and political scientists, that Cumann na nGaedheal was a badly organised,[3] cadre-style party that was loosely tied to its national leaders. Unlike mass political machines, cadre parties were organised on an ad-hoc basis by notable supporters and lacked a large-scale dependable branch network.[4] Cumann na nGaedheal's literature implies that it too was such a party, and that its platforms were dominated by the local élites of Irish society.[5] Moreover, the dominant narrative suggests that the party's organisation was deliberately dampened down, branches were viewed as an unnecessary burden and that power was ultimately consolidated around government ministers ensconced in Merrion Street. [6]

[1] John M. Regan, *The Irish counter revolution, 1921-1936: Treatyite politics and settlement in independent Ireland* (Dublin, 2001); Maryann Gialenella Valiulis ' After the revolution: the formative years of Cumann na nGaedheal' in Audrey S. Eyler and Robert F. Garratt (eds), *The uses of the past: essays on Irish culture* (Delaware, 1988).
[2] Ciara Meehan, *The Cosgrave party: a history of Cumann na nGaedheal, 1923-33* (Dublin, 2010).
[3] Michael Gallagher and Michael Marsh, *Days of blue loyalty: the politics of membership of the Fine Gael party* (Dublin, 2002), pp11-21; Liam Weeks, 'Parties and the party system', in John Coakley and Michael Gallagher (eds), *Politics in the Republic of Ireland* (London, 2010), pp 137-67; David M. Farrell, 'Ireland: centralization, professionalization and competitive pressures' in Richard S. Kratz and Peter Mair (eds), *How parties organize: change and adaptation in party organizations in western democracies* (London, 1994), pp 216-41.
[4] Susan E. Scarrow, *Parties and their members: organizing for victory in Britain and Germany* (New York, 1996), pp 19-23.
[5] R. K., Carty, *Party and parish pump: electoral politics in Ireland* (Ontario, 1981), p. 106; Tom Garvin, *The evolution of Irish nationalist politics* (Dublin, 1981), p. 152.
[6] Ronan Fanning, *Independent Ireland* (Dublin, 1983), p. 102.

This article, seeks, not so much to challenge this prevailing historical consensus, but rather to test it by looking at the party from the ground up through the lens of its putative constituency structures. By examining Cumann na nGaedheal's organisation in two quite different constituencies, Clare and Dublin North, new light can be shed on the party's machinery. Was it a classic cadre-style party, unable to compete in an age of collective political mobilisation, or did it more closely resemble the disciplined, mass movements then emerging in Europe. These questions are important as we try to understand the more complex reasons underpinning Cumann na nGaedheal's demise as a distinct party in the turbulent years of 1932-33.

Parties are 'profoundly influenced by their origins',[7] so let us briefly examine the impact of Cumann na nGaedheal's foundation on the subsequent evolution of the party's organisation. A distinct pro-Treaty political organisation developed over the autumn and winter of 1922 as the Irish Civil War entered its bloodiest phase. The impetus for the new party came from the pro-Treaty election committees that had been formed in early 1922 to support the Provisional Government established in January under the terms of the Anglo-Irish Treaty. On 29 August the pro-Treaty General and Election Committee resolved to establish the new party that would become Cumann na nGaedheal.[8] Nine days later members of this committee met with an Ernest Blythe led deputation from the pro-Treaty parliamentary party.[9] During this meeting, Blythe emphasised the need to shore up support for the Provisional Government by establishing a broadly based 'National Party' that would cater to all interests who supported the Treaty. Against the background of violent fratricidal conflict, little attempt was made to formulate a rigorous policy agenda or to systematically organise the constituencies. Instead,

[7] Scarrow, *Parties and their members*, p. 23.
[8] General and Election Committee minutes of meeting, 29 Aug. 1922 (UCD Archive Department, [UCDA], Cumann na nGaedheal party minute books , P39/min/1).
[9] The group also included Séamus Dolan, Padraic Ó Máile and Walter Cole. Blythe further suggested that the new party share a relationship to the government similar to that of the British Liberals. General and Election Committee minutes, 7 Sept.1922 (UCDA, Cumann na nGaedheal party minute books, P39/min/1).

support of the Treaty settlement and a vague conception of government for the benefit of all classes sufficed for a policy agenda. Already in power since January 1922, the Provisional Government did not conceive of the new party as an instrument for winning power but rather to keep it there.[10]

Veteran Sinn Féin organiser Dan MacCarthy wished to see the new party launched at a 'big meeting' representing 'all Ireland'.[11] Others such as Richard Mulcahy were opposed to the idea of launching the party during a time of Civil War, believing the conflict would overshadow the formation of a new pro-Treaty party organisation.[12] Nonetheless, when Treaty supporters gathered in Dublin for a conference on 7 December 1922, they intended to press ahead with the foundation of the new party. Those in attendance chose Cumann na nGaedheal, the name of Arthur Griffith's 1900 precursor to Sinn Féin, as the new party's title. Although publicly launched the following April, the Cumann na nGaedheal party organisation was brought into being on the day of the 7 December conference through the establishment of a provisional party executive. However, Cumann na nGaedheal's foundation was overshadowed by one of the darkest episodes in Irish history. That day, pro-Treaty deputy Seán Hales was assassinated by the IRA and on the following day four republicans were executed in a reprisal in an action that could have had no pretence to legality.

Following the preliminary conference of 7 December, Treaty supporters were urged to organise Cumann na nGaedheal branches or *cumainn* in their local constituencies.[13] Dublin North was one of the first constituencies thus organised as the capital became the initial focus of efforts to establish the party's apparatus.[14] In early January 1923 R.J. Purcell was appointed to organise Dublin.[15] Formerly an organiser with the Irish Self

[10] Fanning, *Independent Ireland*, p. 101.
[11] General and Election Committee minutes, 3 Oct. 1922 (UCDA, Cumann na nGaedheal party minute books, P39/min/1).
[12] Richard Mulcahy to Dan MacCarthy, 18 Oct. 1922 (UCDA, Richard Mulcahy papers, P7b/325); Interview with Risteárd Mulcahy, in Dublin, 10 Feb. 2010.
[13] General and Election Committee, minutes of meeting, 14 Dec. 1922 (UCDA, Cumann na nGaedheal party minute books, P39/min/1).
[14] Ibid., 5 Jan. 1923 (UCDA, Cumann na nGaedheal party minute books, P39/min/1).
[15] Ibid., 26 Jan. 1923 (UCDA, Cumann na nGaedheal party minute books, P39/min/1).

Determination League of Great Britain, the soon to be ubiquitous Purcell was pro-active in establishing branches, attending local meetings and in ensuring that the new *cumainn* were speedily affiliated with Cumann na nGaedheal headquarters. Purcell also briefed the provisional party executive on the activism levels of those branches he had set up. Within days of Purcell's appointment, *cumainn* had been established in east Clontarf, Drumcondra and the Mountjoy ward.[16] A branch had appeared in Glasnevin by 8 February while efforts to establish *cumainn* in other parts of the constituency also proved successful. On 16 March, Purcell reported to the Standing Committee that a *cumann* had been formed in every Dublin North ward except the Rotunda.[17] By April, a constituency committee had been set up in Dublin North at a time when branches had not even been formed in most constituencies in the Free State.

By contrast, Cumann na nGaedheal made a somewhat belated appearance in the south-western constituency of Clare. By 24 April, Canon William O'Kennedy, described as a 'pillar'[18] of revolutionary Sinn Féin in Clare, was elected president of a new Cumann na nGaedheal branch formed in Ennis, the County's main town.[19] Little or no attempt was made at this time to spread the organisation outside Ennis to its surrounding districts. Consequently, Cumann na nGaedheal fought the August 1923 election with just the bare outline of an organisation in Clare.

Whereas in Dublin North there was a solid branch structure through which to organise a Cumann na nGaedheal selection convention in the summer of 1923, things were less satisfactory in Clare. On 28 July an advertisement appeared in the *Clare Champion* which, for 'want of organisation', simply invited Treaty supporters to meet at the courthouse in Ennis to select the Clare Cumann na nGaedheal candidates. Also invited to the convention were: all the priests in Clare, all local councillors, former Sinn

[16] Provisional General Council, minutes, 2 Feb. 1923 (UCDA, Cumann na nGaedheal party minute books, P39/min/1).
[17] Cumann na nGaedheal, [Provisional General Council?] minutes, 16 Mar. 1923 (UCDA, Cumann na nGaedheal party minute books, P39/min/1).
[18] Canon William O'Kennedy, undated (Killaloe Diocesan Archive, [KDA], clergy files).
[19] *Clare Champion*, 28 Apr. 1923.

Féin branch and constituency officers, pre-Truce volunteers not attached to the Free State army and representative farmers, businessmen and workers.[20] In the absence of established structures across the County, Clare Treatyites invited former Sinn Féiners, representatives of a cross section of economic interests and local notables to adjudicate on the selection of Cumann na nGaedheal candidates in the constituency. Séamus Hughes, soon to be the party's general secretary, chaired the subsequent convention at which five Cumann na nGaedheal candidates were selected. Evidently feeling the need to identify their party with the revolutionary war, an official report of the proceedings in the following week's *Clare Champion* stated that among the attendance were 'a majority of the men who have borne the brunt of the struggle for independence for many years past'.[21] Having selected the party's general election candidates, those assembled then elected a new constituency executive to take charge of the campaign in Clare.

Meanwhile, during the summer of 1923, the Dublin North organisation displayed a keen desire to shape the structures and ethos of the new party. Dublin North resolutions, dealing with both the party's internal mechanics and with government policy, were prominent in the programme of Cumann na nGaedheal's national convention of 27 April,[22] while correspondence from its *cumainn* showed the grass-roots wanted Cumann na nGaedheal to contest local elections and pursue a policy of 'gaelicisation'.[23] In subsequent years activists in north Dublin continued to express strong views about Cumann na nGaedheal's identity, structures and policy.

A robust election campaign was fought in both Clare and Dublin North in August 1923. Whereas a well drilled network of branches underpinned efforts in Dublin North, Cumann na nGaedheal's campaign in Clare depended largely on the *cumann* established in Ennis. In Clare, the party's campaign was controlled from an election headquarters that had been

[20] Ibid., 28 July, 4 Aug. 1923.
[21] Ibid., 4 Aug. 1923.
[22] Report of Mansion House Convention, 27 Apr.1923 (UCDA, Cumann na nGaedheal party minute books, P39/min/1).
[23] Standing Committee, minutes of meetings, 22 June, 6 July 1923 (UCDA, Cumann na nGaedheal party minute books, P39/min/1).

set up in the Queen's Hotel Ennis. At numerous election meetings in Clare, Cumann na nGaedheal's speakers were introduced by the local priest. A meeting in Kilkee was chaired by Fr. Charles Culligan, formerly a Sinn Féin branch officer,[24] while a rally in Ennis addressed by W.T. Cosgrave was opened by Fr. John Meade. Priests were prominent on the party's platforms in numerous rural centres indicating a desire to showcase its Catholic credentials.

In Dublin North, a selection convention was arranged in a much more efficient manner than had been evidenced in Clare. Numerous branch meetings took place in the north Dublin constituency before the rank-and-file gathered to select the party's candidates on 1 August 1923. These meetings were well attended and supporters were in a confident mood ahead of the election. One such meeting on 24 July heard grass-root members confidently predict that the upcoming Dublin North selection convention would be representative of each part of the constituency through the network of branches that had already been established since January. Whereas a makeshift convention had selected the party's candidates in Clare, signed-up members chose the Cumann na nGaedheal candidates in Dublin North. Moreover, the constituency machine would play an active role in the party's overall campaign in the capital.[25]

The results of the August 1923 election (shown in tables one and two below) are indicative of the Cumann na nGaedheal organisation's strength in each constituency. In Clare, the party returned just one deputy, Eoin MacNeill, while four of the eight seats on offer in Dublin North were secured by Cumann na nGaedheal candidates. This was repeated in Dublin South as the party secured an impressive return on its efforts in the capital.

[24] Undated list of Sinn Féin personnel, Clare West (National Archives of Ireland, [NAI], Cumann na Poblachta and Sinn Féin papers, 1094/13/3).
[25] Standing Committee, minutes, 13 July 1923 (UCDA, Cumann na nGaedheal party minute books, P39/min/1).

Table 1: First preference vote obtained by successful Clare candidates, August 1923.

Candidate	Party	Vote
Eamon de Valera	Sinn Féin	17,762
Eoin MacNeill	Cumann na nGaedheal	8,196
Patrick Hogan	Labour	2,083
Conor Hogan	Farmers' party	1,914
Brian O'Higgins	Sinn Féin	114

Brian M. Walker, *Parliamentary election results in Ireland, 1918-92* (Dublin, 1992), p. 113.

The ignominy surrounding Cumann na nGaedheal's poor performance in Clare was worsened by the failure of local activists to manage party funds prudently. John Regan notes a pre-Treaty culture of profligacy in the revolutionary Sinn Féin movement in Clare, a trait seemingly inherited by the county's Cumann na nGaedheal organisation. Clare's constituency committee accrued large debts during the 1923 campaign and the Standing Committee, itself hamstrung financially having depended heavily on paid organisers, was unable to cover the arrears.Clare remained £200 in debt in spite of a £150 cheque obtained, with some difficulty, from party headquarters.[26] Acrimony between local businesses in Clare, the constituency committee and Cumann na nGaedheal headquarters rumbled on for over two years.[27] Unsurprisingly, support for the party in the county evaporated. Clare was unrepresented at the party's 1924 party conference as the constituency organisation melted away and in effect became a 'one man show' under Canon O'Kennedy. In the spring of 1925, the indefatigable R.J. Purcell was drafted in to repair the broken Clare Cumann na nGaedheal organisation. In Clare, Purcell again showed the organisational skills that had been on display in Dublin North two years earlier. He succeeded in establishing numerous

[26] Standing Committee minutes, 26 Oct. 1923 (UCDA, Cumann na nGaedheal party minute books, P39/min/1).
[27] The situation had been worsened by the fact that three candidates failed to win enough votes to secure their deposits. Correspondence in the Eoin MacNeill papers reveals the frustrations of numerous local businesses in Clare as bills for dinners, teas, apartments and electrical works went unpaid. Harry Guinane the constituency secretary and Canon O'Kennedy were left to pick up the pieces. E. Laracy to Eoin MacNeill, 28 Mar. 1924; Harry Guinane to Seán Mac Giolla Fhaolain, 3 Nov. 1925 (UCDA, Eoin MacNeill papers,LA1/H/64/2 ;LA1/H/66/29). Regan, *Counter revolution*, pp 152-3.

cumainn across the county in time for the May 1925 Cumann na nGaedheal annual convention. Again, priests were prominent in the reorganising effort in Clare while the Standing Committee was careful to emphasise that constituencies would have to take responsibility for their own electoral expense.

Table 2: First preference vote obtained by successful Dublin North candidates, August 1923.

Candidate	Party	Vote
Richard Mulcahy	Cumann na nGaedheal	22,205
Alfred Byrne	Independent	10,518
Ernest O'Malley	Sinn Féin	4,602
Seán T. O'Kelly	Sinn Féin	4,233
William Hewat	Businessmen's Party	2,594
Seán McGarry	Cumann na nGaedheal	1,397
MargaretCollins-O'Driscoll	Cumann na nGaedheal	1,247
Francis Cahill	Cumann na nGaedheal	790

Walker, *Parliamentary election results*, p. 110.

In Dublin North, branches remained active during 1924 and 1925. Activism there had not abated with the passing of the 1923 election, and members in the capital remained eager to shape the new party's identity and structures. A Dublin North constituency committee meeting in September 1923 resolved to provide a social entertainment forum for supporters. Such a medium would help reinforce the political identity of Cumann na nGaedheal's followers. To help provide such an outlet, the constituency committee arranged to meet with their counterparts in neighbouring Dublin County and Dublin South.[28] Members of the Standing Committee were also invited to this meeting which took place on 24 September. From this meeting, Cumann na nGaedheal established a central branch or *ard chumann*.

[28] *Freeman's Journal*, 22 Sept. 1923.

Addressing the 24 September meeting, Mulcahy expressed hope that the central branch would become a centre for 'progressive ideas' and 'gaelicisation'. An Irish language committee was subsequently formed showing that elements deep within the party machinery remained committed to Irish-Ireland ideals.[29] The central branch aimed to both entertain and educate party members and its committee was made up of delegates representing the three Dublin constituencies.[30] Cumann na nGaedheal's activity in Dublin, corresponds with the efforts of mass organised parties in this period to build 'cohesive, class-based communities' that would 'reinforce a collective political identity'.[31]

The Dublin North constituency organisation's interest in Irish nationality was again evident at the party conference of 1924. Various north city branches proposed resolutions, some of which called for Irish dancing and music to dominate all future party social functions.[32] Changes to party rules were also suggested while the Glasnevin branch proposed that a book be produced annually 'giving particulars as to salaries in the Civil Service'.[33] In April and May 1924, capitalising on the twin crises of the Army Mutiny and the National Group secession, Dublin North members led efforts to give the organisation more input in government policy. Councillor Paddy McIntyre, chair of the constituency committee, also sat on the party's Standing Committee at this time. The Dublin North constituency called on the Standing Committee to summon a national convention of party members so that the relationships between the government, the parliamentary party and the Cumann na nGaedheal organisation could be discussed and defined.[34] The Standing Committee referred the matter to the National Executive which met to debate the issue on 13 May.

[29] Ibid., 26 Sept. 1923.
[30] *Dublin Evening Mail*, 2 Oct. 1923.
[31] Scarrow, *Parties and their members*, p. 4.
[32] Amendments to the constitution, Jan. 1924? (UCDA, Hugh Kennedy papers, P4/1380/9).
[33] Ibid.
[34] National Executive minutes, 13 May 1924 (UCDA, Cumann na nGaedheal party minute books, P39/min/1).

During the tumultuous 13 May meeting, McIntyre called for greater consultation between the government and the party organisation and warned that failure to bring about closer cooperation could plunge the party machine into a general election where it would be expected to secure the return of an unpopular government. Instead, he argued, the party hierarchy should warn rank-and-file members in advance of unpopular legislation and, where possible, test public opinion through the Cumann na nGaedheal branches. Delegates from other parts of the country concurred with McIntyre's analysis.[35] However, the government was not about to cede power to its machine and the organisation's scope to influence decisions remained limited.

Such commitment to improving Cumann na nGaedheal's structures, or to pursuing an Irish-Ireland type policy agenda as witnessed in Dublin North was rarely in evidence in Clare. This is somewhat unusual given that during the revolutionary period O'Kennedy had said that the ideal Sinn Féin branch 'ought to be a school for national thought'. At that time O'Kennedy had clearly taken an interest in what shape an independent Ireland would take and how political action could help foster Irish nationality.[36] Aside from occasional references to the exploits of Michael Brennan and others during the War of Independence, the reorganised Clare branches tended to only discuss matters of local concern. This was true of resolutions proposed by the Ennis *cumann* in advance of the 1925 party conference. Among these were motions calling for the drainage of the river Fergus and for loans to be made available to farmers who had lost livestock to fluke. Another proposal sought to take advantage of the new sugar beet industry by pointing out that the lands on the banks of the river Fergus were 'in every way' suitable for the growing of sugar beet.[37]

Land division was another matter that provoked discussion in Clare Cumann na nGaedheal circles. In June 1925, the Sixmilebridge branch

[35] Ibid.
[36] David Fitzpatrick, *Politics and Irish life, 1913-1921: provincial experience of war and revolution* (Dublin, 1977), p. 129.
[37] *Clare Champion*, 2 May 1925.

president, James O'Regan, an unsuccessful election candidate in 1923, suggested his *cumann* cooperate with the local clergy to ensure that the Estate Commissioner, the official responsible for assessing local needs in areas where land was to be divided, would receive the best possible advice when inspecting the area.[38] Priests, heavily influential in the Free State during the 1920s and 30s, were often called upon to advise these commissioners on their visits to an area. The Sixmilebridge branch subsequently formed a committee 'none of whom are claimants for land' to help guide the Commissioner in his work.[39] A week later, the Ennistymon branch was less civic-minded. Members attending a meeting there on 21 June resolved that Cumann na nGaedheal supporters should in fact gain preferential treatment in respect of land division.[40] It seems that at least some members of the reorganised branches in Clare hoped to use their connection to the 'government party' in pursuit of political patronage. Whatever their motivation, the reorganised branches remained quite active throughout 1925 with regular meetings taking place across the county. However, activism in Clare would again drop in 1926 prompting yet another reorganisational effort in early 1927.

Dublin North's commitment to the party cause was rarely in question. On numerous occasions, Dublin North supporters volunteered to campaign during by-elections in other constituencies.[41] In addition, there seems to have been closer cooperation throughout the period between rank-and-file branch members and the party's candidates there than there ever was in Clare. Dublin North members were sometimes consulted on strategy during campaigns.[42] Moreover, in October 1924, Dublin North chairperson Paddy McIntyre, was dispatched to Mayo to help organise it for the by-

[38] Terence Dooley, *'The land for the people': the land question in independent Ireland* (Dublin, 2004), p. 254.
[39] *Clare Champion*, 20 June 1925.
[40] *Clare Champion*, 27 June 1925.
[41] *Freeman's Journal*, 28 Feb.1924.
[42] *Dublin Evening Mail*, 9 Feb.1925.

election of November. Clearly McIntyre's success in Dublin North was recognised and it was hoped he could use those skills elsewhere.[43]

Noisy political debate remained the hallmark of Cumann na nGaedheal in Dublin North. In September 1925, a resolution was passed proposing a new tillage scheme in Irish agriculture. During the course of the debate, various speakers for and against the motion put forward cogent arguments as to why such a scheme was suited or unsuited to Irish farming. A report of this meeting reveals, not just a knowledgeable discussion of agricultural policy, but a willingness among grass-root supporters in Dublin North to go against the prevailing policy of their own party.[44] At other meetings members supported increased interest rates on deposits held in the G.P.O to provide investment opportunities and to give voters a stake in electing stable governments.[45] This resolution made it to the programme for the 1926 party conference, as did the motion on agricultural policy.[46] Furthermore, in 1927 a branch member in Glasnevin proposed making use of the army to help inculcate a sense of Irish nationality among citizens, particularly in rural areas where, according to its proposer, cynicism and apathy were most prevalent.[47] The army would be used in marches and pageants to show that Irish national aspirations were coterminous with the Free State. Although this isolated initiative never came to anything, it does have continental precedents, particularly with regard to Primo de Rivera's Spain,[48] and shows the continued influence of Irish nationalism among many government supporters

Cumann na nGaedheal faced the people twice in 1927. Having lost sixteen seats in June, the Standing Committee anticipated an early general election and took steps to improve organisation. At meetings in July

[43] Standing Committee minutes, 10 Oct. 1924 (UCDA, Cumann na nGaedheal party minute books P39/min/1).
[44] *Irish Independent*, 2 Sept. 1925.
[45] *Irish Times*, 10 May 1926.
[46] Cumann na nGaedheal, annual convention, 1926 resolutions (Cork City and County Archives, [CCCA]. Liam de Róiste papers, U271/Dáil material/K).
[47] *Dublin Evening Mail*, 10 Jan. 1927.
[48] Alejandro Quiroga, *Making Spaniards: Primo de Rivera and the nationalization of the masses, 1923-30* (Basingstoke, 2007).

the Standing Committee focussed its efforts on constituencies where seats had been lost in the June election and urged deputies to improve the local machinery.[49] Given the tight Dáil arithmetic, and the political convulsions following the assassination of Kevin O'Higgins in July, Cosgrave sought a fresh mandate in September.[50] In a further attempt to make good the seat losses sustained in June, Cumann na nGaedheal hired an advertising agency to coordinate its press campaign.[51]

In both Clare and Dublin North, the campaign for the two elections of 1927 took on much the same character as that of 1923. Paid organisers were dispatched to Clare to stir the party machinery to action in early 1927, while Dublin North's active branches were already well prepared. In Clare, new *cumainn* were established or existing ones reorganised months in advance of the party's selection convention. Sensing that its prospects in de Valera's constituency remained grim, Cumann na nGaedheal cooperated with the Farmer's Party. A prominent Farmers' Party councillor, James O'Flynn, helped with the reorganisation of the Sixmilebridge Cumann na nGaedheal branch arguing that 'a purely National organisation' that was 'best suited to the interests of all classes' should continue to govern.[52] To boost the local campaign, various high profile speakers such as Patrick Hogan and Desmond FitzGerald travelled to Clare to address Cumann na nGaedheal election rallies. [53]

In Dublin North the *cumainn* had remained active and busily involved in electioneering. While some *cumainn*, such as that in Clontarf, had lapsed and needed to be revived, the constituency remained well organised with active branches in most places. As can be gauged from the tables below, as in 1923, Clare remained a problematic constituency, returning just one Cumann na nGaedheal deputy in both the June and September 1927 electoral

[49] Standing Committee minutes, 17 June, 9 July 1927 (UCDA, Cumann na nGaedheal party minute books, P39/min/1).
[50] Stephen Collins, *The Cosgrave legacy* (Dublin, 1996), pp 50-1.
[51] Meehan, *Cosgrave party*, pp 113-38.
[52] *Clare Champion*, 18 Mar.1927.
[53] Ibid., 26 Mar., 21 May 1927.

contests.[54] In Dublin North, a determined effort to win back a seat lost in June proved successful in the second election of the year.[55]

Table 3: First preference vote obtained by successful Clare candidates, June 1927

Candidate	Party	Vote
Eamon de Valera	Fianna Fáil	13,029
Thomas Falvey	Farmers' Party	5,140
Patrick Hogan	Labour	4,147
Patrick Michael Kelly	Cumann na nGaedheal	3,612
Patrick Houlihan	Fianna Fáil	1,500

Walker, *Parliamentary election results*, p. 118

Table 4: First preference vote obtained by successful Clare candidates, September 1927.

Candidate	Party	Vote
Eamon de Valera	Fianna Fáil	13,902
Patrick Michael Kelly	Cumann na nGaedheal	5,646
Patrick Hogan	Labour	4,683
Martin Sexton	Fianna Fáil	3,506
Patrick Houlihan	Fianna Fáil	3,003

Walker, *Parliamentary election results*, p. 125.

[54] Walker, *Parliamentary election results* , pp 118-27.
[55] Ibid.

Table 5: First preference vote obtained by successful Dublin North candidates, June 1927.

Candidate	Party	Vote
Alfred Byrne	Independent	17,780
Gen. Richard James Mulcahy	Cumann na nGaedheal	11,726
Seán Thomas O'Kelly	Fianna Fáil	6,040
Oscar Traynor	Sinn Féin	4,351
Kathleen Clarke	Fianna Fáil	3,818
John Joseph Byrne	Cumann na nGaedheal	2,267
Margaret Collins-O'Driscoll	Cumann na nGaedheal	2,267
Dennis Cullen	Labour	1,692

Walker, *Parliamentary election results*, p. 119.

Table 6: First preference vote obtained by successful Dublin North candidates, September 1927.

Candidate	Party	Vote
Gen. Richard James Mulcahy	Cumann na nGaedheal	14,597
Alfred Byrne	Independent	11,864
James Larkin (Sen.)	Independent Labour	7,490
Seán Thomas O'Kelly	Fianna Fáil	6,958
Eamon Cooney	Fianna Fáil	3,477
John Joseph Byrne	Cumann na nGaedheal	2,935
Margaret Collins-O'Driscoll	Cumann na nGaedheal	2,274
Patrick Leonard	Cumann na nGaedheal	2,068

Walker, *Parliamentary election results*, p. 127.

With the passing of the September election, the Dublin North constituency retained its commitment to developing a sense of Irish national identity, while a constituency social club, established in November 1927,[56] was lauded in the new party organ *The Freeman*. Indeed, the party's newspaper encouraged other branches to follow the example of Dublin North by calling on them to arrange social events for members. From party headquarters, the Dublin North social club organised card games, billiard nights, music and Irish dancing classes and in the process maintained a longstanding Irish nationalist tradition of merging leisure and politics.[57] Soon other constituency committees sought to emulate the club's success by extending their own social activities. For example, in December 1927 the Ballinalee *cumann* in county Longford resolved to become a 'medium of social entertainment for the district'.[58] However, in Clare Cumann na nGaedheal activism again dipped as the party struggled to make an impact in de Valera's stronghold.

Cumann na nGaedheal's organisational fortunes differed greatly in the two constituencies that were examined in this article. Between 1923 and 1927 the party was continually dogged by structural problems in Clare. Branches lapsed between elections, funds were inadequately managed and the constituency failed to send delegates to the 1924 party conference. In addition, Clare's *cumainn* network seems to have been somewhat isolated from the party's central structures and little by way of an ideological agenda is discernable among the reports of Cumann na nGaedheal meetings in the county. Instead activism there seemed to revolve around the parish pump and the limited spoils of office that were perceived to be on offer. Paid organisers were needed and these were dispatched to Clare in 1925 and 1927 to breathe new life into the lapsed constituency machinery. In Dublin North on the other hand, Cumann na nGaedheal branches remained active throughout the period and their cultural and social activities correspond with the characteristics of

[56] *The Freeman*, 19 Nov. 1927.
[57] R.V., Comerford, 'Patriotism as pastime: the appeal of Fenianism in the mid 1860s' in *Irish Historical Studies*, xxii (March 1981), pp 239-50.
[58] *The Freeman*, 17 Dec. 1927.

the mass party. *Cumann* meetings in Dublin North were regular and the party's structures seemed to function quite successfully through the period in question. In addition, the constituency's attempts to provide recreational activity through the medium of Cumann na nGaedheal represented an attempt to forge a loyal, party community.

Mass parties are distinguished from cadre parties, not by their success in enrolling a grass-root membership, but by their willingness to enlist supporters in a widespread branch based organisation.[59] In this regard, Cumann na nGaedheal cannot be regarded as a cadre party. Not only did it have party newspapers, centralised structures and branches as its basic unit, Cumann na nGaedheal also took corrective action whenever its grass-root structures were in need of repair. In 1925 and 1927 paid organisers descended on Clare to form new branches and stir grass-root activism in a clear attempt to marshal support through the organisational structures of the party. That these efforts broke down between elections is evidence, not of an 'amateur' approach to party organisation, but rather is further proof that de Valera's stronghold was unfertile territory.[60] As such, in trying to understand Cumann na nGaedheal's demise as a distinct party in 1933, the cliché of an inadequate commitment to party organisation cannot suffice. In explaining Treatyite political realignment in 1933, scholars should instead focus on the suitability of the party's economic and social policies in the context of rapidly changing global circumstances.

[59] Scarrow, *Parties and their members*, p. 19.
[60] Meehan, *Cosgrave Party*, p. viii.

Consultation and Cooperation? NATO's intra-alliance frictions during the Berlin Crisis 1958-1961

Boris Barth*

On 27 November 1958, Nikita Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, questioned in a note to the USA the division of Berlin into four sectors, and asked for the reconsideration of the city's status.[1] In his opinion, the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in 1949 and its accession to the North Atlantic Treaty organisation (NATO) in 1955 'grossly violated' the Potsdam Treaty of 1945 which regulated the administration of occupied Germany by the four victorious powers of World War II: France, the Soviet Union, the UK, and the USA. Khrushchev pointed out that the creation of the West German state had harmed the allied goal of a reunified Germany and that FRG's membership in NATO not only posed a threat to the Soviet Union but to all countries which, consequently, had organized themselves militarily in the Warsaw Defense Treaty in 1955. Eventually, Khrushchev asked to end the city's status as a 'state within a state' and 'a springboard for intensive espionage, sabotage, and other subversive activities against Socialist countries' by requesting it become a demilitarized free city.[2] If the Western allies did not cooperate to find a satisfying solution within half a year, Khrushchev would settle the question of the status of Berlin in a bilateral agreement with the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Thereby the Soviet Union's occupational rights over Berlin

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[1] 'Note from the Soviet Union to the United States regarding the status of Berlin and the Potsdam Agreements',27 Nov. 1958 , in United States Department of State (ed.), *Documents on Germany 1944-1985* (Washington, D.C., 1985), pp 552-9. Khrushchev had already expressed his views on the status of Berlin in a speech given on 10 November 1958 in Moscow, cf. 'Address by the Chairman Khrushchev proposing the Western Powers thenceforth deal directly with the German Democratic Republic on any question concerning Berlin' ,10 Nov. 1958 , in: ibid., pp 542-6.

[2] 'Note from the Soviet Union to the United States regarding the status of Berlin and the Potsdam Agreements', 27 Nov. 1958, pp 553, 556.

would be transferred to the GDR, at that time not recognised by the three Western allies.

Khrushchev demands were the beginning of the second Berlin Crisis of 1958 which, eventually, ended in the construction of the Berlin Wall on 13 August 1961 and has been characterized as 'the likeliest flash-point of conflict in the Cold War'.[3] The political crisis not only called the three Western allies and the FRG to action but all NATO member states. In a resolution of 22 October 1954, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) had already declared that the three Western occupation powers in Berlin 'reaffirm that they will treat any attack against Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon their forces and themselves'.[4] According to the NATO treaty's article 5, member states are obliged to militarily support any attacked member state in a counter-strike.[5] An attack on West Berlin by the Soviet Union would have meant an attack on the sectors of the three member states and could have provoked a military intervention by NATO. Policies concerning Berlin were negotiated and agreed upon between the three Western allies, taking the FRG's interests into consideration. On the other hand, military provocations against West Berlin called all NATO member states to action. This clearly was the grounds for a stalemate: Eleven NATO members were not consulted in the decision-making process but had to militarily support any strike or counter-strike by the other four if Berlin was attacked – not to mention the constant threat of both the US and the USSR actually using nuclear weapons when rhetoric deterrence failed.

This article will research intra-alliance frictions between the eleven NATO member states and the three Western allies plus West Germany caused by the second Berlin Crisis. Two types of intra-alliance

[3] Kori Shake and John Gearson, 'Editor's Introduction' in (ed.), *The Berlin Wall crisis. perspectives on Cold War alliances* (Basingstoke and New York, 2002), pp x-xiv, p. x.

[4] 'Resolution of association by other parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, Annex B: declaration by the governments of United States of America, United Kingdom and France', 22 Oct. 1954 (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17412.htm) (29 Mar.2010).

[5] 'The North Atlantic Treaty', 4 Apr. 1949, Article 5' (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm) (29 Mar. 2010).

frictions will be looked at: the disregard for the 'habit of consultation'[6] within NATO and the deliberate defiance of the three Western allies by launching LIVE OAK in January 1959, a clandestine organisation responsible for Berlin contingency planning. The other type of intra-alliance dispute was caused by the question of which policy to adopt when dealing with the Soviet Union – de-escalation and diplomacy, or deterrence and, ultimately, military confrontation? Here, special attention will be paid both to NATO's Secretary General, Paul-Henri Spaak's (1956-61) attempts to establish a consensual diplomatic position of the alliance and the US policy under President Eisenhower. Analysing the US foreign policy is especially relevant because the US played a dominating though not unchallenged role within the "triumvirate" with France and the UK.[7] The US was also the only superpower in the bipolar world order of the Cold War to face the USSR. Furthermore, the US was eager to impose its policies on its allies, both within Berlin and NATO, and, finally, the US was then the only NATO country in the possession of a relevant quantity of nuclear arms.[8]

NATO's intra-alliance situation during the second Berlin Crisis has not yet been thoroughly studied. Recently, Christian Nünlist and Bruno Thoss have researched this topic individually,[9] as did an anthology edited by John P. S. Gearson and Kori Shake.[10] An anthology edited by Mary Ann Heiss and S. Victor Papacosma investigated intrabloc conflicts of NATO and

[6] 'Report of the Committee of Three on non-military cooperation in NATO, 13 Dec. 1956 , Chapter II Political Cooperation, II. Consultation, A. Scope and character of political consultation, paragraph 43' (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17481.htm) (29 Mar. 2010).

[7] The positions of France, the UK and the FRG have also to be considered in this article as well since they influenced the intra-alliance crisis, too. On the influence of the UK see John Gearson, 'Britain and the Berlin Wall Crisis, 1958-1962' in Gearson and Shake, *The Berlin Wall Crisis*, pp 43-72; on France's influence see Cyril Buffet, 'De Gaulle, the Bomb and Berlin: How to use a political weapon' in ibid., pp 73-95, and Anna Lochner and Christian Nuenlist, 'Containing the French Malaise: The role of NATO's Secretary General, 1958-1968' in Mary Ann Heiss and S. Victor Papcosma (eds), *NATO and the Warsaw Pact: intrabloc conflicts* (Kent, OH, 2008), pp 75-90.

[8] Great Britain only started to gain access to nuclear weapons in the 1950s and closely cooperated with the US on their development. The US knowledge and quantity of arms was far more advanced because they began developing arms as early as the 1940s.

[9] Christian Nünlist, 'Die NATO und die Berlinkrise von 1958-1961' in Bernd Greiner et. al. (eds), *Krisen im Kalten Krieg* (Bonn, 2009), pp 244-73, and Bruno Thoss, 'Information, persuasion, or consultation? The western powers and NATO during the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962' in Christian Nuenlist and Anna Lochner (eds), *Transatlantic relations at stake: aspects of NATO 1956-1972* (Zurich, 2006), pp 73-94.

[10] Gearson and Shake, *The Berlin Wall crisis*.

the Warsaw Pact from a broader, comparative perspective.[11] A significant amount of contemporary source material is available: NATO itself provides relevant official texts of that time, e. g. communiqués of NAC or Spaak, and declassified official US documents are accessible in the Digital National Security Archive. The document edition 'Foreign Relations of the United States', issued by the Department of State, allows valuable insights into US policies of that time, too.[12]

Reactions to Khrushchev's Berlin Ultimatum

On 17 November 1958, one week after the speech in Moscow and a few days before the release of the Khrushchev note on 27 November, an extraordinary NAC-meeting was held in Paris. Interestingly, NATO members were not overly concerned with the Soviet aggression but rather irritated by a note released on the same day by West Germany's federal government to the Soviet Union.[13] The other member states were even more irritated because Horst Blankenhorn, the German ambassador to NATO, had deliberately left them out and defended this action by stating that a consensus with the three Western allies was accomplished prior to the sending of the note. The action of the German federal government was especially audacious, Christian Nünlist argues, since it was in need of the support and solidarity of the whole alliance as this emerging crisis could have led to military conflict.[14] In a telegram to the Department of State, the American ambassador to NATO, W. Randolph Burgess, briefly reported that 'there was strong pressure from all members and chairman for fullest use of consultative process in North Atlantic Council on all matters connected with Berlin situation'.[15] Dirk Stikker, Burgess' Dutch colleague and later NATO Secretary General, affirmed that 'other NATO members have associated themselves with the

[11] Heiss and Papcosma, *NATO and the Warsaw Pact*.

[12] All of them are accessible online via http://www.nato.int, http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/ and http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/FRUS (29 March 2010).

[13] Nünlist, *NATO und die Berlinkrise*, p. 249f.

[14] Ibid., p. 250.

[15] 'Telegram from the mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State', 17 Nov. 1958 in United States Department of State , Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1958-1960, vol. VIII, p. 80f.

position of three powers in Berlin' – but, as Burgess pointed out, apparently not for the price of giving up the organisation's habit of consultation.

NATO's irritation was reinforced by another intra-institutional conflict caused by France earlier that year, in mid-September 1958: Charles de Gaulle had proposed a tripartite US-UK-French consultation forum that would have been in charge of 'the security of the free world', including the use of nuclear weapons, and would have left out the smaller member states in consultations.[16] Secretary General Spaak did try to prevent de Gaulle from the realisation of these plans because the remaining NATO member states were offended by this proposition. However, Khrushchev's Berlin ultimatum finally allowed France to reach its goal: it was not obliged to consult NATO for any measures to be taken in Berlin because of the three Western powers' occupational rights.[17] This position was again expressed during a later meeting of NAC on 26 November 1958 where the three Western allies and the FRG did not participate in any discussion on the Berlin situation.[18] Through their abstention, no substantial discussion on Khrushchev's demands took place. With the release of Khrushchev's note on the following day, the Soviet leader forced the Western Alliance as a whole to consider the matter within a timeframe of six months and to come up with a consensual position.[19]

The next NAC session from 16 to 18 December 1958 was the first meeting to provide an official position regarding Khrushchev's provocation and eventually led to the Declaration on Berlin and an official response by the four Western allies. It was preceded by a debate on whether or not to put the Berlin situation on the meeting's agenda. West Germany's chancellor Konrad Adenauer opposed it because he did not want Khrushchev to be successful in dominating the organisation's agenda and preferred a secret quadripartite meeting. Spaak, who favoured a debate within NATO,

[16] 'Letter from President de Gaulle to President Eisenhower ,17 September 1959 in FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. VII, part II, p. 81f.
[17] Lochner and Nuenlist, *Containing the French Malaise*, pp 75-90, at p. 77f.
[18] Nünlist, *Die NATO und die Berlinkrise*, p. 251.
[19] According to ibid., p. 252, the ultimatum de-escalated the crisis and provided valuable time for NATO to develop a consensual position.

persuaded Blankenhorn to put this urgent matter on the meeting's agenda and to define a consensual position among the member states. Eventually, the Berlin matter was put on the agenda.

Again, the Western allies were reluctant to participate in consultations on the matter. Overall, NATO member states were divided on which attitude to adopt towards the Soviet Union: diplomacy or deterrence. The Eisenhower administration aimed at a policy of deterrence, not letting itself become intimidated by the Russian aggression and convinced to use escalation in order to test the Soviet Union's seriousness of its claims on Berlin. France generally supported a "hard-line"-position because General de Gaulle was not convinced of the seriousness of Khrushchev's threat, either.[20] The British were very reluctant regarding the possibility of a war: the Chief of the British Defense Staff, Lord Louis Mountbatten, would not risk a nuclear strike against Britain for the sake of Berlin.[21] On the West German side, Adenauer had made the protection of West Berlin and West Germany a condition for the FRG contributing militarily to NATO.[22] Therefore, the federal government upheld a firm stance on the Berlin matter, though excluding the option of especially nuclear military actions when verbal deterrence had failed (which undoubtedly would have taken place on its territory).[23] This approach was rejected by the US: 'Prevention of war by deterrence was not possible without the willingness to incur the full risk of using nuclear weapons',[24] as Bruno Thoss paraphrased the US position.

NATO achieved two important conclusions by the end of the NAC ministerial meeting: a demonstration of the organisation's credibility and a strong will to meet its aims vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.[25] The member states did manage to agree to a consensual line with the Declaration on

[20] Buffet, *De Gaulle, the bomb and Berlin*, p. 74.
[21] Thoss, *Information, persuasion, or consultation?*, p. 80.
[22] Ibid., p. 75.
[23] Sean M. Maloney argues: 'Mit dem Ausbruch eines allgemeinen Krieges war Berlin– ebenso wie ein erheblicher Teil des bundesdeutschen Territoriums – im wesentlichen abgeschrieben', Sean M. Maloney, 'Notfallplanung für Berlin. Vorläufer der Flexible Repsonse 1958-1963' in *Militärgeschichte*, 7 (1997), pp 3-15, at p. 3.
[24] Thoss, *Information, persuasion, or consultation?*, p. 81.
[25] Ibid.

Berlin. It is not surprising that NATO's Secretary General highlighted the well-functioning of the organisation, especially regarding the 'position excellente' achieved by NAC,[26] because in his function as Secretary General it was his responsibility to maintain good working-relations among the member states. The Alliance Council's first statement in the Declaration was a clear opposition to Khrushchev's claims: '[n]o State has the right to withdraw unilaterally from its international engagements' was a clear reference to the binding nature of international treaties. The possibility of the USSR handing over its rights over Berlin to the GDR government 'can in no way deprive the other parties of their rights or relieve the Soviet Union of its obligations'.[27] Further, NATO as a whole supported the communiqué issued by the triumvirate and the FRG on their status and rights in Berlin two days earlier – a communiqué that had been published without prior consultation with NATO whose members wanted to release a concerted communiqué.[28]

The Declaration further recalled the Alliance's members consent to 'the security and welfare of Berlin', meaning to reject any solution 'which jeopardized the right of the three Western Powers to remain in Berlin as long as their responsibilities require it' and its commitment to 'assure freedom of communication between that city and the free world'.[29] No doubt, 'free world' meant the Western, democracy-based countries, and presumably, all NATO members in particular. The Declaration finally legitimised the political system of their member countries by highlighting that 'the two-million inhabitants of West Berlin have just reaffirmed in a free vote their overwhelming approval and support for that position', demonstrating thereby that NATO operated highly consensual within its own structures and did not exercise coercion like the Soviet Union which acted without the democratic consent of the people. NAC recalled in the Declaration's end that 'the

[26] Paul-Henri Spaak, 'Les grands problèmes qui se posent au Conseil de l'OTAN. Intervention au Collège de Défense de l'OTAN,' 13 Jan. 1959 in Spaak, *La pensée européenne et atlantique de Paul-Henri Spaak, 1942-1972*, ed. by Paul-F. Smets (Brussels, 1980), vol. 2, pp 699-707, at p. 700.
[27] 'Declaration on Berlin' ,16 Oct. 1958 (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/ official_texts_17646.htm) (29 Mar. 2010).
[28] 'Memorandum of conversation: ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council', 14 December 1958 in FRUS 1958-1960, vol. VIII, pp 198-200: Nünlist, *NATO und die Berlinkrise*, p. 254 f.
[29] 'Declaration on Berlin', 16 October 1958.

Western Powers have repeatedly declared themselves ready to examine this problem, as well as those of European security and disarmament. They are still ready to discuss all these problems.' Through this last statement NAC clearly affirmed its and the three Western allies' firm position on Berlin and invited the Soviet Union to mutual consultation – both on the Berlin Crisis but also on matters going beyond the city's future alone, as for example the possibility of a reunified Germany. Spaak was highly content with the collective declaration: the tone was '*extrêmement ferme*' but at the same time '*nullement provocante*'.[30] If the three allies were to give up Berlin, the consequence would have been, according to him, '*la première étape de la désagrégation définitive de l'Occident*'.[31] For Spaak, no policy was acceptable that '*amènerait le départ d'Europe les troupes américaines*' – since they seem to have been the guarantor of a peaceful and prosperous Western Europe. One can presume that this conviction was one reason why he let the Americans dominate NATO and disregard the organisation's consultation habit. Although he doubted that the Soviet Union really wanted to provoke a third world war, he legitimised NATO's firm position because '*la diplomatie soviétique est un peu obligée de jouer avec le feu et, par conséquent, la diplomatie occidentale aussi*'[32] – but emphasized the option of a diplomatic solution of the crisis.

On 31 December 1958, the three Western allies replied in individual notes to the USSR's note after quadripartite consultations and draft discussions on 29 December 1958.[33] The notes received the consent of NATO.[34] The Federal Republic of Germany sent its note on 5 January 1959. The US government again emphasized the impossibility of a unilateral abstention from the Soviet Union's commitments to Berlin. The United States made its point clear that the treaties in force were 'binding upon all of the signatories so long as they have not been replaced by others following

[30] Paul-Henri Spaak, *Les grands problèmes*, p. 700.
[31] Ibid., p. 702.
[32] Spaak, *Les grands problèmes*, p. 706.
[33] 'Note from the United States to the Soviet Union on the status of Berlin and the Potsdam Agreements', 31 December 1958 in *Documents on Germany*, pp 573-6.
[34] 'Editorial Note' in FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. VIII, p. 224.

free negotiations'.[35] Nevertheless, the US government showed an awareness of the fact that it 'cannot prevent the Soviet Government from announcing the termination of its own authority in the quadripartite regime in the sector which it occupies in the city of Berlin'. Bearing this in mind, the US stated that it would not have accepted the unilateral termination of any treaty regarding the four power administration of Berlin because 'such action on the part of the Soviet Government would have no legal basis, since the agreements can only be terminated by mutual consent.'[36] Since the US regarded the FRG as the only legitimate state, it could not recognise the "other" German state. If the Soviet Union was interested in consultations, the US goal would be 'to discuss the question of Berlin in the wider framework of negotiations for a solution of the German problem as well as that of European security'.

This response note seeks cooperation with the USSR and does not contain any belligerent elements that the US was willing to go beyond verbal deterrence. As Nünlist argues NATO's double-strategy of a firm position on the matter and the offer of cooperation and diplomacy influenced both the USA's official response and that of the other three Western powers.[37] Presumably, Spaak's influence on calling the four NATO members to consultations within the Alliance produced a common position. Nevertheless, the fact that the four Western allies imposed their view on the matter in the premature sending of their communiqué without consulting NATO has to be taken into consideration. Disregarding the habit of consultation did not end with the release of the communiqué of 14 December 1958, the Declaration on Berlin or the four Western powers' notes. The four pursued their "individual" way on the matter of creating contingency plans for Berlin, known under the operational name of "LIVE OAK".

LIVE OAK: Quadripartite Contingency Planning for Berlin

[35] 'Note from the United States to the Soviet Union on the status of Berlin and the Potsdam Agreements', 31 December 1958, p. 574.
[36] Ibid., p. 575.
[37] Nünlist, *NATO und die Berlinkrise*, p. 256.

On 4 April 1959, the three Western Powers issued a Berlin contingency planning called the 'Tripartite Basic Paper'. The previous four months had been marked by tripartite consultations and the harassment of a US convoy by Soviet soldiers in February.[38] The mission of the contingency planning was the Allies' overall 'determination to maintain their free access' to Berlin and, in order to meet this aim, requested their respective military authorities to 'plan quiet preparatory and precautionary military measures of a kind which will not create public alarm but which will be detectable by Soviet intelligence'.[39] 'Quiet' and 'precautionary' presumably hints at NATO which, in the beginning, was to be kept out of the group's military plans.[40] A tripartite staff for Berlin contingency planning was to be established in Paris under the supervision of US-General Norstad, US Commander in Chief Europe (USCINCEUR) and NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SAUCEUR) in the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).[41] Norstad, however, did not exercise an actual command authority: all LIVE OAK plans and decisions were subject to the approval of the powers involved.

The actual timeframe within which LIVE OAK had to establish contingency plans for Berlin in case of a military conflict with the Soviet Union and the mandate of this sub-organisation was unclear. The initial estimation was that it would take about six to eight weeks to complete the plans.[42] Against Nortstad's intentions, it was decided that the three states that

[38] For a detailed analysis of the consultations leading to the Tripartite Basic Paper see Gregory W. Pedlow, 'Allied Crisis Management for Berlin: The LIVE OAK Organization, 1959-1963' in William W. Epley (ed.), *International Cold War military records and history: proceedings of the International Conference on Cold War military records and history held in Washington, D.C., 21-26 March 1994* (Washington, D.C. 1996), pp 87-116, pp 87-90.
[39] 'Berlin Contingency Planning', 4 Apr. 1959 in FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. viii, pp 584-9, 585.
[40] This view is shared by Bruno Thoss, *Information, persuasion, or consultation?*, p. 83. US Secretary of State Rusk proposed that NATO be informed about LIVE OAK after the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961 due to its possible escalating implications. But it is unknown when and to what extent NATO was informed. Ibid., p. 89. The Soviets surely have known about LIVE OAK, because four years later, in 1963, their spy Georges Pâques, a French NATO official who worked on Berlin planning, was arrested. Pedlow, 'Allied crisis management for Berlin', p. 110.
[41] The picture of him wearing 'three hats' which implies that he was holding responsibilities for three separate military commands is used to describe his powerful military position. see Gregory W. Pedlow, 'Three Hats for Berlin: General Lauris Norstad and the Second Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962' in Gearson and Shake (eds), *The Berlin Wall Crisis*, pp 175-98; Maloney, *Notfallplanung für Berlin*, p. 7.
[42] Ibid., p. 91. Eventually, LIVE OAK persisted until the reunification of Germany in 1990.

formed LIVE OAK would receive instructions from their national authorities. LIVE OAK was reduced to an executive instrument carrying out what was planned within tripartite consultations.

In a memorandum by Norstad dated 14 April 1959, part of a previously classified "top secret" letter from SHAPE to the Department of State and therein referred to as 'an informally-agreed charter for the Berlin contingency military effort',[43] Norstad outlined how to operate Berlin contingency planning. He recommended that a 'liaison will be established with the German Federal Republic.' It was not put into effect until more than two years later, in August 1961 and, consequently, LIVE OAK's political governing body, the Tripartite Ambassadorial Group in Washington, D.C., then became quadripartite. Further, he demanded that 'political guidance be available for the LIVE OAK staff' which 'can be made available to the staff as a whole, but the senior officers may be used as national representatives for this purpose'. The latter statement referred to the decisional authority of all three states and took into consideration the explicit character of cooperation among national governments. In particular, 'Anglo-American differences' and 'the diffidence of the French' who had different views concerning the establishment of the planning staff should have been accommodated.

Concerning France, the letter which accompanied Norstad's memorandum stated that France was asking for 'coordination' and not 'integration', presumably to emphasize their view on the operation as one of cooperating states and not as states contributing to a US military operation.[44] In the case Britain, the differences were caused by different assessments of the actual risk a Soviet threat posed. The UK was reluctant to engage in a war over Berlin, especially if the possible use of nuclear weapons was involved, because, as Lord Mountbatten expressed it, 'such a step would involve the

[43] 'Raymond L. Thurston to Foy D. Kohler', 20 Apr 1959 (http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com) (29 Mar. 2010).
[44] For France's struggle to become more influential in international politics see Cyril Buffet, *De Gaulle, the bomb and Berlin*.

destruction of our land, while for the United States [...] global war might only involve the destruction of a few cities'.[45]

With the administrative structures set, LIVE OAK started drafting plans how to react if the Soviets used force on allied troops accessing Berlin.[46] The first measures were drafted on 14 May 1959 and approved by the Tripartite Ambassadorial Group:

> Course A, a probe that would stop if confronted with Soviet or East German obstacles; Course B, a probe whose personnel would attempt to remove such obstacles but would stop if the Soviets or East Germans showed a willingness to use force; and Course C, a probe with attached engineering equipment to overcome obstacles without the use of weapons (except for self-defense).[47]

Although this approach can be judged as drawn-back rather than aggressive towards Soviet harassment, the British were pointing to one aspect underlying the whole issue: What happened if the Soviets responded militarily to any of these Allied probes? The British government saw 'no point in trying to use further military force on the ground in an attempt to restore access' and was able to include this point of view in a second draft study called 'More Elaborate Military Measures', which was released in mid-June 1959. Norstad, following the US' hard-line in arguing with the Soviets, supported a more deterrent position in making the Allies' firm point of view on Berlin clear to the Soviets in case of aggression against any of the Allies' troops: 'convince the USSR of the determination of the Three Powers to maintain their lawful rights even at the risk of war, and to exclude the possibility of a successful Soviet bluff.'[48]

The Berlin contingency planning was a constant work in progress until 1961. Other measures to guarantee the Western Powers' access to Berlin, besides ground access plans, included an airlift (Operation QBAL) to

[45] Cited after Thoss, *Information, persuasion, or consultation?*, p. 85.
[46] The final report was approved by Norstad on 5 Aug. 1959 see Pedlow, 'Allied crisis management', p. 94.
[47] Cited after ibid., p. 92. These measures were integrated in the final report as Operation FREE STYLE.
[48] Ibid., p. 93.

supply West Berlin's population as well as air and naval reinforcements.[49] Interestingly, only the use of conventional weapons was integrated, the use of nuclear weapons that could have been provided by the US was not taken into the catalogue of counter-measures.[50] Although the LIVE OAK planning staff did establish a reactive contingency plan in case of Soviet aggression, they did not have to carry it out: at the end of May 1959, Khrushchev's Berlin ultimatum expired without the realisation of his threat to hand over the Soviet Union's responsibilities to the GDR. Khrushchev confirmed to Eisenhower 'that there was no longer any "time limit within which he would sign a Soviet-East German peace treaty"'.[51] Although there was a 'low level of tension' in the Berlin question,[52] Norstad did not consent to the dissolution of the LIVE OAK planning staff once their mission had been accomplished. He opposed the disbanding because he wanted 'to keep it in existence so as not to lose the pool of specialized knowledge that had been built up'.[53] His wish seems to have been approved: since 'concern about possible Soviet moves to reduce Allied access rights never went away completely',[54] a reduced LIVE OAK staff kept on planning a division-sized tripartite operation during 1960.[55] When, on 4 June 1961, Khrushchev renewed his demand for peace agreements to settle the German question and to turn Berlin into a 'Free City' within a six month timeframe,[56] the Berlin Crisis reawakened and proved Norstad right to have kept LIVE OAK ready at a standing order. He re-enlarged the organisation's staff and obtained the consent of the three governments to direct tripartite operations themself.

Gregory Pedlow argued that LIVE OAK, firstly, was 'a significant crisis management instrument' and, secondly, 'a very successful

[49] Pedlow, 'Three hats for Berlin', p. 181; Pedlow, 'Allied crisis management', pp 97-100.
[50] Maloney, *Notfallplanung für Berlin*, p. 5.
[51] Pedlow, 'Three hats for Berlin', p. 179.
[52] Ibid., p. 179; Pedlow, 'Allied crisis management', p. 100.
[53] 'Three hats for Berlin', p. 179.
[54] Ibid., p. 100.
[55] Pedlow, 'Allied crisis management', p. 179.
[56] 'Aide-Mémoire from the Soviet Union to the United States on the German Question, handed by Chairmen Khrushchev to President Kennedy at Vienna', 4 June 1961 in *Documents on Germany*, pp 729-32.

instrument of multinationality'.[57] The latter assessment certainly seems correct because all three, later all four, states' considerations were taken into account and the Ambassadorial Group worked together on an apparently equal level and through consultations. But where did NATO come into the picture? The four Western Powers deliberately left NATO out of its Berlin contingency planning.[58] France, the UK, and the US established reactive measures to confront possible Soviet military strikes during this Berlin Crisis on the basis of their occupying rights in Berlin. The dominant United States had to maintain its credibility as a leading world power that was, as a last resort, willing and able to fight for its position. The Eisenhower administration seems to have had an important ally in General Norstad who was willing to pursue the US hard-line position within the multinational LIVE OAK. It can be judged as the most concrete military response instrument established during this Berlin Crisis. However, NATO was left out of it. This raises again the question of its position in the case of a military intervention due to article 5 of the NATO treaty and the Alliance's declared support to assure the Three Western Powers' rights in their Berlin sectors.

Although Khrushchev did not manage to change the Four Power status on Berlin, he surely did thoroughly trouble the functioning of NATO. The Berlin Crisis was a test for the Alliance's credibility, firmness and its ability to speak unanimously. The crisis depicts how the international organisation NATO malfunctions when member states are not equals at the negotiating table and, as Stikker put it, 'too many members of NATO attached greater value to certain political principles than to the overriding idea of the Alliance'.[59] This captures very well the essence of the Western crisis management. The US under the Eisenhower administration, principally supported by its 'satellites' France, Great Britain, and West Germany,[60] was acting with an attitude characterized as brinkmanship: 'the ability to get to

[57] Pedlow, 'Allied Crisis Management', p. 110.
[58] Nünlist, *NATO und die Berlinkrise*, p. 258.
[59] Christian Nuenlist, 'Into the 1960s : NATO's role in east-west relations, 1958-63', in Andreas Wenger, Christian Nuenlist and Anna Locher (eds), *Transforming NATO in the Cold War* (New York, 2007), p. 79.
[60] This term is used by Shake and Gearson, Editors' Introduction, p. xiv.

the verge without getting into the war,' as John Foster Dulles explained it.[61] Eisenhower chose escalation: he did test the firmness of Khrushchev's demands, installed measures to probe the Soviet Union's military decisiveness, and included the risk of an 'atomic holocaust'.[62] Not without reason do some scholar's judge the Berlin Crisis 1958-1961 as 'prelude to World War III'.[63] Bluffing, though, is part of this game theory as well: 'You have to take chances for peace, just as you must take chances in war', as Dulles expressed it. An interesting question, though probably very difficult to measure, is how much bluffing was involved in Khrushchev's demands and Eisenhower's reactions. How 'hot' was the Cold War during the Berlin Crisis?

Through the clandestine organisation LIVE OAK and Eisenhower's meeting with Khrushchev at Camp David in September 1959, leaving out NATO and deliberately disregarding the organisation's habit of consultation became especially obvious. Though it did not weaken the Alliance's firm stance on the Berlin matter, the US heavily dominated NATO's position on which approach to adopt regarding Khrushchev – initially the position of deterrence, later the position of coexistence. Spaak tried to maintain good working relations among the member states and, fearing the Americans leaving Europe alone against the threat posed by the USSR, to arrange the member states behind Eisenhower's superpower politics. Presumably, the presence of American troops in Europe convinced the continental European NATO member states to consent to Eisenhower's policy of deterrence. Britain's reluctance to wage a costly war over Germany supported their cause to choose diplomacy over military confrontation. In the Declaration on Berlin, they did manage to introduce the possibility of diplomacy with Khrushchev. The double strategy of military deterrence and diplomacy then shifted under the Kennedy administration towards a preference for bilateral

[61] 'Uproar over a brink' in *LIFE Magazine*, 23 Jan. 1956 (http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,861876,00.html) (29 Mar. 2010).
[62] The term was used by John F. Kennedy, 'Report to the Nation on the Berlin Crisis', 25 July 1961 in John F. Kennedy, *To Turn the Tide*, by John W. Gardner (ed.) (London, 1962), pp 188-98, at p. 193.
[63] Dean and David Heller, *The Berlin crisis : prelude to World War III?* (Derby, CT, 1961); Shake and Gearson, Editors' Introduction, p. x.

negotiations and conflict management with the Soviet Union, thereby severely damaging cooperation and confidence within NATO. Additionally, de Gaulle's rising demands for a more important French position caused more intra-alliance frictions. While Eisenhower could still integrate France in quadripartite contingency planning for Berlin, calls for more influence in international relations – and thereby challenging the US leadership – rose from the French during Kennedy's presidency.[64] At the end of the Berlin Crisis, the consensual cooperation seeking policy of NATO as well as the cooperation among the Western four had changed completely, if not to say was damaged because of the inequality of member states, non-consultation, and, in the case of France, even non-cooperation. Spaak's vision of an "Atlantic Community", that, starting from NATO, cooperated not only militarily but politically and economically, too, was certainly out of reach due to the 'cycles of superpower détente' at the end of the Second Berlin Crisis.[65] In his farewell address, Spaak pointed out that upon '*Kennedy et de Gaulle, c'est d'eux que dépend le succès ou le déclin de l'Alliance atlantique*' and had to deal with three major issues: '*des armes atomiques, [...] la consultation politique et [...] et la solidarité économique*'.[66] He paraphrased the persisting problem about the balance of power and equality within the Alliance as following: '*Quatre ou cinq agissant pour le compte de tous les autres? Peut-être. Mais les Gouvernements sont-ils prêts à une telle délégation d'autorité? On en discutera encore longtemps.*'[67] Even Spaak, at the end of his time as NATO Secretary General, seemed to have doubted the possibility of achieving an Alliance of equals – the principle he persistently had fought for during his mandate and which declined in the course of events during the second Berlin Crisis.

[64] Eventually, France withdrew from NATO in 1966.
[65] Nuenlist, *Into the 1960s*, p. 82.
[66] Paul-Henri Spaak, 'Au revoir OTAN', Feb. 1961 in Spaak, *La pensée européenne et atlantique*, vol. 2, pp 791-5, here p. 794f.
[67] Ibid., p. 795.

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

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History Studies is the journal of the University of Limerick History Society and is jointly produced with the Department of History, University of Limerick. The journal is refereed by a panel of distinguished historians and is an established periodical in the field of historical scholarship.

Papers can focus on any aspect of history and should be no more than 5,000 words in length. Papers can be posted as an email attachment or in hard copy to the addresses below.

For details in relation to style sheet or back issues of *History Studies* please contact the editors at addresses listed below.

Closing date for submission
30 June 2012

Editor,
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